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States seek security, and scholars of international 
relations routinely assume that they do so in a rational 
manner. However, in many instances this assumption of 
rationality may be neither warranted nor illuminating. 
Consider a state that habitually fails to achieve its 
security goals: is it self-evident that such a state is 
acting rationally? What if the state's behavior is 
demonstrably counterproductive when measured against its 
security objectives? Moreover, if the leaders of all 
states are rational actors then does the concept of 
rationality tell us anything worth knowing? 
This study argues that the idea of rationality as 
employed by some scholars is of limited utility when 
applied to the national security policies of Third World 
states at odds with the dominant powers in the 
international order. Using Colonel Qaddafi's Libya as a 
case study, this thesis adopts a refined operational 
definition of rationality centered upon the habitual 
selection of efficacious behavior rather than the mere 
employment of cost-benefit analysis. By periodizing and 
analyzing Libyan national security policy between 1969 
and 1994, it demonstrates that Tripoli's pursuit of 
security was frequently counterproductive: the very 
policies intended to make the state secure instead 
exacerbated the Libyan national security predicament. 
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Introduction 
One of the dilemmas that leader-driven 
explanations of foreign policy behavior pose is 
that the movers and shakers of history often 
pursue decidedly irrational policies ... How do we square this kind of behavior with the 
logic of political realism? ' 
The determinants of a state's power are several; 
they include geographic and demographic magnitude, 
economic might, and military prowess. Ultimately, 
according to Hans Morgenthau (the father of political 
realist theory), none is more important or decisive than 
the quality of a state's leadership in its national 
security affairs. 2 Certainly none is more difficult for 
the historian or student of politics to assess. 
The criteria for distinguishing 'good' leaders from 
those who are 'poor' are unhappily vague and subjective. 
Few would contest the idea that rationality (or its 
absence) should be an important criterion for making such 
a distinction, yet devising a theory of rationality which 
is applicable both to the study of politics in the 
abstract as well as to real world experience has proven 
far more difficult than anticipated. At one time it 
appeared that the advent of rational actor models derived 
from game theory might provide precise analytical tools 
1 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World 
i{tics: Trends and transformation, third edition, (London: 




with which to redress this inadequacy. Sadly, it did 
not, for when applied to real world scenarios rather than 
to games, either the criteria for determining rationality 
became obtuse or the definition of rationality was 
diluted to the point of banality. Indeed, the reluctance 
of scholars to identify irrational actors (presumably 
owing to fear of their research being dismissed as 
subjective) has led to the prevalent assumption that all 
actors in the international system are rational--a 
surrealism of the type Lewis Carroll captured in his 
famous quip that 'everybody has won, and all must have 
prizes. " 
Clearly there is something amiss here. While 
rationality may appear to be relative when viewed from an 
ivory tower, such a nuanced view is of little aid to 
those who live closer to earth and who must daily grapple 
with the nuts and bolts of threats, deterrence, and 
force. For those charged with actually making and 
implementing security policy, the disjuncture between 
theory and reality consigns the former to ever greater 
irrelevancy. As one scholar recently noted: 
.. strategic studies do little if anything to prepare national policymakers for 
confrontations with enemy states whose leaders 
do not conform to the pertinent rules of 
rational decision-making. 4 
3 Emphasis original. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland, 
ed. Donald Gray, (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), 2d ed., 
23. 
4 Louis Rene Beres, "On the need for an Avant-Garde in 
strategic studies, " Strategic Review, vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 
1997), 73. 
6 
This thesis aims to redress this deficiency by exploring 
the origins, expressions, and consequences of irrational 
leadership in the national security affairs of a Third 
World state. It would be difficult to imagine a better 
candidate for such a study than the regime of Colonel 
Muammar El Qaddafi, the colorful and much-maligned leader 
of Libya since 1969. Few leaders have so frequently been 
awarded the appellation 'irrational' by journalists and 
statesmen; however, this branding has not significantly 
increased our understanding of the man or of the Libyan 
polity since none of Qaddafi's detractors (or admirers) 
have systematically explored what it means to be rational 
or irrational. 
This study takes as its foundation the proposition 
that the concept of irrationality can and should have 
other than a pejorative usage. Properly defined, it 
should be a reasonably effective tool (by the standards 
of social science) for parsing the history of nations 
and, more particularly, for assessing the contributions 
of individual-and collective actors. The thesis itself 
can be succinctly stated as follows: Colonel Qaddafi's 
leadership in Libyan national security affairs from 1969 
to 1995 was consistently self-defeating when measured 
against his own objectives. This pattern of 
counterproductive behavior constitutes irrationality, and 
In Qaddafi's case originated in both systemic and 
personal forces, namely, a lack of political 
accountability on the one hand, and on the other an 
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inability to reconcile Qaddafi's world view with 
geostrategic reality. 
Before turning to the historical record to establish 
the validity of this argument, we must consider a number 
of critical questions: What is rationality? Is Qaddafi 
an irrational actor? If so, what makes him tick? 
Finally, why were his policies counterproductive? In 
addition to addressing these questions, this chapter 
discusses a few pertinent methodological issues (e. g., 
availability of source material) and provides a brief 
synopsis of the succeeding chapters. 
I. What is rationality? 
Though one might assume that the task of defining 
rationality is rightfully the province of psychologists, 
the definition of rationality which has become dominant 
in the literature of international relations comes 
instead from mathematics via its sub-discipline, game 
theory. Rationality, as defined by game theorists, means 
that in any given situation in which a player (i. e., an 
actor) faces one or more options with different utility 
pay-offs, he will always act in such a way so as to 
maximize his rewards. 5 Rationality, in other words, 
equates to the application of cost-benefit analysis. 
Unfortunately, in assessing real world decisions it may 
5 Roger Myerson, Game theory: Analysis of conflict, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 2-3; Cf. Frank 
Zagare, Game theory: Concepts and applications (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 1984), 7. 
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be impossible for external observers to determine whether 
cost-benefit analysis took place, much less what the 
content of that analysis was. However, it is a 
comparatively facile matter to tailor a cost-benefit 
analysis to fit any decision after the fact. For 
example, we may not truly know with any specificity what 
an automobile driver who died while trying to beat a 
train through a railroad crossing was thinking at the 
time, but with little effort we can devise a cost-benefit 
analysis that explains his decision. Virtually all 
decisions, no matter how disastrous their consequences, 
can thus be rendered rational. 
Unsurprisingly, game theorists routinely assume all 
players--and their decisions--to be rational. 6 Moreover, 
in complex scenarios involving multiple players, they 
further assume that each player has perfect knowledge of 
every other player's pay-off utility matrices (thereby 
permitting each to make informed estimations of the 
others' likely actions). The rationale for these 
assumptions is simply theoretical convenience; theory, by 
its very nature, never corresponds precisely to the real 
world. Thus, the assumption that all actors are rational 
is not intended to reflect reality but to approximate it; 
irrational actors may exist, but they are held to be the 
exception and unworthy of study. 
6 Martin Shubik, Game theory in the social sciences: 
ýýnrATts and solutions, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1983), 16). 
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These assumptions may be justified when confined to 
the controlled atmosphere of academic inquiry. They are, 
however, less tenable when applied to a world where human 
and inter-state relations are marred by poor 
communications, imperfect information, and diverse value 
systems. In such a world, it is not always possible to 
understand what the long-term consequences of a decision 
will be, much less how another actor perceives the costs 
and benefits inherent in any given choice. Thus, there 
are no guarantees that real world actors will exercise 
their volition in accordance with the dictates of theory. 
Experts in the study of conflict are well aware of 
the limitations of theory. Schelling, in his seminal 
study The strategy of conflict, observes that: 'the 
assumption of rational behavior is a productive one in 
the generation of systematic theory. If behavior were 
actually cool-headed, valid and relevant theory would 
probably be easier to create than it actually is. '7 In 
other words, as Schelling admits, the widespread 
assumption of-rationality results in theory which is 'not 
fully accurate. " 
Nevertheless, the assumptions of game theory have 
been indiscriminately transferred to the study of the 
game of nations. In most instances, states and their 
leaders are presumed to be rational. To cite just one 
Thomas Schelling, The strategy of conflict, first 
published 1960, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1980), 16. 
a ibid. 
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example, Kegley and Wittkopf, in answer to the question 
posed at the beginning of this chapter, propose erasing 
the notion of irrationality by reducing rationality 
itself to acting according to one's preferences: 
Why did Libya's leader, the mercurial Muammar 
Qaddafi, repeatedly challenge the United 
States, almost goading President Ronald Reagan 
into a military strike against the North 
African desert country in 1986? Because, we 
can postulate, Qaddafi's actions were 
consistent with his preferences, regardless of 
how 'irrational' it was for a fourth-rate 
military power to take on the world's 
preeminent superpower. 9 
This is no solution but an unfortunate tautology. If all 
choices represent preferences, and if selecting a 
preference is the quintessence of rationality, then an 
irrational choice becomes a logical impossibility! 
Moreover, if all decisions are rational, then rationality 
itself tells us nothing worthwhile; we might as well say 
that all decisions are orange. 
Preference is also a poor standard upon which to 
base our analysis because preferences are fleeting and 
inconsistent. Although an actor should be allowed a 
degree of tactical flexibility in responding to changing 
circumstances, such reasonable adaptations must be 
differentiated from the incessant shuffling of priorities 
which disguises an inability to devise and execute a 
coherent plan to achieve strategic objectives. 
Otherwise, even the most self-destructive behavior can be 
excused by ascribing it to some value (e. g., honor or 
ibid., 59-60. 
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revenge) which an individual allows to temporarily 
supersede his normal priorities. All leaders rationalize 
their decisions; this does not make all their decisions 
rational. 
In a slight variation of the Kegley-Wittkopf theme, 
scholars commonly argue that seemingly irrational leaders 
are simply motivated by a different value structure or 
strategic culture. For example, Rubin argues: 
Third World dictators often take extreme 
positions or seemingly suicidal actions that 
appear irrational to Americans but are the 
reflections of the dictatorship's ideology and 
requirements for staying in power ... (these 
regimes) operate on different criteria from 
those of democracies, not only because their 
nations' histories and regional situations are 
different but also because their internal 
politics are different. '° 
Garfinkle, to cite yet another example, applies this 
formulation to Saddam Hussein's behavior in the Gulf 
crisis: 
.. because rationality is context--and 
culture--dependent, what is and is not rational 
is not always obvious from the outside. Saddam 
acted rationally in the situation in which he 
found himself because there are times in Middle 
Eastern political cultures when it is better 
(e. g., literally safer) to be defeated (so long 
as one is not totally destroyed) than to be 
dishonored. " 
io Barry Rubin, Modern dictators: Third World coup makers, 
strongmen, and populist tyrants, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1987), 
328. 
il Adam Garfinkle, "An observation on Arab culture and 
deterrence: Metaphors and misgivings, " in Regional security 
regimes: Israel and its neighbors, ed. Efraim Inbar, (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995), 205. Parentheses 
original. 
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This line of reasoning merely substitutes one pay-off 
matrix for another once it becomes clear that the actor's 
choices were self-defeating and therefore inexplicable 
under the first matrix. The end result is the same: all 
choices are rational, or at least can be made to seem 
rational if only viewed in the most forgiving light. 
There is no denying that different cultures have 
different value structures, though the significance of 
these differences is easily overstated (e. g., how many 
cultures believe that their enemies do not value life the 
same way they do? ). It may also be true that some actors 
have conflicting values, and hence conflicting pay-off 
matrices. But the inability to reconcile the mandates of 
a 'disorderly and inconsistent value system' is, as 
Schelling himself concedes, not proof of rationality but 
evidence of its opposite. 12 
The reduction of rationality to the lowest common 
denominator--choice--was perhaps to be expected in an era 
in which all values are held to be relative. However, 
much of the descriptive and analytical power of the 
concept is lost in the process. If all statesmen are 
rational, then we must search for some other analytical 
tool by which to winnow the wheat from the chaff. 
Clearly, we must reconceptualize rationality as 
something other than an expression of preference or a 
question of cost-benefit analysis if the term is to tell 
us something useful about history, for history judges men 
12 Schelling, 16-17. 
13 
not only by their motives but by their accomplishments. 
Should strategic studies not do the same? Surely one of 
the attributes of 'good' statesmanship is that of 
purpose--of not merely reacting to the vagaries of chance 
and circumstance but of possessing an agenda and 
accomplishing its points. Rationality, it follows, 
should be determined by examining a leader's decisions 
and examining their actual consequences, not just their 
intended ones. Even this is not the most stringent 
accounting which one could make; as Lisa Anderson, the 
foremost Western authority on Libya, points out: 'any 
fair assessment of the Jamahiriyya would require not only 
holding the regime to its own ambitious standards but 
also comparing it with plausible alternatives. t13 
However, given the difficulties inherent in trying to 
calculate historical opportunity costs, this is an 
impractical standard for our purposes. 
Naturally, isolated incidents of success or failure 
are inconclusive: fortune may at times favor the 
undeserving and frown upon the worthy. Moreover, a 
leader may be excused the occasional lapse of judgement. 
We must therefore take a wide sample in order to ensure 
significance. Should the historical record reveal a 
consistent pattern of counterproductive behavior, that 
pattern constitutes irrationality. 
13 Lisa Anderson, 'Qadhafi's legacy: An evaluation of a 
political experiment, ' in Vandewalle, 223. 
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Seen in this light, rationality is demonstrated by 
the adoption of efficacious behavior rather than by the 
mere application of cost-benefit analysis. Let us 
therefore operationally define rationality as the 
practice of consistently efficacious behavior, or in 
other words, behavior that demonstrably advances an actor 
towards the achievement of his goals. It follows that 
irrationality is the habitual selection of choices that 
prove counterproductive to the fulfillment of one's 
aims. U 
Why are some actors irrational and others not? We 
should not assume that rationality is the norm and 
irrationality an aberration, common though this prejudice 
may be. In point of fact, note how Henry Kissinger 
describes Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union: 
'(Stalin assumed) that Hitler engaged in rational 
calculations; however, Hitler did not consider himself 
bound by a normal calculation of risks. '15 However, it 
is not self-evident that either man or the state is 
exclusively, or even usually, rational. Rational and 
irrational impulses co-exist in each. (Moreover, as 
Schelling points out, there are situations in which 
14 NB--Hence, as used throughout this thesis, irrationality 
is a descriptive political term rather than a diagnostic 
psychiatric term. 
is Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1994), 364. Parentheses added. 
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irrationality--or even a reputation of irrationality--may 
convey a distinct advantage to an actor. 16) 
Perhaps we may detect a clue to the origins of 
irrationality by noting that efficacious social behavior 
is learned behavior. As children, humans are generally 
rewarded by their parents for those behaviors needed to 
survive in a complex society, and punished for those that 
are not. However, behaviors which are temporarily 
effective may become inappropriate and even 
counterproductive as circumstances change. For example, 
a small child who discovers that temper tantrums are an 
effective means of getting her way may continue to repeat 
that behavior long after it ceases to produce the desired 
outcome so long as she is not held accountable (i. e., her 
parents tolerate the tantrums). 
Such self-defeating behaviors are more common than 
one might suspect; indeed, they appear to be part and 
parcel of the human condition. Consider the recluse who, 
though he desires friends, fears rejection and therefore 
adopts behaviors which amplify his sense of loneliness 
and estrangement. Or the woman who, depressed at the 
thought of being obese, indulges her sweet tooth to raise 
her spirits. Or the man who, anxious to avoid the stress 
of undertaking a project, procrastinates until his stress 
level becomes extreme. Or the totalitarian leader whose 
professed aim is to create a powerful state, but who-- 
because he is indifferent to the suffering of his people 
16 Schelling, 17. 
16 
and unfettered by the legal and political constraints 
shouldered by democratic leaders--persists in policies 
which bring ruin upon his nation (and even his own 
geopolitical aspirations) long after those consequences 
are apparent. 
Such individuals are irrational because they can 
afford to be; they are cocooned in high office, shielded 
from domestic political threats, and all too frequently 
indifferent to the human misery generated by their 
behavior. Irrational behavior is therefore not the 
result of some immutable defect of personality or 
intellect, but is rather an indulgence: it is the luxury 
of those who are unaccountable. So long as individuals 
are not held responsible (either by themselves or by some 
external agent) for the consequences of their actions, 
there is little impetus for them to alter their 
counterproductive behaviors. Trapped by inertia, they 
will not escape the cycle of self-defeating behavior 
unless they are impelled by circumstance or ambition. 
The implications of this theory of rationality are 
intriguing. First, understanding irrationality as an 
indulgence, rather than as a defect, rids the concept of 
its most pejorative connotations. Irrationality thus 
conceived is not particular to any nation, culture, race 
or gender--a point worth stressing since some might 
otherwise object to its application to Libya on the 
grounds that it might abet anti-Arab or anti-Muslim 
stereotypes. There is no denying that the Libyan 
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leader's antagonists have often questioned his 
rationality with an eye towards discrediting him. Anwar 
Sadat, for example, often referred to Qaddafi as a 'crazy 
boy' and once memorably described the Colonel as 
possessing 'a split personality--both evil. ' Ronald 
Reagan not only questioned Qaddafi's sanity (calling him 
a 'mad clown') but dubbed him a 'flaky barbarian, ' a 
remarkably un-illuminating appraisal. Reinforcing such 
aspersions is not the aim of this thesis, yet their 
existence should not prevent us from making measured 
judgements of Qaddafi's record as a statesman and 
strategist. 
A second implication of our theory of rationality is 
that an irrational actor (per our definition) is not 
incapable of rational behavior (and hence undeterrable). 
Quite the opposite is true--deterrents impose 
accountability upon an actor and thus reduce the scope 
for irrational behavior. Since rationality is often 
discussed with reference to deterrence, this is an 
important apercu. 
Granted, the linkage between irrationality and 
accountability might lead one to ask whether the 
expression of irrationality is really irrational at all. 
By the standards of cost-benefit analysis it might not 
be. But again, the effect of equating rationality with 
cost-benefit analysis in which values fluctuate and all 
costs are bearable is to deprive the word of meaning. 
Above all, rationality denotes the pursuit of long-term 
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interests, an ability to think and act on a level above 
the mandates of visceral emotion in order to accomplish a 
pre-determined task. 
Having discussed rationality in general terms, let 
us now apply our definition to a specific case. 
II. Is Oaddafi an irrational actor? 
With regards to Libyan national security affairs, 
the answer to the above question is a resounding yes. 
This is true, not--as is often argued--because the Libyan 
leader is quixotic or anti-Western, or because he suffers 
from some psychological malady, but because his behavior 
is demonstrably self-defeating when measured against his 
core security objectives. Let us therefore pause to 
consider just what the North African leader set out to 
accomplish. 
Discerning a state's national security objectives 
requires some critical thought. If one attempts to cull 
a state's objectives solely from its declaratory policy, 
then one must contend with questions of propaganda, 
intentional obfuscation, and deliberate mistruths. In 
addition, one must bear in mind that at times a state 
might be unsure of what its interests are and how it 
should pursue them, with the result that its deeds may 
contradict its declared policy. 17 Consequently, national 
17 'All nations like to impute to other states a degree of 
rational and hierarchical decision-making and planning which they 
do not have themselves and which, if the truth were known, other 
states probably do not have either. ' Earl Fry, Stan Taylor and 
Robert Wood, America the vincible: U. S. foreign policy for the 
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security objectives must be pieced together both by 
reference to a state's declaratory policy and by 
inference from its diplomatic and military actions. Only 
thus can we reach a reasonably accurate understanding of 
what a government hoped to achieve. 
The origins of Qaddafi's national security agenda 
will be explained later in this chapter, but his aims can 
be briefly summarized here. These aims fluctuated 
somewhat over time but rarely strayed from well 
established parameters. 
Qaddafl's supreme ambition was to transform Libya 
into a Great Power. His Grand Strategy for realizing 
this aim entailed creating a 'unified' (i. e., Libyan- 
controlled) polity capable of eradicating Western 
(especially American) influence in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and the Mediterranean. Any diminution of 
Western, Israeli, or Arab 'lackey' power was considered a 
victory in this zero-sum struggle. Over time, and in the 
face of repeated setbacks, Qaddafi devoted increased 
attention to the slightly less ambitious objective of 
establishing regional hegemony. 
In accordance with this Grand Strategy, the eleven 
most important objectives of Libyan national security 
were: 
f To increase the strength of the Libyan armed 
forces by expanding their manpower and by 
purchasing state of the art weaponry. 
twenty-first century, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1994), 87. 
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f To expand the state's resources and 
geographic boundaries by merging with 
neighboring states. 
f To intimidate and, if need be, to coerce 
weaker states through conventional military 
force. 
f To subvert hostile or uncooperative 
governments. 
f To support guerrilla and terrorist groups 
with a shared anti-Western agenda. 
f To project power throughout North Africa and 
the Mediterranean. 
f To challenge, diminish, and ultimately end 
the U. S. 
Sixth Fleet's dominance of the Mediterranean. 
f To form regional alliances propitious to the 
accomplishment of Qaddafi's Grand Strategy. 
f To produce or otherwise acquire weapons of 
mass destruction. 
f To cow political opposition by assassinating 
Libyan dissidents at home and abroad. 
f To participate in the destruction of Israel. 
Even the most cursory familiarity with contemporary 
Libyan history leads to the conclusion that Qaddafi 
failed to achieve his own national security objectives, 
primarily because his behavior was non-conducive to those 
ends. Instead of forging an anti-American or anti- 
Israeli coalition, he alienated and antagonized his 
neighbors, the very states whose cooperation was 
essential to the success of his Grand Strategy, and in so 
doing allowed the United States to establish a stronger 
regional presence. Time after time, Qaddafi pushed the 
policy envelope to extremes where it was bereft of clear 
(and obtainable) objectives, and stripped of even the 
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erstwhile justification of his Third Universal Theory. 
All that remained was shrill extremism, an extremism 
which propelled Libya into disputes from the South 
Pacific to the Caribbean, disputes which dissipated the 
country's strength and earned it new enemies. By 1994 
Libya was isolated on the global stage and was treated as 
a pariah even within the Arab world. UN sanctions 
eviscerated the operational readiness of its armed 
forces. Moreover, Libya's unrepentant sponsorship of 
terrorism (especially its intransigence over the 
Lockerbie affair) and its development of chemical weapons 
threatened to entangle the state in further military 
confrontations with the West. The ultimate legacy of 
Qaddafi's national security policies was chronic 
insecurity. 
Even scholars who believe Qaddafi to be rational 
agree that his foreign and defence policies were ruinous. 
Indeed, the failure of these policies became evident 
within the first decade of Qaddafi's rule. As one writer 
noted at the time, Qaddafi's policies were pursued with 
much fanfare but 'yielded few worthwhile long-term 
dividends. 1113 Fifteen years later they had done little 
better: the regimes's accomplishments 'seemed few and 
largely unintended. 119 Libyan foreign policy in 
particular was distinguished by a 'singular lack of 
18 John Wright, Libya: A modern history, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1981), 172-73. 
19 Anderson, 223. 
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success. 120 The literature abounds with concurring 
opinions. How then can one argue that policies which 
produced such abysmal results were nevertheless rational? 
III. Irrationality and its discontents 
Whereas Western journalists and politicians may at 
times be wont to saddle the Libyan regime with the 
moniker "irrational, " academics who have specialized in 
the study of contemporary Libya tend instead to 
characterize the Qaddafi regime, and Qaddafi himself, as 
rational. Neither characterization, unfortunately, is 
entirely satisfactory. In the first instance, 
irrationality is commonly employed in a pejorative, as 
opposed to an analytical, sense. That academics would 
attempt to distance themselves from such pejorative 
connotations (and from the policies associated with such 
pejorative usage) is entirely understandable. Indeed, it 
is perhaps no acident that during the mid to late 1980s, 
when Libya found itself in almost continuous conflict 
with the world's most powerful state (whose leaders were 
persuaded of, and themselves proclaimed, Tripoli's 
irrationality), scholars of contemporary Libya were most 
vocal in professing the rationality of the Libyan regime. 
In other words, typifying Qaddafi's government as 
rational was, in many cases, an apparent reaction to the 
sometimes flippant manner in which Libya was dismissed as 
irrational. 
20 St. John, 11-12. 
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However, the scholarship that professed Qaddafi's 
rationality was not entirely suasive either. In large 
part, this was because the theoretical construct used to 
explore rationality in the Libyan context was somewhat 
flawed. In some instances, demonstrating the rationality 
of Libya's ends meant regurgitating the regime's paranoid 
interpretation of the international security environment. 
In other cases, attempting to demonstrate the rationality 
of Libya's means led to reducing rationality itself to a 
question of cost-benefit analysis and ultimately, 
preference: whatever the regime chose to do, it had 
presumably settled on because it had weighed its options 
and chose the best, hence its actions were rational. In 
other words, the scholarship was built in part upon 
acceptance of inherent unknowables: because it was 
impossible to replicate with absolute precision the 
options, objectives, and pay-off matrices as perceived by 
Libyan decision-makers, there was no way to effectively 
measure whether Libya had in fact settled upon the 
optimal means for advancing its self-interest. 
There is a problem, then, with how the concept of 
rationality has been applied to Libya. Nevertheless, 
this thesis is not meant to be an assault upon rational 
actor theory itself. Critiquing the utility of rational 
actor theory as applied to international relations would 
involve far more than what this work aspires to achieve. 
Rather, the intent is to, firstly, dispute the way in 
which that conceptual paradigm has been invoked 
24 
(particularly, as we shall see, by Mary-Jane Deeb) with 
regards to Libya and, secondly, to forward an alternative 
conceptualization of rational state behavior that, within 
the limited context of Libyan security policy, provides a 
more useful instrument of analysis. 
There are two grounds upon which one might object to 
the proposition that Qaddafi is an irrational actor. 
First, one could categorically reject the idea of 
irrationality itself by appealing to the cost-benefit 
notions of rationality introduced in the foregoing pages. 
Second, one could specifically object that even if one 
admits the existence of irrational actors, Qaddafi should 
not be numbered among their ranks. Both lines of thought 
have been employed in previous studies of contemporary 
Libya. 
As we have seen, the favored approach of scholars 
who are reluctant to see the idea of irrationality gain 
currency in political discourse is to simply eliminate 
the very possibility of irrationality by invoking cost- 
benefit analysis and dubbing all actions rational. 
Little more needs to be said about the merits of this 
argument. 
A much more interesting objection is that states are 
not simple unitary actors but complex political organisms 
with labyrinthine bureaucracies and convoluted decision 
making processes. Thus, one could argue that ascribing 
responsibility for policy to a single individual distorts 
that reality, and at worst may be tantamount to 
25 
intellectual laziness. Perhaps because the Western media 
has taken such obvious delight in reporting Qaddafi's 
alleged eccentricities, this particular objection has 
become something of a mantra for scholars of Libyan 
affairs. " 
Theirs is a reasonable criticism. Qaddafi was by no 
means the only factor behind Libyan national security 
policy. He was, however, by far the most important 
factor, and there are compelling reasons for awarding 
Qaddafi primacy of place in our study. Leadership- 
centric models which might not be appropriate for 
industrialized states are nevertheless effective 
explanations of Third World state behavior because 
developing societies tend to have fewer political and 
institutional checks on their political elites. 22 These 
underdeveloped legal, social, and bureaucratic safeguards 
afford leaders extraordinary latitude in formulating 
policy. As will be more fully explained in Chapter Six, 
Libya was unmistakably one such society. 23 
Second, the centralization of decision making in 
Libya was unusual even for a developing state. As Owen 
21 See I. William Zartman and A. G. Kluge, "Heroic politics: 
The foreign policy of Libya, " in The foreign policy of Arab 
states, ed. Bahgat Korany and All E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984), 175; St. John 1987,11; Ruth First, Libya: 
The elusive revolution, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 
1974), 20; Deeb 1991,7. 
22 Peter Calvert, The foreign o=z ley of new states, (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986). 
Z' Even scholars who caution against the use of leadership 
models admit their relevance in the case of Libya. See Wittkopf 
and Kegley, 56. 
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notes, the state 'became Qaddafi's Libya in a way that it 
could never have been Bourguiba's Tunisia or Nasser's 
Egypt. '24 This was especially true with regards to 
Libyan national security policy. Qaddafi appropriated 
the defence portfolio shortly after seizing power in 1969 
and never relinquished it. Within a decade he had 
successfully marginalized his peers, thereby freeing 
himself of the only significant remaining check on his 
one-man rule. With seemingly unlimited oil revenues and 
no one to answer to, Qaddafi was able to embark on an 
irrational path. 
Scholars who understate Qaddafi's preeminence in 
policy making, preferring subtler systemic explanations, 
leave us with a sterile appreciation of the Jamahiriya's 
policies. Indeed, to minimize Qaddafi's impact upon . 
contemporary Libya is to deny the salient feature of that 
society. 
More rigorous arguments are to be expected from 
those students of contemporary Libya who, though they may 
admit the theoretical possibility of irrational state 
behavior, argue that Qaddafi's conduct of Libya's 
national security affairs has been rational. Advocates 
of Qaddafi's rationality tend to employ one of three 
arguments in making their case. Many take his 
rationality to be self-evident: Qaddafi survived, ergo he 
must be rational. Others employ the tired argument that 
24 Roger Owen, Preface to Oadhafi's Libya 1969 to 1994, ed. 
Dirk Vandewalle, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995) xi. 
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Qaddafi's behavior is rational if understood in terms of 
his background and ideology (in other words, if he is 
judged by a more forgiving pay-off matrix). The least 
common argument is that Qaddafi's rationality is 
demonstrated by his practice of realpolitik; by this 
standard, all realists are rational (with apologies to 
liberals and other idealogues, who presumably are not). 
The contention that political survival establishes 
rationality is perhaps the least suasive of the three; 
nevertheless, it is frequently heard. 25 Mary-Jane Deeb, 
the most ardent defender of the Libyan leader's 
rationality, nicely summarizes the argument: 
To explain the complexity of Libya's relations 
to other states in terms of Qadhdhafi's 
"madness" or "irrationality" is to miss the 
whole point of his foreign policy. In fact, if 
Qadhdhafi were so out of touch with reality, 
and if his perceptions and expectations were so 
irrational and distorted, it is very unlikely 
that he would have remained in power for so 
long or played such an'active role in Arab and 
African affairs. 26 
The problems with this argument are two-fold. First, it 
conceives of irrationality as an immutable condition that 
manifests itself across the board, rather than as a 
behavior which is primarily displayed under discrete 
circumstances (i. e., in the absence of accountability). 
Yet there is no reason to assume that individuals who may 
25 See, for example, the comments of former Soviet 
Ambassador to Libya O. G. Peresypkin in Alexei Vassiliev, Russian 
policy in the Middle East- From Messianism to pragmatism, 
(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), 286. 
26 Deeb, 7. 
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exhibit self-defeating behavior under some circumstances 
are incapable of rational behavior in other situations. 
Second, survival is not the only grounds upon which 
a political leader should be evaluated, nor is playing 
'an active role' in regional affairs the same as playing 
a productive or successful role. Qaddafi set out to do 
far more than merely retain his office and be 'active' in 
Arab affairs. Thus, to dub him rational on the basis of 
that one feat is to ignore the more compelling question 
of why he did not fulfill his larger ambitions. 
Qaddafi's ideology--an amalgam of cliched 
revolutionary slogans and utopian ruminations--is 
frequently invoked as proof of the Libyan leader's 
rationality. If only one could see the world as Qaddafi 
does, or so the argument goes, then the logic of the 
Colonel's seemingly self-defeating behavior would become 
apparent. Robert Bruce St. John, whose work best 
illustrates this line of thought, asserts that Libyan 
foreign policy must be understood through reference to 
the regime's motto: 'Freedom, Socialism, Unity. "' 
Driven by unswerving devotion to these ideals, Qaddafi 
pursued 'a rational foreign policy. 1,28 
27 Robert Bruce St. John, Qaddafi's world design: Libyan 
foreign policy- 1969-1987, (London: Saqi Books, 1987) 18-19; see 
also I. William Zartman and A. G. Kluge, "Heroic politics: The 
foreign policy of Libya, " in The foreign on licy of Arab states, 
ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1984), 175. 
28 St. John, 143. 
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At first glance, this line of reasoning seems 
plausible enough, but upon closer consideration it 
becomes apparent that ideology-based explanations of 
Libyan behavior suffer from serious defects. Foremost of 
these are problems of scope and intellectual consistency: 
Qaddafi threw his ideological net so wide, and the net 
itself was riven with so many holes, that his ideology 
had little meaning or explanatory power. The Colonel's 
rhetoric was always elastic enough to make any decision 
appear consistent with the regime's ideology, even if 
that decision was a complete reversal of former policies. 
Attempting to cobble a coherent and cohesive philosophy 
from the Libyan leader's pronouncements is therefore an 
endeavor doomed to frustration. 
Application of revolutionary ideals in Libya was 
selective at best. Consider, for example, Qaddafi's aid 
to various groups of 'freedom fighters. ' Such aid was 
not based on principle but on Machiavellian calculations. 
The Colonel's support of insurrectionists in New 
Caledonia and-Francophone Africa stemmed directly from 
his contest with France for control of Chad, as Qaddafi 
himself admitted: 
If France harasses us in Chad, we must harass 
it everywhere. If it fights us in Chad, we 
fight it everywhere--from Martinique to New 
Caledonia, passing through its bases in Africa 
... I hope that the French people do not 
sacrifice their interests with Libya for the 
problem of Chad. 29 
29 FBIS, 10 November 1985. 
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By the same token, his aid to guerrillas in Central 
America increased in direct proportion to the escalation 
of his problems with the Reagan administration: 
'When we ally ourselves with revolution in 
Latin America, and particularly Central 
America, we are defending ourselves. This 
satan (the United States) must be clipped and 
we must take war to the American borders just 
as America is taking threats to the Gulf of 
Sidra and to the Tibesti Mountains. ' 30 
When relations between Libya and the United States been 
warmer, Tripoli's support for Central American 
revolutionaries was considerably cooler. 
Indeed, Qaddafi apparently had few qualms about 
abandoning his 'freedom fighters' whenever it served his 
purposes. In the early 1980s he suspended aid to the 
Western Saharan Polisario Front as part of a 
reconciliation with Morocco; in the 1990s he terminated 
assistance to the Irish Republican Army, and even gave 
intelligence about the group to British authorities, in 
an effort to improve relations with London. 
Qaddafi's putative devotion to socialism was just as 
selective and self-serving. Despite his avowed 
opposition to capitalism, the Colonel sanctioned a brisk 
trade with his erstwhile adversaries, using his oil 
revenues to import European and American goods and 
services. When he deigned to acknowledge the apparent 
inconsistency at all, he described such trade as 'non- 
exploitative capitalism'--a curious choice of words for 
30 FBIS, September 1983. 
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someone who at other times held that capitalism was 
inherently exploitative. 
Unity, in Qaddafi's parlance, embraced Pan-Arabism, 
Pan-Islamism, as well as solidarity in the Arab League, 
the Organization of African Unity, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Above all, it entailed merging Libya with its 
neighbors to create a new polity. However, as 
neighboring powers soon learned, Qaddafi wanted unity on 
his own terms or not at all. 31 Libya's neighbors rapidly 
grew disenchanted. Each successive bid for 'unity' was 
met by suspicion (and no small amount of mockery) abroad. 
Frustrated, Qaddafi tried to achieve his ends by force or 
subversion. More often than not, he ended up 
accentuating the fragmentation of the Arab world rather 
than transcending it. The hallowed ideal of Arab unity 
did not, for example, prevent Tripoli from briefly going 
to war with Egypt, skirmishing with Tunisia, and 
supporting Iran during its war with Iraq. Nor did 
Islamic unity impede Tripoli from supporting the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, or from arming Chadian and 
Sudanese Christian groups against their Muslim countrymen 
when it suited the regime's purposes. 
The latitude of Qaddafi's ideological inconsistency 
clearly extended beyond 'tactical flexibility. ' Thus, at 
best, attempting to derive evidence of Qaddafi's 
rationality from his ideology ultimately becomes an 
31 Anwar el-Sadat, In search of identity (London: William 
Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1978), 217. 
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exercise in switching pay-off matrices so as to exempt 
him of responsibility for the failure of his policies 
(since rationality is conceived of in terms of 
preferences rather than results). At worst, 
rationalizing Libyan policy in terms of ideology amounts 
to little more than regurgitating the regime's 
propaganda. 
The final (and most original) argument in behalf of 
Qaddafi's rationality is found in the scholarship of 
Mary-Jane Deeb. Deeb actually makes two arguments in 
favor of Qaddafi's rationality (beyond the 
survival=rationality argument noted above). First, she 
argues that Libyan security policy was a logical response 
to the regime's perceived threats. Second, having noted 
the problems which beset the ideological approach, she 
contends that Libyan foreign and defence policy was 
determined primarily by national interests; ideology was 
only allowed to be a critical determinant when vital 
interests were not at stake (she proposes that the degree 
of ideology reflected in Libyan foreign policy was 
proportional to a state's distance from Libya). " In 
other words, she believes Qaddafi to be a realist, and 
the exhibition of realism to be proof of rationality. 
Unfortunately, Deeb seriously misrepresents the 
regime's security objectives to make her argument stick: 
Libya's core foreign policy objectives in North 
Africa have been to protect the regime from 
32 Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya's foreign policy in North Africa, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 9. 
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external attempts to overthrow it and to defend 
Libyan territory from attacks and threats of 
invasion by neighboring states. 33 
As will be abundantly demonstrated in the following 
chapters, Qaddafi's goals were not so modest. Why does 
Deeb get it wrong? Though she acknowledges Qaddafi's 
dominant role in defining Libya's national interests and 
formulating policy, she skirts the implications because 
she finds the impact of individuals difficult to deal 
with empirically. As she puts it, interpreting Libyan 
behavior in light of Qaddafi's psychological determinants 
'lacks rigorous scientific analysis. 134 This aversion to 
considering the role of the individual engenders a flaw 
in her reasoning: an aggressive leader does not define 
his nation's interests in benign terms. Nevertheless, 
Deeb interprets Qaddafi as a perennially threatened party 
whose behavior was invariably defensive. 
This interpretation is not supported by the 
historical record. Libya displayed far more interest in 
invading its neighbors than vice-versa. Indeed, Qaddafi 
pointedly refused to endorse a territorial-defence 
oriented army, and later attempted to configure his 
forces for power-projection and offensive operations. 35 
It is true enough that from its inception, the 
Qaddafi regime loudly proclaimed that it felt threatened 
33 Deeb 1991,15. 
34 Deeb 1991,6-7. 
35 salah El Saadany, Egypt and Libya from inside, 1969-1976, 
(London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994), 22. 
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by external powers. Indeed, if one were to accept all of 
Qaddafi's expressions of threat perception at face value, 
then the Libyan regime lived in a perpetual state of 
extreme anxiety. 36 However, it strains credulity to 
maintain that the Libyan leader took seriously the more 
improbable threats which he publicly decried, as when he 
accused the United States of plotting a nuclear attack on 
Africa to rid the globe of its excess population. 37 
in any event, the sincerity of Tripoli's expressed 
fears is beside the point; empathy is not the highest 
level of insight to which the study of international 
relations should aspire, and the Libyan regime's fears 
were rarely justified by objective fact. Instead, 
Libya's denunciations of foreign 'threats' were usually 
intended to justify the state's adventurism and to 
mobilize domestic support for the regime. Indeed, the 
very actions which Tripoli found threatening were 
frequently the product of its own behavior. For example, 
Tripoli's responses to the multiple deployments of French 
forces to Chad could be seen as threat-motivated only if 
divorced from the expansionist policies (in the Aouzou 
Strip) which prompted those deployments in the first 
place. 
The same was true of the 'threats' Libya encountered 
in the Mediterranean. In 1973 Tripoli--citing the needs 
36 William Gutteridge, Libya: Still a threat to Western 
interests? conflict Studies no. 160 (London: Institute for the 
Study of Conflict, 1984), 5. 
37 FBIS-NES-94-202,18 October 1994,20. 
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of national security--proclaimed its sovereignty over the 
Gulf of Sirte, and began asserting its claim by force. 
On multiple occasions Libyan military units attacked 
units of the U. S. Sixth Fleet exercising in the disputed 
region as part of a long-standing U. S. policy of 
upholding freedom of navigation in international waters. 
These clashes were cited by some as evidence that Libya's 
expansionist behavior was normal for a 'threatened' 
state. 38 Yet juggling cause and effect does not erase 
the fact that Libya's maritime claims were made in 
defiance of international convention, or the fact that it 
was the Libyan forces which repeatedly instigated 
hostilities with the Sixth Fleet. Qaddafi's conception 
of security, however much it appealed to those 
sympathetic to his point of view, was not recognized by 
international law. 
Nevertheless, Deeb uncritically accepts expressions 
of threat perception as the basis for Libyan behavior. 
Indeed, her main contention is that: 
i he . 
this perception of threat coupled with 
the knowledge of Libya's inherent weakness has 
been the main motivating factor behind 
Qadhdhafi's foreign policy in North Africa. 39 
Only rarely (and reluctantly) does Deeb acknowledge the 
less irenic motives that drove Libyan policy: 
38 George Joffe, "Libya--Regional history, regional and 
national borders, " in Libya: State and region, J. Allan and K. 
McLachlan and M. Buru, ed., (London: SOAS Centre of Near and 
Middle Eastern Studies, 1989), 14. 
39 Deeb 1991,15. 
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A perception of threat, however, is not always 
enough to explain certain alliances. The Chad 
merger, for instance, and the Steadfastness and 
Confrontation Front were also determined to 
some extent by Libya's desire to extend beyond 
its borders and increase its power and prestige 
regionally. '' 
As we shall see in Chapter Five, the 'merger' in question 
was pursued through multiple invasions and prolonged 
military occupation of one of the weakest states in the 
international system. By failing to call a spade a 
spade, Deeb misses the essence of Libyan national 
security policy. 
Furthermore, Deeb apparently assumes all threat- 
generated behavior to be rational. This is not at all 
evident. Slapping a marauding grizzly bear may be a 
clear response to a threat, but that does not necessarily 
make it a rational response (i. e., one that is likely to 
reduce or eliminate the threat posed by the bear). 
As for Deeb's assumption that all realists are 
rational, this is yet another moot proposition. The 
effect of her assumption is to once again reduce 
rationality to a question of intent; if an agent intended 
a given decision to maximize his power then he was 
rational, irrespective of the consequences. It is 
difficult for the imagination to conceive of an actor who 
would not meet, or whose actions could not be interpreted 
so as to meet, this low standard. Hence, Deeb's notion 
of rationality tells us remarkably little that is 
worthwhile. 
40 Deeb 1991,126. 
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In contrast, we argue that Qaddafi's maximalist 
objectives were not inherently irrational, but that his 
pursuit of them was, insomuch as the policies he devised 
to achieve those objectives were consistently 
counterproductive. Those policies originated not only in 
a lack of accountability, but in the world view of the 
Libyan leader. 
IV. What makes Oaddafi tick? 
To a recent initiate in Libyan studies, this simple 
question rapidly assumes the proportions of a riddle of 
the Sphinx. Far too many writers have indulged in the 
pretense that Qaddafi's thinking somehow defies analysis. 
For example, Ian Lesser of the RAND Corporation suggests 
that the vagaries of Libyan policy are such that their 
analysis is best left to country specialists. 41 At the 
height of the Reagan administration's confrontations with 
Libya, another RAND analyst concluded with evident 
frustration: 
Because he (Qaddafi) does act on principle-- 
based on a purely "Qaddafian" morality--rather 
than in response to pressure, he cannot be 
influenced ... Whether he is irrational, at least by our standards, or whether this is some 
huge cultural/political misunderstanding seems 
useless to debate. 42 
Yet Qaddafi is not so inscrutable as these comments 
suggest. Whether the Libyan leader is an 'Islamic 
41 Ian Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and 
PXternal challenges, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), 2. 
42 Bonnie Cordes, "Qaddaf1: Idealist and revolutionary 
philanthropist, " RAND Paper P-7209, (March 1986), 9. 
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fundamentalist' or 'desert mystic'--tags which place him 
beyond the pale of comprehension for some--is largely 
irrelevant. 43 If approached as a statesman, his 
weltanschauung is readily accessible and illuminating. 
Qaddafi believes that the Arabs are the victims of 
numerous historical injustices, many of which were 
perpetrated during the twentieth century. In addition, 
because of the specific circumstances behind Libya's 
emergence into the international community he sees 
Libyans as an aggrieved people. Together, these beliefs 
engender truculence, or aggressive defiance of those he 
deems responsible for the indignities born by his 
countrymen and fellow Arabs. By his own admission, 
Qaddafi also has a deep sense of destiny, a conviction 
that it is his mission in life to redress the injustices 
born by Libyans and other Arabs by increasing the power 
of his state. " Thus, truculence and a dramatic self- 
perception are the defining elements of the Libyan 
leader's world view. 
Such an outlook is not atypical for the leader of a 
developing state. Many in the Third World sympathize 
with the notion that they have been wronged by the 
43 A serious political biography of Colonel Qaddafi has yet 
to be written. Efforts to give him a fair hearing frequently 
terminate in embarrassing apologetics or hagiography. See, for 
example, Mirella Bianco's Gadhafi: A voice from the desert, 
Frederick Muscat's My president, my son, George Tremlett's 
ýadaffi : The desert mystic, and Musa Kousa's The political l leader 
and his social background* Muammar Oadafi_ the .I yan leader. 
44 Musa Kousa, The political leader and hin social 
background! Muammar Oadafi_ the Libyan leader, MA Thesis, 
(Michigan State University, 1978), 143. 
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Western powers, and the sentiment is especially 
pronounced in the Arab world. This sense of 
victimization dates to Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 
1798, which produced a crisis of confidence in the Arab 
world that deepened over the following decades as 
European domination of the Middle East became an 
unavoidable reality. In the twentieth century, the 
Arabs' sense of victimization became acute following the 
creation of Israel in 1948 and repeated (and humiliating) 
defeats in the Arab-Israeli wars. 
The history of modern Libya accentuated the sense of 
historical injustice. The brutality of Italian 
colonialism, which began in 1911. laid the foundation of 
Libyan nationalism. Libyan guerrillas waged a brave but 
futile campaign against the modernized Italian forces. 
By one estimate, 50% of the Cyrenaican populace was 
eradicated in the course of Italian 'pacification. '45 
Libyans maintain that some 50,000 Libyans died after 
being forcibly relocated to internment camps in the 
southern desert, and that a total of some 500,000 of 
their countrymen died resisting the Italians between 1911 
and 1943, with a further 250,000 allegedly forced into 
exile. 46 Although these figures are undoubtedly inflated 
by a large factor, the mythology is nevertheless 
significant. Whatever the historical reality, post- 
45 Richard Parker, North Africa: Regional tensions and 
strategic concerns, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 64. 
46 Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The making of modern Libya, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1. 
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independence Libyans believed themselves to have suffered 
horrible atrocities at the hands of the Italians. 
The Second World War ultimately brought liberation 
from the Italians, but afterwards Libya was still subject 
to foreign military occupation. Many young Libyans were 
further outraged that their country, upon being granted 
its independence by the United Nations in 1951, was 
subsequently ruled by a pro-Western monarchy. The 
combined weight of these humiliations--real and imagined- 
-turned the North African kingdom into a fertile breeding 
ground for Arab nationalism. Nasserism flourished. 
Thus, to a considerable extent Qaddafi's world view 
was a reflection of his historical context. It may also 
have been influenced by the impoverished circumstances of 
his youth. Qaddafi's family was poor and politically 
disadvantaged. As a child, Qaddafi's poverty made him a 
target of ridicule. In the 1980s, psychiatrists working 
for the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency allegedly 
surmised that these circumstances led Qaddafi to develop 
an exaggerated Bedouin value system, marked by naive 
idealism, religious fanaticism, intense pride, austerity, 
xenophobia, and sensitivity to slight. '47 
Whether under the thrall of 'Bedouin values' or not, 
Qaddafi was undeniably bitter about the deprivations of 
his childhood. While touring the Fezzan (Libya's poorest 
47 Bob Woodward, Veil: The secret wars of the CIA 1981-19A7, 
(London: Headline Book Publishing PLC, 1987) 94-95. 
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region) in September 1969 (only days after seizing 
power), Qaddafi told a crowd: 
In the recent past I was with you as a student 
in the school nearby. I was subjected then to 
the same injustice as you suffer today ... I 
was denied the sacred right of education as all 
the sons of Fezzan, and with the extreme 
injustice done to us all, I feel the same way 
as you, and will always share your feelings. `8 
Qaddafi immediately took steps to rectify this and other 
perceived injustices. He defied the Western powers by 
ejecting British and American forces from Libya, and by 
nationalizing foreign oil companies. In addition, 
Qaddafi openly supported Palestinian militancy, shipped 
arms to the front-line Arab states, and declared that 
Libya would henceforth hinge its foreign policy to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
For Qaddafi, Israel was the ultimate injustice 
inflicted upon the Arab world by the West. After all, 
Israel had been the vehicle of Arab humiliation in the 
wars of 1948,1956, and 1967. The Jewish state therefore 
assumed an enormous psychological significance for the 
young Libyan, -an importance which excised it from the 
realm of normal international relations. In this regard 
he was not unique; many other Arabs at the time saw 
Israel in the same terms. (It was precisely to expunge 
this sense of humiliation and inferiority that Egypt's 
Anwar Sadat launched the 1973 War, thereby opening the 
door to peace. ) However, long after most Arab leaders 
48 Muammar El Qaddafi, speech delivered in Sebha on 22 
September 1969. 
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had begun to psychologically accommodate Israel's 
existence Qaddafi was still consumed by the flames of 
humiliation. 
The motifs of inferiority and victimization 
permeated his speeches. In his first radio address he 
spoke of the Arab's 'shattered honor' which he promised 
to avenge. In a televised interview broadcast a month 
after he seized power, Qaddafi emphasized: 
Libya in particular and the Arab area in 
general have been subjected to long centuries 
of injustice, oppression and slavery through 
foreign occupation, and social backwardness as 
a result of reactionary rule and regionalism 
which has been forcibly imposed on them 
.. it was these historical reasons which led 
up to the revolution in Libya as well as in 
every other Arab land which had passed through 
the same conditions. " 
To his 'backwards' countrymen, as well as to Arabs 
everywhere, the young Libyan officer brandished the 
promise of catharsis: 'Arab unity is what will solve all 
the difficult problems of the Arab nation. ' 50 
Qaddafi's conception of Arab unity--a precept 
espoused by Gamal Abd Al Nasser--was inseparable from his 
own sense of mission. Notwithstanding his obligatory 
self-deprecation, the Libyan Colonel made no secret of 
his conviction that he was destined for more important 
49 As transcribed in Meredith 0. Ansell and Ibrahim Massaud 
al-Arif, The Libyan revolution: A sourcebook of legal and 
historical documents, (Harrow, England: Oleander Press, 1972), 
79. 
50 How was this unity to be achieved? In a Catch-22 which 
Qaddafi never fully resolved, unity was held to be both the 
result of, and a prerequisite for, the liberation of Palestine. 
Middle East Journal 1970,216-18. 
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things than being the leader of a mere two million 
people. In short, Qaddafi aspired to succeed Nasser as 
the leader of the Arab world. 
There were, however, important differences between 
the two self-styled revolutionaries. Qaddafi's 
Nasserism, as one observer noted, 'far transcends 
anything ever imagined by Gamal Abdel Nasser. 151 Perhaps 
this was because, in Fouad Adjami's words, Qaddafi had 
been spared 'the wounds, the constraints, and the traumas 
of original Nasserism ... Because his baggage is light- 
-a small population, a high income--Qaddafi can fly as 
high as his imagination could take him. 152 
The young Libyan was never content to be just one 
more head of state. His philosophical aspirations, 
embodied in the bombastic Third Universal Theory and I 
Green Book, were forwarded with little modesty: 
The Green Book is the new gospel. ... One of its words can destroy the world. Or save it 
. the Third World only needs my Green Book. My word. 53 
Unhappily for Qaddafi, the Third World apparently had 
other ideas. His political philosophy attracted few 
followers. Moreover, Libya's neighbors displayed a 
disturbing indifference to the young Libyan's plans for 
uniting the Arab states into a single polity--run, 
51 Sicker 1987,127. 
52 Fouad Adjami, The Arab predicament, 93. 
53 Oriana Fallaci, "Iranians are our brothers, " New York 
Times Magazine (December 16,1979) : 123; as quoted in Zartman and 
Kluge 1984,177. 
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naturally enough, from Tripoli. Thus, Qaddafi's naked 
ambition played an important role in repeatedly foiling 
his bids for unification with other Arab states (and, by 
extension, scuttling one of his major national security 
objectives). 
The conjunction of these two powerful elements of 
his world view, truculence and a dramatic self- 
conception, propelled the Colonel into increasingly 
extreme (and self-defeating) behaviors such as terrorism. 
Terrorism brought the regime notoriety, and perhaps some 
visceral pleasure. Yet its benefits were ephemeral: 
rather than moving Libya closer to the fulfillment of its 
strategic goals, terrorism had the opposite effect of 
turning Libya into an international pariah. Many other 
Libyan policies had similarly self-defeating 
consequences. 
V. Why were Qaddafi's security policies 
counterproductive? 
In some respects, Libya was a quintessential Third 
World state: a relatively small power which made its 
debut as an independent political entity late in the game 
of nations. " Moreover, as previously noted, Tripoli's 
54 Indeed, post-1969 Libya could serve as an archetype of 
Barry Buzan's model of unstable Third World states whose weakness 
begets erratic shifts in relations with their neighbors, and 
whose rulers rely upon foreign threats to strengthen their own 
status (Barry Buzan, "People, States, and Fear: The national 
security problem in the Third World, " in National security in the 
Third World: The management of internal and external threats, ed. 
Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, [Hants, England: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 1988], 32). 
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professed 'anti-imperialism' was not atypical of Third 
World states, nor was the regime's resentment of the West 
(especially its animosity towards the United States and 
Israel) exceptional for a late twentieth century Arab 
country. Yet in several regards Libya differed 
profoundly from other developing states, and it is those 
differences which make Libya a singularly intriguing case 
study in Third World security. 
Qaddafi's Libya set out to defy the conventional 
wisdom that held small powers to be 'something more than 
or different from Great Powers writ small, ' a difference 
that 'generates a substantive difference between the 
problems and constraints, the alternatives and policy 
options faced by a small state as opposed to a large 
one. '55 To the contrary, Libya thought of itself as a 
Great Power in gestation, a self-perception made 
strikingly clear by the fact that Tripoli ascribed to 
itself a universalist mission, as the Great Powers 
themselves were wont to do (e. g., the United States and 
Wilsonian liberalism; the Soviet Union and communism). 
Libya's mission was to export its 'revolution, ' or in 
other words, to re-make the international order in 
accordance with Qaddafi's precepts. Thanks to the 
trappings of the modern totalitarian state, the Colonel 
was able to turn his personal agenda into a national 
crusade. 
55 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and small powers, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 1; Efraim Karsh, 
*ýeüýraýir_y and all states, (London: Routledge, 1988), 4. 
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Naturally, since Libya did not conceive of itself as 
a Third World state, it did not view its security in 
terms befitting its stature. For Qaddafi's Libya, 
security was nothing less than 'a condition which helps 
the (Arab) nation to transcend its state of fragmentation 
through struggle against its enemies. t56 But in the cold 
reality of international relations, Arab unity remained 
an unrealized Xanadu--and aggressive policies purportedly 
enacted in its behalf were rarely deemed legitimate by 
the dominant powers in the world system. 
Security, no less than the other fundamental ideas 
which are the concern of social sciences (e. g., power, 
justice, the state), is a vigorously contested concept. " 
Because security is a measure not just of objective 
reality but of perception, the meaning of security in its 
various contexts--personal, societal, national, and 
international--is inherently nebulous. Of the myriad 
definitions which have been forwarded, none surpasses for 
concise elegance that by which security denotes an 
absence of threat. 58 National security therefore denotes 
an absence of threats, internal and external, to the 
state. (Policy denotes a course or principle of action 
56 Said 1986,265. 
57 An excellent introduction to the rich and varied debate 
is Barry Buzan's Pie ple, States & Fear, (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1991); see also Richard Shultz's "Introduction to 
International Security, " in Security Studies for the 1990s, ed. 
Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, (London: 
Brassey's, 1993). 
58 Lawrence Freedman, ed., }, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 4. 
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adopted by a government, party, or individual. National 
security policy therefore consists of the courses and 
principles of action adopted and or proposed by a 
government to produce an absence of external and internal 
threats to the state. 59 ) 
In nearly all states, the prerogative of identifying 
threats and vital national interests belongs to the 
ruling party; in a totalitarian regime that prerogative 
often resides with the head of state and his small 
coterie. So it was in Libya. Qaddafi defined Libya's 
national security interests in rather expansive terms. 
Indeed, Qaddafi's notion of Libyan security resembled a 
Pan-Arab version of the Brezhnev doctrine. 60 Stretching 
the notion of national security to encompass the entire 
Arab world was his favorite means of justifying 
interventionism: 
When the countries around Libya constitute a 
threat to the security of the Libyan people, 
this people, in order to defend that security, 
can resort to force in order to remove the 
elements that constitute threats to Libyan 
security. When an Arab territory anywhere is 
exposed to external aggression it is the duty 
of the Libyan people ... to use all their (resources) so as to defend this Arab 
s' For alternative conceptualizations, see Stephanie G. 
Neuman, "Defense-planning in less industrialized states: An 
organizing framework, " in Defense planning in less-industrimlizec 
states: The Middle East and South Asia, in Stephanie G. Neuman, 
ed., (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1984), 6-8; Lt. Col. 
Christopher Shoemaker, Structure, function and the NSC staff! An 
officer's guide to the National Security Council, (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army 
War College, 1989) 5-6. 
60 Sicker 1987,129-130. 
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territory, whether they were asked to do so or 
not. 61 
In the Colonel's parlance, external aggression meant 
the presence of Western troops or their allies anywhere 
in the Arab world or Africa. His gratuitous intervention 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict borrowed the same reasoning 
(the Israelis being imperialist proxies), as illustrated 
by Qaddafi's self-declared aims in Lebanon: 
We have decided to repel the enemies, or rather 
we have decided to defeat them finally, the 
Americans, Israelis, and reactionaries. 
Therefore, we are exercising the legitimate 
right of self-defence supported by all laws .. 
. Thus, when we decide to confront the advance 
of the American forces that have established 
bridgeheads on Masirah island, at the port of 
Berbera, and at Ghardaqah, Marsa Matruh, Cairo 
West and in Palestine, we are deciding to 
exercise a legitimate defence in face of an 
enemy that has penetrated the Arab homeland. 62 
In welcoming Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to Libya he 
added: 'We have decided to attack the American bases in 
the Arab homeland; by doing so we would be exercising the 
right of legitimate defence of our existence in the Arab 
land. 963 The Colonel further elaborated his theory of 
Pan-Arab security in September 1985: 
We support, as of now, the realization of Arab 
unity by force. ... Arab unity by force has become necessary 
because our existence without Arab unity 
is threatened with destruction and extinction. 
We say that if the world has heard about any 
violent act to change the Arab map it is a 
domestic act concerning only the Arabs and is 
permitted. It is not an invasion or 
61 SWB ME/6362/A/l, 5 March 1980. 
62 SWH ME/6517/A/1,8 September 1980. 
63 SWB ME/6519/i, 10 September 1980. 
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interference in internal affairs. ... We 
support Syria if it annexes Lebanon tomorrow by 
any method. ... This is an internal action 
and a revolution, an internal revolution and 
not a war between one country and another, and 
we refuse to discuss it in the UN, the Security 
Council, the OAU, or in any other level. 64 
Thus, in Qaddafi's mind, Pan-Arab security became the 
ultimate justification for inter-Arab aggression. 
Had Libya been a more powerful state, its pursuit of 
such an ambitious agenda would have resulted in even more 
notoriety than the regime otherwise acquired. As it was, 
the scale of Tripoli's ambitions greatly exceeded the 
state's stubbornly limited resources, and the regime's 
inability to bridge the gulf between the two was the 
principal reason that the state's policies often proved 
counterproductive. For a superpower to act upon its 
hegemonic aspirations was one thing, but it was quite 
another for a comparatively weak power to pursue similar 
aspirations without apparent regard for international 
norms or political realities. 
Thus, Libya's studied mimicry of the Great Powers-- 
which included numerous external military interventions 
and the sponsorship of surrogates in a remarkable number 
of conflicts--proved unsustainable. In the end the 
constraints of small power status prevailed, showing that 
neither oil wealth nor military hardware do necessarily 
Great Power status impart. 
This tension between ends and means echoed deeper 
contradictions between the objectives themselves. These 
64 Sicker 1987,129. 
BIBL 
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contradictions became particularly pronounced during 
Libya's clashes with the United States in the 1980s. 
Rhetoric notwithstanding, Qaddafi did not want to enter a 
pitched battle with the United States. On the other 
hand, he obviously relished the deluge of media attention 
that came each time he squared off with the Reagan 
administration. Unfortunately for the Libyan leader, he 
could not have his cake and eat it too. He had to make 
choices, and in the heat of the moment, the choices made 
often undercut his own long term goals. 
These conflicting values reflected a transcendent 
duality in modern Arab society, a duality eloquently 
summed up by Fouad Ajami: 
To deal with the predicament of their place in 
the world, the losers in the world system have 
alternated between the quest for the Occident's 
power and success and the desire to retreat to 
their own universe, to try to find their own 
values, to rebel and say no (to the West) ... hence the incoherence and breakdown of so many 
Third World societies. 65 
Thus, the quest for Arab power was psychologically 
indivisible from the rejection of the existing 
international order--they were two sides of the same 
coin. But as Ajami points out, the two impulses could 
not be easily reconciled. More often than not, the 
attempt to follow both impulses produced chaos. In like 
fashion, Libyan national security policy--riven by 
inconsistent values, and torn between the regime's 
65 Fouad Ajami, The Arab predicament, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981,199). 
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objectives and its limited resources--collapsed under the 
weight of its internal contradictions. 
VI. A word on methodoloav 
Studies of Libya face formidable methodological 
limitations. Libya is a closed society; little 
verifiable information about the internal deliberations 
of its leaders escapes its borders. The situation is no 
better, however, for researchers working inside the 
country where information about security is still 
difficult (and dangerous) to obtain. 66 This problem is 
by no means unique to Libya. Scholars have dealt with 
similar difficulties in studying security policies in 
closed societies ranging from the former Soviet Union to 
Iraq. Good scholarship can nevertheless be produced 
under these conditions, particularly if one asks 
questions whose answers can be had through sound analysis 
rather than through access to some gnostic trove. 
Insomuch as this study focuses on broad policy strokes 
and their consequences, rather than on the policy making 
process per se, the relative scarcity of Libyan sources 
is less consequential than one might at first imagine. 
Speeches, interviews, and other statements by Libyan 
authorities constitute primary sources. In addition, 
reports and editorials in publications of the Jamahiriyah 
66 Maja Naur, "The military and the labor force in Libya, " 
Curren-t research on peace and violence 4 (1981), 89. 
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News Agency (JANA) receive official sanction and serve as 
primary sources. 
If the quality of the sources is imperfect, such 
limitations are intrinsic to the study of international 
relations. The primary contribution of this thesis is 
not that it unearths new documents but that it focuses on 
an area of Libyan history which has not hitherto been 
analyzed. At the very least, this study should serve as 
a point of departure for future historians with greater 
access to primary sources. 
VII. Chapter Summary 
The first four chapters of this thesis chart the 
course of Libyan national security policy through four 
distinct periods: The Nasser era, 1969-1973; the Sadat 
era, 1974-1980; the Reagan era, 1981-1988; and the Post- 
Cold War era, 1989-1994. Each of these periods was 
distinguished by a pronounced conflict or shift in 
Tripoli's security policy, and it is perhaps no 
coincidence that this periodization roughly corresponds 
to what Qaddafi himself perceived as four distinct phases 
of U. S. -Libyan relations. 67 
Chapter 1, From coup to the politics of 
confrontation, 1969-1973, charts the radical 
transformation of Libyan national security policy 
67 SWB ME/1785/MED/20,4 September 1993; see also Jalloud's 
comment, SWB ME/1540 A/1-A/3,17 November 1992; cf. Mary-Jane 
Deeb's economic periodization: rentier state, 1961-69; 
revolutionary state, 1969-73; state in transition, 1973-75; 
socialist state, 1976-80; state in crisis, 1980-86. 
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following the end of the Sanusi monarchy. Qaddafi's 
junta adopted a pro-Egyptian orientation, severed its 
military ties with the United States and Great Britain, 
and wantonly involved itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
(including support of Palestinian terrorism). It also 
launched a militarization campaign which supersaturated 
the armed forces with weaponry they could not absorb. 
The regime also formulated a truculent security policy in 
Africa and the Mediterranean. Expansionist claims were 
staked to the Gulf of Sirte and to the Aouzou Strip. 
Notwithstanding its petulance Libya enjoyed the 
indulgence of the Great Powers, which tried to 
accommodate a realignment they believed was inevitable. 
Chapter 2, From alliance to antagonism: Aggravating 
the Libyan security predicament, 1974-1980, unearths a 
consistent pattern of counterproductivity in Qaddafi's 
regional alliance-building endeavors. The foremost 
example is the deterioration in relations with Egypt 
after the 1973 War, a degradation driven by Qaddafi's 
megalomania. After climaxing in a brief border war in 
1977, relations sank back into mutual suspicion and 
hostility. Elsewhere Qaddafi's quest for an ally 
followed the same pattern of courtship, recrimination and 
subversion, and alienation. Globally, Qaddafi's 
security policy was equally self-defeating. He answered 
American restraint, particularly notable under the Carter 
administration, with spite. He vehemently opposed U. S. 
foreign policy in the Near East, setting himself against 
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Camp David and the inexorable expansion of American 
military influence in the region, especially the creation 
of the Rapid Deployment Force. Last but not least, 
Qaddafi affixed his seal to a wide range of terrorist 
movements. 
Chapter 3, Vacillation, confrontation, and 
humiliation: Qaddafi and Reagan, 1981-1988, analyzes 
Qaddafi's turbulent relations with the Reagan 
administration. Though faced with a hostile and more 
powerful antagonist, Qaddafi steadily inched towards the 
Soviet Union. His tactic backfired. Cozying up to 
Moscow was the worst way to placate Reagan, and his pro- 
Soviet overtures failed to elicit a defensive commitment 
from the Kremlin, with well-known consequences. 
Qaddafi's mistake was not so much his failure to 
conclude an alliance with the USSR as his insistence on 
single-handedly confronting a vastly more powerful state. 
Libya's regional isolation was further assured by the 
invasion of Chad and continued efforts to destabilize 
neighboring states. By any standard, Qaddafi's behavior 
was aggressive and threatening. By the standard of his 
self-declared objectives, it was also counterproductive 
and thus irrational. 
Chapter 4, Denouement: Qaddafi's Jamahiriya in the 
New World Order, 1989-1994, examines the nadir of Libyan 
national security policy in the post-Cold War 
international order. Qaddafi was appalled at the 
realities of the New World Order: the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union left him without so much as a nominal 
patron, while the Gulf War and the Middle East Peace 
Process expanded Washington's regional influence to new 
heights. In times which demanded pragmatism Qaddafi made 
only half-hearted attempts to rehabilitate his country's 
image. Libya kept a low profile during the Gulf War and 
relinquished its long-standing claim to Chad's Aouzou 
Strip. However, these belated attempts at reformation 
came to naught once investigators concluded Libya was 
culpable for the Lockerbie bombing. UN Security Council 
sanctions soon followed. 
Amazingly, even when shackled by sanctions Qaddafi 
refused to extricate Libyan security policy from the 
realm of irrationality. He defied demands to end his 
support of terrorism. His claims to the Gulf of Sirte 
remained unchanged. Development of chemical weapons 
continued unabated. The result was international 
isolation and containment. By 1994 Qaddafi had 
conspicuously failed to achieve any of his national 
security objectives and had in fact regressed on most 
fronts. 
Chapter 5, Chad: Qaddafi's Vietnam, describes 
Libya's only protracted military campaign. Libya's 
prolonged interference in Chad was an exercise in 
expansionism and adventurism which Qaddafi baldly tried 
to justify in terms of Libyan security. This chapter 
demonstrates that Libya fomented the very instability at 
which it feigned alarm. Stripped of its putative 
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justification, Libya's invasion of Chad is correctly 
viewed as incontrovertible evidence of the threat posed 
to regional security by Qaddafi's regime. Fortunately 
for the Chadians, Qaddafi did not anticipate that his 
field experiment in realpolitik would provide Egypt, 
France, the Sudan and the United States with an arena for 
waging a proxy-war with Tripoli. The influx of foreign 
aid and the ineptitude of the Libyan armed forces put a 
decisive end to Qaddafi's sub-Saharan ambitions. 
Chapter 6, Regime Security, analyzes the most 
successful element of Libyan national security policy. 
Qaddafi's skill in snuffing out internal threats, 
combined with a measure of luck, proved effective. 
Nonetheless, policy passed into the realms of extremism 
here as well. The infamous "stray dogs" campaign 
generated widespread opprobrium and eventually led to 
Libya's international isolation. 
Finally, the gulf between Qaddafi's ambitions and 
reality is revisited. Far from transforming his state 
into a regional superpower, Qaddafi left Libya vulnerable 
politically and militarily. The country's pariah status, 
the marginal effectiveness of its armed forces, its vast 
territory and considerable oil wealth left it a ripe 




To summarize, this study proposes a refined, and 
hopefully more useful, conception of rational/irrational 
behavior--one that has relevancy to the world as it 
exists in fact, rather than in theory. By contrasting 
the results of Libyan behavior with the regime's self- 
declared and inferred national security objectives, it 
reveals a consistent pattern of counterproductive 
behavior. Moreover, it explains the origins of this 
behavior and shows why it ultimately proved to be self- 
defeating. As the only extant study of Libyan national 
security policy, it thus fills an important gap in our 
understanding of contemporary Libya while serving as a 
useful case study of national security policy in the 
Third World. 
Chapter 1 
From coup to the politics of confrontation, 1969-1973 
From this day forward, Libya is a free self- 
governing republic. ... (we must) prepare to face the enemies of Islam, the enemies of 
humanity, those who have burned our sanctuaries 
and mocked at our honor. Thus shall we rebuild 
our glory, we shall resurrect our heritage, we 
shall avenge our wounded dignity, and restore 
the rights which have been wrested from us. 
-- Muammar El Qaddafi, 
1 September 1969. 
The leader of every nation faces a security dilemma 
which can be summarized in three questions: How is the 
security of the state to be defined? What level of 
security will the state seek? How will it be achieved? 
The answers a state formulates to these questions 
depend on factors such as the state's history, its form 
of government, its values, and most importantly its 
comparative power to shape the international environment. 
Obviously, states which rank among the Great Powers have 
a correspondingly greater latitude in answering these 
questions and may arrogate unto themselves global 
security interests. But for the majority of states 
created in the twentieth century, the parameters within 
which their governments must address the security dilemma 
are fairly narrow. Such states must seek to protect 
themselves from interference by the Great Powers as well 
as from neighboring states while simultaneously pursuing 
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development with limited resources. This permutation of 
the universal security dilemma is the Third World 
security predicament. ' 
On the first day of September, 1969, Libyans awoke 
to a new government (or at least the incipient stages of 
a new government) which, disdainful of the security 
policies pursued by the monarchy it replaced, set about 
formulating its own responses to Libya's unique iteration 
of the Third World security predicament. Internal 
security was, befittingly, the new regime's foremost 
preoccupation, and in the following months a bevy of 
policies were crafted to consolidate the government's 
control over the country. These policies aimed to 
dismember the old power structure and legitimize the new 
order, which rapidly took on authoritarian hues. 
Security became the justification for disallowing dissent 
and neutralizing actual and potential rivals, thereby 
shielding the country's leadership from political 
pressures. The lack of accountability created by these 
policies was an essential precursor for irrationality. 2 
The new regime concluded that a multi-faceted 
strategic reorientation was needed to address the 
I See Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World security predtnament 
state making, regional conflict. and the international system 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also Muthiah Alagappa, The 
patio arm l security of developing states: Lessons from Thailand 
(Dover, Massachusetts, Auburn House Publishing Company, 1987), 
and Edward Azar and Chung in moon, eds., National secure ty -in the 
(Hants, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988). 
2 The dynamics of accountability are explored in greater 
detail in Chapter Six, "The Primacy of Internal Security. " 
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external dimension of Libya's national security 
predicament. Defining the existing international order 
as threatening, the Libyan leadership made the 
achievement of security contingent upon effecting a 
change in the regional balance of power--above all, by 
contributing to the military defeat of Israel. This 
necessarily pitted Tripoli against the Western powers 
which, rightly or wrongly, were perceived as Israel's 
allies. Thus, the ancien regime's military links with 
the United States and the United Kingdom were severed: 
bases were closed, troops expelled, and training missions 
terminated. In their stead an intimate yet informal 
alliance was forged with Egypt. In addition, the Libyan 
Armed Forces (LAF) were reorganized, expanded and 
modernized in preparation for the anticipated reckoning 
with Israel. 
The unifying thread woven throughout the fabric of 
this new national security policy was the world view of 
Libya's young head of state. Although there was nothing 
extraordinary in Muammar Qaddafi's desire to improve 
Libya's standing in the international order, it quickly 
became apparent that he conceptualized himself and his 
state in terms that sat in poor juxtaposition to the 
country's limited resources. By late 1973 the assertion 
of this world view, coupled with the lack of legal or 
political checks on Qaddafi's power, nudged Libyan 




The coup d'etat led by Lieutenant Muammar El Qaddafi 
on September 1,1969, could serve as a textbook example 
of the genre. 3 Credit for its success must go to 
Qaddafi, whose charisma and force of will made him an 
able conspirator. So too did his patience. Qaddafi 
began organizing his friends into seditious cells while 
still in secondary school; he then persuaded friends to 
join him in attending Libya's fledgling military academy 
for the express purpose of assisting his future plot. ' 
He dubbed his followers the 'Free Unionist Officers' in 
homage to the Egyptian model of 1952. Within the 
movement's innermost ring, the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), Qaddafi achieved psychological dominance 
over his comrades by reserving to himself full knowledge 
of the conspiracy's membership and plans. ' 
3 Though he appropriated the rank of Colonel after taking 
power, Qaddafi was either demoted from captain or denied 
promotion to that rank just prior to the coup d'etat. While on 
a training run he allegedly shoved a straggling soldier to the 
ground and allowed the remainder of the company to trample him. 
The injured soldier was hospitalized for ten days. Salah El 
Saadany, Egypt and Libya from inside, 1969-1976 (London: 
McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1994), 57; cf. Mohamed 
Heikal, The road to Ramadan, (London: Collins, 1975) 70. Other 
allegations implicated Qaddafi in the brutal murder of the 
Benghazi Military Academy commander in 1963 and in the murder of 
a fellow cadet (D. Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and th- 
r{bvan revolution [London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987], 46, 
48). 
* "Interview of Colonel Muammar Al-Qaddafi on UAR 
Television, 14 October 1969, " as reproduced in Meredith 0. Ansell 
and Ibrahim Massaud Al-Arif, The Libyan revolutf n: A cnureohnnk 
of legal and historical documents (Harrow, England: Oleander 
Press, 1972), 79. 
Blundy and Lycett, 57. 
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The years of secrecy and patience paid off. Despite 
evidence that the authorities were on to their plot the 
conspirators achieved complete tactical surprise; within 
24 hours they had arrested most senior army and police 
officials, including Abdel Aziz El Shalhi, Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces, Major-General Sanoussi, the 
Chief of Staff, and Major-General Taleb, director of 
internal security. 6 Mid-level officers were not given an 
opportunity to rally resistance: some 40 colonels, 75 
lieutenant colonels and 150 majors were also arrested. 7 
The Libyan monarch, King Idris Sanusi, based his 
security on the premise that tribal loyalties were of 
greater strength than patriotism in the developing Libyan 
state. ' The palace organized the armed forces into three 
nominally unified regional militia but was careful to 
weight the balance of power in favor of the King's home 
province. The regular army (to which Qaddafi pertained) 
had only 6500 men and was little more than a gendarmerie 
when compared to these three forces: the Cyrenaican 
6 Shalhi avoided capture for a few hours by hiding in his 
swimming pool. He and his brother are believed to have been 
planning a coup of their own: an amusing but apocryphal tale 
claims that when soldiers arrested him in his bed he snapped: 'Go 
away, you fools. It's not today, it's the fourth' (as related 
in Ruth First, Libya: The elusive revolution [Middlesex, England: 
1974], 99). 
7 Paul Martin, "Libya after the revolution: A time to wait 
and see, " Times (London), 29 January 1970. Hereafter all 
references to the Times refer to the London newspaper. 
8 The King's fall did not necessarily invalidate that 
proposition, as his failure may well have been one of political 
ability rather than sociological misdiagnosis. In point of fact, 
QaddafI later emulated the King's tribal patronage system. 
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Defence Force (CYDEF), the Tripolitanian Defence Force 
(TRIDEF), and a small force in the Fezzan. Their 
strengths were 8000,4200, and 600 men respectively. 9 
CYDEF was the strongest force not only in terms of 
manpower but in equipment; its arsenal surpassed that of 
the regular army. 1° 
Consequently, CYDEF headquarters--located at the 
Gurnada camp near Beida--was the nerve center of the 
monarchy's security. The eastern province of Cyrenaica 
had been the stronghold of the Sanusi movement for over a 
century, and the King depended upon the loyalty of 
Cyrenaican tribes for his protection. This tribal bloc 
included the Ebedat, the Al-Hassa, the Al-Derisa, the Al- 
Awagir and most importantly the Barassa. 11 These tribes 
provided the bulk of administrators in the Sanusi 
government. But rivalries between these tribes provided 
a chink Qaddafi could exploit. Since the Barassa were 
the most loyal to the King, Qaddafi recruited a man from 
the rival Al Hassa tribe to storm the CYDEF headquarters. 
The man he chose, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Ahmed, was 
assisted by the duty officer at the camp, Captain 
Abdullah Shuayb, who also belonged to the Al Hassa. 
Brigadier General Sanusi Fezzani, commander of the CYDEF, 
9 As authoritative figures are unavailable, these numbers 
represent the best available estimates. Area handbook for Libva, 
(GPO: Washington D. C., 1969), 263; cf. "Solomon might know what 
to do, " Economist 15 November 1969. 
10 Ansell and Al-Arif, 81. 
11 First, 78-79. 
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was found asleep at home and taken into custody. 12 
With CYDEF neutralized, the TRIDEF and Fezzani 
forces were coopted without difficulty. (Before being 
captured, the commanding officer of TRIDEF tried to 
convince British technicians training his force in the 
use of the Vigilant missile to ready the missiles for 
launch. This bizarre request would seem to indicate that 
the militia had little or no information about the foe it 
faced. 13) Senior officers who were not arrested were 
nevertheless warned to stay in their homes. " 
Though Qaddafi broadcast news of the coup d'etat 
from Benghazi, it was not until additional infantry and 
armored car units entered the Cyrenaican capital on 
September 4 that the city was finally secured. 11 The 
delay in seizing Libya's second city was an unforeseen 
complication (the local cell leader got cold feet and 
refused to carry out his part of the conspiracy) which 
could have unravelled the entire plot. 16 Tobruk was the 
last city to fall by virtue of its distance from the 
12 First, 108-109. 
13 First, 110. 
14 Paul Martin, "Senior officers warned to stay at home, " 
Times, 3 September 1969. 
15 "Libyan junta says Soviet fleet scared off U. K. 
intervention, " International Herald Tribune, 5 September 1969; 
according to Wright, continuous small arms fire was heard in 
Benghazi for most of the first 24 hours (John Wright, Libya: A 
modern {story [London: Croom Helm, 1981], 130). 
16 Qaddafi was furious. George Tremlett, "Gadaffi: The 
desert mystic, " (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 
1993), 133; "Libyan regime may still not be in control, " 
nj, a" rdian, 6 September 1969,2. 
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coup's epicenter. By September 10, the RCC was satisfied 
that it had the police in tow, and ordered all civilians 
possessing firearms to turn them in at police stations or 
face severe penalties. A curfew was enforced at night. 
The coup had succeeded with virtually no bloodshed: only 
one soldier is known to have died fighting for the 
monarchy. 17 
Why did no one else resist the conspiracy? In part 
because of the absence of King Idris Sanusi, who had been 
in Turkey for several weeks accompanied by his senior 
cabinet officials. (This lesson was not lost on Qaddafi, 
who over time proved increasingly reluctant to venture 
outside of Libya). Nevertheless, the RCC was troubled by 
the fact that King Idris was not in custody. Qaddafi 
feared that the King might persuade the United States or 
Britain to orchestrate a countercoup from the military 
bases both powers maintained in Libya. 'a Forestalling 
this possibility became the new Libyan leader's first 
national security objective. Qaddafi's fears were at 
least partially warranted. King Idris promptly entreated 
British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart (through his 
Palace Affairs Minister, Omar Al-Shalhi) to reinstate 
him. Shalhi made a similar demarche to the Americans. " 
17 Fifteen defenders of the monarchy were allegedly wounded 
at Gurnada (Blundy and Lycett, 59). According to Wright, there 
was more resistance than the RCC ever admitted (Wright, 130). 
18 Clare Hollingworth, "Non-alignment, Libyan style, " Day 
Telegraph, 23 December 1969. 
19 P. Edward Haley, Oaddafi and the United States since 1969 
(New York: Praeger, 1984), 22. 
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But the King's pleas fell on ears deafened by a din of 
Cold War interests. The Americans were wary of swimming 
against a tide of Arab nationalism and unenthusiastic at 
the prospect of employing force on behalf of a non- 
democratic regime. In fact, two years earlier U. S. 
Ambassador David Newsom explicitly warned King Idris that 
the United States was not prepared to defend his regime 
against internal revolt. 20 This attitude reflected a 
weariness with nationalist struggles (not least the war 
in Vietnam) which had tempered Washington's appetite for 
foreign intervention. The British were similarly 
reluctant to take unilateral action after the Suez fiasco 
of 1956. Thus, the prevailing wisdom in both capitals 
was that though the demise of the Sanusi regime was 
regrettable, restoring the throne would entail more 
difficulty than it was worth. 
Predictably, the West was mainly concerned with 
keeping Libya outside of the Soviet camp; the prevalent 
attitude at the time was that one despot was as good as 
another so long as he toed the anti-Soviet line. Far 
from opposing the RCC, Western intelligence agencies 
tried to curry favor with it. Of three known royalist 
plots which were hatched over the next three years, at 
least one failed because the CIA alerted Oaddafi to the 
danger. 21 The British foiled another. In 1970 Libyan 
20 Haley, 22. 
21 "Aid to Qaddafi in '71 charged, " New York Times, 22 
December 1983. 
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royalists prevailed upon Colonel David Stirling, founder 
of the Special Air Service (SAS), to draw up plans for an 
invasion. He duly drafted a scheme for a seaborne 
assault on Tripoli from Malta, using mercenaries 
recruited from the SAS and other special forces units. 
Although the plan had financial backing from wealthy 
Libyans in exile (notably Omar Al-Shalhi), it too was 
quashed by the British government. 22 
However, Qaddafi and his co-conspirators were unsure 
that the Western powers would not attempt to restore the 
king to his throne, either to maintain control of Libya's 
substantial oil resources or to deny the USSR a potential 
satellite. The RCC feared that Britain might justify 
intervention by invoking its treaty commitments to defend 
Libya against external aggression. Thus, RCC units 
nervously took up positions around the U. S. and British 
bases. Qaddafi also took the more practical precaution 
of telling the Western powers what they wanted to hear. 
Within hours the new government pledged to honor all 
extant treaties, including oil concessions. 23 Given the 
rapidity with which this promise was broken, it was 
obviously fabricated to assuage U. S. and British concerns 
and thus avert foreign intervention. 
The mist of confusion which shrouded the following 
days was made thicker by the RCC's furtiveness. Officers 
22 "Whitehall vetoed plot to carry out raid on Libya, " 
fig, 14 May 1973. 
23 "Libyan regime's promise to stand by its treaties, " 
jardian, 3 September 1969,3. 
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refused to give their names to foreign correspondents and 
diplomats. Diplomats at the British embassy dealt with 
the RCC through an officer in a raincoat whom they 
nicknamed 'Colonel Mackintosh' since he would not 
identify himself. 24 Journalists were forbidden, upon 
pain of 'severe punishment, ' to photograph members of the 
RCC, military installations or troop movements. 25 
Qaddafi's identity remained the strictest secret of 
all for the first few days. This secrecy bought him time 
to establish control over the country before revealing 
himself and his agenda. A royalist challenge could not 
be effectively mounted if the King's supporters were 
unsure who their opponent was. RCC members claimed their 
leader was Colonel Saad al-Din Bushweir, who was 
subsequently described as the new Chief of Staff. 26 It 
later emerged that he was not even in Libya at the time 
of the coup. 27 A week passed before Arab diplomats in 
Tunis began to realize that Qaddafi was the man in 
charge. 28 On September 8, Qaddafi finally entered the 
limelight and promoted himself to commander-in-chief of 
24 Author's interview with retired British diplomat, 
November 1994. 
25 Edward Mortimer, "Libya curb on photographers, " Times, 11 
September 1969. 
26 Paul Martin, "Senior officers warned to stay at home, " 
Tjx=, 3 September 1969; "Tanks in Benghazi as Junta begins to 
meet opposition, " Guardian, 5 September 1969. 
27 First, 112. 
28 Edward Mortimer, "Libya curb on photographers, " Times, 11 
September 1969. 
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the Libyan armed forces (LAF). 
Despite its infancy, the new government displayed a 
surprising sophistication in dealing with the 
superpowers. The USSR, eager to expand its influence in 
North Africa, made overtures to the new regime within 48 
hours of the coup d'etat, offering arms shipments while 
Western governments were still puzzling over who was in 
charge. The RCC politely declined the Soviet offer and 
leaked news of its forbearance, thereby placating the 
Western powers whose troops were still in the RCC's 
backyard. The RCC was equally deft in handling the 
Soviets. On September 4, Tripoli radio reported that the 
United Kingdom had ruled out forcibly restoring the 
monarchy due to the Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra, which 
was conducting exercises off the Libyan shores. 29 In 
fact, the Soviet naval presence was sheer coincidence. 
Nonetheless, the RCC's praise was a clever means of 
mollifying the Soviets after spurning their arms'offer. 
The new government soon received diplomatic 
recognition from the major powers, none of whom wished to 
be left in the cold once the fledgling regime settled 
down to business. Clearing the recognition hurdle was a 
major accomplishment for Qaddafi and his band insomuch as 
it greatly diminished the odds of foreign intervention to 
restore the monarchy. Having at least temporarily staved 
off that threat, the RCC's foremost security priority 
29 "Libyan Junta says Soviet fleet scared off U. K. 
intervention, " International Herald Tribune, 5 September 1969. 
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became reinforcing its control over the country, or as 
Qaddafi put it, to consolidate the revolution. 30 To this 
end the RCC began to methodically dismember the old power 
structure, in particular by disenfranchising the tribal 
bloc which formed the principal support of the Sanusi 
regime. Qaddafi proved adept at dismantling the 
monarchy; indeed, the end of the Sanusi order may be 
regarded by future historians as Qaddafi's principal 
political legacy. 31 
Under King Idris, at least half of all mid-level and 
senior Libyan officials were tribal leaders or 
appointees. 32 Many were caught by the first wave of 
arrests during the coup. 33 Those who escaped arrest were 
soon forced to retire or farmed out to insignificant 
civil service or diplomatic posts. The result was that 
the bureaucracies were soon depleted of many of their 
most experienced minds. In addition, these purges 
ushered in a minor sociological upheaval. With few 
exceptions the officers in the RCC hailed from minor 
tribes which dwelt in the Libyan interior and comprised 
30 SWB ME/0583/A/4,10 October 1989. 
31 Richard Parker, North Africa: Regional tensions and 
etrategin concerns, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 74. 
32 Helen Metz, ed., Libya: A country study, (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 264-265; Jonathan 
Bearman, Oadhafi's Libya (London: Zed Books, 1986), 56. 
33 Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, Political development 
and social chance in Libya (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1980), 57. 
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the country's lowest economic stratum. 34 Purging the 
government of appointees from the wealthy coastal tribes 
was therefore a singularly satisfying experience for 
these young men. 35 Even Qaddafi made no secret of the 
fact that he relished the chance to avenge himself of the 
humiliations he suffered as a youth because of his 
penury. 36 
Within the armed forces a parallel purge took place 
over the next six months, and the upper echelons of the 
army were culled completely. Not a single general or 
colonel kept his job, and nearly 100 lower ranking 
officers were forced into retirement. 37 Preparations for 
this purge had begun months before the coup d'etat, when 
Qaddafi ordered his conspirators to prepare intelligence 
profiles of all senior officers. 38 Officers who (like 
Qaddafi himself) had undergone training in the West were 
considered particularly suspect. The case of the Libyan 
air force, where roughly half of the pilots were grounded 
for political reasons, was illustrative: 
Most senior officers were removed from flying 
status because they had attended staff colleges 
in the U. S. and were considered too pro-Western 
by the new regime. Some were jailed and others 
34 Bearman, 57. 
35 First, 115. 
36 Lisa Anderson, The state and social transformation in 
Tunisia and Libya. 1830-1980, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), 261. 
37 Metz, 264. 
38 First, 104. 
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given non-sensitive staff jobs. 39 
As a result, it was hard to find any officer over the age 
of 30; the new air force commander, Saleh al-Farjani, was 
a typical 27.40 Notwithstanding the purge, the Libyan 
air force remained well disposed to America. In addition 
to their American training, the lack of an air force 
officer in the RCC may have created a sense of 
estrangement from the new regime. 41 By one account, 
Libyan fliers feared they would be absorbed into the 
Egyptian air force. 42 
In tandem with the purges the RCC began 
restructuring the armed forces. CYDEF and TRIDEF units 
were dissolved and absorbed into the regular army after 
being screened for loyalty . 
43 Some 800 Libyan troops 
sent to the Suez Canal region by King Idris were quietly 
recalled in March 1970 so that they too could be- 
44 
reabsorbed. 
The RCC was not content with reducing the influence 
of certain tribes. Tribalism itself was a heresy in the 
gospel of Arab nationalism, an anachronism that Qaddafi's 
39 Edward H. Kolcum, "Arab pilots to train at Wheelus, " 
AviRtinn Week & Space Technology (23 March 1970): 15. 
4o ibid. , 15. 
41 Jesse Lewis Jr., "Winds of change whistle across Wheelus 
runways, " Washington Post, 21 January 1970,14. 
42 Kolcum, 15. 
43 "The Libyan revolution in the words of its leaders, " 
M, tcl dle East Journal 24, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 219. 
44 Clare Hollingworth, "Libyans pull out of Suez, " Sunday 
Tejog ph, 15 March 1970. 
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Young Turks decided to abolish. This could only be 
accomplished by radically changing the fabric of 
traditional Libyan society. The RCC therefore introduced 
a number of fundamental reforms. Tribes were no longer 
recognized as legal institutions. 45 Administrative 
areas, which under the monarchy had been little more than 
tribal enclaves, had their boundaries carefully redrawn 
to enervate tribal controls. 46 Local government was 
placed in the hands of young technocrats rather than left 
to traditional sheikhs. 
Tribalism, however, proved more resilient than the 
RCC had imagined. The sheikhs reasserted their authority 
by covertly organizing resistance to the government's 
reforms. By 1973 the RCC conceded defeat and replaced 
the technocrats with a structure more amenable to tribal 
interests. A survey of the defeated technocrats revealed 
an overwhelming consensus (91.7%) that tribalism was the 
primary cause of their policy failures. "' 
Just as the RCC's rejection of the existing order 
betrayed the humble origins of its members, so too did 
the RCC's preoccupation with establishing its legitimacy 
reveal a profound sense of insecurity.. Lacking a 
democratic mandate, the Council tried sundry means of 
impressing its legitimacy upon the populace. Enforced 
Arabization, the partial imposition of Islamic law, the 
45 El Fathaly and Palmer, 58. 
46 ibid., 75. 
47 ibid., 84. 
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deportation of the Italian citizenry and the confiscation 
of their assets, the termination of foreign basing rights 
and the ceaseless rhetoric of the state propaganda 
machine were all attempts to reappropriate a 'legitimate' 
national identity. 
As Qaddafi became recognized as the primus inter 
pares in the RCC, the search for legitimacy quite 
naturally began to adhere in him. The government 
emphasized his piety and Bedouin roots, portraying 
Qaddafi as the personification of the 'revolution, ' which 
in turn supposedly embodied the will of the Libyan 
people. `3 Qaddafi played the role of Libyan Everyman 
with zeal, a role which facilitated reshaping the 
national identity in his own image. " 
In the short term, however, Qaddafi's retinue 
presented more immediate threats to his survival than did 
the prospect of popular revolt. The regime's first 
internal security crisis occurred a mere four months 
after the September coup. Lieutenant Colonels Adam El 
Hawaz and Musa Ahmed, Ministers of Defence and the 
Interior respectively, were arrested for plotting to 
invite the other members of the RCC to a dinner where the 
two could poison or arrest them. After 'confessing' 
under duress, the two were tried and sentenced to 
imprisonment. Following contrived 'popular' protests at 
48 Ansell and Al-Arif, 83. 
"' Andre Martel, La Libya 1835-1990: Essaa de o6op itt ue 
higtoriQue (Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1991), 193; 
Anderson, 260. 
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the lightness of their sentences, the two were retried 
and condemned to death. The death sentences were later 
commuted. 
The existence of any anti-RCC plot was dubious, and 
it may well be that the El Hawaz affair originated in 
less dramatic circumstances. There was, for example, bad 
blood between El Hawaz and the Egyptian military attache, 
Salah El Saadany. According to the latter, the 
distinguished El Hawaz was visibly annoyed by the need to 
play second string to the youthful Qaddafi and engaged in 
suspicious activities. 50 But El Hawaz and Mussa Ahmed 
reportedly opposed the pervasive Egyptian presence which 
Qaddafi had invited into the country (and which El 
Saadany represented), which casts the Egyptian's distrust 
in a different light. sl Whatever El Hawaz's sentiments 
towards Cairo, there were other forces at work. Shortly 
before his arrest, El Hawaz was touted by Africa Report 
as Qaddafi's leading--and more urbane--rival. 52 Qaddafi 
may have concocted the alleged plot simply to divest 
himself of a potential challenger. 
The El Hawaz incident was significant not for its 
own sake but because it led to the codification of the 
proposition that the RCC had to answer to no one except 
itself; such lack of accountability set the stage for the 
50 El Saadany, 30. 
s' "Libyan reshuffle, " Africa Report (March 1970): 4. 
52 Charles Brown, "The Libyan revolution sorts itself out, " 
Africa Report (December 1969): 12-15. 
76 
formulation of increasingly radical policies. Qaddafi 
used the alleged plot as a pretext for enacting draconian 
security clauses in the provisional constitution, clauses 
which authorized the RCC to jail anyone it deemed hostile 
to the 'revolution. v53 Article 18 of an RCC decree 
issued December 11,1969, stipulated: 
The Revolutionary Command Council is the 
highest authority in the Libyan Arab Republic 
.. In this capacity it may take any measures deemed necessary for the protection of the 
Revolution as well as the regime ... Measures 
adopted by the Revolutionary Command Council 
may not be challenged before any body. 
Extraordinary as this declaration of unaccountability 
was, the RCC's drift towards authoritarianism was 
discernible even before the El Hawaz affair. On October 
16,1969, Qaddafi squelched any prospects of organized 
political opposition, declaring 'after the first of 
September, he who engages in party activities commits 
treason. ' The following day the Interior Minister 
confirmed that political parties were permanently 
banned. 54 Anyone taking up arms against the 'revolution' 
would be sentenced to death. 55 Curbs on labor unions and 
the press were quickly implemented as well. 
Removing El Hawaz from office enabled Qaddafi to 
appropriate the defence portfolio, which he never again 
relinquished. His friend Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir became the 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff and was relegated to 
53 Africa Report (March 1970): 5. 
54 diddle East Journal 1970,206. 
55 Ansell and Al-Arif, 108-113. 
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predominantly ceremonial and administrative duties. The 
Egyptian military attach& discovered that Abu Bakr could 
not give any orders without Qaddafi's approval. 56 This 
prohibition soon expanded to other RCC members who 
presumed to involve themselves in security planning: 
I (El Saadany) inquired of Qaddafi whether 
members of the government other than himself 
had the authority to move Egyptian forces 
within Libya or bring additional forces from 
Egypt. He indicated that not a single Egyptian 
soldier should be moved or brought into Libya 
without his personal approval. " 
Another attempt to topple the fledgling regime 
occurred in July 1970. Prince Abdullah Abid Sanusi, a 
nephew of the deposed King who had a long-standing 
alliance with Omar El Shalhi, devised a plan to invade 
the Fezzan (the southern Libyan desert) from Chad. Word 
of the plot was leaked to the regime, an advance party 
was arrested having scarcely set foot inside Libya, and 
the uprising sputtered out. 5e Twenty plotters stood 
trial and an additional 400-500 police and military 
officers of the ancien regime were detained. Perhaps 
because of the magnitude of the scheme the RCC tread 
carefully. Most suspects were let off lightly and none 
of those condemned to death were actually executed. " 
Benghazi, the old Sanusi stronghold, was a hotbed of 
56 El Saadany, 40. 
57 ibid., 46. 
511 "Royalist coup uncovered, " Times, 25 July 1970. 
59 Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Oadhafi's revolution and the 
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anti-Egyptian and anti-RCC sentiment; in May 1970 a plot 
with tribal overtones was unearthed there (perhaps thanks 
to Egyptian intelligence) among army and police 
officials . 
60 A Baathist plot was crushed in September of 
the same year and sabotage of Qaddafi's plane detected 
the next month. 61 
Tensions lurked beneath the veneer of control. 
Splits within the RCC forced a cabinet reorganization in 
late 1970.62 Qaddafi forbade RCC members to travel 
abroad without his personal authorization. In November, 
on the eve of signing an agreement to form a federation 
with Egypt, the RCC ordered that telephone lines be cut 
and wireless radios removed from army units near Tripoli, 
leaving them incommunicado. This startling precaution 
was thought necessary to prevent officers who objected to 
the unification scheme from taking action. 63 Rumors of 
attempted assassination were frequent and Qaddafi's 
guests were thus surprised that his personal security 
arrangements appeared haphazard and lax. 64 
Journalists seized on one such rumor circulating in 
Rabat in July 1972 (relations with Morocco were severed 
60 First, 118; El Saadany, 46. 
61 El Saadany, 23. 
62 "Libya: Nasser's defeat, " An-Nahar Arab Report, 21 
September 1970. 
63 "Libyan struggle for power, " International Herald 
Tribune, 30 November 1970. 
64 e. g., Philip Norman, "The thundering silence of Colonel 
Gadhafi, " Sunday Times, 3 September 1972. 
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in 1971 after Qaddafi prematurely applauded an attempt to 
depose King Hassan) that Qaddafi had been deposed by 
Jalloud, who had announced the formation of a new 
cabinet. 65 These reports were only partially correct: 
though there had indeed been a power struggle within the 
RCC, it soon became evident that Qaddafi was still in 
control and in fact had emerged stronger than ever. The 
cabinet reorganization reflected Qaddafi's determination 
to ease out other potential adversaries, most of whom 
were fellow army officers. Consequently, Qaddafi 
demanded a civilian cabinet which disenfranchised many 
RCC members; in the end only Major Jalloud and Major 
Abdul-Moneim al-Houni represented the military. 66 Though 
in theory Qaddafi was still only the chairman of the RCC, 
he now exercised complete control over the council and, 
by extension, over Libya itself. 
Qaddafi's repeated resignations created further 
confusion for foreign observers. The first such 
resignation came on September 11,1971. Coincidentally, 
the following week Qaddafi's motor convoy was involved in 
a traffic accident after a truck careened into two of his 
motorcycle escorts. 67 As days passed and Qaddafi failed 
65 Andrew Wilson, "Mystery grows over Qadhafi, " Observer, 16 
July 1972. 
66 Elias Nawas, "Cabinet list indicates that Colonel Gaddafi 
has prevailed in Libya power struggle, " Times (London), 17 July 
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1972. 
67 James Goldsborough, "Qadhafi vs. his Libyan colleagues, " 
International Herald Tribune, 9 October 1971. 
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to appear in public, whispers of his assassination 
abounded. 68 Qaddafi deliberately fed the confusion by 
keeping out of sight until early October, when he 
suddenly announced he had withdrawn his resignation. "' 
(Nonetheless, on several occasions thereafter he again 
tendered his resignation, although after 1980 the Colonel 
made these resignations conditional so as not to supply a 
pretext for his removal). 70 In each instance Qaddafi 
laced his resignation with self-disparaging remarks which 
invited sycophantic correction, strongly suggesting that 
these half-hearted resignations were calculated to test 
the loyalty of Qaddafi's subordinates and allow him to 
reassert his authority. 
In 1973 Qaddafi reorganized Libyan political life 
into a system of popular congresses and committees, 
ostensibly to remedy the putative shortcomings of 
representative democracy. In reality the new organs 
worked hand in glove with the internal security services 
to ferret out the government's opponents. A 'cultural 
revolution' launched the same year began with sweeping 
arrests of Marxists, Baathists, and Islamists. 71 
The broad outlines of what would henceforth be the 
68 "Le colonel Kadhafi: n'a pas paru en public depuis le 18 
septembre, " Le Monde, 28 September 1971. 
69 "Qadhafi says he resigned top job, then decided to stay, " 
international Herald Tribune, 8 October 1971. 
70 Harris, 17. 
71 The New York Times suggested that as many as 1000 people 
were arrested. Henry Tanner, "Tough Libyan 'Cultural revolution' 
stresses merger with Egypt, " New York Times, 22 May 1973. 
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internal dimension of Libyan national security policy had 
thus already taken shape four years after power was 
wrested away from King Idris. Through the auspices of 
the RCC which he dominated, Qaddafi sought to dissolve 
all units--tribal and political--with sufficient cohesion 
to defy his authority. In addition, Qaddafi worked 
feverishly to establish his own legitimacy by emphasizing 
his Bedouin roots and his piety. But in his own mind the 
ultimate source of his legitimacy was not the will of the 
people but his neo-Nasserist vision. Thus we must turn 
to the external dimension of Libya's new national 
security policy to appreciate the full impact of 
Qaddafi's world view on the state's behavior. 
As a junior army officer, Qaddafi possessed scant 
experience of international affairs to guide him in 
reshaping Libya's external relations. Instead he had the 
strength of his convictions, foremost of which was the 
belief that Libya, like the entire Arab world, had been 
repeatedly victimized by the West--the most grievous 
evidence of which being the existence of the State of 
Israel. For Qaddafi, the existing international order 
was fundamentally inimical to Libyan interests; indeed, 
he saw the dangers posed by Israel and the industrialized 
world to the Arabs and newly developing states in almost 
Manichean terms. Consequently, he concluded that Libya 
could only achieve security by revamping that order, 
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particularly by uniting with other Arab states and 
conquering Israel. All that was required to accomplish 
this, Qaddafi believed, was to weld Libya to Egypt. 
Possessed of these certitudes, the young head-of- 
state lost no time in translating them into policy steps, 
many of which took aim at the Jewish state. A rapid 
stream of declarations spelled out the RCC's enmity to 
Israel, along with a promise that the new government's 
foreign policy would be pegged to the Palestinian 
cause. 72 A Jihad Fund was established in January 1970 to 
channel material support to Palestinian guerrillas. The 
Foreign Ministry set about countering Israel's diplomatic 
gains in sub-Saharan Africa and met with remarkable 
success; by 1973 some 26 African states had broken 
relations with Israel (although Tripoli's bargaining was 
but one of several factors behind Israel's diplomatic 
troubles in Africa). 
Scarcely 24 hours after seizing power the RCC 
invited President Nasser to send an emissary to meet its 
leader. Both parties agreed the Egyptian president's 
confidant, Mohammed Heikal, would serve the purpose, and 
Heikal arrived with a small team on September 3. They 
were the first foreign officials to learn Qaddafi's 
identity and to discover the earnestness and even naivete 
in the RCC's Nasserism; Heikal reported to Nasser that 
Qaddafi was 'scandalously pure. ' In a briefing that 
lasted until 4: 00 AM, Captain Mustafa El Kharoubi 
72 diddle East Journal 1970,218. 
83 
explained that the main goal of the Libyan 'revolution' 
was unity with Egypt. 73 The following day Qaddafi met 
the Egyptian delegation, confidently announced that the 
Western forces in Libya did not pose a 'serious problem' 
to his forces and demanded immediate unification with 
Egypt . 
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To fully appreciate the enormous significance of 
Qaddafi's overture to Nasser one must first consider the 
national security policy of the ancien regime. Its 
alignment was unabashedly pro-Western: America and Great 
Britain were Libya's patrons and the ultimate guarantors 
of its security; the principal external threat stemmed 
from Egypt. This arrangement was codified in a twenty 
year renewable treaty of friendship with Britain signed 
on July 29,1953, by which Britain undertook to defend 
Libya from external aggression. London also agreed to 
train and equip the Libyan army and create a navy. In 
tandem to this formal agreement was an unspoken 
understanding that Britain would aid the King in 
suppressing internal dissidence. In July 1958, when the 
Iraqi monarch was overthrown, Britain reaffirmed its 
gentleman's agreement with King Idris by flying 
reinforcements to Cyrenaica. 75 In return Libya granted 
Britain over flight privileges, use of El Adem airbase, 
73 El Saadany, B. 
" El Saadany, 9-10. 
75 Wright, 88. 
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and the right to station troops in the country. 76 
Libya entered into a similar renewable treaty with 
the United States on September 9,1954, which gave the 
United States use of Wheelus Field until 1970. In 1957 a 
U. S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) began 
training Libyan army personnel. 77 In 1960 the Libyan 
government informally requested help in launching an air 
force; a formal request followed in 1962. The United 
States supplied instructors and two T-33 jet trainers the 
following year. In 1964 it was estimated that a quarter 
of all Libyan officers had trained in the U. S., and more 
had trained in Britain. 78 Thereafter, the MAAG program 
furnished the Libyan Air Force with four more T-33s, six 
C-47s, and two helicopters. 
At the time this treaty was signed, diplomats did 
not fully anticipate the regional repercussions of 
Nasserism, as revealed by the comments of Henry Villard, 
the first U. S. Chief of Mission to Libya: 
The engineers who built Wheelus Field have not 
built their house out of sand ... For its 
part, Libya has in effect acquired a powerful 
new protector in addition to its British ally. 
As a stakeholder in Libya's future, the United 
States, it stands to reason, will have a 
natural interest in the defense of that none 
too strongly unified country. What that means 
to a young nation, in no position to defend 
itself should a third world war break out, is 
76 "Libya: The military treaties with the U. K and the 
U. S. A., " Africa Institute Bulletin, July 1964,205. 
77 it helping to train army and air force, " New York 
HE+raid Tribune, 4 March 1964. 
78 ibid. 
85 
clear enough. 79 
The foundations of the Wheelus Field arrangement turned 
out to be shakier than Mr. Villard believed. Despite its 
Western alignment, the monarchy was slowly forced to 
adopt a security policy attuned to the budding 
nationalist sentiments of the populace. 80 For example, 
French troops which had been permitted to remain in the 
Fezzan for the first few years of Libya's existence were 
told to leave by the end of 1956; subsequently, Libya 
permitted arms shipments to traverse the Fezzan en route 
to Algerian nationalists. Support for the foreign basing 
arrangement also waned. The transfer of the U. S. 17th 
Air Force headquarters from Morocco to Libya met 
considerable opposition in the Libyan parliament. 81 The 
bases had become a sore spot for several reasons. Most 
Libyans believed the British had flown sorties from Libya 
against Egypt during the 1956 Suez War. Moreover, the 
affluence of the military communities, in contrast to 
Libya's abject poverty, made them a locus of political 
disgruntlement. 82 
Far-sighted British observers, noting how the Arab 
nationalist rumblings about the bases rattled the self- 
confidence of the Sanusi regime, saw the writing on the 
79 Henry Villard, Libya*. The new Arab kingdom of North 
a (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), 142. 
80 E. A. V. DeCandole, 132-135. 
81 Wright, 83,85-86. 
82 "Libya: The military treaties with the U. K. and the 
U. S. A., " Africa Institute Bulletin (July 1964): 206. 
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wall. In a prescient article published in 1959, one 
officer argued that the limited strategic value of 
Britain's Libyan facilities did not justify their 
expense. He foresaw that in a crisis domestic sentiment 
would make the shaky Sanusi regime an unreliable ally, 
proscribing Britain's freedom of action as in 1956. The 
Libyan population, though not hostile, was: 
. by no means as friendly as many would have us believe ... (consequently) the troops 
required to guard our installations in Libya 
would outnumber those available for offensive 
operations, which after all is the main purpose 
of having a foreign base. 83 
Furthermore, he astutely noted: 'the fact that there may 
be a secret "Young Officer's Society" of the type common 
in Middle Eastern armies, in the Libyan army, cannot be 
completely ruled out-'84 
The Egyptian president also sensed that the monarchy 
was vulnerable to public opinion. Nasser denounced the 
foreign presence in Libya on February 22,1964.85 The 
next day Libya requested an early abrogation of the 
treaties. Consequently, Great Britain and the United 
States began to cast around for alternative facilities. 
The British began lengthening the runways at Luga, Malta, 
to accommodate the long-range transport aircraft that had 
83 Major E. O'Ballance, "Libya as a base, " Army guar_ terry 
(1959): 69. 
84 O'Ballance, 68. 
85 Nasser said of the foreign bases: (they) 'constitute a 
threat to us and all the Arabs' ("Libyan cross-currents, " Ti__ ems 
(London), 23 March 1964). Ironically, this was the very charge 
that Qaddafi would hurl back at Egypt scarcely a decade later. 
87 
been dependent on the Libyan bases. " Losing Wheelus 
would cause training headaches so the Americans stalled 
for time, but they were aware that pressure to leave 
could mount again at any time. 87 The Six Day War made 
the internal vulnerability of the Sanusi government stand 
out in sharp relief. Mobs ransacked the U. S. Information 
Service library in Benghazi. The request for withdrawal 
from Wheelus was renewed. The United States began 
serious study of alternatives to its arrangements with 
Libya. Likewise, heads in Britain concluded there was 
'no pressing military reason' to retain a Libyan 
presence. 88 Thus, throughout 1968 Britain quietly 
withdrew units from Libya. 89 
With the departure of the British and the Americans 
only a matter of time, the monarchy was obliged to assume 
responsibility for its own defense. Egypt--ambitious and 
oil-hungry--was regarded as the main foreign threat. 90 
Distrust of Cairo had been heightened when an Egyptian 
police captain directed the sabotage of an oil 
86 "Malta Alternative, " Times (London), 24 August 1964. 
87 Weldon Wallace, "U. S. air base hopes to stay, " Baltimore 
$ý, 6 June 1965. 
88 George Ashworth, "U. S. hunts Wheelus replacement. " 
rhr{ st{ an Science Monitor, 19 June 1967; cf. "Backlash of Mideast 
war: Libya turns on the U. S., " U. S. News and World Report (21 
August 1967): 48. 
89 For details see Africa Report (1 April 1968). 
90 "Libya: The Military treaties with the U. K. and the 
U. S. A., " Africa Institute Bulletin (July 1964): 206. 
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installation in Marsa al-Brega on July 22,1965.91 The 
monarchy therefore turned to Britain for help in 
upgrading its defenses. In 1967 Libya placed a contract 
worth over £130 million with the British Aircraft 
Corporation for an air defense (AD) system including 
radar, Rapier short-range surface-to-air missiles, and 
high-altitude Thunderbird missiles. The Libyan 
government made no secret of the fact that its AD system 
was purchased with the Egyptian Air Force in mind. 92 The 
next year an order followed for 200 Chieftain tanks, a 
sale which was defended in the British Parliament on the 
grounds that Libya needed the tanks for defence against 
Egypt (and were not intended for use against Israel). " 
The Libyan air force negotiated the purchase of twenty 
American F-5s, while the navy paid England another eleven 
million pounds for a frigate, a corvette, three patrol 
boats and a depot ship. 94 
These purchases were later lampooned by one writer 
for having 'less to do with war than with business. '95 
This was not an entirely fair criticism. Certainly 
corruption was rife--officials under the monarchy were 
91 Africa Report (March 1966); see also The New York Time-q. 
20 January 1966. 
92 "New Middle East deal in view, " Flight InternatinnaI, 28 
September 1967. 
93 "British tanks for Libya?, " Times, 8 December 1969. 
94 David Fairhall, "The Libyan void, " Guardian, 31 October 
1969. 
95 First, 95. 
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renowned for their venality. 96 Nevertheless, without a 
Western presence the kingdom did in fact stand vulnerable 
to Egyptian intervention. The army did not possess a 
single tank, nor were its soldiers proficient in even 
rudimentary military skills. The largest functional 
units were companies. In fact, a year after the RCC 
seized power the Egyptian military training mission had 
to work frantically simply to ensure that the army could 
parade properly. 97 Under the circumstances the monarchy 
had little choice but to invest the requisite sums to 
strengthen its hitherto neglected forces. For the 
interim, however, the King still looked to London and 
Washington to provide for his defence. This pro-Western 
orientation met its demise with the Sanusi throne in 
September 1969. 
His imagination fired by Nasser's eloquence, Qaddafi 
told Heikal to inform the Egyptian President that 'we 
made this revolution for him. ' But in a telling 
afterthought, Qaddafi presumed to give the Egyptian 
leader a lesson in strategy: 
(Nasser) ... is forgetting depth. Libya 
represents depth. We have hundreds of miles of 
Mediterranean coastline; we have the airfields; 
we have the money; we have everything! Tell 
President Nasser we made this revolution for 
him. He can take everything of ours and add it 
to the rest of the Arab world's resources to be 
used for the battle. 98 
96 A point Qaddafi often made. Ansell and Al-Arif, 83; 
Parker, 66. 
97 El Saadany, 51-52. 
98 Heikal, 70. 
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Qaddafi's enthusiasm outstripped his strategic awareness. 
The young Libyan was wrong; Nasser had not forgotten 
depth. Cairo's strategic alliance with Khartoum had the 
express aim of providing strategic depth. Furthermore, 
Nasser had occasionally sheltered Egyptian warplanes in 
Algeria where they were safely beyond the reach of the 
Israeli air force. Nasser was nevertheless elated by the 
prospect of further enlarging Egypt's strategic 
hinterland, and responded to this windfall by rushing 
army and naval units to fend off any foreign attempts to 
reinstate the deposed monarchy. 99 
On September 5,1969, the RCC requested that Cairo 
dispatch a contingent of military advisers to bolster the 
Libyan armed forces. 100 The Egyptian military attache 
set up shop in the Libyan Ministry of Defence compound 
and began the task of redesigning the Libyan armed 
forces. Within three months at least 500 'technical and 
military advisers' were placed at the RCC's disposal. '°' 
This number soon rose to an estimated 2000 Egyptian 
soldiers. 102 These advisers supervised a general 
restructuring of the Libyan army. Soon plans were 
underway to turn the facilities at Wheelus Air Base into 
99 ibid., 71-72. 
100 El Saadany, 12. 
101 David Leitch, "Debre sells Libya French know-how, " Sunday 
fig, 25 January 1970. 
102 Alan MacDougall, "Libya, " in Fighting armies! Antagonists 
in the Middle East, ed. Richard Gabriel, (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1983), 140. 
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a joint Libyan-Egyptian air academy, and to harbor 
Egyptian MiG-21 interceptors and Su-7 fighters there. 103 
The Libyan military academy was abolished, and in the 
interim Libyan cadets studied at Egyptian academies. 
Fathi Deeb, a senior Egyptian official, was reportedly 
entrusted with organizing the new Libyan intelligence 
service. 104 Libyan military assets were routinely spoken 
of as a supplement to Egyptian strength in preparation 
for further combat with Israel. When Qaddafi and Nasser 
met for the first time in December 1969 the Libyan 
pressed for immediate military unification and the two 
leaders reviewed proposals for a joint war council. 105 
The influx of Egyptian aid gave the Soviet bloc 
another opportunity to cultivate Tripoli. In April 1970 
the Soviets tried, through Cairo's auspices, to obtain 
access for its fleet to the harbor facilities at Tobruk. 
In addition, the USSR hoped to station reconnaissance 
aircraft at the El Adem airbase which the British had 
recently abandoned. 106 Qaddafi remained suspicious of 
the Soviets' advances and critical of Egypt's dependency 
upon communist advisers. However, Russian technicians 
were reportedly included in the Egyptian contingent that 
103 Edward Kolcum, "Arab pilots to train at Wheelus, " 
Aviation week & space technology, 23 March 1970,14. 
104 "Libya: Phantom government, " An-Nahar Arab Report, 14 
September 1970,2. 
105 El Saadany, 28-29. 
106 Clare Hollingworth, "Russia seeks facilities in Libya, " 
Daily Telegraph, 21 April 1970. 
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occupied El Adem, and may have served elsewhere in Libya 
even at this early date. 107 
Beneath this enamorment with Cairo lay the driving 
force of Qaddafi's world view. Qaddafi was dazed to find 
himself standing shoulder to shoulder with Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, an act which he believed gave him a domestic 
legitimacy far greater than that bequeathed by any 
referendum. He was particularly gratified when Nasser 
designated him 'the trustee of Arab nationalism' during a 
rally in Benghazi. Shortly after Nasser's death Libya 
was swamped with posters showing the Egyptian leader, now 
an angel, passing the deed of Arab nationalism to 
Qaddafi. 108 
Paradoxically, Nasser's death probably came as a 
relief to both men. Restraining Qaddafi's zeal wearied 
the ailing Egyptian President. 1109 Yet he was repeatedly 
forced to disabuse Qaddafi of 'the extremely simplistic 
way in which he looked at the problems of war and 
peace. 1110 For his part, Qaddafi was ill at ease with 
his mentor's readiness to supplant pan-Arabist ideals 
with political pragmatism, as when Nasser agreed to a 90 
day cease-fire arranged by the United States during the 
1970.107 
Colvin, "Russians move in, " Daily Telegraph, 29 April 
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109 Anwar El Sadat, In search of identity: An autnhiographV 
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War of Attrition. ui Qaddafi's discomfort betrayed a 
fundamental asynchrony in their outlooks. Qaddafi's 
brand of Nasserism--fiery, rebellious, confrontational-- 
was one that Nasser himself had begun to outgrow. Unlike 
Qaddafi, Nasser had come face to face with the disastrous 
consequences such an ideology could produce, and painful 
experience had tempered his judgement. 112 It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that had Nasser 
survived, Qaddafi's ambitions would have inevitably 
impinged upon his deference to the Egyptian President. 
Indeed, one can speculate that by 1973 Qaddafi had grown 
to see Nasser less as a mentor to be emulated than as a 
forerunner to be surpassed; Qaddafi would be Jesus to 
Nasser's John the Baptist. At the very least, Qaddafi 
saw Nasser--even in death--as a rival. In point of fact, 
in 1973 Qaddafi forbade the display of statues and 
posters of Nasser on the grounds that they were 
inappropriate for an egalitarian state--a consideration 
which did not prevent his own image from becoming de 
rigueur. 113 
The second facet of Libya's security orientation was 
eliminating the presence of Western forces inside its 
borders. Reneging on the RCC pledge not to abrogate any 
111 El Saadany, 50-51. 
112 For an elegant comparison of Qaddafi's Nasserism to 
Nasser's, see Fouad Adjami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 93. 
113 "Libyan, in anti-atheist move bars portraits of leaders, " 
,, tee., ynrk Times, 18 February 1973. 
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extant treaties, on October 16,1969, Qaddafi called upon 
Great Britain and the United States to evacuate their 
Libyan bases. He even warned that force would be used to 
reclaim the bases if necessary. '" 
This was a risky step for Qaddafi, insomuch as it 
represented his government's first direct challenge to 
the interests of two major foreign powers. Since such 
challenges would come to characterize the 
counterproductive nature of Libyan state behavior, it is 
important to understand why Qaddafi was able to make this 
demand with impunity. 
Firstly, Qaddafi's victory was made hollow by the 
fact that neither the British nor the Americans were much 
perturbed. As we have seen, both powers had long ago 
concluded that their Libyan bases were of negligible 
strategic import. Though Libya retained some 
significance as a supplier of oil, the advent of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles deprived it of its 
former strategic import as a staging ground for U. S. 
bombers. In any event, the leases on the bases were 
already set to expire in 1970 and 1973. 
Second, Qaddafi was also the beneficiary of a long 
series of fruitless Western interventions in the Third 
World, not least the on-going war in Vietnam. Rather 
than swim against the tide of Arab nationalism, the U. S. 
State Department hoped conciliatory gestures would 
114 "Libya asks U. S. to leave air base now, " International 
j ]l Tribune, 22 October 1969. 
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channel that nationalism against a Soviet bid for 
influence (ironically, the Soviets were equally 
optimistic about co-opting the new 'anti-imperialist' 
regime). 115 Moreover, the Americans had always assumed 
that the British would intervene should their Libyan 
interests be threatened. 116 But in the event, London 
settled upon appeasement for much the same reason 
Washington did. The acting ambassador, Peter Wakefield, 
ascribed the Foreign Office's lack of action to the still 
all too vivid memories of Suez. 117 
In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger recalls being 
frustrated by such timidity: 
A study was prepared of economic and political 
pressure points on Libya; but the agencies did 
not have their heart in it. All options 
involving action were rejected, causing me to 
exclaim that I was averse to submitting to the 
President a paper that left us with the 
proposition that we could do nothing. My 
reluctance did not change a consensus along 
precisely those lines. According to the 
dominant view, the real danger of 
radicalization resided in our opposition to 
Qaddafi. 118 
The dominant view prevailed, and Washington resolved to 
befriend the new regime. Thus the Americans departed 
Wheelus Air Force Base on June 11,1970--almost three 
its Pravda, 16 November 1969. 
116 A belief spelled out in declassified National Security 
Council memoranda from 1960 and 1967 (Blundy and Lycett, 51-52). 
il' Blundy and Lycett, 60. 
118 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1982), emphasis in the original, 
860. 
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weeks ahead of schedule. 119 
The third facet of Libya's reorientation was the 
expansion and modernization of the military. On 
September 10,1969, Qaddafi told the Egyptian news 
agency: 
My work in the coming stage will focus on 
reorganizing the three branches of the armed 
forces--army, air force, and navy. I will work 
in accordance with the instructions of the 
Revolutionary Command Council to equip the 
Libyan Army with the most modern weapons in the 
light of the most modern military tactics in 
the world--from East or West. '2° 
On October 14 he reiterated his intention 'to apply the 
most modern military systems. ' 121 Qaddafi complained 
that under the Sanusi regime enlisted men functioned as 
domestic servants instead of as professional soldiers. 
Officers were 'far removed from military spirit' and were 
closer to merchants; it was not unheard of for officers 
to moonlight at different jobs during normal working 
hours. '22 Qaddafi aimed to rectify this situation and 
create 'a modern military force on a basis of co- 
ordination and integration with Arab military forces. 1123 
Such integration, he believed, was essential if the Arabs 
were to defeat Israel. 
Libya's military modernization began with a review 
119 "U. S. Evacuates Libyan base as demanded by new regime, " 
Tn -ernati onal Herald Tribune, 12 June 1970. 
120 Middle East Journal 1970,219. 
121 ibid. 
122 Ansell and Al-Arif, 81-82. 
123 ibid. 
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of outstanding arms orders. As previously noted, King 
Idris had already set in motion efforts to re-equip the 
armed forces in preparation for the Anglo-American 
departure. Just two weeks before the September coup the 
monarchy announced a significant budget increase for 
modernizing the armed forces, and during the preceding 
two years the King had spent at least £120 million and 
perhaps as much as £190 million on modernization. 124 Yet 
the RCC's modernization campaign was more a reversal than 
an extension of this trend. Qaddafi's agenda aimed at 
giving Libya a capacity for offensive operations rather 
than a sound national defence force (how else to destroy 
the 'Zionist entity'? ). 125 This preference became 
increasingly explicit over time. For example, in 1973 
Qaddafi derided the SAMS offered by the Soviet Union: 
'What advantage do we get from these missiles? To defend 
ourselves only, while we are in need of an offensive 
armament. ' 126 
Yet Libya's commander-in-chief was ill-prepared for 
the task of designing a military force with balanced, 
sustainable offensive capabilities. His previous 
commands had been insignificant and his military 
education lacking: the tiny Libyan military academy had 
barely been established when he studied there, and his 
124 "Libyan army budget, " Financial Times, 19 August 1969. 
125 Wright, 201. 
126 Mu' ammar El Qathafi, Discourses by Mu' a mar el-Oathafi 
ýn, p.: Adam Publishers, 1975), 28-29. 
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only other significant training was a signals course in 
England. He had never attended a Command and Staff 
College or its equivalent and was untrained in the 
operational art. This lack of advanced military 
education revealed itself when El Saadany sought 
Qaddafi's views on restructuring the Libyan army. 
Qaddafi would not elucidate his strategic vision, leading 
the attach& to suspect that the Libyan leader was unsure 
of how to proceed. 127 
Consequently, arms procurement was haphazard and 
imbalanced from the perspective of combined arms. Unable 
to resolve problems of standardization, the regime opted 
to equip some units with Western arms and others with 
Soviet equipment. The only constant which guided 
Qaddafi's impetuous procurement policies was a penchant 
for firepower and state of the art technology. An 
early casualty of this approach was the air defence 
contract awarded to the British Aircraft Corporation 
(BAC) by the monarchy. The deal stuck in the craw of the 
RCC for several reasons. First, Qaddafi accused 
officials in the previous government of ordering an 
overpriced system in exchange for hefty bribes: 'Those 
who tried to corrupt the armed forces must be brought to 
account. Those who traded in the name of the armed 
forces must be punished. 1128 Second, the RCC objected to 
the system's envisaged deployment along the Tunisian and 
12' El Saadany, 22. 
128 Middle East Journal 1970,204. 
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Egyptian borders rather than along the Mediterranean 
coastline. To Qaddafi and his followers the thought of 
deploying an air defence system against their Arab 
neighbors was nothing less than scandalous, a reaction 
that epitomized the distinction between the current and 
former governments' security orientations. 129 In 
contrast to King Idris, the young Nasserites-reserved 
their apprehensions for the U. S. Sixth Fleet and the 
Soviet Eskadra operating along the extensive shoreline 
which Libya's new air defenses would not cover. 3.30 
Finally, Qaddafi suspected the British saw the BAC deal 
as a means of retaining influence in Libya by sending 
large numbers of technicians to operate and maintain the 
system. After weighing these considerations, the RCC 
announced it would not honor the BAC contract. 
The Libyans did, however, wish to complete the 
purchase of Chieftain main battle tanks, and Whitehall 
tentatively attempted to use both the BAC and Chieftain 
contracts as leverage to salvage some form of basing and 
overflight rights. 131 Then still-Defence Minister El 
Hawaz retorted that the RCC would buy its tanks from the 
Soviet Union if Britain cancelled the Chieftain order. 132 
129 economist, 15 November 1969; Frederick Muscat, My. 
+res dent', my son (Malta: Adam Publishers, 1974), 91. 
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Apparently believing that Tripoli was bluffing, London 
doggedly attempted to salvage the BAC contract by linking 
it to the Chieftain sale. 133 Deliveries of the 
Chieftains due to begin in December 1969 were 
indefinitely delayed. 131 The Guardian editorialized: 
'Libya should therefore agree to accept the air defence 
system in return for continued delivery of Chieftain 
tanks .' 
135 
As it turned out, Tripoli was not bluffing and 
delivered on its threat to buy Soviet tanks. Shipments 
of T-54 and T-55 tanks, light armored vehicles and 
amphibious vehicles commenced in July 1970.136 A few 
months later, Qaddafi's second-in-command, Abdul Salam 
Jalloud, demanded a refund of Libya's £41 million 
downpayment on the BAC and Chieftain orders (and brashly 
demanded another £16 million for good measure). It was 
nevertheless clear that the Libyans still wanted to buy 
British tanks, albeit with no strings attached. Jalloud 
rejected out of hand a British proposal to replace the 
Chieftains with older Centurion tanks, and also balked at 
the precondition of pledging not to use the tanks against 
Israel. To the contrary, he asserted that Libya would 
133 However, the Economist advised against such linkage. See 
"Solomon might know what to do, " Economist, 15 November 1969. 
134 "British tanks for Libya?, " Times, 8 December 1969. 
135 Terence Prittie, "Complex talks with Libya, " Guardian, 
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136 Ian McDonald, "Libya gets tanks from Russia, " Time,, 23 
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'naturally' use the tanks to 'recover lost Arab 
lands. ' 137 
If London underestimated Tripoli's resolve to cancel 
the BAC deal, Tripoli likewise failed to appreciate that 
the Chieftain sale would not proceed in such an 
atmosphere no matter what Jalloud's negotiating tactics. 
Once the downpayments were refunded, Jalloud promised, 
Libya would purchase British radars and armored cars. 
Should a refund not be forthcoming, he hinted at 
repercussions on British oil interests in Libya. 138 
Neither carrot nor stick worked, and Whitehall pronounced 
the Chieftain order dead a few weeks later. IL39 
The Libyan army continued its drive towards 
mechanization by negotiating the purchase of hundreds of 
Land Rovers and Bedford Lorries in February 1971.140 
However, the regime explicitly pegged improved relations 
with Britain on the Chieftains issue. Tripoli still 
balked at restrictions on Libya's use of its weaponry; 
Israel, Jalloud claimed, hoped to expand into Libya or 
the Sudan within six or seven years. 141 The British were 
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141 Richard Johns, "Libya to insist on supply of Chieftain 
tanks, " Financial Times, 26 April 1971. 
102 
not swayed by this supposition, and Tripoli turned to yet 
another supplier. In August 1972 Libya began purchasing 
used M-113 (U. S. -designed) armored personnel carriers, 
including amphibious models, from Italy. 142 The irony of 
purchasing arms from Libya's former colonial power was 
apparently lost upon the RCC. 
In parallel to this modernization of its ground 
forces Tripoli undertook a drastic expansion of its air 
power. In this the Libyans were aided by the French, who 
were anxious to fill the gap left by the Americans and 
British. Scarcely a month after the September coup the 
French ambassador brooked the subject of supplying the 
new regime with Mirage fighters more sophisticated than 
those in any Arab arsenal at the time. 143 (Moreover, 
these were planes which had originally been destined for 
Israel in a sale which Paris ultimately cancelled. ) The 
two parties settled on a deal for 100 warplanes: 50 
Mirage V fighter-bombers, 30 Mirage III-B interceptors, 
and 20 Mirages for training and reconnaissance. The 60 
million pound deal was the largest arms sale in French 
history, and included provisions for 1000 French 
technicians to train the Libyan Air Force. 144 
The sale drew considerable international criticism 
142 "Italy is said to be selling tanks to Libya, " 
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for potentially upsetting the Arab-Israeli balance of 
power. The French Prime Minister therefore tried to cast 
the contract in purely defensive terms: 
These machines are required by the Libyan 
Government to give Libya a defense system 
guaranteeing its security. I would point out 
that Libya is a country--from the point of view 
of territory, one and a half times the size of 
France--with a very small population, less than 
2,000,000 inhabitants; that this country 
possesses fabulous oil wealth which could make 
it, if not the first, one of the leading 
producers in the wold; and that this situation 
could well excite covetousness in the future. 
.. the Libyan Government believes that it is 
necessary to assure itself of means of defence. 
As it can not base its defenses on big 
battalions, it seems to it that it must have an 
adequate air force flown by Libyan pilots. "" 
Tel Aviv was justifiably skeptical of the unenforceable 
terms of sale which forbade Libya from transferring the 
planes to Egypt for use against Israel. The entire 
Libyan air force (all 400 men and 60 officers) had only 
10 qualified fighter pilots--not even enough to provide 
alternate crews for each of its seven remaining F-5s. 146 
Moreover, the air force lacked ground crews capable of 
maintaining so many planes. 147 
It was not long before Israel's fears were realized. 
Well before Libya took possession of its first Mirage, 
the Libyan pilots had washed out of the French training 
145 Keesing's, 23809A. 
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many excuses, " Economist, 17 January 1970,29. 
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program and were replaced by Egyptians in Libyan 
uniforms. 148 Libya had consulted with Egypt from the 
outset of the sale and pledged to loan the planes for the 
'war effort'; furthermore, the French negotiators 
privately--but explicitly--assured the Libyans they could 
employ the aircraft against Israel, and the proviso 
against transferring Mirages to Egypt only applied to 
'permanent transfer' (i. e., for more than five months at 
a time). 149 In February 1971 Qaddafi publicly stated 
that Libya was free to use the planes as it saw fit. 15° 
Although Paris was eager to equip Libya's ground 
forces as well, Qaddafi was more interested in expanding 
the air deal. During a state visit in November 1973, 
Qaddafi asked President Pompidou to replace the 
outstanding Mirage-III jets on order with the more 
advanced Mirage F-1 interceptor. 181 Libya tried to buy 
an additional thirty F-ls the following year. 152 
In need of an AD system to protect its Mirage jets, 
the regime looked for an alternative to the cancelled BAC 
deal. On April 7,1970, a delegation travelled to Moscow 
seeking 'state of the art' interceptors. For its SAM 
148 "Libyan pilots trained in France ' were Egyptian, '" Times, 
17 February 1971. 
149 El Saadany 1994,27. 
15° "Libyan pilots trained in France 'were Egyptian, '" Times, 
17 February 1971. 
151 Francis Hope, "Qadhafi shops for Mirages, " Observer, 25 
November 1973. 
152 "Talks on buying 30 new Mirages, " Middle East Economic 
, 18 October 
1974. 
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batteries Tripoli successfully placed an £8 million order 
for Tigercat SAMs with London. However, the British were 
incensed when in July 1971 Qaddafi's unarmed executive 
jet forced down a BOAC plane en route to the Sudan, where 
an anti-Numeiri coup had just taken place. The coup 
leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Babiker el-Nur and Major 
Farouk Mandullah, were travelling with Whitehall's 
blessing. When their capture was announced the putsch 
crumbled. Qaddafi handed the pair over to Numeiri, and 
they were promptly executed. 153 Notably, Qaddafi's 
gambit brought few dividends either in Sudan (where 
relations with Numeiri soon faltered) or in England, 
where Whitehall retaliated by cancelling the Tigercat 
contract. 
To summarize, Qaddafi's government dramatically 
redefined the meaning of Libyan security in terms that 
set the state at odds with Israel and the West. That it 
was the RCC's prerogative to so conceptualize and pursue 
Libya's national interests is indisputable; whether its 
new policy would further those interests remained to be 
seen. 
Confrontation and Extremism 
The interaction between the RCC's internal and 
external national security policies was volatile. 
Qaddafi's lack of accountability combined with his world 
153 "Libya row may lose £8M contract, " Guardian, 31 July 
1971. 
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view to sweep his state into a vortex of increasingly 
aggressive behavior. This aggressiveness was epitomized 
by Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip in May 1973 and 
the proclamation of sovereignty over the Gulf of Sirte in 
the same year. 154 Qaddafi justified his claims in the 
Mediterranean by invoking Libya's need for security: 
'Because of the Gulf's geographical location-commanding a 
view of the Southern (sic) part of the country, it is, 
therefore, crucial to the security of the Libyan Arab 
Republic. 115 Moreover, 'everything concerning the 
security of the Mediterranean ... must be of great 
interest to all Arab countries. ' 256 How then were the 
Arabs to find security in the Mediterranean? 
I believe the best way of achieving this aim 
would be that the littoral Mediterranean 
countries should acknowledge that their 
interests and their security are threatened by 
the presence of the Great Powers in this sea. 
Only then would they put any real effort into 
neutralisation ... is' 
Diplomacy was but one key to Qaddafi's Mediterranean 
aspirations. Scarcely a month after seizing power 
Qaddafi called for a surge in Arab seapower: 
The tendency in the Arab homeland, and not only 
in Libya, and more particularly in countries 
lying along the Mediterranean shores, should be 
towards the navy in the first place, followed, 
154 Libya's relations with Chad are examined in Chapter Five. 
155 Dennis R. Neutze, "The Gulf of Sidra incident: A legal 
perspective, " U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings 108 (January 
1982), 28. 
156 Mirella Bianco, Gadafi: Voice from the desert (London: 
Longman Group Ltd., 1975), 156. 
157 Bianco, 157. 
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in the second place, by the air force. "' 
On October 11,1973, Libya declared sovereignty over the 
Gulf of Sirte to latitude 32 degrees and 30 minutes, an 
invisible line running from Misurata to Benghazi--the 
infamous 'line of death. ' The timing of the declaration 
was significant. To the east the Yom Kippur War raged 
and Egypt had already declared Israel's coastal waters a 
war zone to intimidate merchant shipping. In this 
context, the Libyan declaration was guaranteed Arab 
approval, although the linkage between the Gulf of Sirte 
and the Arab war effort was questionable at best. 
Qaddafi clearly intended to deny the Gulf to foreign 
navies, notably the U. S. Sixth Fleet. Furthermore, by 
declaring the Gulf of Sirte to be internal Libyan waters, 
he in effect tried to deny an even greater section of the 
Mediterranean to"foreign navies. With the 32.5 parallel 
as their baseline, Libya's territorial waters would 
extend northward for an additional twelve miles. Within 
this area foreign ships would still enjoy freedom of 
passage but not the right to conduct military 
exercises. '" 
Qaddafi believed the Gulf was vital because it 
dipped 'inside the guts of Libya. 1160 However, the 
Libyan claim contravened the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
158 Ansell and Al Arif, 82. 
159 Neutze, 29. 
160 SWB ME/0481/A/8,13 June 1989. 
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the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 161 According to 
Article 7, a bay must have a mouth of less than 24 miles 
(in contrast, the mouth of the Gulf of Sirte as 
delineated by Qaddafi extends for some 300 miles). 
Libya's only legal recourse was to take refuge in a 
loophole recognizing historic bays. Thus, Tripoli 
asserted: 'Through history and without any dispute, the 
Libyan Arab Republic has exercised its sovereignty over 
the Gulf. 1162 
This was not the first time Qaddafi displayed 
hegemonic ambitions in the Mediterranean. In fact, by 
one account the LAF had already endangered innocent 
shipping by mining portions of the Gulf, an act which may 
have caused the sinking of two ships, one Greek and one 
Lebanese. 163 In June 1972 Libya restricted the airspace 
within a 100 mile radius of Tripoli in defiance of the 
conventional 12 mile zone. '" On March 21,1973, two 
Libyan Mirage fighters fired on a U. S. C-130 flying a 
reconnaissance mission eighty miles from the Libyan 
coast. Although the C-130 escaped unharmed, firing on an 
161 See paragraphs four and seven of Article Seven of the 
"Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, " Geneva, 
29 April 1958, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Treaty 
Series No. 3,1965), Command 2511. 
162 Neutze, 28. 
163 William Gutteridge, "Libya: Still a threat to Western 
interests?, " Conflict Studies no. 160 (London: Institute for the 
study of conflict, 1984), 17. 
164 Hossein Alikhani, In the claw of the eagle: A guide to 
Y sanctions against Libva (London: Centre for Business 
Studies, 1995), 9. 
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unarmed aircraft in international airspace was an 
extraordinary provocation--and a profoundly risky one 
since the aircraft in question belonged to a superpower. 
The United States quietly manifested its determination to 
preserve free access to international waters and 
airspace. On April 30,1973, three Libyan Mirages were 
intercepted by fourteen carrier-based F-4 Phantoms flying 
40 miles off the Libyan coast north of Tripoli. 165 The 
American jets played cat-and-mouse with the Libyan 
pilots. In response to this quiet show of strength, 
Qaddafi dramatically placed Libya on 'war alert. "166 
Appropriation of the Gulf of Sirte was a logical 
extension of this pattern, based on Qaddafi's overarching 
desire to upset the existing international order. After 
laying claim to the Gulf in September 1973, Libya seized 
five Italian fishing trawlers operating in 'Libyan 
waters. ' To reinforce its point, Libyan air force jets 
attacked an Italian navy corvette 33 miles off the Libyan 
coast on September 21.167 Two Italian sailors were 
injured by machine gun fire. The despised Italians were 
popular targets for the RCC: on October 7,1970, all 
Italian assets in Libya were nationalized and Italian 
expatriates were ordered to leave the country. 
165 Anthony McDermott, "The Colonel and the Koran, " Guardian, 
19 May 1973. 
166 Jim Hoagland, "Qadhafi says U. S. incursion triggered 
Libyan war alert, " International Herald Tribune, 17 May 1973. 
167 "Libyan jets attack Italian navy ship, " Internationa 
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Remarkably, the Italians, too, accepted these affronts 
with little protest. 
Inevitably, Qaddafi's Mediterranean aspirations 
brought him into conflict with the dominant Cold War 
powers. Tripoli's maritime claim was formally protested 
by both the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Nevertheless, Libya continued to assert its right to the 
contested region and to advocate the expulsion of all 
foreign (i. e., Western) fleets from the Mediterranean. 
The logical focus of this campaign became Malta, with 
Cyprus next on the list. 168 Qaddafi campaigned 
energetically to draw the island into his sphere of 
influence: 
It is from this standpoint (security through 
banning Great Power fleets) that we have 
offered our help to the friendly people of 
Malta ... It is none the 
less true that the 
Great Powers have tried literally to buy and 
sell the island in order to dominate it more 
effectively: that they have done everything 
they could to transform it into a permanent 
naval base for their fleets. 169 
On June 30,1971, a three-ship squadron (consisting 
of the supply ship Zeltin --the largest boat in the 
Libyan fleet--and two patrol boats, Tobruk and Sabratha) 
paid its first official visit to the island. Under other 
circumstances Whitehall might have taken this Libyan 
grandstanding with a grain of salt. After all, Royal 
Navy personnel seconded to the Libyan Navy provided the 
168 Libyan Arab Republic Ministry of Information and Culture, 
The revolution of ist September: The fourth anniversary (Tripoli, 
Libya: 1973), 267. 
169 Bianco, 157. 
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fleet's backbone and even had to help sail the Libyan 
boats into the Maltese port--where the British sailors 
diplomatically avoided the cameras. 170 
But two months later Libya offered Malta a $12 
million dollar loan. In exchange, Tripoli expected Malta 
to oust the British and close existing NATO facilities on 
the island. In December of the same year Qaddafi 
nationalized British Petroleum's Libyan assets. Dom 
Mintoff, the Maltese Prime Minister, visited Tripoli in 
the first week of January 1972, and days later Malta bid 
farewell to the British. Qaddafi ordered the Royal 
Navy's training mission (10 officers, 37 ratings, and 
some 100 dependents) to leave Libya on the same day. 171 
Libyan troops in civilian clothes were rumored to be 
running Malta's airport following the departure of a 
British contingent. Even though Malta later made a seven 
year concession allowing Britain to retain partial use of 
the island, the new agreement forbade using facilities on 
Malta for attacks against an Arab state--a considerable 
victory for Qaddafi. In July 1972 Libya and Malta signed 
a treaty on economic and cultural development. 
As it became clearer to Western military observers 
that Qaddafi was trying to gain control of sorts of the 
central Mediterranean, the consequences for Tripoli 
170 "Libyan fleet for Malta, " Sunday Telegraph, 20 June 1971. 
171 Patrick Keatley, "Formal end to Libyan treaty, " Guardian, 
5 January 1972; "Royal Navy men ordered to leave Libya, " Times, 
4 January 1972. 
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became more serious. 172 Britain expressed its 
displeasure by formally terminating its treaty of 
friendship with Libya rather than letting it lapse. 
Relations between the two states plummeted the following 
spring when the ship Claudia was intercepted off the 
Irish coast with five tons of Libyan arms for the IRA. 
Britain promptly suspended military sales to Libya. 173 
Qaddafi was nonplussed. In his own words, he was 'making 
war on Great Britain' and would therefore back the IRA 
'to the hilt. s174 Although he had only a vague 
understanding of the Irish conflict, he still possessed 
the certitudes of his world view: 
Aid to Ireland enables us to kill three birds 
with one stone. We still support liberation 
movements; we are showing the whole world that 
the Arab revolution is passing from the 
defensive to the attack; we pay Great Britain 
back in some way, even though minimally, for 
the harm she has done and continues to do in 
our countries. 175 
Qaddafi's truculence propelled him towards other 
counterproductive acts. Twice international disasters 
were narrowly averted only because of his dependency upon 
Egyptian aid. In February 1973 a Libyan airliner strayed 
over the Sinai desert (then held by Israel) and was shot 
down by Israeli fighters. Mobs in Tripoli demanded 
172 For example, see Lewis B. Ware's 1977 study "The Maltese- 
Libyan entente in the Mediterranean basin" (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Alabama: Air University). 
173 "Government suspends arms supply to Libya, " Times, 7 
April 1973. 
174 Alikhani, 9. 
175 Tremlett, 192. 
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vengeance. In April Qaddafi called the commander of an 
Egyptian submarine berthed in Libya to his office and 
ordered him--verbally and in writing--to find and sink 
the British oceanliner Queen Elizabeth II, which was en 
route to Israel with mainly Jewish passengers. The 
Egyptian submarine commander promptly put to sea and 
informed Cairo of the matter. Sadat instantly 
countermanded Qaddafi's order and instructed the 
submarine to return to Egypt. This brazen attempt to 
embroil Egypt in a monumental act of state-sponsored 
terrorism gave Sadat additional reason to doubt Qaddafi's 
desirability as an ally. "' 
Tripoli chased its Pan-Arab rainbow with the same 
startling lack of political or military sophistication 
with which it sought to attack the Jewish state, as 
demonstrated during a July 1971 coup d'etat attempt in 
Morocco. Eager to be rid of King Hassan, Qaddafi ordered 
three Egyptian bombers to attack the King's palace. The 
Egyptian military attache stalled for time while he 
contacted Cairo. Acting once again on Sadat's 
instructions, the pilots took off but then changed 
direction and returned to Egypt. Not to be easily 
thwarted, Qaddafi next tried (unsuccessfully) to arrange 
air passage to Morocco for his commando units before 
finally admitting defeat. 17 
176 Anwar El Sadat, Those have known (New York: Continuum, 
1984), 48-50. 
177 El Saadany, 72-73. 
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Likewise, during September 1970--the infamous 'Black 
September'--Qaddafi became enraged at King Hussein's 
expulsion of the PLO. He tried to persuade Saudi 
Arabia's King Feisal and Nasser to invade Jordan, 
offering to send a Libyan armored force to join in the 
battle: 
I think we should send armed forces to Amman-- 
armed forces from Iraq and Syria. ... What Hussein is doing is worse than the Jews ... 
we must send someone to seize him, handcuff 
him, stop him from what he's doing, and take 
him off to an asylum. "" 
Neither the Egyptians nor the Saudis were swayed by 
Qaddafi's professed zeal, and El Saadany was forced to 
remind the Colonel that the LAF had barely been trained 
for parade and were not even remotely combat ready. He 
later wrote: 'It became apparent that Qaddafi was driven 
by emotion and enthusiasm rather than logic, a reflection 
of military, as well as political, immaturity. 1179 
Inevitably, the Libyan leader's growing inability to 
reconcile the imperatives of his world view with 
international norms, and Libya's limited capabilities, 
had self-defeating repercussions. Nowhere was this 
clearer than in the case of Egypt, where relations became 
unsteady after the death of President Nasser in September 
1970. Qaddafi suspected (correctly, as it turned out) 
that Nasser's successor, Anwar El Sadat, did not share 
178 Seymour Hersh, Kissincer: The price of power, (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1983), 240; see also Mohamed Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 83-4. 
179 El Saadany, 53. 
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Tripoli's revolutionary ardor. Relations between the two 
cooled as Sadat deflected Qaddafi's insistence upon 
immediately unifying their respective states. 180 It 
became clear to the Egyptians that Qaddafi aspired to be 
president of both Egypt and Libya, and he was sorely 
disappointed when Sadat, not he, became president of the 
Union of Arab Republics (embracing Libya, Egypt, and 
Syria). iel As a sop to Qaddafi's ego, some Egyptian 
officials agreed to make the Libyan Colonel the 
commander-in-chief of the combined Libyan-Egyptian 
armies, an idea which Sadat rejected in Qaddafi's 
presence. During a February 1973 summit Qaddafi in turn 
rejected Sadat's strategy of limited war. 
Consequently, Libya did not figure significantly 
into Sadat's plans for the 1973 war. This was a 
devastating slight to a man who saw himself as the 
champion of the Arabs. Duly offended, Qaddafi made a 
speech on October 7 in which he predicted the war would 
end in catastrophe and warned Egyptian soldiers not to 
believe their military command's predictions. He further 
protested on October 23: 
This war is not mine. Assad and Sadat took 
their decision and implemented their plan 
without my approval and without even consulting 
me. Neither had they informed me of anything, 
though our three countries are members of a 
180 Sadat's prefered tactic was to allow Qaddafi to make a 
fool of himself, thereby alienating the Egyptian masses. For a 
vivid example, see Jehan Sadat's recollection of Qaddafi's 
address to an Egyptian women's conference (Jehan Sadat, A woman 
Qf EQyptt [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987], 333-36). 
181 El Saadany, 68,79. 
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Federal Union whose constitution stipulates 
clearly that the decision of war or peace can't 
be taken without a consensus by the three heads 
of state. 1e: 
Exclusion from the war's pre-planning was not the 
only blow to Qaddafi's ego. After travelling to Cairo to 
offer his help in repulsing the Israeli counter- 
offensive, the Colonel had an acrimonious exchange with 
Sadat, who impressed upon the Libyan that his tactical 
insights were unwanted by refusing to admit him to the 
War Room. 183 Sadat then rubbed salt in the Colonel's 
wounds by welcoming a number of Saudi princes into the 
War Room, 1t4 This second snub was too much for Qaddafi 
to bear. He told the press: 
We also disagree about the manner of conducting 
the campaign. I had once submitted to them a 
strategic plan, but their general staffs 
decided otherwise. I still think that my plan 
is better. Even if Egypt and Syria were to 
defeat Israel, I cannot lend my name to a 
comic-opera war ... I'm in profound disagreement with Presidents Sadat and Assad 
even on the aims of their war. For me, the 
essential thing is not to take back from Israel 
the territories she conquered in 1967, but to 
free the Palestinians, all the Palestinians, 
from the Zionist yoke. "" 
This was not the first time that Qaddafi's strategic 
counsel--which amounted to little more than encouragement 
182 Eric Rouleau, "States and stances, " Le Monde, 22 October 1973. 
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for everyone else to fight Israel--was spurned by front- 
line Arab leaders. During May and June 1970 Qaddafi and 
his Foreign Minister visited Iraq, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt (Busair also visited Qatar, Kuwait, 
North and South Yemen) to outline a strategy for 
heightening Palestinian action against Israel; his scheme 
was dismissed as 'outdated, simplistic, and even 
impertinent. 1186 
True to character, Qaddafi urged the Egyptian 
president to press on fighting, a counsel delivered with 
'characteristic disregard for military and political 
realities. "" Sadat retorted that Egyptian soldiers, 
rather than Libyans, were the ones dying on the front 
lines. Nevertheless, Qaddafi continued his criticisms of 
Sadat's limited war. 188 On November 17, Qaddafi gave the 
Egyptian media an open letter to Sadat which politely 
suggested Cairo's acceptance of a cease-fire had stained 
its honor. Guerrilla warfare, even if it led to complete 
devastation, would have been preferable, said Qaddafi. 189 
No doubt it would have been--at least for Tripoli, which 
was in little danger of being visited by any devastation 
at all. 
Fearing--with considerable prescience--that Sadat 
186 Wright, 157. 
187 Harris, 39. 
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would trade peace with Israel for the return of the 
Sinai, Qaddafi's hitherto mild criticisms took a harder 
tone. In an interview with the Lebanese magazine Beirut 
Al Massa he mocked the Arabs' performance in combat and 
stressed that the Egyptian army had clearly been 
defeated. 190 These criticisms were out of sync with Arab 
sentiment and damaged his own credibility more than 
Sadat's. For his part, Sadat dismissed the Libyan 
contribution to the war effort as negligible. In fact, 
the Libyans had contributed a squadron of Mirage 
fighters, thirty-six artillery pieces, one hundred anti- 
aircraft missiles, another hundred armored personnel 
carriers, and some 800,000 barrels of oil--a contribution 
worth roughly $700 million. 191 Furthermore, Egyptian 
naval units were given permission to operate from the 
Libyan base of Tobruk if necessary. While Sadat was 
ready to downplay this support Qaddafi was equally 
prepared to exaggerate it. In April 1974 he went so far 
as to claim that Libyan units were the first to cross the 
Suez Canal, a misrepresentation which incensed the 
Egyptian President. "' 
As 1973 drew to a close Qaddafi called for Egyptians 
and Palestinian guerrillas to foment a revolt against 
President Sadat to keep him from making peace with 
190 Paul Martin, "Libya calls for revolt in Egypt to stop 
peace pact with Israel, " Timen, 29 December 1973. 
191 Wright, 164. 
192 El Saadany, 132. 
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Israel. "" This was a momentous if somewhat pointless 
appeal. In calling for civil war Qaddafi was clearly 
crossing a line beyond which lay no hope of normal 
relations with Cairo, yet it is unclear what he hoped to 
gain--the Arab nationalist moral high ground, perhaps, 
but certainly not a change of Egyptian policy. 
The key to understanding why Qaddafi engineered such 
a precipitous decline in his relations with Egypt may be 
the realization that whereas Sadat's war aims conflicted 
sharply with Qaddafi's own objectives, the Egyptian 
leader's new found stature impinged even more forcefully 
upon the Libyan leader's self-conception. It was no 
secret that Qaddafi regarded the Egyptian president as an 
unworthy successor to Nasser. By expunging the 
psychological damage the Arabs suffered in 1967, Sadat 
had usurped the heroic role which Qaddafi coveted. 
Conclusion 
Between 1969 and 1973, the new Libyan regime crafted 
a national security policy distinct from that of the 
previous government. Internally, the RCC consolidated 
its grip on power by dismembering the ancien regime, by 
rejecting any institutional checks on the Council's 
power, and by assaulting (albeit unsuccessfully) the 
tribal underpinnings of Libyan society. Within the RCC 
itself, Qaddafi dispensed with the pretence that he was 
193 Paul Martin, "Libya calls for revolt in Egypt to stop peace pact with Israel, " Times, 29 December 1973. 
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merely the primus inter pares and made control of 
security issues his sole prerogative. Independent 
thinkers were culled from the Council, leaving Qaddafi 
accountable only to himself. The Colonel believed it was 
for historians to judge whether he followed in Nasser's 
footsteps, not for the RCC and certainly not for the 
Libyan people. 194 Virtually unencumbered by political, 
economic, or constitutional restraints, the Libyan leader 
was free to adopt radical (yet ultimately 
counterproductive) policies in his search for security. 
Libya, Qaddafi believed, was inherently insecure in 
a world dominated militarily by the superpowers, 
dominated economically by the west, and in which the Arab 
states were divided and weakened by the existence of the 
State of Israel. Achieving security therefore meant 
changing the status quo, which Qaddafi set out to do by 
allying himself with Nasser's Egypt, expelling U. S. and 
British forces from Libya, and modernizing Libya's armed 
forces. The seeming impunity with which he accomplished 
these goals encouraged him to adopt increasingly 
aggressive policies, especially in the Mediterranean 
where Qaddafi laid claim to the Gulf of Sirte and tried 
to expel NATO from Malta. There and elsewhere the Libyan 
leader's propensity for belligerence and confrontation 
rapidly became apparent: Libyan aircraft fired upon an 
American surveillance plane and an Italian warship in the 
disputed Gulf of Sirte. Libya shipped arms to the IRA 
194 e. g., Bianco, 122. 
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and through its Jihad Fund lent support to numerous other 
terrorist movements. By and large, the leading Western 
powers did not hold Libya accountable for such behavior 
since they were fearful of turning Tripoli into a Soviet 
satellite. Few foresaw that restraint might merely 
embolden the Libyan leader. 
Nevertheless, the first intimations of the 
counterproductive potential of Qaddafi's policies could 
now be glimpsed. Relations with the United States had 
dipped below ambassadorial representation. The U. S. 
Sixth Fleet had quietly contested Libya's claim to the 
Gulf of Sirte. Great Britain had angrily terminated its 
treaty of friendship and suspended arms sales. Most 
disturbingly of all, Libya's alliance with Egypt--the 
pillar of the regime's new national security policy--had 
been placed in jeopardy. Without an Egyptian front 
against Israel, security (as Tripoli conceived of it) 
would become unachievable, and Libya's new security 
policy irrelevant. Indeed, Libya's most important ally 
now threatened to become its most dangerous enemy (an 
ironic reversion to the threat environment of the Sanusi 
monarchy). As we shall see in the next chapter, Egypt 
was but the first of many allies that Qaddafi would so 
transform. 
Chapter 2 
From alliance to antagonism: 
Aggravating the Libyan security predicament, 1974-1980 
It is a well-known fact that a weak party which 
has no strong and sincere ally cannot achieve 
anything. 
-- Omar Al Meheishi, 
RCC Member' 
The deterioration of the rapport between Tripoli and 
Cairo forced Qaddafi to revisit his external security 
predicament, the general contours of which were 
consistent with the security dilemma faced by most Third 
World states. In an international security environment 
dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, 
Libya's considerable petroleum resources, seemingly 
strategic location, and small population exacerbated its 
sense of vulnerability. In short, Libya had the classic 
trappings of a Cold War pawn. Qaddafi therefore faced a 
choice: would he ally Libya with either of the competing 
potencies, or would he continue to pursue a strategy of 
non-alignment? The latter course did not necessarily 
immunize a state from superpower pressure, nor was it a 
guarantee against the designs of other powers. Moreover, 
choosing non-alignment left unanswered the question of 
whether Tripoli could continue its quest to upset the 
1 As cited in Mary-Jane Deeb's L ya's foreign policy in 
North Africa, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 109; 
from an interview with Al-Ba_'a_th, 11 March 1975, translated in 
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international status quo without first securing the 
patronage of another state to take the place of Nasser's 
Egypt. 
In the case of Libya, however, the Third World 
security predicament was not deterministic. ' Qaddafl's 
world view remained the guiding force behind Libyan 
national security policy, though Sadat's indifference to 
Qaddafi's aims compelled the Libyan leader to revise his 
Grand Strategy. Since Egypt had lost its way, Libya 
would no longer sublimate its efforts to Cairo's. 3 
Henceforth, Libya would be the engine of Arab resurgence 
and would spare no expense in executing its role. Libya 
would create a powerful army, build fresh alliances, and 
aggressively assert its presence in the international 
arena. Moreover, it would discredit and punish those who 
contested its right to Arab leadership. 
It sounded good in theory, but in the cold light of 
day Qaddafi could not make his Libyan juggernaut fly. By 
the end of the decade his revised Grand Strategy had not 
moved him appreciably closer to his political objectives, 
both because implementing his strategy proved more 
difficult than anticipated, and because its 
counterproductive effects were likewise unexpected. 
Such unforeseen difficulties were especially 
manifest in Libya's quest for an ally, a quest marked by 
2 In contrast to Deeb's view. Deeb, 91. 
3 Qaddafi articulated his 'go it alone' strategy in 
September 1974 with reference to southern Lebanon. SWB 
ME/4695/A/1,5 September 1974. 
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a panoply of diplomatic initiatives and mutual defence 
agreements. At both the global and regional levels, 
Qaddafi was almost exclusively interested in partnerships 
framed by his terms, terms which usually sought to expand 
his authority (and even abrogate national borders) at the 
expense of the other party. Unsurprisingly, his 
prospective allies balked at this prospect. Moreover, 
Qaddafi was unwilling to circumscribe his own behavior to 
secure the benefits of an alliance. This reticence 
bedeviled his relationship with the Soviets in 
particular, who made restraint the price of their 
protection. This was a price that the Libyan leader 
simply could not contemplate. Thus, the salient truth 
made manifest during this epoch was Qaddafi's inability 
to maintain an alliance with anyone, despite superficial 
liaisons with Egypt, the USSR, Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, 
Niger and Sudan. 4 In fact, Libya consistently 
antagonized the very states it had sought to ally itself 
with, thereby aggravating its security predicament. In 
short, Qaddafi's fruitless quest for an ally--and what 
was even worse, the alienation of the states he attempted 
to rally to his side--exemplified the type of 
counterproductive behavior which we have posited to be 
irrational. 
The conflict between Qaddafi and Sadat was the 
Deeb, 91. 
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definitive element of Libyan national security policy 
over the remainder of the decade. What began in 1973 as 
a rift in Libyan-Egyptian relations became, by 1980, an 
unbridgeable chasm. This distension was not inevitable; 
on several occasions the two states tried to iron out 
their differences. The reasons rapprochement eluded them 
were twofold. First, Qaddafi never relinquished his 
claim to Nasser's mantle, and he invested tremendous 
amounts of political capital into discrediting Sadat, 
whose press agents were already sniping at Nasser's 
memory. By disputing Sadat's right to deviate from 
Nasser's legacy, Qaddafi transmuted Egyptian domestic 
politics into a matter of Libyan foreign policy: 
Any attack levelled against the July 23 
Revolution is considered a degradation of Gamal 
Abdul Nasser, an attack against the Libyan 
Revolution and a degradation of Mu'Ammar el- 
Qathafi. 5 
This was a blatant interference in Egyptian affairs, and 
the resultant friction amplified the antipathy already 
radiating between the two leaders. Had effective checks 
on executive power existed in either state then their 
mutual disdain might have had fewer foreign policy 
ramifications. As it was, the absence of checks allowed 
the animosity between the pair to grow into a bilateral 
crisis that cooler heads were unable to contain. 
Although Soviet diplomats advised Qaddafi against 
s In an interview with Bassam Freiha, "Dialogue of 
principles, " 2 August 1974, Al Anwar; reprinted in Muammar 
Qaddafi, Discourses by Mu'ammar el-Oathafi Chairman of RCG 
published in the Arab and international press, (n. p.: Adam 
Publishers, 1975), 19. 
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personalizing the conflict, his disparagement of Sadat 
grew in ferocity and was answered by acerbic ripostes 
from Cairo. 6 These insults eventually left the political 
realm and grew extraordinarily personal, as when Tripoli 
lambasted Sadat with racial slurs mocking his dark 
pigmentation, or viciously maligned his wife. 7 Since the 
Libyan-Egyptian alliance had been based above all else on 
Qaddafi's affinity for Nasser, it was no surprise that 
these acidic exchanges swiftly eroded that alliance. 
Corrosive exchanges do not, however, fully explain 
the enmity which supplanted the hitherto 'fraternal' 
relations between Cairo and Tripoli. Libyan strategic 
objectives vis-d-vis Egypt evolved in tandem with 
Qaddafi's denunciations of Sadat. Qaddafi's maximalist 
objectives (uniting Libya with Egypt, persuading Egypt to 
renew the war against Israel) gradually gave way to a new 
set of aims (preventing the formation of an Israeli- 
Egyptian peace, subverting the Sadat regime), an 
evolution that was mirrored in Libyan foreign policy as 
pleas for Arab unity gave way to calls for an Egyptian 
revolution. This evolution was not smooth, and its 
halting nature gave a chaotic sheen to Libyan diplomacy 
as Qaddafi vacillated between reconciliation and 
subversion. But the incessant drift towards subversion 
6 Saleh El Saadany, Egypt and Libya from inside, 1969-1976. 
Mohamed M. El-Behairy, trans. (Jefferson, North Carolina: 
McFarland & Company Inc., 1994), 147. 
7 Martin Sicker, The making of a pariah state: Th 
9ayentri st politics of Muanmrnar oaddafi, (New York: Praeger, 
1987), 58. 
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and extremism was the second and decisive factor in 
transforming Egypt from ally to enemy. 
Libyan subversion first caught the world's attention 
on April 17, -1974, when approximately 20 members of the 
Shabab Muhammed (an outgrowth of Egypt's Islamic 
Liberation Party) tried to seize the Egyptian Military 
Technical Academy in Heliopolis. From there-they planned 
to move against Sadat and topple the government. Eleven 
people were killed before the security forces restored 
order. The evidence implicating Libya in the uprising 
was admittedly circumstantial: the Shabab's Palestinian 
leader, Dr. Saleh Sariyya, had met Qaddafi while visiting 
Libya, possessed a Libyan as well as an Iraqi passport, 
and allegedly implicated Qaddafi as the inspirator of the 
attack during his subsequent interrogation. 8 Tripoli 
heatedly denied its involvement but was decidedly 
sympathetic to the rebels in its official references to 
the mutiny. To what extent Libya actively supported 
Sariyya remained unclear even after the trial. Although 
the prosecutor's report issued on April 25,1974, did not 
mention Libya, the perception that Sariyya's puppet- 
strings led to Tripoli remained paramount. The Egyptian 
press excoriated Qaddafi. 9 
In any event, it was not long before Tripoli's 
8 Deeb, 96. 
9 In an interview with Talal Salman on April 28,1974, 
Qaddafi intoned: 'In our opinion the incident is suspicious and 
only the enemy benefits therefrom. ' See "The issue of the 
revolution and the issue of unity, " Assafir; reprinted in 
Qaddafi, 82; see also El Saadany, 133-135. 
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coercive measures became unambiguous. Having immediately 
suspended free oil deliveries once Sadat accepted a 
cease-fire, the following summer Qaddafi instructed the 
Libyan Air Force to demand the return of its Mirage 
aircraft since they were no longer needed for combat. 
When Hosni Mubarak, Commander of the Egyptian Air Force, 
proved reluctant to comply, Libya threatened to embarrass 
the Egyptians by publicizing the dispute. This merely 
made Cairo adamant. Libya therefore suspended deliveries 
of jet fuel to Egyptian MiG fighters training at Tobruk 
and all but imprisoned the Egyptian contingent stationed 
there. Tripoli proposed a simple trade: Egypt could 
resume flying its MiGs once the Mirages were returned. 
Egypt accepted, but once its pilots were reunited with 
their planes they promptly departed Tobruk for good. 
Furthermore, on August 4,1974, Sadat ordered all 
Egyptian officers and advisers posted to Libya--nearly 
7,000 personnel--to return to Egypt within 72 hours. '° 
No leader could be faulted for asserting the rights 
to his nation's military property. Qaddafi's tactics, 
however, affixed a costly price tag to a minor victory. 
Humiliating Sadat meant the prospects for reconciliation 
or for a reversal of Egyptian policy would be remoter 
than ever. The strategic had been sacrificed to the 
tactical. 
Rather than minimizing the damage wrought by the 
Mirage affair, Qaddafi further inflamed matters by sowing 
io El Saadany, 137-140. 
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insurrection along the Egyptian frontier--an operation 
that again demonstrated paltry strategic thinking. 
Qaddafi chose the impoverished Bedouin tribes of Western 
Egypt to be his fifth column, astutely guessing they 
would be susceptible to his overtures because of their 
alienation from mainstream Egyptian society and because 
of their ancestral roots in Cyrenaica. He won their 
loyalty through financial aid--given with the condition 
that they accept new identification papers designating 
their homeland, the (Egyptian) Western desert, as the 
(Libyan) Eastern desert. 
Egyptian officials were taken aback at this bald 
claim to their territory. Egyptian intelligence began 
monitoring the situation closely as of August 1974 while 
Cairo arranged a countering array of welfare 
initiatives. " By April 1975 Qaddafi had begun arming 
the tribesmen and the Egyptian government publicly 
accused Tripoli of interfering in Egypt's internal 
affairs. 12 Exposed but unrepentant, Tripoli continued 
fomenting insurrection'among the tribes throughout the 
summer. 13 This covert policy became a festering sore in 
relations with Cairo until as late as may 1979, when 
twenty Libyan intelligence operatives were tried for 
attempting to persuade the tribes to forcibly annex the 
11 El Saadany, 141. 
12 Deeb, 96; FBIS-MEA, 22 April 1975, D6. 
13 Deeb 96; FBIS-MEA, 8 July 1975, Dl. 
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Siwah oasis to Libya. 14 
Measured against the standard of Libyan strategic 
objectives as Qaddafi defined them, the wisdom of 
subversion was not impressive. It made reconciliation 
problematic, yet fell short of effecting a change in 
Egyptian policy. Qaddafi maintained that forging ahead 
with Libyan-Egyptian unity (i. e., preserving the 
strategic partnership) was still his primary aim. After 
securing a tentative reconciliation with President Sadat 
in Lahore, Qaddafi played down their falling out as a 
'sort of misunderstanding. ' But he simultaneously 
implied that the Egyptians had already violated the 
understanding reached at Lahore. 15 For Qaddafi, the only 
alternative was conflict: 
To say the truth we predicted from the 
beginning what is going on now. We said that 
unless unity is achieved between the two 
countries the alternative would be clash. ... They have no choice but to unite or collide 
since there is no justification for not 
realizing unity. " 
On July 2,1975, Tripoli requested that Egypt withdraw 
its military attache and his staff. The following month 
witnessed a stand-off between Libyan and Egyptian armored 
units along the border, and minor clashes were reported 
14 SWB ME/6105/A/l, 1 May 1979. 
is In an interview with Fuad Mattar on April 14,1974. 
"Inter-Arab relations, " Al-Nahar; reprinted in Qaddafi, 62-63. 
16 In an interview with Dara Janikovic, "Comprehensive 
talk, " Zagreb newspaper, April 29,1974, reprinted in Qaddafi, 
130-131. 
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on August 26.17 
Well before these clashes took place the fissure 
between Tripoli and Cairo had already begun to figure 
into Libyan security planning. Qaddafi had hitherto 
relied upon Egypt to supply the requisite military 
hardware, expertise, and above all the manpower to 
guarantee his security at home and allow him to pursue 
his regional ambitions. To make good the loss of 
Egyptian patronage Qaddafi turned to the USSR in the 
final months of 1973. Within a matter of weeks the 
Libyan attitude towards the Soviet Union underwent a 
remarkable volte face on both the rhetorical and 
operational levels. In October 1973 Qaddafi had 
described the Soviets as the 'arch enemy of the Arab 
World' and ridiculed its 'miserable arms shipments. 11' 
On numerous occasions Qaddafi asserted that Soviet 
interests were as inimical to the Arabs as American 
interests. Such anti-Soviet rhetoric disappeared once 
the Soviets indicated they would consider shipping more 
powerful weaponry to Tripoli. Gone too were the days 
when Libya would protest the formation of Arab-Soviet 
alliances, as when it recalled its ambassador from Iraq 
in February 1972. Qaddafi now perceived a harmony of 
Libyan-Soviet interests in opposing the 'American 
17 Otto von Pivka, Armies of the Middle East, (Cambridge, 
England: Patrick Stephens, 1979), 121. 
18 Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, 22 October 1973. 
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onslaught. '1-9 
Expressions of mutual admiration became common. 2° 
On March 27,1974, Jalloud travelled to Moscow and 
negotiated a major arms sale. By mid-year Libya had 
received ten batteries of SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 anti- 
aircraft missiles manned by 1500 Soviet troops who 
supervised their emplacement around Ugbah Bin Nafi 
airbase. Accompanying the batteries was a Soviet Tu-22 
(Blinder C) reconnaissance squadron, on loan but painted 
with Libyan colors. 
In mid-May 1975 the Soviet Prime Minister, Aleksei 
Kosygin, paid a three-day visit to Tripoli. Shortly 
after his departure the Egyptian ambassador 
surreptitiously obtained a copy of the accords signed 
during the visit and found them 'mind-boggling. ' 21 In 
exchange for roughly $4 billion Libya would receive some 
of the most advanced weaponry in the Soviet inventory, 
including hundreds of advanced tanks, MiG-23s and MiG- 
25s. 
For Libya, far more than arms procurement was at 
stake. The introduction of Cold War overtones into its 
national security policy created a dynamic with the 
potential to draw Tripoli deeper into the global bipolar 
conflict. Consequently, Qaddafi dismissed the import of 
19 Salman, 87. 
20 e. g., SWB SU/4691/A4,4,29 August 1974; SU 4693/A$/3,3 
September 1974. 
21 El Saadany, 148. 
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his pivot towards Moscow by stressing the limits to 
Libyan-Soviet friendship: 
I must define the sense in which we use the 
word 'friendship, ' which must not imply any 
kind of influence, and still less involves 
putting ourselves under Soviet protection When 
I speak of friendship I see it in terms of 
equality ... True enough, in international 
relations every friendship has its price, but a 
friend must remain a friend, and, as for the 
USSR, although I have supported this friendship 
I neither wish, nor am I able, to go further. 22 
Qaddafi was sincere in his reticence. He was with Sadat 
in 1972 when the Soviet base commander at Marsa Matruh 
denied the Egyptian president entry to the base, a 
humiliation which marked the beginning of the end for 
Soviet naval privileges in Egypt. Qaddafi found such an 
arrangement intolerable and indeed had already made the 
exclusion of all foreign bases a matter of principle from 
which he could not easily back down. 
But neither Moscow nor Cairo felt inclined to let 
Qaddafi escape the Cold War snare so easily. The Kremlin 
had compelling military and political reasons for 
maximizing its influence in Libya, reasons which are 
easily adduced. The Mediterranean Eskadra was in need of 
additional harbor and air facilities which in the event 
of war would help it neutralize the U. S. Sixth Fleet and 
divert the resources of NATO's southern command, Allied 
Forces Southern Europe, from the central European front. 
Moreover, the Soviets were eager to re-establish regional 
influence following their undignified exit from Egypt. 
22 Mirella Bianco, Gadafi: Voice from the desert (London: 
Longman Group Ltd, 1975), 152. 
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Finally, adopting Libya made sense if for no other reason 
than denying that possibility to the West--the promise of 
cheap oil and hard cash was an added bonus. Qaddafi's 
reluctance to grant basing privileges was no great 
concern. Moscow trusted its weapons sales to create 
subtle bonds of dependency, forcing Libya to look to the 
Soviet bloc for ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance. 
The Soviet-Libyan relationship was thus unexceptional 
both in terms of Soviet Near Eastern policy and of Third 
World strategy. 23 
In fact, Smolansky's observations on the Soviet- 
Iraqi relationship are equally applicable to Libya: 
Specifically, Baghdad's interest in courting 
the Kremlin's goodwill and assistance was based 
on the need for a powerful patron in its 
efforts to shed all the remnants of Western 
colonialism and to establish Iraq as an 
autonomous member of the world order of nation 
states. It is important to recognize, however, 
that this goal never accommodated the notion of 
replacing one form of domination with another. 
For their part, the Soviet leaders were only 
too happy to assist any nation or movement 
intent on "throwing off the yoke of 
imperialism, " for this was the heyday of the 
cold war and of Moscow's quest for recognition 
of its status as a global superpower. In the 
ebullient era of Khrushchevian expansionism, 
the leaders of the USSR were apparently 
convinced that any diminution of Western 
influence represented a gain for Soviet 
24 interests. 
23 See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); see also Walter 
Laqueur, "Soviet dilemmas in the Middle East, " in The U. S. S. R. 
And the Middle East, Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, eds., 
(Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), 93; Lisa Anderson, 
"Qadhdhafi and the Kremlin, " Problems of communism 34 (September- 
October 1985): 42-43. 
24 Smolansky, 280. 
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In Egypt, a furious Anwar Sadat (the Kremlin had 
snubbed his own bids to buy the same weaponry) denounced 
Libya as a Soviet surrogate. 25 Almost as soon as the 
Egyptian president received the text of the arms 
agreement, the semi-official Al-Abram reported that Libya 
had agreed to establish Soviet air and naval bases on its 
territory. This, Sadat knew, was not true. But the 
Egyptian papers' insistence (they ran the story for four 
days), and Tripoli's inevitable denials, served to focus 
Western attention on Libya's Soviet ties. 2'6 
In accordance with Qaddafi's hegemonic aspirations, 
advanced offensive weapons topped Libya's post-1973 War 
shopping list. The navy underwent a particularly 
dramatic expansion. In 1974 Libya ordered four corvettes 
from Italy; four years later ten fast-attack boats were 
purchased from France. The Oueen Elizabeth II fiasco had 
apparently convinced Qaddafi he needed his own submarine 
packs. His purchasing agents sounded out Great Britain 
with an offer to spend up to £1,000 million on six 
Vickers submarines and a number of Jaguar low-level 
strike aircraft, but the British were discouraging. " 
25 Christopher Wren, "Russians deny signing pact to put 
Soviet bases in Libya, " International Herald Tribune, 29 May 
1975. 
26 "Libya said to sign Soviet arms pact, " New York Tim-s 23 
May 1975; Henry Tanner, "Libyans confirm Soviet arms deal, " UP& 
York Times 24 May 1975; Irene Beeson, "Press ignores bases 
denial, " Guardian, 26 May 1975, and "Libya to get Soviet arms, 
but no bases, " Guardian, 24 May 1975; Edmund Stevens, "Moscow 
denies Cairo report of Libya deal, " Times, 28 May 1975. 
27 David Wood, "Downing street denies vetoing 1,000m Middle 
East arms order, " Times, 12 April 1975. 
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The Kremlin, in contrast, was receptive. In July 1975 
the CIA leaked news of a Soviet-Libyan deal for six 
submarines. 28 The following April Libya was also 
negotiating a $250 million deal with Spain for four 
Daphne-class submarines. 29 It was common knowledge that 
Libya's most fearsome new weapons, Scud missiles (which 
were unveiled during the 1st of September celebrations in 
1976), were aimed at Egypt. 30 
Sadat countered such developments by playing up 
Libya's Soviet connection. Since expelling the Soviet 
military mission from Egypt in 1972, Sadat's distrust of 
the USSR had only deepened. As-his memoirs and other 
records make clear, the Egyptian leader was genuinely 
alarmed by--some might even say consumed with--the Soviet 
threat. 31 Nevertheless, there was perhaps an element of 
mild theatrics in Sadat's denunciations of the Soviet- 
Libyan friendship. Increasing Washington's anxiety was 
one way of milking the Eisenhower Doctrine, which 
promised U. S. aid to states facing Soviet aggression. 
Moreover, the Libyan-Soviet threat provided a good 
pretext for military aid since Sadat could scarcely ask 
Washington for help against an Israeli threat while he 
28 Egyptian Gazette, 2 July 1975. 
29 Middle East Economic Digest, 29 October 1976. 
30 Robert Fisk, "Libya poses new threat to Egypt with 
battery of Soviet Scud ground-to-ground missiles, " TimQg, 3 
September 1976. 
31 Ibrahim A. Karawan, "Egypt's defense policy, " in Def nsp 
p nning {n less-industrial{zed states, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1984), 153,160. 
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was suing for peace. 32 In addition, the Egyptian 
military had a bureaucratic interest in playing up the 
Libyan threat to maintain their share of the national 
budget. 33 
As a result, the Egyptian media saw a Soviet base 
behind every Libyan oasis. In 1976 the Soviet 
Mediterranean Eskadra lost the last of its access 
privileges to Egyptian harbors and increased its use of 
Libyan ports (Qaddafi had granted limited access in 1975 
to the ports of Tobruk and Bardiyah). 34 AZ-Gomhouriya 
obligingly reported the Soviet 'occupation' of Uqbah Bin 
Nafi airbase (formerly Wheelus AFB), alleging Qaddafi 
cleared the base of Libyan officers and relinquished its 
operational control to the USSR. 35 To the contrary, 
Qaddafi's refusal to sanction a permanent Soviet presence 
was still the sticking point in his relations with 
Moscow. 
Though prone to exaggerate the Soviet threat from 
Libya, Egyptian apprehensions were not entirely 
groundless. Between 1974 and 1975 the number of Soviet 
32 Herman Eilts, "The United States and Egypt, " in I 
Middle East ten years after Camp David, ed. William Quandt, 
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), 143. 
33 Nazih N. Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab state (London: I. H. 
Tauris Publishers, 1995), 271. 
34 Gordon McCormick, "Soviet Strategic aims and capabilities 
in the Mediterranean: Part II, " in Prospects for security in the 
Mediterranean, ed. Robert O'Neill, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 
1988), 41. 
35 "Russians take over base in Libya, " Daily Telegraph, 29 
April 1976; the story was also picked up by The Guardian on the 
same date. 
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military advisers in Libya doubled. 36 Soviet engineers 
built a new Libyan airbase (Banbah) which became 
operational in late 1979, and upgraded dock facilities in 
Tripoli and Bengahzi to receive the USSR's Mediterranean 
Eskadra. More alarmingly, Tripoli escalated its 
activities in Egypt from subversion to terrorism. A 
Libyan assassin attempted to murder an Egyptian 
journalist Ihsan 'Abd critical of Tripoli. 37 On March 6, 
1976, three Libyans (one of whom was a Foreign Ministry 
official) were arrested at the Rome airport carrying 
automatic weapons and a handgrenade in hopes of 
assassinating former Libyan Foreign Minister (now 
opposition figure) Abdel Moneim El Huni. 38 Two days 
later, seven Libyan special forces soldiers were arrested 
for trying to kidnap El Huni and Major Omar El Meheishi 
(an RCC member who defected in 1975). " Twelve more 
Libyan agents were arrested at the Cairo airport. 40 
Within days another twenty provocateurs, led by Libyan 
Captain Muhammad El Sharif, were arrested for plotting to 
kill the two opposition figures as well as for raising 
insurrection among the tribes of the Western desert. 
36 Flora Lewis, "Russians in Libya increase sharply, " 
York Times, 21 February 1975. 
37 Deeb 1991,97; FBIS-MEA, 7 August 1974, Dl. 
38 "3 armed Libyans seized at Rome, " New York Timen, 7 March 
1976. 
39 Henry Tanner, "Egypt says 7 Libyan soldiers admit 
kidnapping plot in Cairo, " New York Times, 9 March 1976. 
40 "Egypt announces arrest of 12 more Libyan agents, " NeK 
York Times, 13 March 1976. 
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Libya retaliated rather disproportionately by expelling 
3,000 Egyptian workers. 41 
One Libyan provocation followed another during the 
spring and summer of 1976. In April the Libyan 
Ambassador to Egypt, Milod El Sedik Ramadan, opened fire 
on a student demonstration with a submachine gun, 
allegedly shouting 'I am the revolution--I will kill you 
all. 141 Libyan-sponsored terrorists hijacked an Egypt 
Air Boeing 737 and demanded Meheishi as ransom; after 
Egyptian commandos stormed the plane, the captured 
terrorists revealed that Qaddafi had personally promised 
to pay them $300,000 for the operation. 43 In light of 
such trespasses, on June 30 the Libyan Ambassador was 
declared persona non grata. 44 
Within hours Libyan-supported Sudanese dissidents 
invaded Darfur to topple the Numeiri government, thereby 
surrounding Egypt with hostile regimes. This scheme 
backfired: Numeiri called for Egyptian aid in restoring 
order, which Cairo promptly sent. The rebellion was 
crushed and the Egyptian-Sudanese axis emerged stronger 
than before. 
On August 16,1976, the Egyptian Interior Minister, 
41 "Libya said to oust 3,000 Egyptians, " New York Times, 12 
March 1976. 
42 "Libyan envoy opens fire on protesters at Cairo embassy, " 
New York Times, 5 April 1976. 
43 "Egypt-Libya ... mini-war, " Africa Institute Bulletin 




General Hassan Hubsha, accused the Libyan leader of 
allocating one million dollars to foment a coup against 
Sadat. And indeed, Libyan operatives planted explosives 
in government offices and trains. 45 Sadat responded by 
`6 stationing 30,000 Egyptian troops along the border. 
The breaking point came in the summer of 1977. 
Qaddafi derided as 'wicked and heretical' a defence pact 
concluded between Egypt, Syria, and Sudan in late 
February. 47 Throughout the spring Egypt and Libya 
accused each other of sponsoring terrorism. On July 11, 
1977, the Egyptian Vice-President, Hosni Mubarak, along 
with the Egyptian Chief of Staff, travelled to Sudan and 
on to Chad to coordinate resistance to Libyan 
intervention there. The political editor of the Libyan 
news agency opined this trip gave Libya the right to take 
the offensive against its enemies, and a spokesman for 
the Libyan Foreign Ministry declared that Libya would not 
permit a foreign (i. e., Egyptian) presence in Chad to 
threaten its borders. 48 Israeli intelligence reportedly 
tipped off Egyptian officials of a Libyan plot to 
's Deeb, 98; see FBIS-MEA, 
August 1976. 
9 August 1976, and FBIS-MEA, 14 
46 Peter Gill, "Libya shows off Russian weapons, " Daily 
Telegraph, 2 September 1976; see also FBIS-MEA, 13 August 1976. 
" Herve Bleuchot, Chronigues et documents libyens, 1969 
Q, (Paris: Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 
1983), 113. 
4s ibid., 240. 
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assassinate Sadat. For Sadat, this was the last straw. 49 
A series of border incidents ensued. According to 
an official Libyan spokesman, Egyptian troops attacked 
police posts at Al Malfa and Al Rebda on the night of 
June 14, seizing four prisoners. On the morning of June 
25, the Egyptians allegedly attacked three more posts (at 
Farnich, Motaradh and Solb Ennass) and took six more 
prisoners. After Egypt refused to respond to three 
diplomatic notes protesting these attacks, a Libyan 
patrol captured 13 Egyptian soldiers. The Egyptians then 
occupied territory claimed by Libya, prompting the Libyan 
regional military commander on July 17,1977, to threaten 
his Egyptian counterpart with the promise of a strong and 
vigorous riposte. 
The Egyptian version of events, as described by 
Cooley, maintains that a Libyan patrol in Egyptian 
territory killed nine soldiers, and that Egyptian units 
chased them to Musaad, destroying 40 tanks, two aircraft, 
and capturing some forty prisoners. 50 Whether in 
response to a Libyan assault or not, Sadat had decided to 
teach Qaddafi a lesson. Egyptian forces occupied the 
village of Musaad while planes bombed the village of Al 
" Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of fury (New York: Random House, 
1983), 94-95; Ronald Bruce St. John, Oaddaf{'Q World d_sion! 
Libyan foreign policy, 1969-1987, (London: Saqi Books, 1987): 60. 
so Cooley, however, gets his dates wrong. The first clashes 
occurred in June, not July. John Cooley, Libyan sandstorm: The 
. ". mp ete account of Oaddafi's revolution (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 121. 
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Bordj. 51 Egyptian armored units then penetrated about 15 
miles inland along the coast. The following day the air 
force attacked radar installations and aircraft on the 
ground at the former British airbase of El Adem, while 
infantry units conducted an airborne assault at Kasr 
Jidda. The Egyptian planes inflicted little damage in 
their first raid on the base but fared better during a 
follow up sortie on July 23. Additional actions took 
place at Tobruk, Kufra, Jarabub, and Barada. 
Propagandistic coverage of the campaign produced 
conflicting assessments of Libyan combat performance. 52 
For example, the Libyans said they shot down 17 enemy 
planes; Egypt admitted losing two. The Libyans claimed 
that People's Militia units, rather than the regular 
army, bore the brunt of the fighting. 53 While the 
Militia was mobilized, its role may have been exaggerated 
to disguise an undistinguished performance by the regular 
army. 54 Major Jalloud summarized Libya's losses as 27 
dead and 9 missing, with only two planes lost and nine 
tanks damaged. 55 
On July 24, only three days after the offensive 
51 Bleuchot, 240-242. 
52 e. g., John Wright, Libya: A modern history, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1981), 205; Sicker, 57. 
53 Financial Times, 27 July 1977. 
54 Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, Politic. -pt 
development and social change in Lihya, (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980), 122. 
55 Cooley, 122; find Jalloud statement on 1 August 1977. 
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began, both nations agreed to a cease-fire. 56 Why Sadat 
acquiesced to this early termination remains unclear two 
decades later. Sadat passes over the war in his 
autobiography, and neither the military objectives of his 
punitive campaign nor the deliberations within the 
Egyptian war room were made public. We must therefore 
try to deduce how Libyan national security policy bore 
upon Sadat's decision. 
The possibility that Sadat was coerced by the 
Soviets can safely be excluded. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Moscow contemplated military intervention on 
Libya's behalf or pressured Cairo during the course of 
the conflict, despite a brusque warning in April. 57 
Perhaps the Soviets misread the Carter administration's 
commitment to Sadat; whereas President Ford had assured 
Sadat of U. S. protection from Soviet retaliation if he 
attacked Libya, President Carter had withdrawn that 
pledge. In fact, the Egyptians later complained that 
Washington had unduly restrained them. 58 On the other 
hand, the U. S. may have encouraged the destruction of a 
56 William J. Foltz, "Libya's military power, " in The green 
and the black, ed. Rene Lemarchand, 52-69, (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 59. 
57 In April Moscow warned: "If the Egyptian leadership 
drives the situation toward a clash with Libya, and if it 
continues in its efforts to attack the current regime in Libya, 
it must realize that full responsibility for the results, which 
are difficult to anticipate, rests upon Egypt" (Deeb, 109; FBIS- 
MEA, 28 April 1977, Dl). 
58 Eilts, 131; Lillian Craig Harris, "Libya and Egypt: 
Reflections on an old love affair, " The Maghreb Review 14, no. 
1-2 (1989), 31,40. 
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newly installed Soviet air-defence radar system as a 
tactical objective for the campaign. 59 Three Soviet 
technicians reportedly died manning one of these radar 
stations, and the Egyptians exploited news of their 
deaths as additional proof that Libya had become a Soviet 
surrogate. 60 Moscow did little more than sheepishly 
condemn the Egyptian adventure and send its Chief of 
Staff around to take more arms orders. This muted 
response, bordering on indifference, was perhaps a 
cloaked rebuke to Qaddafi for failing to concede basing 
privileges. 
The USSR was not the only power Tripoli had courted. 
On December 28,1975, Libya and Algeria undertook to 
defend each other from external aggression by signing the 
Hassi Masud Treaty, which Deeb hails as inaugurating 
'the most important alliance in North Africa during the 
1970s. '61 The Libyan-Algerian entente was indeed a 
source of concern to Tunisia and more especially to 
Morocco, which watched with alarm as Libya and Algeria 
coordinated their support of the Polisario. By one 
estimate, Libya assumed roughly 80% of the costs of 
arming the Polisario in the mid-1970s. Tons of weapons 
and fuel were shipped across southern Algeria via what 
the Moroccans described as the 'Qaddafi trail. ' 
ý9 Deeb, 109; FBIS-MEA, 25 July 1977 D24 and N3. 
60 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Egypt, " in Security in the 
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However, the Hassi Masud Treaty owed itself as much 
to the clash of Libyan and Algerian interests as to their 
convergence. Algerian President Boumedidne was less 
interested in supporting Qaddafi than in containing the 
Colonel's regional machinations, particularly his 
proposed unions with Egypt and Tunisia. For example, in 
a speech at Algiers on February 19,1974, Boumedidne made 
no secret of his annoyance that Qaddafi had not consulted 
him regarding a proposed Libyan-Tunisian merger. 
Emphasizing their divergent outlooks, the Algerian 
President added: 'Qaddafi says he is a Nasserist. We 
ourselves are neither Nasserist nor anything else of the 
sort. 962 Algerian radio denounced the Jerba accord as a 
'shady agreement. v63 
Nowhere was the divergence of Libyan and Algerian 
interests more apparent than in their Saharan and 
Sahelian diplomacy. Boumedidne derisively dismissed 
Qaddafi's plans for a "United States of the Sahara" as 
unrealistic and was disturbed by the Libyan quest for 
regional hegemony. 64 The two states engaged in a bidding 
war for the allegiance of neighboring state (e. g., Niger) 
and non-state actors (e. g., the Polisario). Libya's 
petroleum earnings gave it the advantage in this contest. 
For example, between 1970 and 1981 Algeria supplied 
62 Bianco 1975,189. 
63 El Saadany, 129. 
64 Nicole Grimaud, La nolitigue extbr{Aura de l'A1 rip 
(Paris: Karthala, 1984), 327-328. 
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approximately $4.76 million dollars in aid to Niger, 
whereas Libya gave an estimated $99.57 million. 
Differing allocation policies revealed a further clash of 
interests. Whereas Algeria generally directed its aid to 
governments, Libya deliberately channeled its funds to 
non-governmental actors (frequently Islamic 
organizations) to destabilize central governments. 65 
Even their mutual support of the Polisario did not erase 
fundamental differences of opinion. Algeria supported 
the establishment of an independent republic in the 
Western Sahara whereas Qaddafi favored integrating the 
territory with Mauritania. 
These differences might have been inconsequential 
had Qaddafi not chosen to contest the demarcation of the 
Algerian border. In September 1976 the Libyan government 
published maps attributing to itself some 135,200 square 
kilometers of territory pertaining to Algeria, Niger, and 
Chad. To Algeria's fury, Qaddafi declared his 
territorial claims non-negotiable; by the time of the 
1977 War it had thus become clear that the Libyan- 
Algerian alliance was transient at best. Although Libya 
and Algeria continued to mouth pleasantries about unity 
until 1980, no serious progress was ever made or 
attempted. The last vestiges of alliance were erased in 
1981 when Qaddafi attempted to establish oil wells on 
65 Louis Blin, L'Algerie du Sahara au Sahel, (Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1990), 363,359. Blin attributes Qaddafi's approach 
to 'racial paranoia, ' taking the Green Book's wisdom on Africans 
as evidence that Qaddafi feared a 'black peril' (355-356). 
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Algerian territory north of Ghat and sent army units into 
the disputed region. 66 
As is endemic in international relations, the 
absence of primary sources introduces a conjectural note 
into any analysis of Algerian intercession in the 1977 
War. Facts have been muddled with tenuous assumptions. 
On 24 July--hours before the cease-fire was announced-- 
Sadat and Boumddiene held a private meeting in Alexandria 
during which the Algerian President urged a cessation of 
hostilities. According to Cooley, Boumediene made 'vague 
hints' of military intervention. Without hard evidence 
to back up this assertion, Deeb leaves open the question 
of whether Boumedidne threatened force but concludes that 
irrespective of the tactics used, Algerian intervention 
was decisive in ending the conflict. 67 Libyan statecraft 
had, it seemed, been vindicated. 
Yet even this conclusion seems premature. 
Coincidence is not proof of causality, and Deeb's 
assertion rests solely on coincidence. Furthermore, it 
stems from a grave misconstrual of the Libyan-Algerian 
entente. To the extent which Algeria used Libya to 
offset Egyptian power, it did so on its own terms and for 
its own geopolitical purposes; the 'alliance' was not the 
product of distinguished Libyan diplomacy and was never 
66 The border dispute was yet another legacy of colonial 
rule. For a review of its historical origins see Blin, 314-317. 
67 Deeb, 105. In contrast, Cooley concludes that 'it was 
most probably Egypt's losses, rather than Arab mediation, that 
caused Sadat to halt what might have otherwise become a wider 
North African war' (Cooley, 122). 
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more than an open marriage of convenience. There was no 
joint military planning, no joint exercises, no exchange 
of officers, no standardization of doctrine and 
equipment. As we have seen, the entire venture was 
marred by conflicting interests abroad and a serious 
border dispute. Significantly, Boumedidne did not 
attempt to mediate in the prelude to the 1977 War, unlike 
President Nyasingbe Ayadema of Togo, President Ahmed 
Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Yasser Arafat of the PLO. Far 
from signifying unflinching support for an embattled 
ally, Algerian intercession on Libya's behalf in 1977 was 
most likely an attempt to regain some leverage over 
Tripoli while avoiding embarrassment should Qaddafi 
invoke the Hassi Masud treaty. Furthermore, if Algeria 
opposed an Egyptian incursion into Libya, it would most 
likely have arrived at that stance regardless of the 
Libyan regime. 
Indeed, the truly decisive factor in Sadat's 
deliberations was probably the mood of his own forces. 
Sadat had not finished rooting out the Nasserists from 
his officer corps, many of whom sympathized with 
Qaddafi's criticisms of Egyptian policy and resented 
fighting against fellow Arabs. One such officer was the 
Army Chief of Staff, Muhammed Ali Fahmi, whom Sadat 
relieved of command not long afterwards. Sadat 
doubtlessly ascribed more importance to averting mutiny 
than to placating Algeria. This interpretation is 
strengthened by Hinnebusch's suggestion that Sadat 
r1, 
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devised the 1977 War as a probing operation prior to a 
larger campaign, which was also scuttled by resistance 
within the armed forces. 68 
The resultant picture of the Libyan-Algerian entente 
differs sharply from the one Deeb paints. The Hassi 
Masud treaty helped to precipitate the 1977 War, since 
Sadat responded by granting asylum and support to Libyan 
dissident Omar Al Meheishi and by signing a defence 
treaty with Sudan the following summer. While the 
calculated risk of a Libyan-Algerian alignment was not 
inherently irrational, the same cannot be said of 
Qaddafi's subsequent behavior. At the precise moment 
when Libya should have zealously deepened its friendship 
with Algiers, the Libyan leader sabotaged his own foreign 
policy by attempting to alter his southwestern border. 
From a military perspective, the border war was thus 
a conflict with no clear winners or losers. Viewed 
politically, the war was a failure for Sadat as it 
produced no appreciable moderation of Libyan behavior. 
Quite the reverse occurred: Qaddafi, portraying himself 
as the victim of Egyptian aggression, renewed his covert 
campaign against Sadat and set about bolstering his 
forces. Nevertheless, the 1977 War exposed Libya's 
strategic vulnerability. The ambiguity of the Algerian 
response and the flaccid Soviet reaction demonstrated 
that Tripoli had not resolved its security predicament. 
68 Raymond A. Hinnebusch Jr. Egyptian politics und r Sadao 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 130. 
' 1.. 
150 
The strategic aftermath of 1977 
Having emerged from battle relatively unscathed, 
Qaddafi took only halting steps towards resolving his 
underlying security predicament. These steps consisted 
of an indecisive tightening of his relations with Moscow 
and an increased pace of militarization at home. In 1978 
Libya became the first state outside the Warsaw Pact to 
receive MiG-25s. 69 By 1979 Qaddafi was discussing terms 
for expanding the Mediterranean Eskadra's access to 
Libyan ports. Nevertheless, he still hoped to guarantee 
Libyan security through sheer mass of arms rather than 
through external support. 
That Libya directed much of its business to non- 
Soviet suppliers while expanding its arsenal reveals the 
unresolved tension in Qaddafi's thinking between 
cultivating the USSR and preserving his autonomy. For 
example, Libya contracted to buy more than $100 million 
worth of arms from Brazil and obtained Yugoslavian aid in 
producing ammunition and spare parts for its Soviet 
weaponry. In August 1978, Major Jalloud appealed to 
North Korea for pilots and within months dozens had 
arrived (prompting a note of protest to Pyongyang from 
the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in 1979 and a direct 
demarche by Mubarak in 1980). 70 Libyan diplomats 
continued their tenacious haggling for the four Daphne 
69 Wall Street Journal, 24 August 1977. 
70 New York Times, 12 February 1979; SWB ME/6046/A/5,19 
February 1979. 
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class submarines they had long sought from Spain. 71 In 
July 1979 Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir hosted the Turkish defense 
minister to ensure Libyan cadets could continue to train 
in Turkey, and Libya ordered five hundred jeeps and a 
number of coastal patrol boats from Ankara. 72 
The militarization of Libyan society accelerated. 
The long-standing disequilibrium between equipment and 
manpower in the armed forces was redressed through a 
proliferation of military academies such as the Air 
Defence College in Tripoli, which Qaddafi inaugurated in 
June 1979. Separate Air Force Colleges were established 
in Misratah and Tripoli. When the latter institute 
graduated its first class of 100 pilots and technicians, 
Major Jalloud paid tribute to their Czechoslovakian and 
Pakistani instructors. 73 Meanwhile Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir 
inaugurated the Libyan Naval Academy. " 
This growth was still too slow for Qaddafi's 
satisfaction. In his Id al-Adha address the Colonel 
pledged to ask the General People's Congress to turn all 
schools into military camps with the goal of mobilizing 
500,000 regular soldiers "to counter the crusading 
campaign which now threatens our very existence. "75 Soon 
71 SWB ME/6142/A/9, 
72 SWB ME/6178/C/1, 
73 SWB ME/6515/A/8, 
August 1980. 
74 SWB/ME/6511/A/4, 
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1 September 1980. 
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"spontaneous" demonstrations broke out as students 
obligingly clamored for total. mobilization and the 
transformation of their schools into more bellicose 
institutions. 76 
The 1977 War, followed by Sadat's historic trip to 
Israel in November, erased any hope that Libyan national 
security policy would transcend Qaddafi's feud with 
Sadat. At least by delivering the coup d'grace to 
reconciliation it solidified Sadat's removal as Qaddafi's 
foremost strategic objective. During a news conference 
on August 2,1977, Jalloud dismissed the possibility of 
unity with Egypt so long as Sadat was in power. Libyan 
newspapers echoed the theme, arguing that it was 
impossible to reach an understanding with Sadat. 
Likewise, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lt. General 
Ahmad Badawi, complained that Libyan behavior was 'not 
based on national objectives or logic. '" A case in 
point was the creation of an elaborate system of earthen 
fortifications (designed and constructed with Bulgarian 
and Soviet aid) along the eastern border, supported by 
newly built airfields. 78 The estimated cost of this 280- 
300km Maginot line (curiously out of touch with the fluid 
nature of desert warfare and the lessons of the 1973 War) 
76 SWB ME/6572/A/1,11 November 1980. 
77 SWB ME/6379/i, 25 March 1980. 
78 SWB ME/6379/A/1,25 March 1980. 
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was estimated at $3 billion. " 
Tripoli portrayed these fortifications as a direct 
result of the Camp David Treaty which supposedly brought 
an 'increased threat of an Egyptian military assault. ` 
The peace dividend for Egypt was significant: a promise 
of billions of dollars worth of U. S. arms and aircraft, 
as well as the freedom to redeploy units away from the 
Sinai front. By May the reinforced Egyptian western 
command was conducting sizable maneuvers at Sidi al- 
Barrani; even worse, the Egyptian army was embarking on 
joint exercises with American forces. In light of such 
exercises, the Libyans deemed their earthworks to be 
'simple precautions. 181 Egypt, Qaddafi told his military 
cadets, was now a U. S. military camp. 82 
Deeb submits that Qaddafi 'mellowed' and became 
'more conciliatory' to the U. S. immediately after the 
Camp David accords of 1978. Her evidence is 
unpersuasive: did Qaddafi really sound 'apologetic' when 
he said Western policy 'compelled' him to 'resort to the 
Soviet Union and to be hostile to the U. S. '? " In fact, 
Qaddafi's flamboyant response to Camp David was a threat 
79 Wright, 206; SWB ME/6438/A/3,6 June 1980; George Joffe, 
"Libya: The decline of Qadafi, " Middle East International no. 127 
(20 June 1980): 8; see also SWB ME/6448/A/8,18 June 1980. 
80 "Call to boycott American goods, " Jamahiriya Review, no. 
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82 SWB ME/6407/A/1,29 April 1980. 
83 Deeb, 120. 
i 
154 
to join the Warsaw Pact! 
The next three years were marked by recriminations, 
threats, and saber-rattling. Libyan diplomats somberly 
raised the 'Egyptian threat' with their Soviet 
counterparts whenever possible. At each stop during his 
July 1979 Middle East tour, Qaddafi warned Arab leaders 
that Egypt would soon renew its 'onslaught' against 
Libya. 84 At the annual celebration of the American 
departure from Wheelus Field, the Colonel berated the 
'unholy alliance' between Washington and Cairo. 85 
The Egyptians were equally adept at milking the 
propaganda value of Libyan-Soviet relations. When in 
1979 Libyan and Soviet officials held talks regarding 
privileges for the Soviet navy, A1-Akhbar sarcastically 
noted that the Soviet fleet already used Libyan ports and 
suggested the entire country was tantamount to a Soviet 
base. 86 The following year the Egyptian Defence Minister 
stated: 
As for the balance of power with other 
neighboring states, we are certainly watching 
very attentively the Soviet activity regarding 
arms supplies to Libya. Soviet experts and 
arms in Libya exceeds the capacity of the 
Libyan armed forces and Libyan people to absorb 
them. 87 
The Egyptian Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad 
Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, told Al-Abram that communism 
84 SWB ME/6179/A/3,28 July 1979. 
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was the 'real danger' in the Middle East and cited Libya 
and Ethiopia as extensions of the Soviet threat. Le 
Point reported that Libya was creating a Soviet naval 
base at Bardia. 8e Sadat impressed similar themes upon 
President Carter, not always successfully. During one 
dinner party he told how Qaddafi had massacred many of 
his colleagues in cold blood; Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Carter's National Security Adviser, dismissed the story 
as fictional. 89 
In any event, while Libya insisted that each and 
every Egyptian field exercise was preparation for an 
invasion, it never conceded Egypt's defence concerns were 
legitimate. 90 After rocket exercises at Hamadah al- 
Hanra, Libya boasted its rockets could hit targets 
hundreds of kilometers away. 91 Later that year Tripoli 
announced its missiles were capable of being fired at 
targets 'across the border. ' 92 Frictional encounters, 
such as an incident between an Egyptian submarine and a 
Libyan naval vessel near Sallum, were depicted as 
pretexts for Egyptian aggression. 93 In a typical display 
88 SWB ME/6504/A/4,22 August 1980; SWB ME/6508/A/6,28 
August 1980. 
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of siege mentality, Libya commemorated the tenth 
anniversary of the American withdrawal from Wheelus Air 
Force Base with a simulation of repulsing a hostile 
landing force. 94 
Tempers hit the boiling point again in the summer of 
1980. On June 11, Qaddafi reiterated his plea for a 
rebellion of the Egyptian armed forces. A week later 
Sadat declared a state of emergency on the border. 
Badawi, now Minister of Defence, stressed that the state 
of emergency was necessary to combat Libyan infiltration 
and sabotage on the border: 100 instances of infiltration 
were logged during the first quarter of 1980 (down from a 
total of 3000 cases in 1977). 95 
Qaddafi's repeated calls for an Egyptian revolution 
showed that his conception of Libyan external security 
remained static. So far as Tripoli was concerned, 
Sadat's policies--from the Camp David accords to Cairo's 
warm relations with Washington--were tantamount to a 
declaration of war. 96 In the words of the Libyan Foreign 
Ministry: 
The freedom of the 
in danger so long 
continued to lurk 
turn Egypt into a 
is not the Libyan 
treason in Egypt. 
responsibility of 
B Libyan people will always be 
as American imperialism 
in Egyptian territory and 
base for aggression. But it 
people's job to overthrow the 
It is in the first place the 
the Egyptian people and 
94 SWB ME/6443/i, 12 June 1980. 
95 SWB ME/6458/A/3,30 June 1980. 
96 SWB ME/6450/A/5-6,20 June 1980. 
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Egyptian army. 97 
With this approach to problems of international security, 
at times the Libyan regime's threat perception seemed to 
border upon paranoia. For example, when an Israeli 
General Staff delegation visited Egypt, Tripoli alleged 
that Israel and Egypt were plotting a joint invasion of 
Libya. 98 Only a few years earlier the thought of such a 
joint Egyptian-Israeli operation would have been beyond 
the pale of credulity. Yet Qaddafi's incessant abuse of 
Sadat had made this almost inconceivable operation 
possible, or so the Israeli Prime Minister boasted to the 
U. S. President. " To the extent that it materialized, 
Egypt's anti-Libya contingency planning with Israel was 
the result of Qaddafi's fulfilling his own prophecy. 
The price of truculence was insecurity. In response 
to Libya's border provocations (and the general 
atmosphere of animosity), Cairo mustered six infantry 
divisions, six motorized infantry divisions, three 
airborne battalions and three air defense brigades along 
its western frontier, with air and naval support on 
call. '00 Libya countered with a general mobilization and 
cleared hospitals to handle casualties. "' On August 15, 
97 SWB ME/6458/A/2,30 June 1980. 
98 "Sadat's military forces ready to strike Libya, " 
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1980, Egypt sent a letter to the UN Security Council 
blaming Libya for the racing border tensions. 102 Three 
days later the Egyptian Ministry of Defence upgraded its 
alert status. i°3 
Qaddafi's actions and rhetoric were quite clearly 
increasing the likelihood of a return to the border war 
of 1977, a resumption of fighting which Libya, despite 
its ever-growing arsenal, would be unlikely to win. 
Nevertheless, the Colonel continued to deliberately 
escalate tensions. He again called upon the Egyptian 
army to seize control of the government. 104 And he made 
what some perceived as a threat to employ weapons of mass 
destruction against Cairo: (Libya) 'possesses such 
weapons and manpower as to be capable of destroying the 
whole of Egypt. ' 105 
Qaddafi moved Libya to a war-footing with a call for 
general mobilization. Tripoli Voice of the Arab Homeland 
reported: 
He (Qaddafi) said that Sadat was carrying out 
continuous provocations and that the Libyan 
people would eventually reach a point where 
they could no longer accept such provocations 
or defiance even if it is America defying them. 
He added that the manoeuvres by the American 
forces along the Libyan borders were the very 
height of defiance. He affirmed that we should 
show the Egyptian army that we had no 
confrontation with it but with Sadat and 
America ... The leader emphasized that what 
102 SWB ME/6498/A/5,15 August 1980. 
103 SWB ME/6503/i, 21 August 1980. 
104 SWB ME/6517/A/2,8 September 1980. 
105 SWB ME/6513/A/5,3 September 1980. 
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he was saying about Egypt also applied to 
another neighboring Arab state (i. e., 
106 Tunisia). 
In December 1980, Al-Abram reported that Libya was moving 
additional troops to its eastern border. 107 
Nominally, Libyan strategic objectives vis A vis 
Egypt after 1973 fluctuated between reconciliation, 
effecting a reversal of Egyptian foreign policy, and 
deposing Sadat, though pursuing the former objective had 
essentially been made contingent upon achievement of the 
latter two. By 1980, Qaddafi had resoundingly failed to 
achieve any of these objectives. He had, however, 
transformed his former ally into his most serious enemy. 
This wanton aggravation of the Libyan security 
predicament was repeated to a remarkable degree with 
Algeria and, as we shall see, with Tunisia, Malta, Niger, 
and Sudan as well. 
Libya's dalliance with its northeastern neighbor 
began in earnest in December 1972 when, during a speech 
at the Palmarium, Qaddafi appealed directly to the 
Tunisian people to unite with Libya. In theory, a 
Libyan-Tunisian union promised a number of strategic 
benefits to each. Tunisia represented manpower, 
technical sophistication, and control over a key 
Mediterranean choke point. Libya offered oil wealth and 
106 SWB ME/6581/A/3,21 November 1980. 
107 SWB ME/6596/i, 9 December 1980. 
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an outlet for Tunisia's swelling population. Together 
the two individually weak states could form a significant 
force in North Africa. 
But Qaddafi's fervent pleas did not sway the 
formidable President Habib Bourguiba, who was just as 
ardent in propounding his vision of Tunisian interests as 
Qaddafi was in promoting his own ideals. Bourguiba, who 
had been watching Qaddafi's speech on television, rushed 
to the scene and admonished the Colonel that Arab unity 
was decades and perhaps centuries away. The Tunisian 
leader cagily agreed to a series of bilateral cooperation 
agreements in lieu of unification. 
The divergence in their approaches to Arab unity, as 
well as to the Arab-Israeli conflict, accentuated 
differences in their world views. Bourguiba, an 
unabashed Francophone, was scorned by pan-Arabists for 
his moderate, pro-Western orientation. Considerable 
evidence suggests that the two men held each other in 
derision. Qaddafi urged Bourguiba to proclaim a cultural 
revolution and smash the Destour party. Bourguiba 
dismissed Qaddafi's criticisms as infantile. '" Their 
one shared trait, a belief that they had been destined to 
lead, was more conducive to rivalry than partnership. 
Great was the shock, therefore, when on January 12, 
1974, the two rulers proclaimed they would blend their 
countries into a single Islamic Arab Republic. What had 
produced this seismic shift in Bourguiba's thinking? 
108 Bianco, 191. 
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Though only in his early seventies, the Tunisian's 
judgement was already beginning to fail. Qaddafi--acting 
in collaboration with Tunisian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mohammed Masmoudi--had cannily played to 
Bourguiba's vanity, agreeing that the latter would 
preside over the new republic. It beggars belief to 
suggest Qaddafi would willingly sublimate his state to 
Tunisian leadership; doubtless, he planned to ease 
himself into Bourguiba's chair. After a mere forty-five 
minute audience, a radiant Qaddafi secured Bourguiba's 
endorsement of the merger, which the young Libyan had 
hastily outlined on a sheet of hotel stationary. '°9 
The Jerba accord horrified Tunisia's political elite 
just as the prospect of unity with Libya had outraged 
urbane Cairenes. Qaddafi scarcely had time to savor his 
victory before Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira set 
about derailing the proposed merger. Within forty-eight 
hours Foreign Minister Masmoudi was sacked and the Jerba 
agreement subjected to withering criticism in the 
Tunisian National Assembly. In the words of a senior 
Tunisian official, the scheme died after an existence of 
only four hours. 110 
The demise of the Islamic Arab Republic need not 
have precluded the establishment of a less ambitious 
alliance which could still have afforded considerable 
109 Derek Hopwood, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, . 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), 90. 
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strategic benefit to Libya. But Qaddafi, incensed at 
being thwarted, found it impossible to scale down his 
objectives to political reality. Over the next year he 
waffled between attempting to resurrect the Djerba 
accord, pressuring Tunisia to alter its Western 
orientation, and orchestrating the downfall of the 
Bourguiba regime. 
Qaddafi seemed blissfully unaware that subversion 
and reconciliation were mutually exclusive. In February 
he called for a Tunisian revolution and pledged his 
support. "' This was an outrageous step, one no 
government could quietly brook. When revolution failed 
to materialize, Qaddafi placed revolt in abeyance and 
tried to resurrect the Djerba agreement. Tunis naturally 
rebuffed these advances and refused to repatriate Libyan 
dissident Omar Al Meheishi. In March 1976 Libya 
retaliated by deporting 7,000 Tunisian workers. 
Simultaneously, several Libyans were arrested for 
attempting to assassinate Tunisian officials, including 
Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, who had been instrumental in 
nullifying the Jerba agreement. 112 
Eventually, the allure of fomenting a rebellion was 
too much for Qaddafi to resist. On January 27,1980, a 
mixed contingent of some 50 mercenaries and Tunisian 
dissidents crossed into Tunisia and assaulted the police 
station, militia headquarters, and army barracks in the 
ul In a speech at Zaouira on 10 February. Hechiche, 57. 
112 Deeb, 97; FBIS-MEA, 2 April 1976, I1. 
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town of Gafsa. 113 At the barracks the rebels caught a 
number of inexperienced recruits unawares and massacred 
them in their beds. But once Tunisian reinforcements 
arrived the insurgents themselves were all killed or 
captured. Numbered among the prisoners was the leader of 
the guerilla team, Ezzadine Cherif, who admitted that he 
and his men had trained in Libyan camps. 
The Libyan Foreign Ministry flatly denied Tripoli's 
involvement: 
SPLAJ has no direct or indirect connection with 
the events which are taking place in the town 
of Gafsa and the attempts by the Tunisian 
Government to blame the SPLAJ for these events 
are aimed at preoccupying the Tunisian public 
with its internal problems and preventing it 
from learning the real motives which had led in 
the past and in the present to events and 
114 popular uprisings. 
But such denials were a shade less than credible when 
juxtaposed with the bellicose rhetoric emanating from 
Tripoli. JANA hailed the fighters as leaders of a 
people's revolution and expressed solidarity with the 
Tunisian masses in their fight against the 'fascist' 
government. Within days Qaddafi added his imprimatur to 
this policy, declaring: 
We consider the Tunisian regime as an adversary 
of the Libyan Republic in Libya. The logical 
solution is in the pursuit of the struggle 
until the disappearance of this adversary. .. 
. We admit no mediation, neither peace nor 
armistice in the struggle which opposes us to 
113 The attack marked the anniversary of a Tunisian uprising, 
and may also have been timed to shift the international spotlight 
to Libya. P. Edward Haley, Oaddafi and the United States since 
fig, (New York: Praeger, 1984), 118. 
114 SWB ME/6335/A/6,2 February 1980. 
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the Tunisian regime. 115 
Tripoli radio broadcast calls for the Libyan people to 
'work with their Tunisian brothers to topple this agent 
regime' well into March. '16 
Tunisian Prime Minister Nouira turned to Paris, and 
to a lesser extent Washington, for assistance against 
Qaddafi's 'expansionist aims. ' The United States 
obligingly sent elements of the Sixth Fleet to the Gulf 
of Gabes. 117 France despatched three warships and two 
submarines, along with transport planes to ferry Tunisian 
reinforcements. 118 Officially, the only French units to 
actually touch Tunisian soil were two helicopters and two 
Transall transport aircraft. 119 Qaddafi and his band 
denounced this 'French invasion' of 'fraternal Tunisia, ' 
but Jalloud paradoxically taunted Tunis to request 'more 
French and US troops because we are with the Tunisian 
troops ready to fight them both. 1120 Speaking to 
Libdration, Qaddafi warned Paris it was 'risking effects 
on other areas of North Africa, and perhaps, all Africa. ' 
On February 4, a Libyan mob set fire to the French 
embassy. 121 
115 Hechiche, 58; Haley, 114-15. 
116 SWB ME/6379/i, 25 March 1980. 
ill New York Times, 1 February 1980. 
118 SWB ME/6334/i, 1 February 1980; Haley, 112. 
119 SWB ME/6336/A/2,4 February 1980. 
120 SWB ME/6342/i, 11 February 1980. 
121 SWB ME/6337/i, 5 February 1980. 
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Such behavior, like the Gafsa raid itself, was 
myopic and counterproductive. The United States 
immediately increased its military sales to Tunisia and 
renewed its efforts to establish military standby 
facilities there. 122 In late February Washington 
unveiled a military aid package of armored personnel 
carriers and helicopters worth $23 million (additional 
helicopters were furnished by France and Italy). By mid- 
1981 U. S. military credits to Tunisia had leapt to $95 
million from a pre-Gafsa level of approximately $19 
million per annum. '23 Furthermore, Congressional 
opposition to a bill authorizing military assistance to 
Morocco dissolved in Gafsa's wake. 124 
Yet Tripoli was anything but penitent. A string of 
border violations further fouled relations with Tunis. 
On July 27,1980, a three-man Libyan patrol was arrested 
12km inside Tunisian territory. On November 16, another 
three-man squad was surprised by a Tunisian patrol 3.5 km 
inside the border near Sidi Toui. The Tunisian Foreign 
Minister, Mahmoud Mestiri, expressed alarm at indications 
Libya was strengthening its air and ground forces at an 
airbase in Otaia (18 km from the border) and along the 
border itself. Mestiri pointedly warned the Libyan 
122 Hechiche, 61-62. 
123 "US arms sales to Tunisia, " Jamahiriya Review no. 23 
(April, 1982), 12. 
124 Haley, 118. 
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charge d'affaires against further incursions. 125 Given 
Tunisia's relative military inferiority, direct U. S. or 
French intervention would have been required to give that 
warning teeth. That the Tunisian government contemplated 
inviting such intervention reflects the extent to which 
Qaddafi had utterly failed to reduce Western influence in 
the region while expanding his own powerbase. 
The Tunisian interregnum neatly captures the 
irrational nature of Libyan national security policy. 
The Jerba proposal, albeit rash, was not without logic. 
But Qaddafi's refusal to accept anything less than full 
union, and the extremism with which he sought revenge 
against those who had thwarted his plan, transformed a 
potential ally into a suspicious and defensive neighbor. 
The Gafsa raid vividly exemplified Tripoli's myopia in 
resorting to subversion. 
Winston Churchill once remarked that Malta is the 
only unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, 
and it is precisely because of its command of a strategic 
Mediterranean choke point, as well as its proximity to 
the Libyan shoreline, that Malta is of strategic import 
to Tripoli. As seen in the preceding chapter, the overt 
imperative behind Libya's Maltese diplomacy was to deny 
the island to NATO by pushing non-alignment. The Libyans 
were far coyer with regards to their own interests; 
125 SWB ME/6579/A/3,19 November 1980. 
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Qaddafi rather improbably maintained that the notion of 
Libyan-Maltese union was incidentally raised in a 
conversation with Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff. 126 
Prospects for a Libyan-Maltese alliance seemed 
propitious after the last British troops departed Malta 
in March 1979. Even before the British finished their 
withdrawal Libyan troops had reportedly taken control of 
key facilities on the island. In 1973 and again in 1978 
Libya donated helicopters to the tiny island-state; the 
quid pro quo was permission to fly helicopter 
reconnaissance missions from the island. 127 However, the 
Maltese were disappointed when expected Libyan largesse 
failed to materialize. In June 1980 Qaddafi stopped 
supplying oil to Malta at a discounted rate. Relations 
were further clouded by an off-shore boundary dispute 
regarding the states' respective drilling rights on the 
Medina Bank. Four years earlier Qaddafi had agreed to 
submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice, 
but he could not resist the temptation to settle the 
matter by force. 
Shortly after Qaddafi's June visit, Libyan warships 
warned the Italian ENI oil platform, Saipem-II, that it 
was operating in an area of Libyan jurisdiction (60 miles 
southeast of Malta). 128 A Libyan submarine trained its 
deck gun on the rig, forcing it to cease operations. A 
126 Mattar, 61. 
127 Bodansky, 90. 
128 SWB ME/6507/i, 27 August 1980. 
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Libyan frigate reportedly fired warning shots. Dom 
Mintoff responded by accusing Tripoli of behaving as 
Malta's 'worst enemy' and expelled 47 Libyan military 
'advisers, ' who had been using Valletta as a base for 
helicopter reconnaissance. 129 According to a former 
Maltese parliamentarian, this expulsion was 
unceremoniously conducted at gunpoint. 130 Two months 
later, Rome Radio reported that the Maltese Nationalist 
Front had attacked a Libyan naval vessel anchored at 
Genoa in retaliation for the August incident. 131 
Maltese terrorism was the least consequential result 
of Tripoli's heavy-handedness. Of greater significance 
was the emergence of a Maltese-Italian defence pact on 15 
September 1980.132 Henceforth Italy, not Libya, would be 
the guarantor of Maltese neutrality. The Italians had 
their own reasons for disturbing Qaddafi's peace of mind. 
In addition to the Saipem-II incident, Rome was angered 
by the recent seizure of two Italian trawlers off the 
Libyan coast. 133 
In November Qaddafi belatedly agreed (again) to 
submit the territorial dispute to the International Court 
129 John Cooley, "Libya's heavy-handed policy nudges Malta 
toward the West, " Christian Science Monitor, 19 September 1980. 
130 Author's interview with former Maltese MP Dennis Sammut, 
November 1994. 
131 SWB ME/6565/i, 3 November 1980. 
132 Wright, 214; Jonathan Bearman, Oadhafi's Libya, (London: 
Zed Books Ltd., 1986) 254. 
133 SWB ME/6492/A/1,8 August 1980. 
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of justice. 134 But his lack of diplomatic aplomb had 
already foiled yet another opportunity to establish a 
significant alliance. 
Ally Niger? 
Libya and Niger signed a number of accords between 
1969 and 1973, culminating in a 'Defence and Security 
Treaty' signed by Qaddafi and President Diori Hamani in 
Niamey on March 23,1974. The two states thereby 
undertook to defend each other in case of direct or 
indirect aggression and to furnish all necessary aid if 
the external or internal security of either state were 
threatened. The Libyans also promised to help develop 
and equip Niger's army. 
The logic behind this unlikely alliance deserves 
some consideration. While Niger lagged behind Libya's 
North African neighbors in wealth, military power, and 
technological advancement, its strategic attractions were 
nevertheless alluring. These included uranium deposits 
at Arlit, abundant manpower (a high percentage of which 
was Muslim and therefore, in Qaddafi's eyes, amenable to 
his purposes), and even (via Nigeria or Benin) access to 
the Atlantic. 
Alas, Niger's alliance with Libya lasted less than a 
month. On April 15,1974, Diori was deposed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Seyni Kountche (to the considerable 
relief of Algeria and France). Kountche criticized 
134 SWB ME/6581/A/4,21 November 1980. 
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Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip and opposed any 
expansion of Libyan influence in Niger. Predictably, 
Qaddafi tried to install a more malleable ruler through a 
135 coup d'etat on March 15,1976. The coup failed. 
Although Boumediene helped the two leaders paper over 
their differences for a brief period, in October 1980 
Qaddafi accused Niger of placing its Touareg minority in 
extermination camps. On January 13,1981, Niamey broke 
diplomatic relations citing the subversive activities of 
resident Libyan diplomats, and Tripoli openly announced 
its support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Niger. 136 Yet another Libyan alliance had come and gone, 
leaving enmity in its wake. 
The volatility of Libyan-Sudanese relations was 
consistent with the pattern previously outlined. Prior 
to the 1973 War Libya, Egypt, and the Sudan formed a 
tripartite alliance. Thereafter, the deterioration of 
Libyan-Egyptian ties reframed Libyan strategic interests 
in the Sudan. At minimum Qaddafi hoped to split Khartoum 
away from Cairo. At best he hoped to forge an anti- 
Egyptian alliance. However, when conventional diplomacy 
was slow to yield results Qaddafi once again resorted to 
subversion. Thus, following a press barrage in March 
1974 attacking Numeiri for supporting Sadat, a Libyan- 
135 Blin, 365. 
136 Blin, 370. 
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backed coup attempt was launched in May. 137 By early 
1975 there were intimations of a rapprochement, but 
behind the scenes Qaddafi was still engaged in 
subversion. Abel Alier, a Sudanese official, met the 
Colonel in April: 
Our meeting with the Libyan leader was most 
uneasy. At one point he seemed to want the 
South to go its own way from the rest of the 
Sudan, and at another he seemed to tell us not 
to obstruct coups in the offing as long as 
self-rule in the South was assured by the new 
government. He seemed torn between a frank 
conspiratorial talk and diplomatic restraint, 
being uncertain about his audience's 
support. 138 
As fate would have it, Qaddafi should have opted for 
restraint; upon returning to Khartoum, Alier warned 
Numeiri that Qaddafi was 'far from friendly' and 'might 
be planning to stab us in the back in spite of recent 
attempts to improve relations. 1139 This assessment 
proved accurate in July 1976. As in the Gafsa incident, 
Libya provided the logistical support for a minuscule 
invasion force which hoped to topple Numeiri (Deeb writes 
that Libya only supplied the Sudanese National Front with 
training and perhaps financial assistance, as if such 
assistance were less egregious! ). 140 Thousands of 
137 Deeb, 106; FBIS-MEA, 10 May 1974,16. 
138 Abel Alier, Southern Sudan (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1990), 
193. 
139 Alier, 193. 
140 Nasr Eldin El Hadi El Mahdi, Deputy Chairman of Sudan's 
umma party, was among the invaders and unequivocally confirmed 
that he and his men acted with the full support of the Libyan 
armed forces. (Author's interview, March 13,1996). 
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Egyptian troops were deployed to assist Numeiri in 
restoring order, and within days the Egyptians and 
Sudanese signed a mutual defence treaty. Qaddafi had 
once again sabotaged his own strategy. 
When Libya did extend military aid to foreign states 
that assistance proved to be of limited utility, a point 
brought into relief by Qaddafi's military adventurism in 
Uganda. Libyan support for the reviled Idi Amin regime 
began in September 1972 after fighting broke out between 
Uganda and Tanzania. Qaddafi despatched a number of C- 
130s to carry weapons and commandos to aid Amin's forces. 
The rationale for this policy was a dim notion that 
Uganda could be a useful ally in undermining the Numeiri 
government. 241 
Libyans soon replaced the Israeli advisers who had 
been training the Ugandan air force. 142 Libyan and PLO 
experts began advising Idi Amin's intelligence service, 
the notorious State Research Bureau; documents recovered 
afterwards indicated they taught Amin how to pit elements 
of his intelligence system against each other. 143 in 
1973, Qaddafi paid for an order of 60 APCs and a squadron 
141 El Saadany, 95. 
142 George Ivan Smith, Ghosts of Kampala, (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1980), 93. 
143 Smith, 117. 
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of 12 Mirage fighters for Uganda. 
114 
In defiance of his own military advisers, in the 
winter of 1979 Qaddafi despatched Libyan forces to help 
the Ugandans quash a Tanzanian-backed rebellion. 145 By 
March between 1,000 and 3,000 troops of the Eagle Qaddafi 
Regiment had been airlifted to the country. 146 In a 
disastrous action, a Libyan tank squadron at Mpigi was 
captured by Tanzanian infantrymen who waded through a 
swamp at night and struck the Libyans from behind. 147 
One witness who surveyed the wreckage wrote: 
Huge Russian tanks and personnel carriers were 
sprawled and overturned among the banana 
groves. The Libyans had manned them and set up 
a well-concealed ambush on the road, guns at 
the ready. The liberation forces had walked 
through the groves and plantations, rounded 
hills, and on foot from each side totally 
annihilated the large Libyan force; four 
hundred killed, no Tanzanian casualty. Libyan 
soldiers trained for desert warfare were not at 
ease in the rain forests, in the wet season. 148 
On the night of March 10,1979, elements of the 
expeditionary force assigned to take Masaka clashed with 
the 201st Tanzanian brigade. After an indecisive 
skirmish in which many Tanzanians broke ranks and fled 
144 Mahmood Mamdani, Imperialism and fascism in Uganda, 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983), 69. 
145 Lisa Anderson, "Libya and American foreign policy, " 
Middle East Journal 36 (Autumn 1982): 527. 
146 Alan Scott MacDougall, "Libya, " in Fighting armies: 
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(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 132; Smith 1980, 
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(terrified by Libyan use of Soviet BM-21 rocket launchers 
colloquially known as 'Stalin organs'), the 208th brigade 
did a forced march and arrived to attack the Libyan rear 
at dawn. The Tanzanians were in no mood to take 
prisoners: around 200 Libyans were killed but only one 
was captured. 149 Another thirty Libyans were killed by 
troops of the 201st brigade at a coffee farm near 
Mityana, West of Mpigi. 150 A Libyan TU-22 flew sorties 
out of Nakasongola airbase but did not provide effective 
air support. 151 
The final battle occurred on the morning of April 7, 
when the 208th attacked Entebbe. Just after 10: 00 AM a 
Libyan C-130 attempted to evacuate thirty Libyan 
soldiers; it took an RPG round while taxiing down the 
runway, killing everyone inside. 152 Remnants of the 
Libyan force, unable to speak the language and unsure of 
where to go, were easily mopped up by the Tanzanians- 
often with the help of local citizens. A Libyan convoy 
escaping to Kampala was ambushed: over 65 Libyans died, 
bringing total casualties just at Entebbe to nearly 300. 
The Libyans also lost a great deal of material, including 
three Stalin organs. 153 
By the end of April approximately 500 Libyan 
149 Avirgan and Honey, 90-91. 
150 Avirgan and Honey, 94. 
151 Avirgan and Honey, 120. 
152 ibid., 121. 
153 ibid., 122. 
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soldiers lay dead. 154 Some 59 Libyan prisoners were 
quickly released; whether Qaddafi paid a $20 million 
ransom to secure their freedom is disputed. 155 Libya's 
explanation for the fiasco was the same supplied during 
the 1977 clash with Egypt: the soldiers were from the 
Popular Militia, not the regular forces. 156 The Libyan- 
Ugandan alliance was not spoken of again. 
In questions of diplomacy, unlike affairs of the 
heart, it may sometimes be better never to love at all 
than to love and lose. Qaddafi never seemed to grasp 
that each successive volte-face in bilateral relations 
eroded the credibility of Libya foreign policy. By 1980, 
his tempestuous quest for an ally had become a joke 
throughout the Arab world. Moreover, Libya had 
established an unenviable reputation for taking its 
international obligations cavalierly. In point of fact, 
Tripoli signed mutual defence treaties with Niger (9 
March 1974), Guinea (27 November 1974), Algeria (28-29 
December 1975), Gabon and Togo (5 January 1976). In 
addition, the Tripoli Declaration of December 5,1977, 
which gave birth to the Steadfastness and Confrontation 
Front (a coalition of Arab states opposed to the Camp 
David accords), also included a defence provision. 
Finally, in the midst of the Iran hostage crisis the 
154 Assuming some exaggeration in the figures previously 
noted. 
155 Wright, 213; Avirgan and Honey, 122. 
156 Wright, 213. 
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Libyan leader announced that, 'The Jamahiriya considers 
any American or other military aggression against the 
Islamic Iranian Republic as aggression against the 
Jamahiriya itself. 9157 Yet in each instance these 
accords were not backed up by political commitment. The 
rhetoric of mutual defence was, in the end, only 
rhetoric. 
This chapter has thus far demonstrated that 
Tripoli's attempts to remedy the Libyan security 
predicament were ineffective and even counterproductive. 
This was in part because Qaddafi conceived of Libyan 
security in such a way as to make its attainment 
difficult if not impossible for a state with Libya's 
limited resources to achieve. This was especially true 
of Qaddafi's determination to roll back or even eradicate 
American influence in the Middle East. Libya not only 
failed to reduce Washington's regional role but also 
aggravated its own security predicament by fostering 
American enmity. 
By 1973, the U. S. State Department had concluded 
that attempting to befriend the Libyan regime was futile. 
Qaddafi deliberately spurned U. S. diplomats despite their 
gestures of goodwill. The State Department decided to 
ignore Qaddafi pending a change, for better or worse, in 
157 SWB ME/6203/A/7,28 November 1979; SWB ME/6337/A/9,5 
February 1980; SWB ME/6626/i, 19 January 1981. 
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his disposition. 
Yet over the remainder of the decade the Libyans 
showed increasing hostility towards the United States. 
In speech after speech the Colonel singled out Washington 
as the enemy of Libya and the 'Arab nation. ' His 
rhetorical attacks became ever shriller, culminating in a 
virtual declaration of war in 1980: 
The presence of American forces in Egypt, 
Somalia and Oman, even if at the request of the 
governments of these countries, is considered 
an invasion and an aggression against the Arab 
homeland that should be resisted. The Arab 
homeland is the home of all Arabs, and if the 
independence of any part of the Arab homeland 
is violated, the independence of the whole Arab 
homeland is violated ... We must force 
America to leave the Arab homeland by force, 
and we must bring it to the state where, even 
if the agents asked it to establish military 
bases in the Arab homeland it would refuse to 
do so. 158 
Foremost of his voiced grievances was U. S. involvement in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, specifically its support of 
Israel and its role in brokering peace between Egypt and 
Israel after the 1973 War. But any display of American 
power, such as formation of the army's Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF), elicited sharp objections from Tripoli. 
Qaddafi warned that the RDF would be used not against the 
Soviets but against Arab forces. Libyan writers 
described scenarios (mostly fantastic, but occasionally 
plausible) under which the RDF would fight against Arab 
forces, such as a new oil embargo or another Arab-Israeli 
158 SWB ME/6517/A/2,8 September 1980. 
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war. 159 Less plausible were his fears that the RDF would 
be used to invade Libya. 16o The RDF exercised in the 
Egyptian western desert with the Persian Gulf, not 
Colonel Qaddafi, in mind. 161 
President Carter's decision to keep the U. S. Sixth 
Fleet out of the Gulf of Sirte reflected the 
administration's hands-off approach to Qaddafi--and its 
failure. 162 In August 1979, when American newspapers 
floated the notion that the navy would contest Libyan 
territorial claims to the Gulf of Sirte, Libya announced 
it would defend the Gulf by force. 163 Tripoli radio 
threatened to teach a humiliating lesson to the 'cobweb 
tiger. ' 164 
Indeed, in March 1976 Libyan Mirages (possibly 
piloted by Pakistani pilots) had in fact attacked an 
American EC-130 flying a surveillance mission over the 
Mediterranean. 165 And on September 16,1980, a USAF RC- 
135 reconnaissance aircraft was intercepted by two Libyan 
159 "The modern face of colonial occupation, " 3amahiriya 
Review no. 13 (April 1981), 15. 
160 SWB ME/6556/A/2,23 October 1980. 
161 SWB ME/6576/A/3,15 November 1980. 
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MiG-23s 200 miles north of Libya. One MiG fired an air- 
to-air missile before the RC-135 escaped towards Athens. 
The USS John F. Kennedy was immediately deployed to the 
area. On September 21, eight Libyan fighters (four 
Mirages, two MiG-23s, and two Mig-25s) intercepted 
another RC-135 in international airspace. The appearance 
of the RC-135's escort--carrier based F-14s--dissuaded 
the Libyans from attempting hostilities. 166 
Two years after leaving office, President Carter 
revealed yet another grave Libyan provocation: a plot to 
assassinate Hermann Eilts, the U. S. ambassador to Egypt. 
When U. S. intelligence circles got wind of the plan 
Carter sent a stern personal note to Qaddafi, threatening 
punitive action. Where disengagement had failed a timely 
and unambiguous threat worked, and Qaddafi cancelled the 
operation. "" 
When it became clear that Libya was using its 
resources to support Palestinian terrorism, Congress 
forbade the sale of U. S. weaponry to Tripoli. This ban 
prevented Libya from taking delivery of eight C-130s and 
two Boeing 727s which it had already paid for, yet Boeing 
refused to refund the money. The impasse became a sore 
166 William Safire, "Qadhafi's shrewd gambit to entice Soviet 
protection, " International Herald Tribune, August 1981; cf. 
Bodansky, 90. 
167 President Carter's recollection of the affair was 
confirmed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. "When Carter got tough, " 
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point with Libyan officials. 168 Yet the regime was 
unmoved by any gesture of goodwill. For example, after 
the State Department persuaded Congress to release 
several planes on the condition they not be used for 
military purposes. The LAF immediately put the jets into 
service ferrying his expeditionary force to Uganda. Such 
brazen flouting of diplomatic convention contributed to 
the growing consensus that the U. S. could not and should 
not attempt to do business with Tripoli. 
Libya's quest to dislodge the remaining C-130s was 
handled in an extremely short-sighted fashion. Tripoli 
cultivated Billy Carter, the President's colorful beer- 
brewing brother, as an agent of influence. He was feted 
in grand style in Tripoli, given the generous sum of 
$200,000--belatedly described as a loan--and asked to 
prevail upon the White House to unlock the C-130 deal. 
Billy narrowly escaped prosecution and was forced by the 
Justice Department to register as a representative of the 
Libyan government. 
Nonetheless, news of the gross conflict of interests 
became a political scandal ('Billygate') which humiliated 
the incumbent administration immediately before the 
presidential election of 1980. As Carter recalls in his 
memoirs: 'The Libyan mess, which was dominating the news, 
was wreaking havoc with our efforts to deal with anything 
168 Richard Parker, North Africa: Re innal Q tensions and 
.q egic concerns, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 68. 
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else .. . v169 Only three months before the election 
Carter was forced to dedicate a one hour news conference 
almost exclusively to the question of Libya. The 
beleaguered Carter campaign already had enough troubles; 
while Libya's baksheesh-diplomacy was not the only wave 
Ronald Reagan rode into the White House, Qaddafi had done 
his bit in creating a far different administration. 
Libyan national security policy set out to reduce 
American influence in the Middle East, but had the 
antithetical result of strengthening American ties to 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. Moreover, the vehemence of 
its anti-American rhetoric and diplomacy, to say nothing 
of its unprovoked attacks on American aircraft, 
established Libya as an adversary and thus set the stage 
for future conflict. Deliberately antagonizing a 
superpower produced few--if any--tangible benefits; it 
did, however, indubitably aggravate the Libyan security 
predicament. 
The 1973 War revamped the Libyan external security 
predicament. With Nasser deceased, how should Qaddafi 
pursue security? Was non-alignment still feasible? Was 
confronting Israel and its allies a viable option? 
Feasible or not, Qaddafi stuck to his guns. The 
course of Egyptian-Israeli relations perhaps made it 
easier to depict himself as the guardian of Nasser's 
169 Carter, 548. 
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flame, and Qaddafi did all in his power to discredit the 
Egyptian president. When he failed to shame Sadat into 
shifting course, Qaddafi resorted to subversion in hopes 
of either coercing a reversal of Egyptian policy or 
deposing his Egyptian counterpart. Libya failed to 
accomplish either objective, yet managed to plunge its 
relations with Cairo into crisis and, briefly, into war. 
With Egypt unwilling (and in Qaddafi's eyes, 
unworthy) to bear the standard of Arab resurgence, the 
Libyan leader stepped boldly into the gap. The 
militarization of Libyan society begun in 1969 picked up 
speed as Qaddafi sought to transform his country into a 
formidable military power. Exorbitant sums were poured 
into the military coffers. But becoming a significant 
military power was never a viable option given the 
state's demographic constraints. Indeed, the armed 
forces could not absorb much of their new weaponry. 170 
In 1979 Libya had 160 operational aircraft and only 150 
pilots. 171 Militarization was thus, at best, indecisive 
in remedying the security dilemma; at worst, it simply 
ignited a self-defeating arms race with Egypt. 
Qaddafi also sought out new allies to join him in 
the task of reordering the Near East. The USSR, now 
Libya's chief arms supplier, was a natural candidate, but 
170 Sadat said of Libya's arsenal: 'we know it (the LAF) 
isn't capable of that (using the weapons) because we trained it. ' 
Flora Lewis, "Soviet navy loses right to use Egyptian ports, " 
y Jc Times, 5 April 1976. 
171 Newsweek, 9 July 1979. 
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Qaddafi refused to relinquish the degree of autonomy 
which Moscow required before undertaking a commitment to 
Libya's security. Elsewhere, Qaddafi showed remarkable 
consistency in alienating the very states which might 
have ameliorated his strategic position. A simple 
pattern governed the life-cycle of Libya's alliances. 
Qaddafi's overtures generally met with cautious tolerance 
at first, but as the Libyan leader spelled out the terms 
of 'unity' he inevitably encountered resistance. Once 
spurned, Tripoli dropped the pretense of amity and 
adopted a hostile policy marked by shrill public 
criticism and violent subversion, thereby alienating 
neighbors which might otherwise have been important 
allies. 
This pattern was played out with Egypt, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Malta, Niger and Sudan. Repeated failure cannot 
merely be ascribed to the vicissitudes of fate (nor can 
serious students of international relations blame it upon 
clandestine imperialist machinations). To be sure, 
Tripoli had to contend with difficult allies. Sadat's 
behavior at times missed the mark of exemplary 
statesmanship. But friction is inherent in international 
relations; successful statesmanship overcomes this 
friction through accommodation, persuasion, patience, and 
flexibility. Qaddafi, on the other hand, answered 
perceived slight with subversion, and in so doing failed 
to maintain a single credible strategic bilateral 
alliance. 
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In light of Libya's relative vulnerability, prudence 
suggested that Tripoli avoid antagonizing larger powers. 
Yet Qaddafi refused to recognize this fact, and since he 
was unfettered by domestic constraints there was no need 
for him to be. He deliberately antagonized the United 
States and even attacked its aircraft to press home his 
claim to the Gulf of Sirte. By the end of the decade the 
Libyan leader's extremism had begun to catch up to him, 
discrediting his sympathizers and leading to a hardening 
of American attitudes. 
Were these policies, as Deeb contends, rational? No 
matter how bitter he found Sadat's pragmatic approach to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, neither the cease-fire after 
the 1973 War nor Camp David posed a clear threat to what 
Deeb argues were Libya's 'core foreign policy objectives 
in North Africa' (protecting the regime from foreign- 
backed coup attempts and defending Libya's territorial 
integrity). 172 Thus, even if one accepts Deeb's 
contention that Qaddafi's exclusion from the 1973 War 
left the Libyan leader sidelined and bereft of 
legitimacy, he was not the only Arab leader who Sadat 
failed to consult, and there is no evidence that 
Qaddafi's hold on power was ever in serious jeopardy as a 
result of his supposed isolation. Hence, her thesis 
fails to convincingly explain the course of Libyan- 
Egyptian relations. 173 
172 Deeb, 15. 
173 ibid., 91. 
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Moreover, the Gafsa episode elegantly debunks Deeb's 
argument that Libya's strategy was reducible to balance 
of power considerations (i. e., playing the Maghreb off 
the Mashreq). By this reasoning, Qaddafi's simmering 
dispute with Cairo should have induced him to nurture 
Tunis as an ally. Instead, Qaddafi cavalierly earned 
Tunisian enmity, ignoring the classic dictum against 
fighting on two fronts. The realpolitik model thus fails 
to convincingly explain Qaddafi's behavior; Deeb herself 
concedes bemusement. 171 
But the Gafsa raid, like the pattern of failed 
alliances it symbolized, is made comprehensible by 
approaching Libyan behavior from the standpoint of its 
leader's world view. Measured against his own 
objectives, Qaddafi's behavior was self-defeating and 
thus irrational. Indeed, the counterproductive 
consequences of his policies would become even clearer in 
the ensuing eight years that marked the Presidency of 
Ronald Reagan. 
17' ibid., 128. 
Chapter 3 
Libya during the Reagan years, 1981-1988 
The natural person has freedom to express 
himself even if, when he is mad, he behaves 
irrationally to express his madness. 
-- Muammar El Qaddafl, 
The Green Book 
Nothing during the first two decades of Muammar El 
Qaddafi's tenure so upset the Libyan national security 
equation as did the ascension of Ronald Reagan to the 
Presidency of the United States. Early in his first 
term, America's new chief executive (perhaps 
overestimating the threat Tripoli posed to the United 
States) became fixated on the Libyan leader, a fixation 
which colored U. S. policy towards Libya throughout his 
presidency. Reagan's hostility presented a challenge 
unlike any the Colonel had hitherto faced. Qaddafi was 
accustomed to being indulged or ignored by Washington, 
and the emergence of an openly antagonistic superpower 
was a rude departure from this experience. The Reagan 
years thus became a severe test of Qaddafi's ability to 
adapt his national security policy to a fluid 
international environment without sacrificing his 
political objectives. 
The Libyan leader did not fare particularly well in 
this test. His agenda remained essentially unchanged, 
though the United States displaced Egypt as his strategic 
186 
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preoccupation. Reducing America's regional influence-- 
especially its military presence--had always been an 
element of Qaddafi's strategy, and it now took on a new 
prominence. However, his tactics (i. e., threatening 
America's regional partners) tended to have the opposite 
effect of increasing Washington's leverage. Qaddafi also 
sought to negate the American threat by drawing closer to 
the Soviet Union, yet failed to obtain any security 
assurances. 
Under the circumstances, Libya might have been 
expected to pursue a temperate, even conciliatory, 
foreign policy. Instead, the regime's behavior became 
more extreme than ever. In the space of only a few 
years, Libya initiated attacks on Sudan, Tunisia, Italy 
and Chad, and sponsored subversion in myriad states. 
Furthermore, Tripoli's liquidation campaign against 
Libyan dissidents overseas stained the regime with the 
indelible ink of terrorism. 
Most memorably, Qaddafi engaged the United States in 
a series of melodramatic skirmishes in which his own 
forces were severely disadvantaged. When, predictably, 
the United States won these encounters, the Colonel's 
determination to get the better of the White House made 
him quick to approve ill-conceived covert operations 
which invited further punitive responses. In so doing, 
he consistently ignored the long-term ramifications of 
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his behavior. I For Qaddafi, the road to disaster was 
paved with moral victories. 
On a collision course with the White House 
As seen in Chapter 2, Tripoli's clumsy attempts to 
use Billy Carter as an agent of influence in Washington 
rebounded by helping to usher in the 'Reagan-revolution. ' 
Relations with the new Republican administration began on 
a foreboding note. Upon presenting his credentials, 
Libya's ranking diplomat (who, technically speaking, was 
no longer an ambassador since Qaddafi had revamped the 
Foreign Ministry and transformed its embassies into 
People's Bureaux), expressed his hope that the two 
countries would be able to resolve their differences 
amicably. Reagan's alleged reply was vaguely menacing: 
'We'll resolve them--one way or the other. 2 Secretary 
of State Alexander Haig elaborated the get-tough-on-Libya 
message during his Senate confirmation hearings. 
This inauspicious beginning reflected Reagan's 
simplistic approach to international affairs. As his 
memoirs demonstrate, the former Governor of California 
had an inaccurate and even caricaturish understanding of 
Qaddafi: 
Qaddafi was a madman ... Through terrorism, 
1 As Lisa Anderson notes, 
that mattered most to the Colon 
the Kremlin, " Problems of comma. 
43. 
2 Author's interview with 
November 1994. 
the short run was always the run 
el. Lisa Anderson, "padhdhafi and 
inism 34 (September-October 1985): 
former Maltese MP Dennis Samtnut, 
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he was trying to unify the world of Islam into 
a single nation of fundamentalists under rigid 
religious control--a theocracy, like Iran ... 
He was seeking to accomplish his goal using 
Libya's oil wealth, Russian weapons, and 
terrorism. Like the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
Iranian despot with whom he was allied and 
often in contact, Qaddafi was an unpredictable 
fanatic. He believed any act, no matter how 
vicious or cold-blooded, was justified to 
further his goals. 3 
In Reagan's eyes, Qaddafi represented an amalgam of the 
worst threats then facing the United States: communism, 
Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. 
Reagan's evident disdain for the Libyan leader was 
reciprocated in Tripoli. The conservative Republican 
personified the Libyan regime's worst nightmare of 
militant American 'imperialism. 14 For Oaddafi 
personally, Reagan perhaps represented much more. Here, 
incarnate, was the Colonel's most cherished dream: the 
leader of a Great Power, confidently brandishing the 
power of his office. In contrast, Qaddafi was still the 
leader of a minor power, incapable of fulfilling his 
sense of destiny. This apergu helps explain the 
extraordinary derision which Tripoli directed at the 
White House. Qaddafi jeered the president for having 
been an actor, and labelled Reagan a 'trivial midget, ' an 
'ignorant' man with 'no understanding of the world, 
3 Ronald Reagan, An American life: The autobiography of 
Ronald Reagan, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 280-81. 
4 "A strategy for the Mediterranean, " Jamahiriya Review no. 
8, (January 1981): 14. 
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politics, and Libya. i5 Mocking the American's cowboy 
image, the Colonel predicted that Reagan would impudently 
plunge the globe into a Third World War. Moreover, his 
first diplomatic note to Reagan was decidedly 
undiplomatic. Qaddafi pointedly neglected to 
congratulate Reagan on his election and berated the 
president for his government's treatment of Native 
Americans, the majority of whom (Qaddafi claimed) were of 
Libyan descent. 6 
Precisely because the U. S. -Libyan conflict was so 
personalized, its broader strategic import has been 
obscured to many observers. For some the conflict was 
reducible to a clash of personalities or to a study in 
brinkmanship.? Others saw Qaddafi either as a victim or 
as a wily survivor of foreign aggression. Deeb, for 
example, posits that the Colonel's policies throughout 
this period were rational because the advent of the 
Reagan administration produced 'panic' in Tripoli. 8 Once 
again, this species of argument misses the point that a 
leader's rationality is most convincingly demonstrated by 
his ability to formulate and sustain policies that 
5 SWB ME/6961/A/l, 23 February 1982; SWB ME/6977/A/5,13 
March 1982. 
6 SWB ME/6634 A/15,28 January 1981. 
7 The latter approach is slyly denoted in the title of James 
Kennon Moore's thesis, "Walking the line of death: US-Libyan 
relations in the Reagan decade, 1981-1989, " (San Jose State 
University, 1991). 
8 Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya's foreign policy in North Africa 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 143. 
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advance his interests, not by referene to his state of 
mind. 
Qaddafi was not alone in objecting to the style and 
substance of America's new chief executive. But unlike 
other foreign leaders, he consistently misread Reagan in 
two ways. First, he grievously underestimated Reagan's 
willingness to use the power of the American Presidency. 
Second, he grossly misjudged Reagan's appeal to the 
American people, and hence his ability to overcome the 
'Vietnam syndrome' which had hamstrung American diplomacy 
during most of the Colonel's tenure. In fact, Qaddafi 
was unfailingly astonished to hear that Reagan--the 
'monster, ' the 'bully'--was immensely popular at home. ' 
This erroneous analysis undoubtedly played a role in 
Qaddafi's decision to accentuate his differences with the 
White House at the time of Reagan's inauguration. 
Qaddafi reaffirmed Libya's enmity towards the United 
States and pledged to lead the Arab nation in attacking 
U. S. interests. "' Specifically, Qaddafi threatened to 
attack U. S. forces based in Berbera, Somalia, unless they 
were withdrawn. 11 In March, Libya's Revolutionary 
Committees (Qaddafi's most fervent disciples) announced 
they would lead the 'strategic counterattack' against 
U. S. bases and, lest there be any dissenters, liquidate 
9 Judith Miller, God has ninety-nine names, (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996), 223-224. 




After years of such inflammatory rhetoric, Libya's 
threats had lost much of their shock value. Tripoli 
therefore decided to throw down a gauntlet in America's 
backyard. When Reagan attempted to pressure Nicaragua's 
communist government by withholding $75 million in aid, 
Libya promptly extended $100 million to the Sandinista 
regime. 12 Nicaragua, hitherto a non-entity in Libyan 
foreign policy, was suddenly hailed by Qaddafi as 'the 
ally on whom one can rely. ' 13 The Jamahiriya began 
furnishing military aid to Managua as well. In April 
1983, a Libyan plane supposedly delivering medical 
supplies to Nicaragua was searched in Brazil and 
discovered to be laden with arms. Over the course of the 
next eight years Tripoli funnelled aid to leftists in 
Grenada (where Libya financed construction of the 
controversial airstrip--designed to accommodate Soviet 
military aircraft--that prompted the U. S. invasion), El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela and several Caribbean 
micro-states, and periodically reaffirmed its support of 
America's favorite bogeymen (Nicaragua, Cuba, North 
Korea, and Iran). 14 
Apart from its nuisance value, this burst of Latin 
American activism was part of a halting courtship pattern 
12 Georgie Anne Geyer Washington Star, 5 May 1981; see also 
John Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1982), 227. 
13 SWB ME/6687/A/2,31 March 1981. 
14 e. g., SWB ME/7295/A/1-2,30 March 1983. 
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which Qaddafi danced around the Soviet bear. In April 
1981, only a few months after Reagan's inauguration, the 
Colonel paid his first visit to the Soviet capital since 
December 1976. There he publicly endorsed the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and joined his hosts in 
denouncing the U. S. presence in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East. 15 As intended, Qaddafi's trip caused 
considerable agitation in Western capitals as analysts 
wondered if Libya would attempt to join the Warsaw Pact. 
But the Libyan leader once again demonstrated that 
he was his own worst enemy. Greeted at the airport by 
Brezhnev himself, the Colonel quickly forgot his place. 
He mortified the Soviets by demanding to pray in Moscow's 
Grand Mosque (which had been closed for years). And he 
stepped roughshod on timeless Soviet fears of a revival 
of Muslim sensibilities in the Central Asian republics by 
requesting permission to establish consulates there. 
Brezhnev drily observed that 'there are certain 
differences of an ideological order between us. ' 16 
The cash-hungry USSR nevertheless agreed to show the 
flag in and around Libya and to supply what was a 
staggering amount of weaponry for a Third World state. 
The growth in LAF naval power was particularly dramatic. 
The fleet received a submarine and two minesweepers in 
15 SWB SU/6712/A4/2-3,1 May 1981. 
16 Anderson, 38; Current digest of the Soviet pig, (27 May 
1981), 10. 
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May, two missile boats in June and a third in December. 
In July 1981 two Soviet frigates paid the first ever 
official Soviet naval call. In another bilateral 
watershed which caused great concern to NATO, a Soviet 
Backfire bomber landed at a Libyan airbase, refueled, and 
returned to the Soviet Union. 18 In September 1981 the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London 
reported the delivery of a dozen SS-12 Scaleboard 
missiles which sparked even greater alarm until the U. S. 
Defence Intelligence Agency opined Libya had in fact only 
received an associated radar system. 19 
Nevertheless, Qaddafi's trip to Moscow was notable 
primarily for what it did not produce--namely, a Soviet 
commitment to defend Libya if attacked. The reasons for 
this were three-fold. First, Qaddafi misread the Soviets 
almost as badly as he misread the Reagan White House. He 
demonstrated little appreciation of Soviet interests or 
of Soviet decision-makers and their aversion to 
unnecessary risks--above all, the risk of war with 
NATO. 2° The Soviets perceived Qaddafi as erratic and 
therefore dangerous. As one official put it: 'one should 
17 "Libyan navy gets evacuation day boost, " Jamahiriya 
g view_, no. 12 (May 1981): 7; "Missile craft add strength to 
Libyan navy, " Jamahiriya Review, no. 15 (August 1981): 7; "New 
missile boat, " Jamahiriya Review, no. 19 (December 1981): 19. 
18 Benjamin F. Schemmer, "The U. S. has lost a lot of years, " 
Armed Forces Journal International (September 1981): 50-51. 
19 Cooley, 241. 
20 Dennis Ross, "Soviet Decisionmaking for the Middle East, " 
in Security in the Middle East, ed. Samuel F. Wells Jr. and Mark 
A Bruzonsky, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 237-239. 
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not forget that Colonel Qaddafi is a Muslim fanatic, with 
all that implies. 921 Qaddafi reinforced Moscow's 
misgivings by misrepresenting Soviet-Libyan relations 
whenever it suited him. For example, in July he boasted 
to Newsweek: 'if we are involved in a war the Soviet 
Union will fight on our side. ' 22 Such statements surely 
raised unamused eyebrows in the Kremlin. 
Second, a subtle but immutable conflict of interests 
mitigated against a tighter Soviet-Libyan strategic 
partnership. Qaddafi's support of Idi Amin in 1979, for 
example, put him at odds with Soviet purposes, as did his 
occasionally sharp criticism of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and perhaps even his support of the 
Polisario. More importantly, Qaddafi's behavior had the 
potential to precipitate a regional conflagration that 
might ultimately increase American influence in the Near 
East. Libya could ill-afford such conflicts of interest 
with its prospective patron, since it needed the USSR far 
more than Moscow needed Tripoli, as Qaddafi admitted in 
his annual September 1st address: 'We desperately need to 
be in military alliance with any ally who will stand by 
us against the United States. t23 This, of course, is 
precisely what Moscow was not eager to do. Tripoli's 
21 Christian Science Monitor, 16 October 1981. 
22 "Kaddafi's dangerous game, " Newsweek (20 July 1981): 46. 
23 As quoted in Ellen Laipson, "Libya and the Soviet Union: 
Alliance at arm's length, " in The pattern of Soviet conduct in 
the Third World, ed. Walter Laqueur, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1983), 136. 
196 
strategic import was marginal when compared to the 
importance of nurturing stable relations with the United 
States. And in the early 1980s, Soviet foreign policy 
took as one of its main missions the task of preventing 
the escalation of Third World conflicts into 
confrontations with the United States. 24 Qaddafi was a 
ready-made casualty of detente. 
Thus, when Brezhnev proposed a new 'code of conduct' 
for the superpowers to observe in the Third World (a 
proposal aimed to dissuade the U. S. from defining regions 
like the Persian Gulf as vital national interests), a 
wary Qaddafi skirted endorsing the plan by requesting 
'more details of the ways to neutralise the Arabian Gulf 
and keep it out of international conflict. '" His 
reticence was understandable. By implication, the 
Soviets were hinting they would also forego areas-- 
perhaps including North Africa--as vital interests. What 
applied to regions might reasonably apply to client 
states, and indeed it was not long before the Soviets, 
disillusioned by Afghanistan, openly questioned the 
wisdom of 'unilateral military intervention in the Third 
World in support of client regimes. '26 
24 Roy Allison and Phil Williams, "Superpower competition 
and crisis prevention, " in Superpower competition and crisis 
n3=vention in the Third World, ed. Roy Allison and Phil Williams, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 16. 
25 As quoted in Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and _he 
strategy of non-alignment in the Third Wo id, (Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Press, 1988), 154. 
26 Allison and Wiliams, 19. 
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Finally, Tripoli still balked at the Kremlin's quid 
pro quo, the establishment of Soviet bases on Libyan 
soil. Qaddafi declared his resistance 'to any attempt to 
reduce or cancel out its (Libya's) international role by 
imposing a situation which might oblige it to relinquish 
neutrality in compelling circumstances. ' 27 
For a White House that viewed the USSR as an 'evil 
empire, ' Libya's association with Moscow was further 
evidence of perfidy. Secretary Haig called Libya a 
Soviet proxy; Francis J. West, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
Libya has been transformed, in effect, into a 
Soviet weapons depot and is able to promise and 
deliver Soviet-origin weapons to states and 
factions friendly to the Soviets and inimical 
to our interests. 28 
Although the Libyan regime had undoubtedly anticipated 
some political fallout from the Moscow summit, it was 
taken aback by the next development. In early May the 
White House--convinced that Libya's policies posed a 
danger to the United States--announced it was severing 
relations, and gave Libya five days to close its embassy 
and recall its diplomats. 29 
This was a serious setback for Tripoli, which could 
27 Allison, 203-204. 
28 As quoted in Mohamed El Khawas, Oaddafi: His ideology in 
theory and practice (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1986), 
151-152. 
29 The -break in relations was due not only to Qaddafi's 
perceived role as a Soviet surrogate, but also to a host of 
complaints about Libyan behavior, including its invasion of Chad 
and its attacks on Libyan dissidents residing in the United 
States. 
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either accept the U. S. action with equanimity or hurl 
invective at America. For Qaddafi, it was an easy 
choice: 
To hell with America ... In the face of what 
the United State has done to us, today, in 
front of the Palestine Resistance, we declare 
that we will arm and finance the Palestine 
Resistance with all our potential. " 
Libyan radio warned that this was a prelude to an 
American invasion, a theme picked up by the Libyan 
Foreign Ministry. 31 The Jamahiriya Review published what 
it claimed was the U. S. plan of attack, which called for 
Libyan exiles and mercenaries to create political turmoil 
as a pretext for U. S. forces to restore stability. 32 
Egypt featured prominently in these conspiracy 
theories. After Egyptian Defence Minister Ahmed Badawi 
and members of his staff died in a plane crash, Libyan 
newspapers accused Sadat of engineering the accident to 
facilitate an invasion. 33 Similarly, when in March 1981 
the Israeli Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, was given a 
30 SWB ME/6725/A/12,16 May 1981. 
31 SWB ME/6720/A/l, 11 May 1981; "Campaign 'paves way to 
direct aggression, "' Guardian, 20 August 1981. 
32 Jamahiriya Review no. 13, (April 1981): 14; Phil Kelly, 
"Blueprint for the US invasion of Libya, " Jamahiriya Review no. 
14, (July 1981): 13. See Claudia Wright, New Statesman (April 
1981). Some years later Wright suggested: 'Reagan administration 
officials hate, detest, spit blood towards Arabs. ... who are 
the officials who hold these views? The senior ranks of the 
State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and the National 
Security Council' (Jonathan Bearman, oadhafi's Libya [London: Zed 
Books Ltd., 1986], x). This would seem to fall somewhat short 
of objectivity. 
33 "How did Badawi die?, " Jamahiriya Review no. 13, (April 
1981): 14. 
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helicopter tour of military sites in Egypt's western 
desert, Libya's state-controlled media predicted a joint 
Israeli-Egyptian assault. Israeli F-16s painted with 
Egyptian markings would supposedly lead the air war while 
Egyptian ground forces would push across the border from 
Siwa before occupying the Brega oil fields and al- 
Jaghbub. 34 
The Libyan government vigorously denounced these 
alleged plots, although it may not have fully believed 
any of them. Aside from its brief border war with Egypt 
in 1977, Libya had never engaged in combat with a 
competent foe. One may assume that Tripoli regarded the 
prospect of American military action with considerable 
disbelief since the conventional wisdom at the time 
maintained that America was still hobbled by the memory 
of Vietnam. To a large extent this conventional wisdom 
was true. However, unbeknownst to Tripoli, Reagan and 
his aides had decided to change the conventional wisdom. 
As Reagan later recalled, he wanted to send a message to 
the world that: 'there was new management in the White 
House, and that the United States wasn't going to 
hesitate any longer to act when its legitimate interests 
were at stake. 05 
Freedom of navigation was one such American 
interest, and the U. S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar 
34 "Plan for invasion of Libya unmasked", Jamahiriya Review_ 
no. 15, (August 1981): 9-10; Newsweek, (15 June 1981). 
35 Reagan, 291. 
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Weinberger, pointed out to the President that the Carter 
Administration had backed away from challenging Libya's 
claim to the Gulf of Sirte (Carter suspended naval 
operations there, apparently in hopes that Libya would 
help to free the American hostages in Iran). Weinberger 
feared, and the President agreed, that continuance of 
this policy would lend credence to Libya's claim and 
encourage similar behavior. " In February 1981 the Reagan 
administration formally reversed President Carter's order 
and began planning naval maneuvers in the Gulf of 
Sirte. 37 In August, a carrier battle group of the U. S. 
Sixth Fleet commenced missile exercises in the disputed 
waters. 
Exercises in a disputed region were bound to be 
controversial; these were calculated to be deliberately 
provocative. In Weinberger's words: 
Qaddafi now had to decide whether to take 
active measures to try to deny us our right to 
exercise ... or be recognized internationally for what he actually was--and empty braggart 
easily able to make threats, but able to do 
little more than indulge in an overflow of 
rhetoric. 38 
The White House made no effort to conceal its 
preparations for a fight; to the contrary, America's 
public diplomacy aimed to goad Qaddafi into action. Pre- 
36 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for peace: Seven critical 
ygars in the Pentagon, (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 176. 
37 "Carter kept jets away, " International Herald Tribune, 23 
August 1981; see also Harold Jackson, "Reagan gave order as 
challenge to Libya, " The Guardian 22 August 1981. 
38 Reagan, 282; Weinberger, 176-177. 
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exercise publicity went well beyond the norms required 
for notifying local sailors and airmen. 39 One U. S. 
editorialist noted it was an 'open secret' that 'the 
Reagan administration was looking for ways to get Colonel 
Qaddafi, who was being widely referred to by officials as 
"the most dangerous man in the world. "'`° To further 
rattle Tripoli, the Egyptian army simultaneously began 
exercises along the Libyan border. "' Moreover, U. S. 
fliers roamed beyond their fleet's exclusion zone to 
within 25 miles of the Libyan coast. 42 This was outside 
of Libya's internationally recognized airspace (though it 
is not improbable that the American planes intruded there 
as well) but well within the expanded zone claimed by 
Tripoli. The United States was dangling the bait right 
under Qaddafi's nose. 
The White House was confident he would bite. A 
National Intelligence Estimate entitled 'Libya: Aims and 
vulnerabilities, ' which circulated while the exercise was 
being planned, stated that the Libyan military had 
'standing orders to attack U. S. ships or aircraft' 
operating in the gulf. The likelihood of aviolent 
39 Official text of Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger's 
news conference, 19 August 1981 (International Communications 
Agency, U. S. Embassy London, 20 August 1981). 
40 International Herald Tribune, 21 August 1981. 
41 Official text of Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's 
press conference, 19 August 1981 (International Communication 
Agency. U. S. Embassy London, 20 August 1981). 
42 Alan Cowell, "Libya jets downed just outside maneuver's 
area, 6th Fleet says, " International Herald Tribune, 25 August 
1981. 
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incident off the coast was therefore rated as 'relatively 
high. 943 In the event of hostilities, Reagan authorized 
the Sixth Fleet to pursue enemy planes 'all the way into 
the hangar. 114 
On the night of August 18,1981, a pair of F-14s 
from the U. S. S. Nimitz intercepted two inbound Libyan Su- 
22s approximately 60 km north of the Libyan coast 
(slightly south of the Sixth Fleet's exclusion zone, but 
well within international airspace). The lead Su-22 
fired a missile at the Americans as his companion 
maneuvered into an attack position. The F-14s evaded the 
missile and shot down both Libyan fighters, whose pilots 
ejected and were later recovered by Libyan search and 
rescue teams. In the White House the atmosphere was one 
of undisguised satisfaction. 
Did Reagan's provocations obviate Qaddafi's 
responsibility for joining battle? Certainly not. 
Qaddafi was baited, to be sure, but he took the bait. 
And it was he who, in 1973, set himself up for just such 
an encounter by drawing a line in the water and pledging 
to destroy those ships and aircraft inclined to cross it. 
Since then Libya had repeatedly threatened, and on a few 
occasions actually resorted to, violence to assert its 
control over the Gulf. In making these observations, our 
43 Bob Woodward, Veil: The secret wars Of the CTA 1.981-19R7 A, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 94. Whether this assessment 
was based on hard intelligence or Qaddafi's dogmatic threats is 
unclear. 
44 Reagan, 289. 
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purpose is not to cast moral or legal aspersions on 
Libyan policy or its chief architect. Rather, affirming 
Qaddafi's responsibility for this encounter is a 
prerequisite for reaching conclusions about the efficacy 
of the policies which engendered it. In this instance, 
making claims and threats Libya could not enforce seems 
to have decisively detracted from rather than enhanced 
the state's security. 
Some might argue that the Colonel's decision was 
mandated by Arab strategic culture (i. e., he had no 
option but to fight or lose face). Assuming that such a 
cultural imperative was operative, Qaddafi still bore the 
onus of having boxed himself into a corner from which 
violence was the only escape. Others might question 
whether Qaddafi personally authorized the engagement. 
His absence (he was in Yemen at the time), and the fact 
that the Su-22 was not the optimal aircraft for engaging 
an F-14, have been construed to support this 
hypothesis. 45 
However, a preponderance of the available evidence 
indicates that the attack was both deliberate and fully 
authorized. It strains credulity to believe that any 
Libyan officer, schooled in a system which discouraged 
initiative, would dare to engage U. S. aircraft without 
authorization from the highest levels. Libya was on full 
military alert for the duration of the Sixth Fleet's 
1981.45 
"Libya pilots acted on their own, " Guardian, 21 August 
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maneuvers and, according to Secretary of Defense Casper 
Weinberger, a classified transcript of the communications 
between the Libyan jets and ground control confirmed the 
attack was sanctioned. 46 Most tellingly, Libyan pilots 
played a dangerous game of chicken with American 
aviators: F-14s on combat air patrol intercepted and 
warned off no less than 44 Libyan aircraft, including 
MiG-23s, MiG-25s, and Mirage fighters prior to the 
dogfight. " By buzzing the Sixth Fleet so many times 
without opening fire, the Libyans probably hoped to lull 
the U. S. aviators into dropping their guard. 
In trying to piece together the strategic rationale 
behind this encounter, some commentators have endowed the 
Libyans with elaborate motives: to rally the Arab states, 
to serve as a pretext for raising oil prices, or to 
justify a security pact with Ethiopia and South Yemen. 48 
Whether the Libyan leadership foresaw the coming battle 
in such complex terms is doubtful. It seems more likely 
that precisely because the odds were so unfavorable 
Qaddafi saw a single air battle as a no-lose proposition. 
Should his pilots manage to damage or destroy even a 
single American aircraft, they would have performed 
46 "US and Libya blame each other for air battle, " Times, 20 
August 1981; "Haig suggests downed Libyan jets were sent on a 
'Targeted mission, "' International Herald Tribune, 24 August 
1981. 
47 Alan Cowell, "Libya jets downed just outside maneuver's 
area, 6th Fleet says, " International Herald Tribune, 25 August 
1981. 
48 Robert Freedman, Soviet policy toward th Middle aat 
ýince 1970, (New York: Praeger, 1982), 411. 
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beyond anyone's expectations. Should they fail, the loss 
of two planes was a small sacrifice to lay upon the altar 
of Arab honor, and Libya would reap sympathy and acclaim 
for confronting a much larger foe. Even a military 
defeat could be portrayed as a victory in a culture where 
notions of honor substituted for evidence of power. " 
Qaddafi gambled that the U. S. response would be 
proportional and therefore limited. 
If this were his reasoning, it proved somewhat 
correct. The dogfight elicited an effusion of Arab 
nationalist sentiment. President Assad pledged to send a 
5000-man tank division to strengthen Libyan defenses 
along the Egyptian border. 50 An airlift (reportedly 
operated with the aid of mercenary American pilots) began 
in mid-October, and two Syrian armored brigades were in 
fact transferred for a period. 51 Sympathy from Europe, 
though comparatively subdued, was nevertheless evident. 
Even the Economist questioned whether the 'mean little' 
incident was beneath the dignity of a superpower. 
Yet much of the support given Libya was superficial. 
Many states, particularly in Europe, were quietly pleased 
to see Tripoli receive its comeuppance. Moreover, 
49 See, for example, Adam Garfinkle, "An observation on Arab 
culture and deterrence: Metaphors and misgivings, " in Regional 
%enurity regimes: Israel and its neighbors, ed. Efraim Inbar, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 204-206. 
50 "Syrian force, " Guardian, 31 August 1981. 
51 "Syria/Libya: US pilots in airlift?, " Defense & For_jg 
Affairs Daily, 27 October 1981; see also SWB ME/6862/A/4,24 
October 1981. 
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Qaddafi himself soon erased any residual sympathy. On 
September 1, Qaddafi threatened to meet further 
'violations' of the Gulf with attacks on NATO bases. 
European governments erupted in protest. The Libyan 
ambassador to Italy hastily claimed that Qaddafi had been 
misquoted--but the Colonel never retracted his statement. 
The benefits of engaging the Sixth Fleet looked all 
the more ephemeral when measured against the immutable 
damage done to Libya's relations with the United States. 
The State Department promptly instructed U. S. citizens 
living in Libya to return home. A few weeks later, 
America was terrified by unsubstantiated reports of a 
Libyan hit-team allegedly inserted across the Canadian 
border with orders to assassinate President Reagan and 
other ranking government officials. After days of anti- 
terrorist fervor no evidence of a hit-team was found; an 
embarrassed Reagan administration confessed it had 
overreacted to intelligence which was apparently 
inaccurate. 52 
Libya's desire to retaliate was no idle fiction. 
Qaddafi's values were such that he felt compelled to 
avenge his military defeat. Nevertheless, he wished to 
minimize the risk of further retribution. He therefore 
authorized several terrorist actions against the United 
52 Although the U. S. took a great deal of flack for the 
false alarm, the initial reports seemed compelling. A CIA source 
reported that during an August 22 meeting in Ethiopia, Qaddafi 
announced he was planning to have Reagan killed. Shortly 
thereafter, the National Security Agency reportedly intercepted 
a similar declaration by Qaddafi (Woodward, 190; Robert Gates, 
From the shadows [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996], 253-254). 
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States in the apparent belief that his hand would not be 
detected. 
Vengeance was a strategically impoverished policy 
objective. Suppose Libya commissioned five terrorist 
attacks on American targets and all five succeeded. How 
would Libya accrue any benefit? Random attacks, 
conducted anonymously, would not produce predetermined 
changes in U. S. behavior, if only because the attacks 
could not be tied directly to Libyan interests without 
compromising the regime's deniability. By their very 
nature, terrorist attacks were destined to be futile as a 
means of enhancing Libyan security. Conversely, they had 
the potential to do great damage to their sponsor if 
discovered. 
In point of fact, American intelligence services 
credited Qaddafi with ordering three terrorist attacks 
against American diplomats in the next two months. The 
first was a plot to assassinate Maxwell Rabb, the U. S. 
ambassador to Italy, who had to be recalled in October 
1981 for his own protection. 53 On November 12,1981, an 
unknown gunman fired six shots at the U. S. charge 
d'affaires in Paris, Christian Chapman. Chapman escaped 
injury; Secretary of State Haig expressed the 
administration's suspicion that Libya was responsible. 
Finally, during that same month Libyan intelligence 
officers filled two stereo speakers with plastic 
53 Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Oadhafi r _voýution and the 
mnciern state, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 101. 
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explosives in hopes of detonating them at a Khartoum club 
amidst scores of American diplomats and their families. 
That attack was thwarted by American and Sudanese 
authorities. 51 
The consequences were swift and sharp. The United 
States announced an embargo on Libyan oil and imposed 
export restrictions on petroleum and dual-use 
technologies. Given that the United States had hitherto 
been the destination for 40% of Libya's crude, the 
embargo accentuated the effects of a concurrent world oil 
glut and took a sharp toll on the Libyan economy . 
55 in 
February 1982, JANA admitted 'the people were taken 
completely by surprise by the current oil glut .. . there 
is nothing left for them to do but to become a militant 
force. 9 56 
Qaddafi apparently arrived at the same conclusion. 
He once again staked his credibility on a threat which he 
had little means of backing up: 'If America enters the 
Bay of Sidra war in the full sense of the word will begin 
between us and them, war with planes, navies, missiles 
and everything. "" 
" "U. S. bans imports of oil from Libya; 'Terror' role 
cited, " International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1982. 
55 Harris, 117; Robert St. John, Qaddafi's world design: 
Libyan foreign policy 1969-1987, (London: Saqi Books, 1987), 
120; Michael Prest, "Headache for Qaddafi, " Middle East 
y., ternational (27 November 1981): 12. 
56 SWB ME/6963/A/4,25 February 1982. 
57 Robert Fisk, "Gaddafi threatens to go to war with US, " 
ThP Times, 5 March 1982. 
209 
Incongruously, Qaddafi declared that Libya was 
nevertheless interested in restoring relations with 
Washington. "' He implored the Austrian Foreign Minister, 
Willibald Pahr, to convey to Washington that America was 
pushing Libya into the Soviet camp. " Qaddafi expressed 
great confidence in Pahr, suggesting the Austrian could 
represent Libya much more effectively than his own 
diplomats. He expressed a willingness to immediately 
resume all relations with the United States. 60 
Pahr's demarche failed. On March 16,1982, the U. S. 
Secretary of the Navy announced that the Sixth Fleet 
would return to the Gulf of Sirte in the next six months. 
Little else could have been expected from an initiative 
which essentially blamed Washington for Libya's behavior. 
(The entire overture was likely designed for European 
consumption, which was not a bad move since the gap 
between the European and American approaches to the 
Libyan question invited exploitation. ) The substance of 
Qaddafi's message had never changed: 'America's fate is 
one doomed to perish ... We are determined to defeat 
America, even if it were to use its atomic bombs. "' 
By now Tripoli had received abundant signals that 
the new American administration was unlike any that 
58 SWB ME/6970/A/4,5 March 1982. 
s' "In from the cold, " Middle East International., no. 171 
(26 March 1982): 4. 
60 SWB ME/6977/A/4-6,13 March 1982. 
61 SWB ME/6970/A/4-5,5 March 1982. 
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Qaddafi and his comrades had dealt with before. In July 
1981 the regime learned, from no less a source than 
Newsweek, that the CIA was attempting to assassinate 
Qaddafi. In March 1982 JANA claimed a CIA agent had 
warned Libyan intelligence of an impending U. S. air raid 
which would be disguised as an Israeli operation. " 
Moreover, Tripoli claimed to have abundant evidence that 
Washington was covertly probling its defenses. 63 
Despite these warning signals, Libya missed yet 
another opportunity to assume a low-profile and thereby 
reduce the risk of further military encounters with the 
United States. Indeed, Libya seemed to be seeking such 
an encounter and the state news agency declared that war 
was now inevitable. " On several occasions in 1983, F- 
14s from the Sixth Fleet intercepted LAF fighters 
attempting to penetrate the carrier's exclusion zone. 65 
Qaddafi's objective was still to reduce and 
ultimately eliminate the American military presence which 
seemed to be hemming him in on all sides. In a letter to 
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Qaddafi 
complained that the presence of U. S. forces in Egypt, the 
Sudan, Somalia and Oman constituted 'a direct threat to 
62 SWB ME/6975/A/4,11 March 1982. 
63 "Libya claims downing a U. S. plane, " International Herald 
Tbm, 7 October 1982; cf. SWB 8 October 1982. 
64 SWB ME/6981/A/1,18 March 1982. 
65 "Qadhafi claims U. S. jet incident, " International Herald 
jhL=a, 2 May 1983. 
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the security of my country., 
"' 
Thus far, the Libyan leader's strategy had produced 
little progress towards that end. In fact, the more 
Qaddafi tried to flex his military might in the 
Mediterranean, the more determined Washington became. 
Undaunted, he upped the ante by publicly ordering his air 
force to destroy any target entering the Gulf of Sirte 
and especially to shoot down any AWACS aircraft 
'affecting' Libyan territory. 67 Both orders were clear 
contraventions of international law, yet Qaddafi believed 
that in this instance might made right: 
By entering Egypt to spy on Libya the AWACS 
plane becomes a hostile target, and Libya, with 
the right to self-defence, is entitled to 
tackle such a target. When the US Sixth Fleet 
comes to this region to threaten Libya, a state 
of war prevails and Libya then has the right to 
take all defensive measures, by force. In this 
case diplomacy is set aside, together with all 
other means, and force becomes the arbiter. 68 
Had the LAF carried out either order, a punitive American 
response would have been inevitable. The fact that 
neither order was fulfilled suggests that they were 
either secretly countermanded by the Colonel or gingerly 
resisted by the LAF. Perhaps both realized that Libya 
could ill afford the war its leader seemed so eager to 
initiate from the podium. In any event, mature states do 
not bandy about threats of war lightly, for doing so 
66 "Libya goes to UN, " Guardian, 10 August 1983. 
67 "U. S. F-14s chase Libyan jets over Mediterranean, " 
Tnternat{ona? Herald Tribune, 4 August 1983; "Libya threatens to 
shoot down American Awacs, " Times, 9 August 1983. 
68 SWB ME/7295/A/4-5,30 March 1983. 
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ultimately dissipates their ability to deter or otherwise 
influence the behavior of fellow states. Qaddafi's 
almost routine use of the threat of war was thus a 
provocative and inherently self-enfeebling behavior. 
Oaddafi's Soviet gambit 
The August 1981 clash with the U. S. Sixth Fleet came 
close to being the elusive catalyst needed to bond the 
Libyan regime to the Kremlin. That same year Qaddafi 
concluded a security pact with two other Soviet clients, 
Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
In 1982 Libya signed treaties of friendship and 
cooperation with North Korea and Czechoslovakia, and the 
following year with Romania and Bulgaria. Qaddafi made 
state visits to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. 
Libyan trade with the Soviet Union more than doubled over 
1981 levels. 69 Moreover, Libya and the USSR conducted 
joint naval exercises in November 1982 and July 1983.70 
In January 1983 a Soviet submarine put in at Tobruk for a 
month-long maintenance period, the first such use of 
Libyan port facilities by the Soviet fleet. 71 Western 
defence planners began to operate on the assumption that 
the USSR would use Libya as a staging ground for 
Mediterranean operations in the event of an East-West 
69 Bearman, 258. 
70 Anderson, 41. 
71 El Khawas, 151. 
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conflict. 72 
It seemed like a propitious moment for Libya to seek 
some form of bilateral security assurance from the USSR. 
In March 1983 Qaddafi sent Jalloud to Moscow yet again to 
solicit the Kremlin's approval of a treaty of friendship 
and cooperation between Libya and the Soviet Union. 73 
Such a treaty would extend to Libya a degree of security 
far beyond what the nation could hope to achieve by 
relying solely upon its own resources. To Jalloud's 
delight, the Soviets approved such a treaty in theory, 
although its completion was put off until a later date. 
Qaddafi jubilantly told his countrymen: 'Let the USA 
understand that Libya has approximately 3,000 kilometers 
of coast on the Mediterranean. Libya, to vex the USA, 
can give the necessary facilities to the superpower which 
is hostile to the USA. '74 
Over the next two years, Libya's relations with the 
Soviet bloc appeared to steadily tighten. In March 1984 
Libya signed a military co-operation agreement with East 
Germany, and in early April the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian 
Defence Ministers visited Tripoli and held talks with 
Libya's national. security figureheads, Abu Bakr Younis 
72 e. g., Drew Middleton, "A Soviet peril: Bases in Libya, " 
New York Times, 1 March 1981. 
73 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic 
ýoý, {aw: Libya. Tunisia. Malta no. 3,1983. 
74 As quoted in Bearman, 263. 
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Jabir and Mustafa Kharroubi. 75 In September 1984, the 
Libyan navy sent three ships to Odessa, and the following 
year Libya conducted three joint naval-air exercises with 
the USSR. 76 The Soviet Mediterranean Eskadra was 
reportedly given expanded access to the port of Al- 
Bardia, a mere 12 miles from the Egyptian border. 77 In 
addition to a drydock, the port was fitted with a copious 
covered area (750m x 285m) to defeat satellite 
reconnaissance. 78 Finally, in June 1985 the USSR 
transferred a number of patrol planes to Libya, which 
Soviet pilots used for reconnaissance flights over the 
Mediterranean. 79 
Superficially, relations between Libya and the USSR 
had never been better. Yet there was an enormous 
qualitative difference between having an agreement in 
principle to sign a bilateral pact, and having the pact 
in hand. The Kremlin's hesitancy to sign the treaty 
suggested that Moscow was plagued by lingering doubts 
about Qaddafi's utility as a client. In fact, the 
promise of a treaty may have been a means of stringing 
75 "Defence ties forged with socialist countries, " 
ýam{h{r{ya Review 47 (May-June 1984), 8. 
76 Maurizio Cremasco, "Two uncertain futures: Tunisia and 
Libya, " in Prospects for security in the Mediterranean, ed. 
Robert O'Neill, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1988), 199. 
77 Yossef Bodansky, "Soviet military presence in Libya, " 
Armed forces journal international, no. 118 (November 1980): 89. 
78 FBIS, 12 September 1985, Dl. 
79 "Soviet firepower for Libya, " Newsweek, (15 July 1985): 
17. 
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Tripoli along as Qaddafi spent literally billions of 
dollars on Soviet weaponry. After restoring 
ambassadorial relations with Egypt in 1984, Moscow 
certainly had less need of Tripoli. Moreover, the rapid 
turnover in the Soviet hierarchy meant that by 1985, 
Qaddafi's standing with the Kremlin had undergone a 
radical devaluation. The new Soviet General Secretary, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, had a much lower estimation of Libya's 
strategic value than did his predecessors. Gorbachev 
(who assumed power in March 1985) had a fresh vision of 
the Cold War and of the Soviet Union's future, a vision 
in which nations such as Libya played little role. 
The depreciation of Libya's stock immediately became 
apparent when Qaddafi, hoping to consummate the treaty of 
friendship, arrived in Moscow on October 10,1985. 
Whereas on his last visit he had been personally greeted 
at the airport by Brezhnev, on this occasion he was met 
by Soviet President Andre Gromyko. The adjustment in 
diplomatic protocol was a sure indication that Qaddafi's 
standing had slipped; the Colonel returned the snub by 
skipping a banquet held in his honor that evening. 80 The 
ensuing talks were also disappointing for Qaddafi, who 
attempted to purchase the USSR's most sophisticated air 
defense system, Su-27 fighters, and additional 
submarines. The Soviets merely promised to consider 
80 Africa confidential 26, no. 23 (13 November 1985): 6. 
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these requests. 81 
Qaddafi, who was experiencing a cash crunch and thus 
having difficulty in making payments for the arms he had 
already purchased, proposed to double his oil exports to 
the USSR. But the Soviets were not interested in 
additional oil, and promised only that Yugoslavia would 
increase its imports. Qaddafi next sought assistance in 
constructing a nuclear reactor capable of producing 
weapons-grade material. The Soviets pointedly replied 
that they would not countenance Libyan attempts to 
construct an atomic bomb. 
The final and most consequential item on Qaddafi's 
agenda was conclusion of the promised treaty. However, 
his interlocutors made it clear that the treaty had been 
indefinitely shelved. The best he could draw out of the 
Russians was a joint communique condemning 'the 
provocative military maneuvers carried out by the USA in 
the Mediterranean including the Gulf of Sirte and near 
the eastern borders of Libya, ' and expressions of 'grave 
concern' over the presence of cruise missiles at 
Comiso. °2 
Qaddafi was caught off guard by this cool reception. 
Hadn't he made extraordinary overtures to the Soviets and 
their allies in recent years? 
Yes. He had not, however, given the Soviets what 
81 "The Soviet-Libyan relationship: Has Qaddafi outlived his 
usefulness? " Pemcon Ltd., December 1985,10. 
82 SWH SU/8084/A4/3,17 October 1985. 
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they had always wanted: permanent bases in Libya. 83 
Moreover, Gorbachev was considerably more anxious than 
his predecessors to avoid conflict with the NATO powers. 
He had obviously thought twice about the wisdom of 
pledging to defend a state that was more likely than most 
to embroil him in such a conflict. Gorbachev was willing 
to retain Libya as a client, but only so long as Qaddafi 
behaved. 
Thus, the Kremlin agreed to upgrade the LAF's air 
defenses, although not to the extent which Qaddafi had 
hoped. In December 1985 the Soviets began delivering SA- 
5 anti-aircraft missiles to Tripoli. 84 By autumn 
batteries had been constructed around Libya's most 
strategic sites. 85 Significantly, the Soviets betrayed 
their lack of faith in Qaddafi's judgement by cautioning 
Tripoli against using its SA-5s against any American 
aircraft over the Mediterranean. 86 
The U. S. State Department strenuously protested the 
SA-5 sale, calling it a 'significant and dangerous 
escalation in the Soviet-Libyan arms relationship' which 
'clearly exceeds any legitimate security requirements the 
83 The Middle East Military Balance 1985, (Boulder: Westview 
Press), 176. 
°` Jacqueline Hahn, "Libya: Intelligence briefing, " IDF 
Journal 3, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 37. 
es Richard Beeston, "Russia sends new missiles to Gaddafi, " 
Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1985; Newsweek, (15 July 1985); 
Defense and Foreign A fairs Weekly, (30 September 1985). 
86 "Moscow 'cautions Gadaffi', " Financial Times, 31 January 
1986. 
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Libyans have. ' 87 The SA-5's range and altitude 
theoretically enabled it to threaten AWACS over Egypt or 
the Gulf of Sidra. 88 But in practice, the SA-5 was less 
formidable and did not redress the holes in the LAF's air 
defenses revealed by the October 1st Israeli raid on PLO 
headquarters at Tunis, which the LAF failed to detect or 
intercept. In fact, compared to missiles and 
countermeasures available to Western air forces, the SA-5 
was already nearing obsolescence. 89 
The exaggerated U. S. reaction to the SA-5 reflected 
Washington's determination to use even the slightest 
evidence of Libyan malfeasance as a hook for its 'get 
Qaddafi' policy. The invasion scenarios which had long 
preoccupied Tripoli were no longer as fantastic as they 
had once been. In December 1985 the Reagan 
administration disclosed it had authorized the Department 
of Defense to draw up contingency plans for invading 
Libya. 90 The Pentagon, however, was not exactly chafing 
at the bit to enter a messy but inconsequential land war 
in North Africa and drew up plans for a six division 
87 Bob Woodward and Lou Cannon, "Soviet rejects protest by 
U. S. on Libyan SAMs, " International Herald Tribune, 23 December 
1985. 
88 Richard Beeston, "Russia sends new missiles to Gaddafi, " 
Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1985. 
89 Bob Woodward and Lou Cannon, "Soviet rejects protest by 
U. S. on Libyan SAMs, " international Herald Tr hung, 23 December 
1985. 
90 The plan was apparently proposed by National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane and his staff. In his memoirs, 
Weinberger called the proposal 'particularly silly' (Weinberger, 
201). 
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attack that, in the words of one administration official, 
resembled the D-Day invasion of Normandy in 1944. With 
the Pentagon's reluctance obvious, and no other senior 
official willing to push the point, the plan was 
scrapped. 91 
Details of an even earlier contingency plan leaked 
out in 1987. This proposed campaign featured an Egyptian 
invasion supported by U. S. air power. According to the 
plan, Qaddafi would either fall or be easily toppled once 
Egyptian forces had occupied the eastern half of the 
country. Not everyone in the Reagan administration was 
enthused, and the State Department concluded that the key 
to scuttling the operation was to invite the Egyptians to 
join in the contingency planning. After unproductive 
talks between Vice-Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy 
Director of the NSC, and Egyptian President Mubarak and 
Defence Minister Abdel-Halim Abu Ghazala in September 
1985 and another round of military-to-military 
consultations in February 1986, the plan was buried. 92 
The Egyptians had no intention of playing Washington's 
hatchet man. 
However, by February 1986 the White House was 
prepared to take unilateral action in order to curb 
Libya's sponsorship of attacks on U. S. targets. 
91 Gates, 352-353. See also Richard Beeston, "Russia sends 
new missiles to Gaddafi, " Daily Telegraph, 23 December 1985. 
92 Bob Woodward and Don Oberdorfer, "State Dept. said to 
thwart '85 plan to invade Libya, " International Herald Tribuns 
22 February 1987. ' 
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High noon over the Gulf of Sirte 
The horrific terrorist attacks at the Rome and 
Vienna airports on December 27,1985, which left twenty 
dead (including five Americans), incensed Ronald Reagan 
as few other events ever had. One of the terrorists 
carried a Tunisian passport which had been confiscated 
from a Tunisian worker by Libyan authorities. As Reagan 
observed, it was not difficult to figure out where the 
terrorist obtained his passport. 93 The Libyan state news 
agency hailed the massacre as a heroic action. 94 Though 
Tripoli subsequently tried to distance itself from the 
operation, Libya's position provoked international 
outrage and convinced Reagan that it was once again time 
to confront Tripoli. The NSC's Crisis Pre-Planning Group 
ordered the Pentagon to draft fresh contingency plans for 
attacking Libya with B-52 and F-ill strikes. " 
On January 7,1986, Reagan issued an Executive Order 
severing all economic ties with Libya and ordering 
American citizens working there to return home. The 
White House did not want any American workers to become 
convenient hostages if and when military reprisals began. 
By the end of the month U. S. navy pilots were again 
buzzing Libyan airspace, and in early February additional 
elements of the Sixth Fleet began taking up position 
93 Reagan, 511. 
94 "Libyans, in anti-U. S. rallies, vow to fight an attack, " 
Tnternat? onal Herald Tribune, 5 January 1986. 
95 Seymour Hersh, "Target Qaddafi, " New York Tm Magazine 
(22 February 1987): A4. 
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outside the Gulf of Sirte. 96 U. S. officials sounded out 
the Egyptians on the possibility of mutual military 
action, and President Reagan issued a presidential 
finding (reversing a position taken by Carter) that would 
enable U. S. forces to support an Egyptian attack on 
Libya. 97 
From Washington's perspective, the solution to the 
Libyan problem was to incrementally increase Tripoli's 
discomfort until reaching Qaddafi's pain threshold, at 
which point the Libyan would presumably behave himself. 
In 1981 it became evident that the principal defect of 
this strategy was that as the decibel level of the 
Libyan-U. S. contest rose, so too did Qaddafi's profile. " 
The prominence which the international media devoted to 
his activities exceeded anything he had previously 
enjoyed, and the Colonel himself gloatingly referred to 
Reagan's attentions as 'an international medal of 
honor. 199 On the other hand, the intensity of 
Washington's focus on ending Libyan terrorism obliged 
America's European allies to impose an arms ban on Libya. 100 
96 George Wilson, "U. S. fighters to fly near Libyan coast, " 
International Herald Tribune, 24 January 1986. 
97 Herman Eilts, "The United States and Egypt, " in The 
wtirýdýP East ten years after Camp David, ed. William Quandt, 
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988), 132. 
98 David Hirst, "Defiant Gadafy thrives on US challenge, " 
rosy rdian, 11 January 1986; Gates, 255. 
99 SWB ME/6748/A/5,13 June 1981. 
100 Paul Lewis, "Europe agrees to ban arms to countries 
backing terror, " New York Times, 28 January 1986. 
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Qaddafi, realizing that a clash was inevitable, was 
torn between the need to seek cover and his desire to 
bask in the international spotlight. For example, on 
January 28 Qaddafi sought assurances from President 
Chadli Benjedid that Algeria would not participate in any 
U. S. or Egyptian military actions. '0' However, as in 
1981, the prospect of standing toe-to-toe with the United 
States (a prospect made more alluring in that it echoed 
the most dramatic elements of Qaddafi's self-conception) 
was irresistible. Showmanship, not strategy, prompted 
Qaddafi to patrol his self-declared 'Line of Death' in a 
Libyan warship. 102 
Having given Americans in Libya a reasonable period 
in which to return home, the White House was now prepared 
to act. Three U. S. aircraft carriers and thirty 
escorting ships entered the Gulf of Sidra in late March 
1986, ostensibly on another freedom of navigation 
exercise. In reality, the U. S. pilots were buzzing 
Libyan airspace in search of a fight. 103 On March 24, 
they found one: Libyan SAM emplacements opened fire on 
U. S. aircraft. None of the missiles hit their targets. 
Signal intercepts revealed that Libyan MiG-25s were 
ordered to fire at U. S. planes if they could achieve a 
101 George Henderson, "Theatre of the absurd, " Middle East_ 
International, no. 268 (7 February 1986): B. 
102 ibid.; Miller, 225-226. 
103 Sovetskaya Rossiya quoted an American pilot who candidly 
described his job as being a 'sitting duck. ' SWB SU/8218/A4/8, 
27 March 1986. 
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missile-lock. 104 The Sixth Fleet unleashed an answering 
barrage on March 25-26. Two Libyan warships were sunk, 
two others damaged, and an SA-5 battery at Sirte was 
struck twice. 
Contrary to fact, Qaddafi claimed that his forces 
downed three U. S. aircraft. 105 He was doubtlessly 
disappointed that the Libyan armed forces had failed to 
inflict any damage on the Sixth Fleet, but perhaps 
grateful that the American response was limited (if of 
debatable proportionality). Over the next few days the 
Jamahirya followed the same script as in 1981. Though 
defeated, Qaddafi remained defiant (urging the murder of 
American oil workers in the Middle East), yet Libya was 
careful not to make any overt offense. 106 Routine air 
force flights were cancelled lest they occasion 
additional combat, and blackouts were enforced for two 
days. 107 Hopeful that another opportunity would present 
itself, the reinforced Sixth Fleet lingered off Libyan 
shores until April. 
As in 1981, Qaddafi could not let defeat pass 
104 George Schultz, Turmoil and triumph: My years as 
Secretary of State, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 
681. 
105 SWB ME/8227/A/1,8 April 1986. 
106 "Libya threatens 'sea of fire, '" New York Times, 25 March 
1986. 
107 Edward Schumacher, "Soviet advisers took shelter at base 
for Sirte raids, foreign workers say, " International Herald 
Tr, 29 March 1986. 
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without seeking some form of vengeance. He again turned 
to terrorism; by April 7 the CIA had details of no less 
than nine Libyan terrorist attacks that were under 
consideration or had been ordered by Tripoli. '08 On 
March 25, Tripoli ordered the People's Bureaux in East 
Berlin, Paris, Rome, Madrid and elsewhere to prepare 
terrorist attacks, unaware that the U. S. National 
Security Agency (NSA), had compromised Libyan diplomatic 
communications. On April 5,1986, the La Belle Club, a 
West Berlin discotheque frequented by American 
servicemen, was bombed. 109 Two patrons were killed and 
some 150 were wounded, more than 50 of whom were 
Americans. Afterwards, the Libyan embassy in East Berlin 
(little realizing the NSA was reading its cable traffic) 
boasted to Tripoli that the operation had been completed 
'without leaving clues. ' 
Qaddafi knew that Washington would suspect Libya'of 
conducting the bombing. Leaving nothing to chance, he 
made a series of threats immediately prior to and after 
the La Belle bombing to deter the United States from 
taking punitive military action against Tripoli. This 
108 Gates, 353. 
109 For years Libyan apologists accused the U. S. of 
fabricating the intercepts. The U. S. was admittedly reluctant, 
due to the intelligence methods involved, to release all of the 
information at its disposal. In fact, Reagan's decision to 
publicize even part of the intercept created notable 
consternation within the intelligence community. In late 1996, 
German prosecutors indicted three Libyan embassy employees for 
the bombing, vindicating the U. S. position. 
110 Schultz, 683; Gates 353. 
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was a dubious policy choice: threatening to spread 
violence 'against America, its civilians and military 
targets in all the world's continent' was not a 
particularly effective way of disassociating his regime 
from terrorism. "I Likewise, threatening retaliation 
against any European state abetting the Sixth Fleet 
brought Libya little sympathy. 112 Spain and Italy, for 
example, publicly rebuked Tripoli, and Spain recalled its 
ambassador for consultations. 113 A few months later the 
Libyan ambassador to Spain was obliged to leave the 
country at Madrid's request, having been implicated in 
two, terrorist operations. "' 
More importantly, Qaddafi's principal threat--that 
the Soviet Union would come to his aid if war erupted-- 
was not credible. "I Only a few weeks earlier the 
Soviets had pointedly refused to intervene as the Sixth 
Fleet unleashed its force on the Libyan navy, just as 
they had failed to come to Qaddafi's aid in 1981. The 
Kremlin's belated protests were strictly pro forma (for 
example, they postponed but did not cancel a scheduled 
trip by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to Washington). 
111 SWB ME/8230/i, 11 April 1986. 
112 A threat made on numerous occasions. See, for example, 
SWB ME/8232/i, 14 April 1986; Schultz, 681. 
113 SWB ME/8221/i, 1 April 1986; SWB ME/8231/i, 12 April 
1986. 
114 "Libyan ambassador makes a quiet exit at Spain's 
request, " New York Times, 31 May 1986. 
115 SWB ME/8230/i, 11 April 1986. 
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Aware that Moscow had declined to conclude a treaty of 
friendship with Libya, Secretary Schultz concluded the 
Soviets found Qaddafi's behavior embarrassing. 116 The 
White House therefore had little fear of calling 
Qaddafi's bluff. 
As a policy instrument, invoking the Soviet threat 
was counterproductive to boot. Gorbachev was not about 
to let a Third World client manipulate the USSR into a 
direct conflict with the United States. As subsequent 
events demonstrated, the Soviet Union decided to let the 
Libyan leader face the consequences of his behavior 
alone. 
Thus, Libya was more isolated than ever, with an 
American fleet poised on its doorstep, when Qaddafi 
ordered the La Belle operation. The bombing itself had 
no strategic value. Killing and wounding a handful of 
American servicemen did not bring Qaddafi any closer to 
achieving his political objectives. It did, however, 
provide Reagan with the smoking gun he had long been 
seeking. Armed with the NSA intercepts and assured of 
domestic support, the White House set the Pentagon's 
wheels in motion. On April 15,1986, the United States 
launched Operation El Dorado Canyon, a joint air force- 
navy bombing attack on five military targets in Tripoli 
and Benghazi, including Qaddafi's personal residence in 
116 Schultz, 682. 
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the Bab Al Aziziya barracks. 117 
The raid itself was over in less than fifteen 
minutes. When the smoke cleared, three army barracks and 
several hangars were damaged, one warehouse used in the 
assembly of MiGs was destroyed, five Soviet-supplied 
heavy transport aircraft were destroyed as were two 
helicopters, and at least four MiGs were damaged or 
destroyed. 118 
Despite the billions of dollars spent on military 
hardware in the preceding decade, the Libyan armed forces 
proved ineffectual. Many soldiers panicked and abandoned 
their posts. 119 The air force failed--or declined--to 
launch a single fighter to intercept or pursue the 
American jets. In fact, Libyan fighters did not resume 
their daily coastal patrols for several days. 120 The 
response of the air defence command was somewhat better, 
and probably accounted for the loss of one U. S. F-111. 
Yet overall, it was a poor showing for a country which 
had ample warning that an attack was imminent and had 
117 The most detailed account of the raid is found in Robert 
Venkus, Raid on Oaddafi (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). 
118 "Libyan SAM missiles hit civilian areas, says USA, " 
, lane' s Defence Weekly 5, no. 16 (26 April 1986) : 737; Weinberger, 
198. For a comprehensive mission autopsy, see Anthony H. 
Cordesman, "The uses of force in the Middle East, " in nja 
ný-l antic Alliance and the Middle East, eds. Joseph Coffey and 
Gianni Bonvicini, (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), 128-136. 
119 Edward Schumacher, "Libya finds fault with military after 
bad showing in U. S. attack, " New York Times, 27 April 1986. 
120 Con Coughlin, "Kremlin pressing Gaddafi to adopt lower 
profile, " Daily Telegraph, 25 April 1986. 
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been at a heightened state of alert. 121 
Qaddafi was badly shaken by the raid but escaped 
personal injury, apparently because Maltese Prime 
Minister Carmelo Bonnici called to warn him that an 
attack was imminent 45 minutes before the first bombs 
fell. 122 In the immediate aftermath of the bombing he 
went to ground, and with the exception of a televised 
speech two days after the attack, did not appear in 
public and apparently withdrew from day-to-day management 
of government affairs. He was rumored to be suffering 
from depression. '23 
Qaddafi's low profile was prudent in more ways than 
one. For the first time, his policies had brought 
destruction upon the Libyan capital, and the Libyan armed 
forces (who bore the brunt of the damage) were reportedly 
in foul humor. There were reports of sporadic gunfire on 
April 16, followed by naval gunfire the next day; Libyan 
naval officers were said to be outraged by the lack of 
air support provided to them. 124 As days passed and 
Qaddafi failed to emerge, rumors of a power struggle 
within the regime circulated. None were ever verified, 
yet it was ironic that it was the failure of Qaddafi's 
121 David Willey, "Qadhafi survives invasion of Islam, " 
j%gry=, 
20 April 1986. 
122 NFSL Newsletter no. 50, (August-September 1986): 3; 
"Gadaffi's raid tip-off, " Times, 29 October 1988. 
123 George Henderson, "Down but not out, " Middle past 
T, +-. national, no. 278 (27 June 1986): 10. 
124 John Cooley, "To the shores of Tripoli, " Middle rast 
, ""+g national no. 274, 
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policies which may have restored some constraints on his 
freedom of action. 
Retaliation 
Predictably, Qaddafi's value system compelled him to 
retaliate against his attackers. Shortly after the 
bombing of Tripoli, Libya fired two Scud B missiles at a 
U. S. radar station on the Italian island of Lampedusa. 125 
Both missiles splashed harmlessly into the Mediterranean. 
Much like the La Belle operation, the attack on 
Lampedusa may have provided emotional catharsis but 
certainly produced no military benefit. Diplomatically, 
attacking Italy was not one of the Colonel's more astute 
moves. European criticism of the United States had 
hitherto been sharp. Spain and France had each refused 
to allow the American planes to overfly their territory. 
Such a rift might have been exploited to considerable 
benefit. Instead, Libya emerged as a ballistic missile 
threat to Southern Europe. Even Italy, noted for its 
tolerance towards its former colony, was alarmed. Things 
would have been even worse had the missiles found their 
targets and triggered a NATO response. 
Qaddafi's intent was to intimidate. Immediately 
after the Scud attack, he explicitly warned Spain and 
Italy that if they did not turn away the Sixth Fleet from 
their ports 'we will be forced to escalate the operations 
125 FBIS, 17 April 1986,03; "Libyan Scud B attack on 
Lampedusa island, " Jane's Defence Weekly 5, no. 16 (26 April 
1986): 739. 
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in self-defense. ' 126 Once again, his threats did not 
produce the desired outcome. To the contrary, Italian 
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi warned that Italy would 
respond with military force if attacked again. Potential 
economic sanctions--such as seizing Libya's 15% share in 
Fiat--were raised to give Tripoli further pause. 127 The 
Italian armed forces began shoring up their southern 
defenses. Embarrassed by their lack of contingency plans 
for responding to an attack from North Africa, Italian 
defence officials turned a new eye on their southern 
neighbor and began developing an Italian rapid reaction 
force to deal with future Libyan contingencies. 128 
Finally, the European Community as a whole placed 
restrictions upon the activities of Libyan diplomats, and 
six European states began expelling Libyan nationals. 129 
Terrorism--cheaper and more dramatic than missile 
attacks--was still the Colonel's preferred means of 
avenging himself. Within days of the U. S. raid, four 
Libyans were arrested in Turkey after trying to plant a 
suitcase filled with explosives at an American officer's 
126 FBIS, 17 April 1986,03. 
127 E. J. Dionne Jr., "Italy says it will strike back if Libya 
attacks its territory, " International Herald Tribune, 21 April 
1986. 
128 Luigi Caligaris, "Italy, " in Politics and security in the 
s, fthern region of the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Douglas Stuart, 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 89-90. 
129 "Europe gets tough on Libya; may do more at summit, " 
ýýr{mot-{an Science Monitor, William Echikson, 24 April 1986. 
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club in Ankara. 130 A week later, the Libyan ambassador 
to Spain directed the attempted bombing of a Bank of 
America office. On August 3,1986, a Libyan-backed group 
launched a rocket attack on the British airfield at 
Akrotiri, Cyprus. Almost simultaneously, the government 
of Togo revealed that it had foiled a Libyan plot to blow 
up the American embassy there. 131 The following month in 
Karachi, four gunmen were arrested after spraying a Pan 
Am airplane with bullets, killing 21; also arrested was 
an Arab man with a Libyan passport who claimed he was on 
a 'special mission' Libyan intelligence. 132 Finally, the 
White House received 'credible' reports that Qaddafi 
purchased the death of an American hostage in Lebanon, 
Peter Kilburn, as well as that of two British hostages. 
All three were killed in cold blood. 133 
The attacks continued into the following years. On 
the first anniversary of the American action, the U. S. 
embassy in Madrid was attacked by homemade rockets. The 
following year a Japanese Red Army terrorist was arrested 
en route to New York City, where he planned to blow up 
130 Nigel Hawkes, Simon Hoggart, and Robin Lustig, "US ready 
to strike again, " Observer, 20 April 1986. 
131 Lillian Craig Harris, "America's Libya policy has 
failed, " Middle East International, no. 285 (10 October 1986): 
14. 
132 Woodward, 475. 
133 Reagan, 520; "Michael Norman, "One of 3 hostages slain 
in Lebanon was U. S. librarian, " New York Times, 19 April 1986. 
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several targets on the anniversary of the April 
bombings. 134 The Japanese Red Army (presumably acting on 
Tripoli's instructions) was also suspected of authoring 
an attack on a USO club in Naples on April 14,1988, and 
was probably responsible for planting a bomb at a U. S. 
air base in torrejon, Spain, the following day. 135 In 
July 1988 six Libyans were arrested by FBI agents for 
violating the American embargo on Libya; one was also 
accused of conspiring to assassinate former NSC staffer 
Oliver North. 136 Libya may also have been responsible 
for the shooting of an American diplomat in Khartoum. 137 
As was to be expected, Libya's confidence in the 
USSR plunged as a result of the April bombings. 138 Prior 
to El Dorado Canyon, the Soviets routinely shared naval 
intelligence about the Sixth Fleet with Tripoli. 139 This 
cooperation ended in March, just when the Libyans needed 
134 James DeHart and Jerrold Post, "Responding to Qaddafi, " 
r riQtian Science Monitor, 7 January 1992. 
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it Most. 140 Sovetskaya Rossiya denied that the USSR had 
any advance warning of the attack. 141 However, when the 
American assault came the Soviets suddenly 'lost' the 
Sixth Fleet and 'failed to detect' the inbound 
warplanes. 142 The Libyans were incensed. 
For their part, the Soviets were angry that Qaddafi 
had discounted their warnings to abandon terrorism and 
felt that the time had come for him to be taught a 
lesson. 143 If, as was rumored, several Soviet advisers 
assigned to Libyan air defence units were killed during 
the March air strikes, the Soviets had further cause for 
disgruntlement. 244 Moscow certainly took pains to ensure 
that there would be no further Soviet casualties. 
According to Israeli intelligence sources, Soviet 
advisers were withdrawn from Libyan radar and missile 
batteries shortly before the April raid. 145 Soviet naval 
140 e. g., Edward Schumacher, "Lukewarm Soviet support worries 
Libya, " International Herald Tribune, 15 April 1986. 
141 SWB SU/8245/A4/1,29 April 1986. 
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units docked in Libya took similar precautions. 146 
In the end, the Kremlin offered little more than 
rhetorical support to its beleaguered client. 147 
Insomuch as Moscow made token efforts to help the Libyans 
militarily, its intent was apparently to bolster the 
USSR's sagging prestige in the Arab world. Libya, for 
its part, had no where else to turn and therefore once 
again raised the prospect of joining the Warsaw pact. In 
May 1986 Jalloud travelled to Moscow for fruitless talks 
with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Defense Minister, 
Sergei Sokolov, afterwards remarking that for Libya, 
'neutrality is naivete. 1148 A Soviet delegation was sent 
soon afterwards to assess Libya's defense needs. "' 
Moscow replaced three of the five transport planes 
destroyed by the F-ills, and delivered the first of two 
'Koni' type frigates to Libya. -50 Emboldened by this 
addition, the Libyan navy carried out missile exercises 
in the Gulf of Sirte and threatened to counter any 
146 Times, 23 April 1986; Con Coughlin, "Kremlin pressing 
Gaddafi to adopt lower profile, " Daily Telegraph, 25 April 1986. 
147 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World Strategy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 165; e. g., "Moscow 
stresses naval rights, " Financial Times, 18 April 1986. 
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further incursions. 15' Significantly, this time Tripoli 
refrained from threatening Soviet intervention. 
In a final desperate bid for Soviet protection, 
Qaddafi announced that Libya was willing to join the 
Warsaw Pact, give the USSR permission to establish a 
permanent naval base at Tobruk, and even allow Moscow to 
deploy nuclear missiles in Libya. 152 But the time for an 
alliance with the Kremlin had passed, and Qaddafi's 
overture went unanswered. 
Qaddafi remained at loggerheads with the White House 
for the remainder of Reagan's presidency, and continued 
his policy of lending rhetorical, financial, and military 
support to nearly any group similarly disposed--even when 
these groups otherwise bore at best tangential relevance 
to Libyan interests. Libya's activism in the South 
Pacific makes an illustrative example. 
Libya established diplomatic relations with the 
South Pacific state of Vanuatu in May 1986. Through the 
auspices of a sympathetic politician, Barak Sope, Libyan 
diplomats made contact with the 'Front Uni pour la 
liberation des Kanaks' (FULK), a militant faction of the 
New Caledonian independence movement. Tripoli also 
became a supporter of the Irian Jaya liberation movement 
151 George Henderson, "still bent on revenge", Middle East 
'Unternational, 
(25 July 1986): 9. 
152 During a May 1987 interview with NBC News. James Barron, 
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'Organisasi Papua Merdeka' and maintained links to the 
Moro National Liberation Front, a Philippino Muslim 
separatist movement. A few dozen FULK members and other 
islanders were flown to Libya and given 'security' 
training. 153 
Libya's flirtations with such movements produced 
consternation in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga, 
Western Samoa, and the Solomon Islands (the foreign 
ministers of Australia and New Zealand held private talks 
on the subject of Libya's activities, which was probably 
to accord Libya's activities more attention than they 
merited). More to the point, Libya's activism annoyed 
both the United States and France, each of which had 
serious equities at stake in the region. 
However, it readily became apparent that Libya could 
not sustain its South Pacific diplomacy. The Vanuatan 
Prime Minister, Walter Lini, rejected Libya's application 
to open a People's Bureau (i. e., an embassy), permitted 
New Zealand to establish a High Commission, and expelled 
the two Libyan diplomats Sope had invited into the 
country. 154 Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and 
Tonga also rebuffed Libyan attempts to establish 
diplomatic relations. 155 Australia closed the People's 
153 David Hegarty, Libya and the South Pacific (Working Paper 
No. 127, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1987), 
7-10. 
154 Ken Ross, Prospects for crisis predic-ticn: A South 
65,1990case study (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 
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Bureau in Canberra. Thus, rather than demonstrating 
Libya's global influence, Qaddafi's brief venture into 
the South Pacific merely accentuated the disconnect 
between Tripoli's aspirations and means. 
Thus far, this chapter has centered on Libya's 
relations with the United States and the USSR, as these 
countries respectively posed Tripoli's greatest security 
challenge and the best hope of remedying that challenge 
during the Reagan era. We have seen that Qaddafi failed 
to fashion a national security policy that reconciled the 
conflicting imperatives of his world view and the limits 
of Third World statehood: his readiness for confrontation 
with the United States was incompatible both with Libya's 
limited resources and with his own reluctance to subject 
himself to Soviet patronage. This failure was violently 
demonstrated by the April 1986 raids on Tripoli and 
Benghazi. By then, of course, the window of opportunity 
had closed. The tepid Soviet reaction to the raids 
debunked once and for all the notion that Libya had found 
security in Moscow's embrace. 
Libya's interactions with the superpowers did not 
transpire in a vacuum, and Tripoli's dealings with other 
states often reflected its preoccupation with the Cold 
War giants. As demonstrated, Tripoli waded into a 
bewildering number of conflicts--from Latin America to 
the South Pacific--whenever it appeared possible to deal 
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a setback to American interests, thereby advancing (in 
theory) the cause of Libyan security. To a limited 
degree, Libya's regional security objectives evolved in 
tandem with external events. Overall, however, they 
remained remarkably constant and can be summarized as 
follows: 
To persuade or coerce Egypt to renounce its 
peace treaty with Israel and to sever its ties 
to the United States. 
To prevent the formation of potentially hostile 
alliances among Libya's neighbors. On the 
eastern front, this meant persuading or 
coercing the Numeiri government in Sudan to 
break relations with Egypt. On the eastern 
front, this meant preventing the formation of a 
Maghribi bloc excluding Libya and, failing 
that, to offset such a bloc through a 
counteralliance. 
In this subsidiary strata of Libyan national security 
policy, the pattern of state behavior remained 
confrontational, coercive, and in general, 
counterproductive. To be sure, Qaddafi had his 
occasional triumphs. These, however, were fleeting and 
did not offset his losses--which, as usual, were largely 
self-induced. 
The assassination of Anwar El Sadat in October 1981 
was hailed with jubilation in Tripoli. Though Libya was 
not responsible for the assassination, it regarded 
Sadat's death as a major victory. With naked glee 
Qaddafi took to the airwaves and urged Cairenes to 
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dismember Sadat's corpse. 156 
His euphoria dimmed, however, once it became clear 
that Egypt would not soon abandon the peace treaty with 
Israel which was Sadat's principal legacy. 157 Thus, 
Libya became a strident critic of the Mubarak government- 
-Qaddafi referred to the new president as Hosni al-Bariq 
(Hosni the sick) and predicted that he would meet Sadat's 
fate--and called for its overthrow (and, if the semi- 
official Egyptian press is to be believed, continued to 
send saboteurs across the border). '" So far as Qaddafi 
was concerned, even with his arch-nemesis gone Egypt 
remained an 'agent regime. ' 
The price of antagonizing Egypt was to see Cairo's 
links to Washington grow ever stronger. Realizing this, 
Tripoli eventually began to moderate its strident attacks 
on Cairo. However, neither Qaddafi's recriminations nor 
his belated steps towards reconciliation persuaded Egypt 
to forego its partnership with the United States. Though 
Mubarak would not countenance an invasion of Libya, he 
was not displeased by the Reagan administration's 
assertive approach to Tripoli. In point of fact, after 
the 1986 bombings Qaddafi sent an envoy to Egypt to 
request military support in the form of submarines and 
anti-aircraft missiles--items of obvious relevance to any 
156 Jehan Sadat, A woman of Egypt (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1987), 450. 
157 In September 1984 Qaddafi offered Egypt $5 billion to 
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further clashes with the American navy, yet a laughable 
request in light of Libyan-Egyptian relations. Egypt 
coolly declined to help. 159 
Qaddafi's failure to achieve his first regional 
goal--a reversal of Egyptian foreign policy--was echoed 
by his inability to foster a breach between Cairo and 
Khartoum. In early 1981, Qaddafi offered to arm and 
organize the Sudanese army, even while suggesting that 
the Sudanese regime was in the grips of Egyptian 
intelligence. 160 Unsurprisingly, this blatantly 
subversive overture backfired: the much-alarmed Sudanese 
(who were in the midst of a diplomatic spat with Cairo) 
restored full diplomatic relations with Egypt. 161 
Consequently, Qaddafi reverted to supporting Sudanese 
rebels. 162 Officials in Khartoum blamed Libya for a rash 
of bombings. 163 In March 1981, Sudan called for Libya's 
ejection from the Arab League. 164 A few months later 
Khartoum expelled the Libyan ambassador to Sudan. 
These actions, as well as Sudan's participation in 
Operation Bright Star in November 1981 infuriated 
Qaddafi. In March 1982 he warned that 'any (external) 
159 NFSL Newsletter no. 47 (April 1986): 4. 
160 SWB ME/6654/i, 20 February 1981. 
161 SWB ME/6680/A/l, 23 March 1981. 
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intervention on the side of the collapsing fascist 
government in Sudan ... will force us to exercise our 
duty of military, economic and political intervention on 
the side of the Sudanese people. '165 
The renewal of the Sudanese civil war in 1983 
allowed Qaddafi to channel weapons and financial aid to 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). To 
further pressure Khartoum, Qaddafi promised to finance 
the construction of Ethiopian dams to imperil the Nile 
flow to Sudan and Egypt. 166 
Tripoli seemed oblivious to the openings its threats 
created for Libya's enemies to increase their influence 
in Khartoum. In February 1983, Libyan ground and air 
forces began amassing at a new airbase at the al-Kufra 
oasis, close to the borders of both Egypt and the 
Sudan. 167 Fearing that Libya would invade Sudan, 
Presidents Mubarak and Numeiri appealed to Washington for 
a show of force. 168 Washington happily deployed four 
AWACs to Egypt and repositioned the aircraft carrier 
165 SWB ME/6972/B/6,8 March 1982. 
166 Ann Mosely Lesch, "Sudan's foreign policy: In search of 
arms, aid, and allies, " in Sudan: State and society in crisis, 
ed. John 0. Voll, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 
49-50. 
167 Richards, 8. 
168 Philip Geyelin, "'Back in his box' went the deterred 
Qadhafi, " International Herald Tribune, 24 February 1983; Charles 
Richards, "Desert mirage?, " Middle East in ernational, no. 157 
(4 September 1983), 8. 
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Nimitz along the Libyan coast. 3,69 Egypt moved its own 
reinforcements towards the southwest border, and Egyptian 
jets soon intercepted Libyan aircraft violating Egyptian 
airspace near Owainat. 170 In conjunction with 
Washington, Egypt reportedly planned an entrapment 
operation that would provide a pretext for strikes 
against Libya, but was forced to abort the project 
because of press leaks in the United States. l'1 
Faced with a resolute Egypt buttressed by the United 
States, Qaddafi's forces stood down, only to mount a 
surprise attack the following year. In March 1984, a 
Libyan bomber attacked an anti-Libyan radio station at 
Omdurman. Far from intimidating Khartoum, the attack 
drove the Egyptians and Sudanese closer together. Egypt 
and Sudan, having signed a mutual defence pact in 1976, 
placed their forces on alert and the Egyptian Defence 
Minister, Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, flew to Khartoum for 
consultations. 
Libya's eventual conciliation with Sudan was brought 
about by serendipity. In April 1985 Numeiri was deposed 
in a coup d'etat. As a foe of the Numeiri government, 
Libya found it easy to befriend the new regime and 
eventually derived some benefit from the relationship by 
using Sudan's Darfur province as a staging ground for 
169 Walter Mossberg and Gerald Seir, "U. S. sends four AWACs 
planes to Egypt and moves carrier to North African coast, " The 
ý"*ý1ý1 Street Journal, 17 February 1983. 
170 Richards, 8. 
171 Eilts, 131. 
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operations in Chad. On the whole, however, Tripoli's 
relations with Khartoum were not handled with a great 
deal of diplomatic acumen. 
The Western Front: Tunisia and Algeria 
Tripoli was not particularly effective at securing 
its western front either. Algiers resented Qaddafi's 
influence on the Polisario (which gave the rebels a 
degree of autonomy from Algerian control) and was 
suspicious of Qaddafi's overtures to the Touaregs of 
southern Algeria (where Libya still claimed a substantial 
parcel of Algerian territory). Tunisia, still smarting 
from the Gafsa episode and exasperated by its own 
geographical dispute with Libya, also eyed Tripoli with 
suspicion. Thus, in 1983 the two concluded a treaty of 
friendship and pledged to assist each other should a 
third party (i. e., Libya) attack either. 
Formation of a Tunis-Algiers axis was a dismal 
indicator of the efficacy of Libyan national security 
policy. Far from rallying his neighbors to his standard, 
Qaddafi had united them against him just as he had united 
Egypt and Sudan. Qaddafi tried to undo the damage by 
applying to become a party to the treaty, a proposal 
which Algeria and Tunisia promptly rejected. Mauritania, 
in contrast, was admitted the following year. This so 
angered Qaddafi that he immediately infiltrated a team of 
commandos into Tunisia where they blew up an oil 
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pipeline. 172 
This expression of pique undoubtedly reinforced 
Tunisia's conviction that it had been wise to ally itself 
with Algeria, and left Tripoli with few policy options 
except forming a counter-alliance with Rabat. Thus, 
after a quick visit to Morocco, Qaddafi suspended 
military aid to the Polisario in June 1984.173 On August 
13,1984, Libya and Morocco concluded the Treaty of 
Oujda, thereby establishing a rival alliance: the Arab- 
African Union. 
In every regard, the Arab-African Union was an 
exemplary piece of realpolitik. Setting aside years of 
enmity, Libya acquired a reasonably potent ally with 
which to balance the Algerian-Tunisian entente. 
Furthermore, the compact brought savory fringe benefits: 
Morroco gave its blessing to Libya's war in Chad and 
repatriated Libyan dissidents to whom he had granted 
asylum. Finally, there was even a chance that King 
Hassan could intervene on Qaddafi's behalf with the 
United States. 
For all of these reasons, the Libyan-Moroccan 
partnership made strategic sense. Yet it was not long 
before the alliance began to buckle under the weight of 
Qaddafi's world view. The logic of balance of power 
172 In January, 1984. See Deeb, 153; FBIS MEA 10 January 
1984, Q3. 
173 Antonio Marquina, "Libya, the Maghreb and Mediterranean 
security, " in Prospects for security in the M diterran an, ed. 
Robert O'Neill, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988), 24. 
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politics could not induce Qaddafi to tolerate King 
Hassan's comparatively friendly relations with Israel. 
When the King met with Israeli Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres in July 1986, Qaddafi accused him of treason. 
Consequently, in August 1986, Morocco unilaterally 
abrogated the treaty of friendship. Shortly thereafter 
Morocco accused Libya of attempting to foment 
insurrection in the kingdom and recalled its 
ambassador. 174 
This left Tripoli with three wary and potentially 
hostile neighbors on its Western frontier. In early 1985 
the Libyan Air Force violated Algerian airspace near 
Djanet in the disputed Ghat region. When Algiers 
complained about the incursions, Qaddafi retorted that 
the border was artificial. Taking Qaddafi at his word, 
Algerian troops took up positions 40km inside Libyan 
territory. 175 Despite Libyan diplomatic entreaties, the 
Algerians were determined to cure the Colonel of his 
casual disregard for borders. By the summer of 1987 
Algerian units maintained positions just six kilometers 
from Ghat. 176 
Tunisia also took a more threatening posture in the 
aftermath of the Gafsa incident, and gave at least tacit 
support to a 1984 assault on Qaddafi's headquarters by 
174 Ronen, 518. 
175 "Libya: Taming the shrew, " Africa Confidential 26, no. 
15 (17 July 1985): 6. 
176 "Libya: Looking for friends, " Africa Confidential 28, no. 
16 (5 August 1987): 5. 
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the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. '77 
Tripoli retaliated with a wave of harassment. Libyan 
border police took three Tunisian border guards hostage, 
and Libyan military units allegedly violated the Tunisian 
border at least twice. 171B In 1985 Libya expelled some 
30,000 Tunisian workers; Tunis retaliated by expelling 
235 Libyans for spying. Qaddafi's hostile rhetoric 
served to set the stage for Bourguiba's June 1985 visit 
to Washington. 179 
The warming of U. S. -Tunisian relations was the last 
thing the Colonel wanted to see, which made his actions 
all the more remarkable since they made such a warming 
inevitable. A few months after Bourguiba returned from 
Washington, the Libyan air force conducted at least two 
overt reconnaissance flights along the 50km road leading 
from the Libyan-Tunisian border to Tunis--the route an 
invasion force would follow to seize the Tunisian 
capital. 180 Tunisia was put on military alert, and 
elements of the U. S. Sixth Fleet and Algerian navy were 
177 Even with Tunisian support, the NFSL lacked the resources 
to conduct such an operation without outside aid. The most 
plausible explanation is that the attack was organized by 
France's Direction de la Securite Exterieure, in response to 
Qaddafi's policies in Chad (Seymour Hersh, "Target Qaddafi, " He& 
ýýrk T{mes Magazine, 22 February 1987). 
178 Mark Tessler, "Libya in the Maghreb: The union with 
Morocco and related developments, " in The green and the black, 
ed. Rene Lemarchand, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1988), 86; see also Francois Burgat, "Qadhafi's 'unitary' 
doctrine, " in the same volume, 27. 
17 Abdel-Wahab Hechiche, "Conflict and resolution in Libyan- 
Tunisian relations, " The Maghreb review 14, no. 1-2 (1989): 65. 
180 FBIS, 12 September 1985. 
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promptly sent to guard Tunis, and Mubarak publicly warned 
Libya not to invade. 181 Qaddafi declared a 24-hour 
helicopter alert along the border, mobilized his patrol 
aircraft to guard against a pre-emptive attack, and 
ordered the Libyan army to reinforce its ground units 
along the Tunisian border in preparation for battle. 282 
Qaddafi's orders triggered an unprecedented result. 
Libyan units, convinced that their leader was about to 
recklessly embroil them in a pointless battle with 
Tunisia (and perhaps Algeria and the United States), 
refused to deploy. This was, so far is as known in the 
open literature, the first time that Qaddafi ever faced 
the possibility of widespread mutiny in the LAF, and it 
clearly jarred him. In the absence of institutional and 
political constraints on his leadership it took the 
threat of rebellion to bring the Colonel to heel. 
Qaddafi countermanded his order and the crisis 
evaporated--yet not before Tunisia had broken diplomatic 
relations, both Washington and Paris had reaffirmed their 
commitment to Tunisian security, and the Algerians had 
shown their annoyance. 
Thus, both in its relations with the superpowers and 
in its pursuit of regional security, Libyan policy was 
181 "Tunisia on military alert for attack by Libya, " New York 
je, 23 August 1985; Eilts, 132. 
182 NFSL Newsletter no. 41, (August-September 1985): 4. 
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essentially self-defeating. This was, for the most part, 
because of the extremist tactics--including terrorism-- 
Qaddafi adopted in the pursuit of short term interests at 
the expense of his strategic goals. 
There are doubtlessly many who accept Qaddafi's 
argument that the Reagan administration's Libya policy-- 
especially the raids on Tripoli and Benghazi--was 
tantamount to 'state terrorism' and that this was the 
moral equivalent of Libya's support for organizations 
such as the Abu Nidal group, the Japanese Red Army, and 
the Bader-Meinhof gang. The infamous 'Carlos' not only 
found refuge in Tripoli but referred to the Libyans as 
his 'bosses. ' 183 Dubious though this argument may be, it 
easily obscures what for the student of international 
relations are the truly salient points about the drift of 
Libyan national security policy into the realm of 
extremism. These are: first, that Libya became an overt 
and unusually active supporter of terrorist groups in 
defiance of international norms; second, that this 
support did not help Tripoli to achieve its strategic 
objectives, and in many instances produced the opposite 
effect; and third, that, deservedly or not, Libya 
acquired a reputation for extremism that itself became a 
handicap to Tripoli. 
Space permits but the briefest exposition of Libya's 
extremist activities, an egregious example of which 
183 David Holden and Richard Johns, The house of Saud 
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981), 436. 
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occurred in November 1984 when Egyptian intelligence 
received word that a Libyan hit-team was en route to 
Cairo to assassinate former Libyan Prime Minister (and 
now dissident). The Egyptians prepared an elaborate 
deception, arresting the would-be killers and staging a 
false assassination, pictures of which were sent on the 
news wires to Tripoli. Duped, Qaddafi claimed 
responsibility for the mission--only to be humiliated by 
the intended victim's re-emergence. Libya was excoriated 
by Egypt and the international community. 
Only a few months previously the world had been 
stunned by a series of mine attacks on international 
shipping in the Red Sea which damaged at least eighteen 
ships. After assembling a long chain of incriminating 
evidence, experts fingered a Libyan merchant ship, the 
Ghat, as the probable culprit. 184 As was to be expected, 
Tripoli vigorously proclaimed its innocence. But the 
regime's protests were undermined by Qaddafi's own words. 
Only a few years earlier Libyan radio urged Palestinian 
commandos to target their assaults on oil installations 
and strategic access points to the Red Sea: 
He (Qaddafi) said the Arab Suez Canal must be 
sabotaged because it had become, under the 
regime of treacherous Sadat, an (oil) artery 
which fed the enemy ... he said this would be 
a legitimate action in the eyes of the 
world. 185 
Furthermore, following the mining incident Qaddafi 
184 John Moore, "Red Sea mines a mystery no longer, " aane! g 
xäval Review 1985,64-67. 
185 SWB ME/6286 A/2,1 December 1979. 
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boasted in a telex to the Ayatollah Khomeini that he was 
'pleased and content' with the Red Sea operation. In 
December 1984, those who served on the Ghat, including 
two alleged Libyan intelligence officers, were formally 
decorated for their service--an unusual honor for the 
crew of a supposedly innocent merchantman. 186 
Assuming that Libya was indeed responsible for the 
Red Sea mining, what was the operation's utility as a 
policy instrument? Mining the Red Sea did not 
appreciably contribute to Libya's security; nor, aside 
from a brief spike in oil prices, did it inflict much 
harm upon the regime's enemies. Rather, to a 
considerable extent the mining operation seemingly 
justified American policy. European governments, though 
some feigned uncertainty about Libya's responsibility, 
had to admit that these attacks--which came without 
warning and were directed at noncombatants--posed an 
egregious threat to international security. 187 Thus, the 
irony of the Red Sea mining operation was that the 
multilateral minesweeping task force dispatched to clean 
up the mess served to strengthen the North Atlantic 
Alliance. In addition, the mine attacks led the CIA to 
186 Moore, 66. 
187 West Germany was particularly indulgent of Tripoli. When 
Libyan diplomats posted to Bonn kidnapped and tortured a Libyan 
student in the ambassador's residence, Libya took 12 Germans 
hostage and swapped them for the accused diplomats and another 
Libyan sentenced to life imprisonment for murdering a dissident 
("8 Germans freed for Libyans, " New York Times, 16 May 1983). 
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'intensify' its efforts to find Libya's 
vulnerabilities. 188 
Strange though the Red Sea mining was, it was not 
the strangest example of a security policy gone amuck to 
surface that year. On April 17,1984,70 members of the 
Libyan opposition staged a protest outside the People's 
Bureau in St. James' Square. Qaddafi had instructed the 
Bureau to 'use all means to go after stray dogs and turn 
Britain into hell if stray dogs go ahead with 
demonstrations. 1189 A gunman within the Bureau opened 
fire on the demonstrators, wounding eleven and killing 
Woman Police Constable (WPC) Yvonne Fletcher. British 
authorities demanded that the gunman be surrendered and 
stripped of diplomatic immunity. Libya refused, calling 
the demonstration a staged provocation and accusing the 
British of opening fire. 190 A Libyan mob besieged the 
British embassy in Tripoli, suggesting that Libya would 
take hostages if necessary to end the crisis. After ten 
days, Britain broke diplomatic relations and the Libyan 
diplomats--including the gunman--were expelled. 
The murder of WPC Fletcher displayed a stupefying 
disregard for international norms, a disregard which cost 
Libya its diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom, 
deepened its international pariah status, and endowed the 
188 Gates, 322. 
189 Apparently a deciphered cable. See Gates, 322. 
190 "The siege of St James's square, " Jamahiriya Review, no. 
47 (May-June 1984): 8. 
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Libyan opposition with new legitimacy. The gains to 
Libya, if any, were negligible. One observer found it 
'almost inconceivable' that the Colonel would order such 
a myopic act of terrorism. 191 Indeed, by any rational 
standard authorizing or tolerating such counterproductive 
behavior would have been inconceivable, *but the shooting 
fit all too well into a pattern of irrational behavior. 
The break in diplomatic relations was overdue, as 
Libya had long been agitating against British interests. 
Tripoli, for example, shipped anti-aircraft missiles to 
Argentina during the Falklands War. 192 Moreover, Libya's 
support of the IRA was a matter of record. In 1984 
authorities intercepted the Marita Ann carrying three 
tons of Libyan weapons bound for the IRA. In 1986, 
Tripoli funnelled an estimated $3 million to the IRA, and 
dozens of cached rifles stamped with Libyan markings were 
discovered in Ireland the same year. 193 On October 31, 
1987, French authorities discovered 150 tonnes of Libyan 
arms in the hold of the ship Eskund, along with three 
known IRA members. After reviewing the evidence, 
intelligence sources concluded that three other shipments 
of similar size had been delivered to the IRA 
191 George Henderson, "Murder in the square, " Middle East 
+yj. e=ationa?, no. 224 (4 May 1984) : 5. 
192 Harris, 103. 
193 George Henderson, "Arms for the IRA, " Middle East 
International no. 313, (21 November 1987): 13. 
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undetected. 194 Both the quantity and nature of the 
weapons seized gave tangible evidence of Qaddafi's desire 
to take revenge on England for its supporting role in the 
1986 bombings. 
All states are free to flaunt international norms of 
behavior, yet small states are rarely free to do so with 
impunity. Libya, which for much of its existence escaped 
the consequences of its more extreme behaviors (for 
reasons previously noted) now reaped those consequences 
in the form of broken alliances, severed relations and 
military reprisals. By the end of 1988, Libya had become 
indelibly associated with terrorism in the minds of 
millions. This association was of no small political 
consequence, as governments contemplating diplomatic or 
military sanctions against a regime so stigmatized faced 
a significantly lower political threshold. 
The heavily personalized and politicized nature of 
Libya's conflict with the United States during the Reagan 
years makes any study of this era inherently 
controversial. Whether Qaddafi's policies were morally 
good or bad, justified or not, is immaterial to this 
thesis. For our purposes, the pivotal questions are 
whether they were rational, whether they moved Qaddafi 
closer to achieving his major political objectives, and 
194 E. A. Wayne, "IRA reported to get huge arms shipment from 
Libya, " Christian Science Monitor, 27 November 1987. 
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whether they made Libya more secure. 
As our cursory survey of the historical record 
reveals, the answers to these questions are negative. 
Qaddafi survived his tussles with the Reagan 
administration, but survival alone was not much of an 
accomplishment when measured against Qaddafi's agenda. 
The Colonel failed to reach any of his core security 
objectives and failed even to achieve most of his 
intermediate goals. 
Qaddafi set out to weaken U. S. influence in the 
Mediterranean region and specifically, to exert control 
over the Gulf of Sirte; U. S. influence increased and the 
American navy, after handing the Libyan armed forces a 
series of defeats, decided to permanently station a 
second aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. 195 He 
sought security assurances from the Soviet Union; he 
received none. He tried to induce Egypt to renege on the 
Camp David Accords; Egypt refused. He sought, through 
intimidation and subversion, to split the Egyptian- 
Sudanese alliance; instead, he drove Cairo and Khartoum 
closer together until Numeiri was deposed by internal 
forces. He tried to persuade or coerce a number of 
European and North African states into breaking relations 
with Washington; none did. He tried and failed to 
prevent a Tunisian-Algerian alliance, after which he 
formed but could not sustain an alliance with Morocco. 
195 ' Jed C. Snyder, Defending the Fringe: NATO, the 
.,.. a aj erranean _ and the Persian Gulf, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
and the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 15. 
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Finally, he turned to extremism in order to solve the 
problems that his conventional policy instruments could 
not rectify; extremism merely aggravated his security 
predicament. 
Returning to a theme invoked in the beginning of 
this chapter, the advent of an overtly hostile American 
administration presented Tripoli with an evolutionary 
challenge. Qaddafi's response--to directly confront the 
United States--was a classic example of maladaptation. 
As Secretary of Defense Weinberger reflected: 
Qaddafi had tried by overt attacks, 
intimidation, threats and bluster, to assert 
control over international waters. He failed 
each time. When he saw that he could not 
accomplish his aim overtly, he then tried the 
covert use of terrorism. Here our response to 
him was so immediate and so devastating 
. that by the end of 1986 
his credibility 
was virtually non-existent. 196 
By pitting his lone Third World state against what was 
arguably the most powerful polity in the international 
community, Qaddafi strained against the impediments of 
strategic reality. In the end, he could not escape them. 
Moreover, one cannot help observing that Qaddafi had 
been the catalyst which allowed Reagan to break the 
'Vietnam syndrome. ' Reagan's adviser Ed Meese observed: 
The Libyan episode of 1981 was the first time 
President Reagan authorized the use of military 
forces in defense of U. S. interests ... His 
message was loud and clear: No longer could 
Third World despots challenge the United States 
and depend on America's post-Vietnam guilt 
complex, or its uncertainty about its global 
196 Weinberger, 200-201. 
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role, to bind our hands. 
197 
That Qaddafi was the inadvertent agent of American 
resurgence was the ultimate irony. 
In nature, the price of failed adaptation is 
extinction. In the international environment the 
consequences are generally less drastic. They are, 
nevertheless, real. For Libya, the price of its 
irrational national security policy was isolation--an 
isolation that would significantly inhibit the regime's 
ability to adjust to future changes in its environment. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, such changes 
were not long in appearing. The waning Cold War and 
ensuing reshuffling of the world order ushered in an era 
in which Libyan national security policy would finally 
collapse under the weight of Qaddafi's leadership. 
197 Edwin Meese III, With Reagan: The inside story, 
(Washington, D. C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 204. 
Chapter 4 
Denouement: 
The Jamahiriyah in the New World Order, 1989-1995 
in truth, there is no logic anymore. 
We have reached an unreasonable state. 
-- Muammar El Qaddafil 
Libyans heaved a collective sigh of relief as the 
Reagan presidency drew to an end. Reagan had proven a 
formidable antagonist, by far the most dangerous Tripoli 
had encountered. Naturally, many hoped that the changing 
of the president would produce a relaxation of tensions 
and a concomitant increase in security. This, 
unfortunately, was not the case. Trenchant forces were 
rippling through the global system in the late 1980s, 
forces that were far more formidable than any single 
leader. These forces ushered in a new world order--an 
order marked by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, and the decisive Western victory in the 
Gulf War. The new order was not kind to its discontents. 
Freed from the shackles of bi-polar conflict, the G-7 
powers--led by the United States--were suddenly able to 
use international institutions to unprecedented effect, 
bringing diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military 
pressure to bear against recalcitrant states they deemed 




threats to international peace and security. 2 For these 
so-called 'rogue states' the pre-eminent security 
challenge of the day was to prevent this new order from 
subjecting them to containment, encroaching upon their 
sovereignty, and even in some instances from replacing 
their regimes. 
Cataclysmic change of this type can be usefully 
conceptualized in biological terms; indeed, the 
unremitting hostility of the international environment 
(as Hobbes conceived it) is not unlike nature itself. 3 
To flourish, states must mimic the adaptability of living 
organisms: they must recognize critical changes in their 
surroundings and devise appropriate responses. Such 
adaptations tax the abilities of even the ablest leaders 
and, as in nature, many fail the evolutionary test. The 
new international order was soon strewn with leaders (in 
Panama, Haiti, Cuba, North Korea and Iraq) thoroughly 
discombobulated by their unfamiliar environment. 
It was thus through no unique failing of his own 
that the Libyan leader, who had not fared particularly 
well under the previous order, was unable to keep pace 
with the rapid permutations in the international system-- 
most of which, he realized, were inimical to his 
interests. Qaddafi's anxiety became particularly acute 
2 See Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs Anthony Lake's article "Confronting backlash states, " 
Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March-April 1994): 45-55. 
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), 
Chapter XXI. 
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after events such as the U. S. invasion of Panama, which-- 
in Tripoli's eyes--set: 
a serious precedent in international relations 
at a time when the world is witnessing 
transformations and changes in the balances of 
power which consolidate tendencies towards 
aggression rather than provide opportunities 
4 for repelling them. 
Though they caused obvious discomfort, these 
'transformations and changes' had a salubrious impact 
upon Libyan decision-making. To the extent that the new 
world order held Qaddafi to account, he adopted pragmatic 
and, at times, eminently rational policies: he attempted 
to repair his damaged relations with Egypt, the Maghrib, 
and the West; he renounced terrorism; he finally 
abandoned his designs on Chad; and he even flirted with 
the idea of making peace with Israel. 
However, sustaining these initiatives required a 
flexibility that Qaddafi did not possess. His world view 
remained constant; hence, his more rational policies were 
ultimately discredited by displays of hostility. 
Moreover, states that had been on the receiving end of 
Qaddafi's less irenic policies over-the preceding decades 
were not only dubious of the Colonel's reformation, but 
content to see him flounder in the new order. Years of 
antagonistic behavior had thus created a gravity well 
from which Qaddafi could not escape. 
The consequences for Libyan national security were 
little short of disastrous. Unable to retain even a 
4 SWB ME/0712/A/8,14 March 1990. 
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minimal level of Soviet patronage, Tripoli became more 
isolated than ever. Outmaneuvered at the United Nations, 
Libya sank into ignominious economic and military 
stagnation under a sanctions regimen. Checked by 
international vigilance, Libyan proliferation programs 
(Qaddafi's last hope for elevating his standing in the 
global pecking order) sputtered inconclusively, 
occasionally drawing threats of American pre-emption. By 
mid-decade, the Libyan security predicament was more 
acute, and its leader further from seeing his 
international agenda realized, than at any time since the 
fateful September morning in 1969 when Muammar El Qaddafi 
toppled the Sanusi throne. 
As explained in the preceding chapter, by the late 
1980s Libya had become marginal to Soviet interests. 
Moscow's waning interest in Tripoli was checked only by 
the instinct of a Great Power to preserve its clients, no 
matter how small, and by the highly profitable tradition 
of supplying Libya with armaments it could not absorb. 
To facilitate these arms sales the Kremlin tossed Qaddafi 
the occasional bone. For example, on June 5,1990, 
Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov persuaded the Soviet 
Central Committee to share satellite intelligence on 
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Sixth Fleet activities with the LAF. 5 This was perhaps 
more to keep Libya out of trouble than to facilitate 
Libyan defence planning. 
Tripoli's estrangement from Moscow was vividly 
underscored by the superpower summit held at Malta in 
December 1989 (only a few weeks after the Berlin Wall 
crumbled). Qaddafi watched in bleak despair as George 
Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev closed a chapter in history 
scarcely a stone's throw from Libyan waters. 6 Whereas 
most nations were relieved by this evidence of the Cold 
War's end, Qaddafi decried the summit as an 'ugly affair' 
and even denounced the choice of venue as 'a kind of 
naval muscle-flexing. ' 7 
Scarcely had Bush and Gorbachev finished meeting 
before the Soviet Union began to buckle under the weight 
of massive inefficiency and the unfamiliar domestic 
pressures generated by glasnost. In less than two years 
the USSR would no longer exist. 
Well before the Soviet Union finished its implosion 
Tripoli realized it could no longer rely upon Soviet aid. 
Publicly, Qaddafi tried to be generous in his assessments 
of Gorbachev. Perestroyka, he said, 'was undoubtedly 
prescribed by the Third Universal Theory' (perhaps the 
5 Jonathan Lyons, "Gorbachev's party provided secret help 
for Gaddafi, " Times, 29 July 1992. 
6 Gorbachev confidently told Bush: 'strategically and 
philosophically, the way of the Cold War has been defeated. ' 
James Baker, The politics of diplomacy, (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1995): 170. 
SWB ME/0607 i, 7 November 1989. 
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highest praise Qaddafi could lavish on any foreign 
ideology). 8 Even the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel 
was generally spared direct criticism; instead, Qaddafi 
denounced the United States for pressuring the Soviets to 
allow such emigration. 9 Beneath the surface, however, 
Qaddafi was dismayed by what he felt was Gorbachev's 
betrayal of his 'revolutionary' responsibilities. Time 
and again he tried to prod or coax the USSR into action, 
visibly struggling to maintain his faith: 
I am sympathetic to the Soviet Union now, 
because the defeat of the Soviet Union is a 
victory of one kind or another for US 
imperialism. ... In fact, it would be in our 
interest if the Soviet Union were not to fall 
and were not defeated. It must remain strong 
as a world force to deter America. However, if 
this does not materialise, we shall work for 
the creation of an international deterrent. 10 
By 'international deterrent' Qaddafi meant, as he always 
had, a force that would enable him to pursue his 
political objectives with impunity. 
The Soviet putsch of August 1991 therefore 
occasioned heartfelt relief and much giddy applause in 
Libya. Qaddafi himself publicly hailed the conspirators. 
Alas, the Colonel's exuberance produced a rather dramatic 
chill in relations once Gorbachev reasserted himself. 
Qaddafi tried to paper over the damage by claiming his 
8 SWB ME/0662 A/4,15 January 1990. With hindsight, of 
course, Qaddafi would later assert that 
the collapse of the USSR 
was predicted by the same 
theory (Arnaud de Horchgrave, "Gadhafi: 
'Why is Libya being punished?, "" Washington Times, 6 July 1993). 
9 SWB ME/0688 A/1,14 February 1990. 
10 SWB ME/0735/A/6,10 April 1990. 
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support of the conspirators had been a 'political stance 
. not an ideological one, ' and by sending a treacly 
telegram to Gorbachev hailing the 'strategic friendship' 
between their states. -- His apologies met only icy 
silence from Moscow. Realizing the damage was already 
done, Qaddafi candidly expressed his disillusionment with 
Soviet patronage: 
Someone could come along and say that, through 
this stand (welcoming the putsch) we have lost 
the Soviet Union. We lost the Soviet Union a 
long time ago ... When they (the Americans) 
struck us in 1986, was it conceivable that 170 
planes were roaring up in skies about 4,000 
miles, and the Soviet Union was unaware of them 
or was not following them by the hour and by 
the minute? ... I wish they had told us: Qadhafi, listen, there is going to be an attack 
on your children by 170 planes, after one or 
two hours they will reach you. .. they did not 
say even these things. .. We were unaware of 
anything (until) the bombs were dropping on us. 
.. Therefore, we had lost the Soviet Union a long time ago. " 
The Colonel's statement held considerable truth. 
However, it was one thing to recognize that the Soviet- 
Libyan relationship was slipping, and quite another to 
push it over the precipice. Qaddafi's reckless praise of 
the Soviet hardliners stripped Tripoli of the last 
vestiges of Soviet goodwill. In the words of one Russian 
diplomat, bilateral relations were 'drastically 
lowered. 113 The Soviet navy, for example, discontinued 
li SWB ME/1167/A/9-11,3 September 1991. 
12 SWB ME/1167/A/11,3 September 1991. 
13 Alexei Vassiliev, Russian policy in the Middle East " From 
MpLS, %{anism to pragmatism, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), 289. 
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joint naval exercises with the Libyan fleet. 14 
The dissolution of the USSR gave Qaddafi an 
opportunity to seek better relations with its successor 
states, notably Russia. But Russian-Libyan relations 
were soon marred by a serious economic dispute. 25 At the 
beginning of 1992 Libya stopped making payments to Russia 
on its military debt, ostensibly because Tripoli 
questioned whether Russia should be entitled to debts 
contracted with the Soviet Union. In reality, Libya was 
distressed by Russia's support of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 731 (January 21,1992); withholding 
payments was thus an expression of displeasure and an 
attempt to dissuade Russia from acquiescing to the 
imposition of sanctions as well. As a secondary 
objective, Tripoli perhaps hoped to gain some leverage to 
renegotiate its payment schedule. Tripoli definitely 
regarded its payments to Moscow as a policy lever; it is 
interesting to note that Libya first began delaying 
payments on its debt to Moscow after the 1986 bombings in 
apparent protest of the USSR's inaction. 16 
Qaddafi's diplomatic fillip failed to spur Russia 
into taking a more active line in Libya's defence, in 
part because Tripoli ignored Moscow's advice to avoid a 
14 The Middle East Military Balance 1992-1993 (Boulder: 
westview Press, 1993), 313. 
15 Libya's foreign reserves were dwindling so rapidly that 
the General People's Congress demanded strict controls to stop 
the 'hemorrhage of foreign currency' (SWB ME/0726/a/1,30 March 
1990). 
16 Vassiliev, 286. 
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protracted confrontation with the Security Council. 
Thus, when in March 1992 the Security Council imposed 
sanctions on Tripoli, Moscow supported the resolution 
rather than use its veto on Libya's behalf or abstain 
from the vote. Outraged, Qaddafi set fire to the few 
remaining bridges with his former friend. On April 2a 
'mob' attacked the Russian embassy in Tripoli, an old 
tactic that the Libyans had previously employed on the 
French, Americans, and British. On April 22, President 
Yeltsin--in accordance with the Security Council 
resolution--froze all arms sales to Libya, ordered 
reductions in diplomatic representation, and ordered the 
withdrawal of all Russian military advisers from Libya. 17 
Tripoli did not accept Yeltsin's decision gracefully and, 
according to the Russian embassy, deliberately hampered 
the departure. 18 
Relations with the Yeltsin government gradually 
thawed, though this was primarily due to Russia's 
internal dynamics rather than to any adroit diplomacy on 
Qaddafi's part. As Russia's economic problems multiplied 
in the post-Soviet era, Moscow became increasingly 
sensitive to suggestions that its Great Power status had 
fallen into abeyance. Moscow therefore grumbled about 
17 According to the Russian press, some 200 of the estimated 
3000 advisers accepted contracts to remain as private 
consultants, at salaries many times greater than their army pay. 
John Hannah, "Russia and the Middle East, " in Middle EaGt 
ýýn mporarv Survey 1992, ed. Ami Ayalon, vol. XVI, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), 53-54. 
18 Radio Moscow, 14 June 1992. 
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tightening UN sanctions 
newspapers arguing that 
it even more difficult 
billion dollar military 
to pay). Unfortunately 
not have the diplomatic 
on Russia's misgivings. 
on Libya in 1993, with some 
additional sanctions would make 
for Tripoli to service its $3 
debt (which Libya still refused 
for Qaddafi, Tripoli simply did 
or economic muscle to capitalize 
In contrast, U. S. President Bill Clinton, British 
Prime Minister John Major, and French Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur each weighed in with President Yeltsin, 
warning that a Russian veto would jeopardize the flow of 
Western economic aid. Yeltsin wisely, if reluctantly, 
capitulated. -The ease with which the Western powers 
nullified Tripoli's best hope of reprieve was a striking 
illustration of the power disparity between Libya and the 
states it had willfully antagonized. " 
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a revised 
Cold War eschatology: whereas it was once understood that 
the Cold War had ended by mutual assent, the West, and 
more particularly the United States, now claimed 
unilateral victory. Whatever the mythology, it was 
"certainly clear that the United States enjoyed--at least 
for a time--a unique position as the preeminent global 
19 Mark Tran, "Moscow falls in step over new Lockerbie 
sanctions, " Guardian, 5 November 1993; Middle East Economic 
ngt (12 November 1993): 13; and author's interviews with U. S. 
officials. 
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power. For pariah states, the consequences of American 
preeminence were swift. Deprived of a unitary threat 
(and realizing it would be impolitic to fully articulate 
fears of Russian resurgence or Chinese emergence), the 
U. S. national security establishment re-ordered its 
agenda. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and terrorism topped the revised hierarchy of 
threats. 20 In American eyes, Libya had the dubious honor 
of qualifying on both counts. 21 
Libya's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was a 
wholly predictable expression of the regime's pursuit of 
national security, albeit one that was not distinguished 
by great success. Following the 1986 bombings, Qaddafi 
recognized that he could no longer rely upon his 
conventional forces to protect him from the repercussions 
of his policies. 22 Moreover, he made it abundantly clear 
that he believed the Arabs suffered a strategic 
deficiency with regards to Israel and the United States 
20 The White House, A national security strategy of 
g, gagement and enlargement, (Washington, D. C.: February 1995): 
8. 
21 'Libya's rogue regime (is) engaged in both terrorist and 
proliferation activities. ' Department of Defense, office of 
international Security Affairs, United States Se urity Strategy 
r the Middle East, (Washington, D. C.: May 1995): 26. 
22 For an explicit admission of this, see SWB ME/11667/A/9, 
3 September 1991. Perhaps it was recognition of this fact which 
prompted Qaddafi two years earlier to make the unprecedented 
statement that Libya 
'had enough' conventional weapons (SWB 
ME/0598 A/2,27 October 1989). 
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which the acquisition of WMD would remedy. 23 Libya, 
Qaddafi said, would have retaliated against New York with 
ballistic missiles in 1986 if it had possessed the 
capability. 24 
Qaddafi's numerous (but fruitless) attempts to 
obtain nuclear weapons are well known and need little 
comment. 25 Dismayed by the difficulties of mounting an 
indigenous nuclear weapons program, the Libyan regime 
instead turned to the development of chemical weapons 
(CW) in the early 1980s. 26 By the end of the Reagan 
presidency, this covert proliferation program was on the 
verge of entering large scale production. 27 
Qaddafi's dealings with the Bush administration were 
thus troubled by proliferation from the outset. Only 
days before the 1989 Presidential inauguration, the White 
House was mulling a pre-emptive air strike to prevent 
Pharma-150 (the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Rabta) 
23 See, for example, the Colonel's ruminations on the 
utility of ballistic missiles in this regard (SWB ME/0584/A/2, 
11 October 1989). 
24 SWB ME/0745/A/2,23 April 1990. 
25 John Cooley, "Qaddafi's great aim for Libya is a nuclear 
capability of its own, " Christian Science Monitor, 12 November 
1980. 
26 An excellent introduction to Libyan CW is Thomas 
Wiegele's The clandestine building of Libya's chemical weals 
faaýtorv, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992). 
27 The Reagan administration first leaked its concern in 
late 1987. See Michael Gordon, "U. S. thinks Libya may plan to 
make chemical weapons, " New York Times, 24 December 1987. 
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from entering full-scale production. 28 Less contemptuous 
of American military might after the experiences of 1986, 
Qaddafi had to devise a means of either protecting 
Pharma-150 or mollifying the Americans. 
Whether through shrewd calculation or serendipity 
(or both), Qaddafi hit upon the right solution. On 
January 4,1989, fighters from the USS John F. Kennedy 
intercepted two inbound Libyan Mig-23s on a 'routine 
reconnaissance patrol' some 145 km north of Tobruk (an 
area claimed by Libya as restricted airspace but not 
recognized as such by the international community). 29 
The Libyan pilots opened fire but missed the American 
aviators, who shot down both Libyan jets. 
If Qaddafi's intent in sanctioning yet another 
attack on the Sixth Fleet were to reassert his claim to 
the Gulf of Sirte, his gambit failed. But if, as seems 
likely, Qaddafi was in effect sacrificing'a pawn to the 
American armada in the expectation that this would stave 
off an attack on Rabta, the ploy worked admirably. 
Though one might have expected the United States to seize 
upon this incident as a pretext for launching a pre- 
emptive strike on the Rabta site, it was evident to 
Washington that its European allies would not support 
such an action; the Reagan White House was partly to 
blame since the exposure of an ill-conceived 
28 SWB ME/0352/A/1,7 January 1989; SWB ME/0353/A/1,9 
January 1989- 
29 SWB ME/0353/A/l, 9 January 1989. 
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disinformation campaign against Tripoli had greatly 
discredited the administration's Libya policy. The 
Pentagon therefore declared the incident closed and the 
Sixth Fleet withdrew, 'not because they were matched by a 
Libyan military force but because of the strength of the 
international stand, ' as Qaddafi observed. 30 The loss of 
two aircraft was thus a small price for protecting the 
strategic chemical works at Rabta. 31 
Qaddafi took logical steps to ensure that the crisis 
was defused. On January 13, he returned the body of Paul 
Lorence, an American pilot killed in Operation El Dorado 
Canyon, to the United States through the good offices of 
the Vatican. " In addition, Tripoli heaped surreal 
flattery on the new American president and Qaddafi 
appealed for face-to-face negotiations with America. 33 
The offer to enter negotiations was immediately 
reiterated by Foreign Minister Jadallah Azzuz Al Talhi: 
'We are ready for dialogue ... and awaiting the 
response of the new U. S. administration. ' 34 For several 
30 SWB ME/0360/A/7,17 January 1989. 
31 Intriguingly, Libya's CW program remained almost inert 
for the remainder of this period. In 1993 Qaddafi hinted that 
he saw the program as a bargaining chip: 'By forging new links 
with us, you (the United States) will be in a much better 
position to influence our policy, especially regarding chemical 
weapons' (de Borchgrave, op. cit. ). 
32 SWB ME/0359/A/3,16 January 1989. 
33 Without a trace of irony, Qaddafi even offered the White 
House some public relations advice: 'America ... should try 
during the Bush era to brighten up its image' (SWB ME/0353/A/5, 
9 January 1989). 
34 SWB ME/04271,6 April 1989. 
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months Tripoli continued declaring its interest in 
normalizing relations and hailed the decrease in tensions 
brought about by Bush's 'rich political experience. 135 
This conciliatory tone demonstrated once more that 
Qaddafi was not incapable of moderation when faced with 
imminent consequences to his actions. However, when the 
immediacy of those consequences dissipated he failed to 
temper his policies long enough to secure any lasting 
political benefit. Work on Pharma-150 continued 
unabated, and Libya's General People's Congress defiantly 
resolved 'to consolidate the defensive capability of the 
Great Jamahiriyah and to develop programmes of scientific 
research and strategic industries in order to confront 
the dangers threatening the Arab motherland' (i. e., to 
continue its proliferant activities). "' 
Thus, by early 1990 the tensions caused by Rabta 
were even higher than they had been the year before. In 
March, just when it appeared that the United States was 
preparing afresh to pre-emptively attack the chemical 
weapons factory, Libya announced that Pharma-150 had been 
destroyed by fire. 37 Tripoli accused various 
intelligence agencies of sabotaging the plant, although 
most Western analysts eventually concluded that Tripoli 
35 SWB ME/05841,11 October 1989; SWB ME/0598 A/3,27 
October 1989. 
36 SWB ME/0726/A/1,30 March 1990. Qaddafi obviously 
agreed, later insisting that Libya had 'both the potential and 
the right to build missiles' (de Horchgrave, op. cit. ). 
37 The threat of pre-emption was made on numerous occasions. 
For a synopsis see Wiegele, 31-32. 
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staged the fire to 
machinery could be 
Either way, it was 
increasing the like 
with the West. 38 
Proliferation 
defuse tensions until Libya's CW 
relocated to less vulnerable sites. 
clear that Libyan proliferation was 
? lihood of renewed military conflict 
was just one means by which Tripoli 
tried to meet the challenge of American pre-eminence in 
the post Cold-War era. Libya also attempted to drive a 
wedge between the United States and its European allies. 
In fact, the General People's Congress instructed the 
Foreign Ministry to cultivate relations in Western Europe 
wherever possible to counter Washington's pressure for 
anti-Libyan measures. 39 France was a natural target for 
such an effort, since Paris took an independent (and 
often sympathetic) line toward Tripoli. Qaddafi 
therefore secured the release of French hostage 
Jacqueline Valente and her family, who were being held in 
Lebanon. `° France rewarded this gesture by returning 
three Libyan Mirage fighters impounded since 1986. 
However, the Franco-Libyan thaw came to an abrupt end in 
September 1990 when Libya was implicated in the 
destruction of a French passenger jet. So much for 
Libya's attempt to fracture-the Atlantic Alliance. 
38 A trend that continued into the latter half of the 1990s. 
See the author's article, "Libyan CW raises the issue of pre- 
emption, " in Jane's Intelligence Review 8, no. 11 (November 
1996): 522-526. 
39 SWB ME/0712/A/6,14 March 1990. 
40 SWB ME/07361,11 April 1990. 
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Rapprochement with Egypt was another sensible move 
under the circumstances, as it reduced the threat of the 
United States working in concert with Cairo against 
Tripoli. But reconciliation was also a capitulation on 
Libya's part, since Tripoli was forced to abandon its 
insistence that Cairo renounce the Camp David accords. 
Qaddafi tried to disguise this fact by claiming that he 
only agreed to attend the May 1989 Casablanca Summit 
(which marked Egypt's return to the Arab fold) after 
being placed under duress by the presidents of Algeria, 
Syria and Tunisia. " Still, it was a 'bitter' experience 
which Qaddafi likened (in a peculiarly distasteful 
metaphor) to 'eating a corpse. ' 42 As relations between 
Egypt and Libya warmed, Qaddafi improbably suggested that 
there had been no capitulation at all. Egypt, he hinted, 
was secretly dedicated to fighting Israel: 'We have 
agreed about strategic matters. We have to keep our 
affairs secret. 943 
Rapprochement came as a relief to most Libyans. Yet 
Qaddafi's question called into question the preceding 
sixteen years of Egypt-bashing. Moreover, by delaying 
reconciliation until Egypt had already resumed its place 
in the Arab world Qaddafi had squandered precious 
diplomatic capital. It soon became apparent which of the 
SWB ME/04641,23 May 1989; SWB ME/04651,24 May 1989; SWB 
ME/0779/A/1,1 June 1990. 
42 SWB ME/0465 A/2-3,24 May 1989. 
43 SWB ME/0481A/9,13 June 1989. 
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two countries needed the other more. Mubarak happily 
became Qaddafi's broker with the Western world, thereby 
establishing leverage over Tripoli. By mid-decade, Egypt 
was widely suspected of prolonging Libya's confrontation 
with the Security Council for its own advantage. 
With the chemical proliferation program at least 
temporarily derailed, Libya's relations with the United 
States returned to their natural center of gravity. This 
equilibrium was shattered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990. Saddam Hussein's action, Qaddafi 
realized with horror, would inflate American influence in 
the Middle East to unprecedented heights: 
We have given to America an historic 
opportunity so that it directly brings its 
forces into the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf 
... We have given them an irreplaceable 
opportunity. An opportunity which they had 
never expected. An opportunity whereby they 
will come back any time and say: The Arabian 
Peninsula? No problem. " 
In a single stroke, Saddam had set in play forces which 
could undo everything Qaddafi had tried to accomplish 
over the preceding two decades. 
How to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was 
thus a question of extreme importance to Tripoli. 
Theoretically, Qaddafi was obligated to support Iraq. He 
had, in fact, allied himself with Saddam only a few 
months before. In May 1990 he pledged 'unlimited' 
44 SWB ME/0860 A/5,4 September 1990. 
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support to Iraq, declaring that 'any attack against Iraq 
is an attack against Libya ... the Libyan leadership 
and people, as well as all of Libya's resources, are at 
Iraq's disposal. 45 
On the other hand, Libya had nothing material to 
gain from joining Iraq in a pitched battle against a 
Western coalition; Qaddafi had sufficient experience to 
realize that his forces would be badly mauled in any such 
conflict. Furthermore, Qaddafi was not willing to stand 
against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. 
Qaddafi therefore adopted a position of studied 
neutrality. Although he was 'undoubtedly siding with 
Iraq against America, ' he disapproved of the invasion of 
Kuwait. 46 For Qaddafi, the principal issue at stake was 
not the future of Kuwait but the American military 
presence in the Middle East. He repeatedly bemoaned the 
fact that Saddam had given the United States a 'golden 
opportunity' to permanently station forces in the Persian 
Gulf. 47 This presence, he believed, would directly 
impact Libya. Qaddafi warned his countrymen: 'your turn 
will come if America and its alliance in the Gulf 
triumphs, they will move to the Mediterranean, to 
Libya. 1 
48 
'S SWB ME/0760/A/7-8,10 May 1990. 
46 SWB ME/0860 A/5,4 September 1990. 
47 SWB ME/0860/A/5,4 September 1990; SWB ME/0837/A/9,8 
August 1990; SWB ME/0842/A/9,14 August 1990. 
48 SWB ME/0890 A/9,9 October 1990. 
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Eliminating America's involvement in the Gulf 
conflict therefore became Qaddafi's self-declared policy 
objective, and Qaddafi became one of several proponents 
of an 'Arab solution' to the crisis. In a sense, the 
crisis re-awakened Qaddafi's aspirations to Pan-Arab 
leadership, insomuch as establishing himself as the 
mediator of the conflict would catapult the Colonel to 
the forefront of the Arab world. 
Qaddafi therefore expended considerable energy 
trying to sell the region on his formulas for defusing 
the gathering storm. He immediately sent his aide, 
Mustafa Al Kharroubi, to Baghdad to assess Saddam's 
intent. Then, in his September 1st address, Qaddafi 
unveiled a unilateral initiative to replace Iraq's forces 
in Kuwait with non-Western UN forces, replace the 
American troops in Saudi Arabia with Arab-Muslim forces, 
to cede Bubiyan island to Iraq and to allow the Kuwaitis 
to determine their own government. 49 Qaddafi sent Al 
Kharroubi out again to garner support for the plan in 
Arab capitals. 50 However, neither side was enthused by 
the colonel's proposal. 5' Nevertheless, as late as 
November Qaddafi tried to broker a meeting between Saddam 
Hussein and King Fahd. 
49 SWB ME/08591,3 September 1990. 
50 Kharrubi visited Iraq (Sept. 5), Jordan (Sept. 6), Saudi 
Arabia (Sept. 8), the United Arab Emirates (Sept. 9), Oman and 
Bahrain (Sept. 10), Qatar (Sept. 11), and Egypt (Sept. 13). 
51 The Saudis, for example, tersely corrected a JANA report 
that they 'welcomed' Qaddafi's proposal (SWß ME/08661,11 
September 1990). 
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The Arab solution never materialized for a number of 
reasons, the most important of which were Saddam 
Hussein's ambitions. Saddam, after all, was also using 
the crisis to depict himself as the champion of the Arab 
cause and had his own 'peace initiative' to end the 
crisis. 52 Thus, the Iraqi leader was not about to allow 
Qaddafi to supplant him as the hero of this drama and 
deflected the Colonel's fervent diplomacy. Qaddafi 
finally washed his hands of Baghdad with a declaration 
that Tripoli was 'no longer concerned about the Gulf 
problem from far or near, and it will leave the 
intransigent parties, whether Saudis, Kuwaitis, or 
Iraqis, to pay the price of their policies. "' 
Libya's inability to negotiate an Arab solution to 
the Gulf crisis was also due to Tripoli's antagonization 
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While half-heartedly 
criticizing the Iraqi invasion, Qaddafi inferred that he 
saw Kuwait's existence as 'illogical. '54 In addition, 
Tripoli abstained from a motion at the emergency Arab 
League summit on August 10 that condemned Baghdad's 
invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Moreover, the Libyan 
leader excoriated the Kuwaitis and Saudis for seeking 
American aid: 'What are we? Are we a plantation or a herd 
of sheep? This (Arab) nation from the Ocean to the Gulf 
52 See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf conflict 
ßq90_19 , (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1993), 95,101-102. 
53 Speech on Libyan television, 28 November 1990. 
54 SWB ME/0860 A/5,4 September 1990. 
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must be respected. To hell with Kuwait. '" He went so 
far as to accuse the Saudis of high treason and declared 
that the country should no longer be entrusted with the 
protection of Islam's holy places, Mecca and Medina. 56 
Such assertions could scarcely be expected to secure the 
Gulf Arabs' support for Libyan diplomacy. 
Thus, Qaddafi's failure to establish himself as an 
Arab alternative to American leadership in the Gulf 
crisis was at least in part due to his own behavior, 
though one may well question whether a state with Libya's 
limited leverage could ever have brokered a solution to a 
conflict between such resolute foes. In any event, the 
contrast between the overwhelming barrage of power 
(military, diplomatic, and economic) which Washington 
brought to bear on Iraq, and the Colonel's inability to 
influence the course of events, was stark. What is more, 
the ease with which the Western coalition dissected the 
Iraqi army (equipped almost identically to Libya's) 
suggested, disturbingly, that the billions of dollars 
spent on upgrading the Libyan armed forces had purchased 
only a slight measure of security. Thus, more than any 
event since 1969, the Gulf conflict brought into sharp 
relief the failure of Libya's national security policies 
to reduce American dominance of the Middle East or, at 
the very least, to establish Libya as a serious 
challenger to that dominance. 
55 SWB ME/0890 A/13,9 October 1990. 
56 SWB ME/0860 A/7,4 September 1990. 
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Lockerbie: A bomb too far 
On December 21,1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was blown 
apart by a terrorist's bomb and fell from the night sky 
over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. In 
September 1989, UTA Flight 772 disintegrated over Niger 
in an identical attack, killing another 170 innocent 
travellers. Each bombing carried Qaddafi's vengeful 
signature. 57 The first was a parting shot at Reagan, 
timed so as not to give the American president time to 
ascertain Libya's responsibility and mount a punitive 
operation. The second was intended to punish France for 
Libya's defeat in Chad. 58 
Vengeance, as we saw in the preceding chapter, was 
not an atypical motivation for 
nevertheless remains startling 
much on attacks that failed to 
demonstrable Libyan interest. 
obvious motive initially threw 
could have been seeking to avex 
Iranian passenger plane by the 
Libyan extremism. It 
that Qaddafi risked so 
advance any other 
Indeed, the lack of an 
suspicion on Iran, which 
ige the downing of an 
USS Vincenn . 
57 This thesis admittedly presumes Libya's responsibility 
for each bombing and considers them elements of Libyan national 
security policy. Since we are dealing with geostrategic 
realities rather than points of law, and since space prohibits 
adequate exposition of the available evidence, this presumption 
can be defended on the grounds that even if one accepts Libya's 
innocence, the regime was still responsible for cultivating a 
reputation which made Tripoli a credible suspect, and thus 
rendering the state itself vulnerable to UN intervention. 
58 In 1996 Libya all but admitted guilt for the UTA bombing, 
and even furnished the investigating French magistrate with an 
exact replica of the bomb used (Charles Trueheart, "Jet sabotage 
is linked to Gadhafi kin, " New York Times, 20 September 1996). 
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Nevertheless, two years after the Lockerbie bombing 
American and Scottish prosecutors issued indictments 
against two alleged Libyan intelligence officers; a 
French magistrate had previously issued indictments 
against four other Libyans with regards to the UTA 
bombing, including Qaddafi's brother-in-law, Abdullah 
Sannusi. These indictments were greeted by derision from 
Tripoli, and Libya's scorn engendered speculation that 
the United States would resort to military retaliations' 
American F-ills based in Britain ostentatiously practiced 
precision bombing runs in apparent preparation for just 
such an operation. 60 
The memory of the 1986 attack was still vivid in 
Tripoli, but its lessons remained unassimilated. Qaddafi 
still relied on crude threats to produce a fissure in 
NATO. For example, he warned Rome and Madrid: 
We will strike Italy and Spain if any attack 
against Libya was (sic) launched from them .. 
. these nations must accept full responsibility for what may befall them, if they allow their 
land to be used to attack Libya or any Arab 
nation ... we do not care how many children 
and women die in Italy or Spain. Their 
children and their women must die ... 61 
This type of menacing remark had always been of 
questionable utility since it tended to convince the 
Europeans to close ranks with Washington. 
59 e. g., James DeHart and Jerrold Post, "Responding to 
Qaddafi, " Christian Science Monitor, 7 January 1992. 
6o Geoff Simons, Libya: The struggle for survival (London: 
Macmillan, 1993), 37. 
61 N*FS Newsreport 8, no. 4 (July-August, 1991): 21. 
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While Qaddafi was scanning the horizon for another 
air raid, the United States, France and the United 
Kingdom were preparing something of far greater 
consequence. Since terrorism was an assault on the norms 
of the Westphalian system, their fitting response was to 
transcend that system altogether. Having used United 
Nations (UN) sanctions to remarkable effect against Iraq 
before and after the Gulf War, they now turned this same 
instrument against Libya by sponsoring a Security Council 
resolution requiring Libya to make a full and effective 
response to their respective extradition requests. The 
Libyan UN delegation was helpless in the face of this 
diplomatic blitz, and the resolution (731) was adopted on 
January 21,1992. 
Qaddafi was suddenly staring into a blatant trap. 
Defiance would likely result in sanctions. Should he 
honor the extradition demands, he would be caving to the 
very powers which he had made it his business to defy. 
At best, he would be humiliated; at worst, the loss of 
face (and sovereignty) might imperil his hold on power. 
Moreover, once surrendered the suspects might cooperate 
with foreign prosecutors and incriminate senior Libyan 
officials. Better, he concluded, to defy the Security 
Council and fight a rearguard action against sanctions. 
Qaddafi thus stepped neatly into the containment trap. 
Over the next two months the Anglo-French-American 
troika mounted a full-court press in the Security 
Council, overwhelming the best efforts of Libyan 
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diplomats. On March 31,1992, the Security Council 
passed Resolution 748, imposing economic and political 
sanctions on Libya. Significantly, not a single member 
of the Security Council--including the sole Arab 
representative, Libya's one-time ally Morocco--voted 
against the resolution. This in itself was disheartening 
for Tripoli, though Qaddafi had only himself to blame 
(Morocco's position might have been different were it not 
for Libya's lengthy and generous support of the 
Polisario). Moreover, Resolution 748 raised the bar 
Libya would have to clear to end the crisis: 'the Libyan 
Government must commit itself definitively to cease all 
forms of terrorist action and all assistance to terrorist 
groups, and that it must promptly, by concrete actions, 
demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism. ' Obviously, 
this sweeping clause would allow the Security Council to 
keep Libya contained indefinitely. 
The sanctions themselves were often dismissed as 
ineffective by those who, oblivious to their overarching 
geopolitical purpose, viewed them solely as a means of 
inducing Libya to surrender the Lockerbie suspects. But 
when seen as instruments of containment (as Qaddafi 
himself saw them), the sanctions on Libya proved 
remarkably effective. 62 They were, for example, an 
especially efficient means of pulling the claws out of 
the Libyan military. Resolution 748 imposed a 
comprehensive arms ban on Tripoli, prohibited UN member 
62 SWB ME/1882 MED/20-22,30 December 1993. 
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states from providing advice or training that would 
assist Libya in circumventing that ban, and required the 
withdrawal of all foreign military advisers from Libya. 
These prohibitions were immediately felt by the Libyan 
military, which was trying to upgrade its defenses in 
light of Iraq's performance in the Gulf War. For 
example, Tripoli ordered new surface to air missiles from 
Russia in February 1992.63 This order, like all other 
military contracts, was instantly nullified. Thus, for 
the first time since 1969 Tripoli was unable to pursue 
security through the purchase of conventional weapons. 
While other Arab states re-equipped their forces in 
accordance with the lessons of the Gulf War, Libya 
struggled just to maintain its existing weapons. 
The influence of these restrictions compounded with 
time, exacting an ever-higher toll from the LAF. In 
fact, as Jalloud admitted in November 1992, Libya's 
forces soon began losing ground as their equipment slid 
into disrepair: 
Now they have banned spare parts and 
maintenance, and our defence capability is now 
being eaten into because of the military 
sanctions ... (our weapons) are getting worn 
out because of the ban on spare parts and 
maintenance. 64 
By late 1994 the Libyan armed forces were less formidable 
than at any point in the preceding decade. The nation's 
air defence system was 'seriously crippled if not 
63 nefense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 22, no. 4 
(30 April 1994): 19. 
64 SWB ME/1540/A/1,17 November 1992. 
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rendered totally ineffective' by the departure of the 
Russian specialists who maintained it. 65 The Libyan air 
force was virtually grounded, its cumulative flying time 
reduced to an anorexic 85 hours. 66 By mid-decade the 
navy had been reduced to a collection of 'dock-bound rust 
buckets. ' 67 Finally, the army's armored forces were, in 
the words of a journalist who witnessed the regime's 25th 
anniversary celebrations, 'in a shabby state and far from 
combat ready. ' 68 
The Security Council also forced Libya to reduce its 
diplomatic missions, compounding the regime's isolation 
and limiting its ability to influence foreign 
governments, collect intelligence, and conduct covert 
operations. The accompanying ban on air traffic in and 
out of Libya meant that only the most determined--and 
generally least influential--statesmen ventured to 
Tripoli. Sanctions also carried a real, if exaggerated, 
economic cost. 69 
65 Chris Hedges, "Libyan anger rises over Gadhafi rule, " 
International Herald Tribune, 23 June 1992. 
66 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, flag 
military Balance 1995/96, (London: Oxford University press, 
1995), 140. 
67 Jonathan Landay, "The arms race under the sea, " Christian 
Science Monitor, 27 September 1995; see also the author's "The 
Libyan threat to the Mediterranean, " Jane's Intelligence Review 
8, no. 5 (May 1996): 225-26. 
68 Charles Richards, "Libya parades its obsolete weapons of 
war, " lnd endent, 2 September 1994. 
69 In April 1995 Libya estimated the cost of sanctions at 
$3.6 billion U. S. dollars. For more on the financial impact of 
sanctions, see the author's 
"The Lockerbie endgame, " in r1 
of 4c, tth African studies 1, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 84-85. 
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As months passed and Resolutions 731 and 748 went 
unheeded, the Security. Council gave Libya an ultimatum: 
comply by October 1,1993, or face additional sanctions. 
Qaddafi, who had been dismissive of the first two 
resolutions, finally awoke to the gravity of his 
situation. How could he fend off another diplomatic 
assault? The problem touched off one of the few 
discernible eruptions of ministerial dissent within the 
Libyan Cabinet, with some advisers (notably Jalloud and 
Abdullah Sannusi, who belonged to the same tribe as one 
of the accused) vehemently opposed to moderation, and 
others (led by the Foreign Ministry) urging compromise. 
Qadda i's reformation 
For once the voices of moderation triumphed. In 
early 1993 Qaddafi launched a media blitz proclaiming 
that he had turned over the proverbial leaf: he now 
wanted warm relations with Washington, eschewed 
terrorism, and--most startling of all--no longer rejected 
the idea of making peace with Israel. Furthermore, 
Qaddafi proposed a series of erstwhile compromises to end 
the Lockerbie crisis. Though there was never much danger 
of the UN accepting these 'concessions' (Qaddafi himself 
quite clearly realizing that the impetus for the Security 
Council's position was containment, not extradition), the 
Colonel hoped to persuade the Security Council that he 
was a man with whom they could do business, and whose 
past revolutionary excesses should therefore be 
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overlooked. 
The first objective of Qaddafi's reformation was to 
persuade the White House that Libya was no longer 
America's enemy. Accordingly, Tripoli sought to curry 
favor with newly-elected President Bill Clinton, 
promising never to harm him politically (memories of 
Billy Carter? ) or even annoy him. 70 Indeed, Qaddafi 
indicated that Clinton was a kindred spirit and at one 
point labelled him the 'savior of the world. 9 71 The 
Libyan leader tried to depict his previous conflicts with 
the White House as aberrations rather than clashes of 
interests: 
Reagan and I were reduced to insulting each 
other, 'mad dogs' and things like that. Bush 
and I were confrontational, but we never 
stooped to personal insults. With Clinton, I 
feel a new era is possible 
... He does not look down on Third World 
people as inferior. 72 
By heaping praise 
was in effect offs 
difficulties with 
case, in exchange 
position. At the 
would 'resist the 
on the new American President, Qaddafi 
wring to resolve his outstanding 
Washington, including the Lockerbie 
for a little softness in the U. S. 
very least, he hoped to ensure Clinton 
temptation to demonstrate that he is 
70 Judith Miller, "Gadhafi 
jjerald Tribune, 16 April 1993. 
takes a new tack, " International 
71 Miller, 239. Qaddafi also rained compliments on British 
Prime Minister John Major, though they were rather lukewarm in 
tries to stave off comparison (Annika Savill, l August 
"Gaddafi 
. sanctions, " eD 
72 de Borchgrave, op. cit. 
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decisive by bombing other countries. 173 
Qaddafi's offer, however pleasantly framed, excited 
little interest in the White House. The anticipated 
discontinuities between the Clinton administration's 
Libya policy and that of its predecessor failed to 
materialize, in part because Clinton was intent on 
freeing the Democratic Party from the image of the Carter 
administration's hand-wringing. Thus, Clinton had no 
intention of breaking out of the Libya policy he 
inherited from Bush and Reagan; the self-styled 'new 
Democrat' wanted to be seen as just as tough on terrorism 
as any Republican. The Libyan leader's image as the 
world's leading supporter of terrorism was simply too 
ingrained to permit any rapid change in U. S. foreign 
policy. 
Consequently, Qaddafi's only hope of softening the 
American position was to first re-package himself as an 
opponent of terrorism. This was no easy task, as Libya's 
support of terrorism did not end, as is popularly 
supposed, with the 1986 raid on Tripoli. Indeed, by some 
estimates more Americans died because of Libyan terrorism 
after 1986 than before, even excluding those killed in 
the Lockerbie bombing. 74 Throughout the early 1990s 
73 ibid. 
'* National Defense University, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1996: Instrumente of U. S. 
wer, (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1996), 145. 
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extremists from all over the world (including, as Qaddafi 
himself admitted, the notorious Abu Nidal) still found 
haven, training, and financial support in Libya. " In 
one illustrative case, a Libyan freighter served as the 
launch pad for a Palestine Liberation Front raid on an 
Israeli beach. Due to the vigilance of the Israeli 
Defence Forces, the raid ended in abject failure: four 
terrorists were killed and twelve captured. The dazed 
captives admitted that they trained for the operation in 
Libya, and were given a personal send-off by a high 
ranking Libyan official. 76 
Libya had not broken the habit of trying to settle 
international disputes through subversion. According to 
Radio Free Lebanon, Libya tried to recruit terrorists 
from Lebanon for anti-U. S. operations in 1989. " In 
1989, Libya was accused of inserting commandos into the 
Philippines to operate with the Moro National Liberation 
Front. 78 In July 1990, Tripoli supported militant 
Islamists attempting to overthrow the government of 
Trinidad. " That same year, Qaddafi exploited a Tuareg 
insurrection in Mali and Nigeria by inviting the 
rebellious Tuaregs to reside in Libya, where he armed and 
75 de Horchgrave, op. cit. 
76 SWB ME/0781i, 4 June 1990; see also SWB ME/0858 A/12,1 
September 1990. 
" SWB ME/0386 A/8,16 February 1989. 
78 SWB ME/0575 A/6,30 September 1989. 
79 SWB ME/0831iii, 1 August 1990. 
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trained them. The rebels were then secretly repatriated. 
In December 1990, two Libyan intelligence officers were 
captured in Mali fighting alongside these Tuareg 
guerrillas. 80 An outraged Malian government bitterly 
denounced Tripoli's interference. "' 
Nor had Libya developed any respect for the norms of 
diplomacy. On April 2,1992, (only days after the 
Security Council, then chaired by Venezuela, imposed 
sanctions on Libya) a mob sacked the Venezuelan embassy 
in Tripoli as Libyan policemen reportedly directed the 
demonstrators. 82 In Ethiopia, Libyan Ambassador Khalifa 
Ahmed Bizelya and an aide were expelled on suspicion of 
abetting terrorism (in 1995 Bizelya was again expelled, 
this time from London, for conducting activities 
incompatible with his diplomatic status). 
In the Mediterranean, Tripoli still menaced civilian 
shipping with its claims to the Gulf of Sirte. The 
Libyan navy repeatedly seized fishing boats in the 
disputed waters. 83 
Only when the Lockerbie investigation drew to a 
close (with Libya as the prime suspect) did Qaddafi seem 
to realize that in the new international environment, 
terrorism was a less useful policy instrument than it had 
- ----------- 
80 ;; FS. Newsreport 8, no. 2 (March-April 1991): 8-9. 
81 SWB ME/0870ii, 15 September 1990. 
82 Paul Lewis, "Libyans riot at embassies; U. N. protests, " 
3 April 1992. 
83 SWB ME/0785/A/9,8 June 1990. 
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seemed during the 1970s and 1980s: 
The entire world detests terrorism; this is 
true you may call it what you like: whether 
bravery or whatever, we do not care; to hell; 
but today the issue of terrorism is a detested 
question in the world. You cannot defend 
yourself from this stand. Consequently, no one 
should place himself in the dock in this 
issue. 84 
It was too late, of course, for Qaddafi to take his own 
advice: he was already in the dock. Getting out required 
some overt penance. Thus, a year before his 1993 'charm 
offensive' he enacted a number of reforms designed to 
reduce his profile as a sponsor of terrorism. He 
'abolished' the Libyan Foreign Activities Secretariat-- 
the agency tasked with killing dissidents abroad. 85 He 
appointed a new director of intelligence to purge the 
service of links to terrorism. 86 He invited the Arab 
diplomatic corps to watch as he flamboyantly demolished 
three terrorist training camps, and invited the UN to 
inspect any other training sites it suspected of housing 
terrorists. 87 
Most surprisingly, in June 1992 Libya began 
furnishing British intelligence with details of its arms 
shipments to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, these shipments were 
°` SWH ME/11167/A/13,3 September 1991. 
es Also known as the External Security Organization. SWB 
ME/1524/A/15,29 October 1992. 
ea Ihsan Hijazi, "Intelligence chief is named by Libya, " Now 
ynrk Times, 27 November 1991. 
87 Associated Press, "Libya asks UN to send inspection team 
to Libya, " 30 July 1992. 
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known to have provided the IRA with some 3,000 automatic 
rifles, scores of heavy machine guns and Soviet SAM-7 
missiles, and literally tonnes of ammunition and 
explosives (including at least one tonne of Semtex). 88 
The British were understandably anxious to discover what 
additional weaponry had been delivered. 
In this way, Qaddafi tried to show the West that he 
had not only washed his hands of terrorism, but could 
actually be an asset in the fight against it-- 
particularly the Islamist variety. Here, he said, Libya 
and the West shared a convergence of interests. " 
However, it rapidly became evident that these 
reforms were only cosmetic. The Foreign Activities 
Secretariat was not actually disbanded but merged into 
the Justice Ministry. 90 Qaddafi continued to openly 
advocate the liquidation of dissidents. Underlings 
formerly responsible for terrorist activities were 
retained and in some cases promoted. As for the training 
camps, foreign intelligence agencies concluded the 
terrorists had simply been moved to new locations. 91 
Even Libya's offer to come clean on its support for the 
IRA was not what it first seemed; one senior Libyan 
ae Tim Coone, "Gadaffi's guns elude police dragnets, " 
Financial Times, 1 June 1992; E. A. Wayne, "IRA reported to get 
huge arms shipment from Libya, " Christian Sc_, ienco Mon ar, 27 
November 1987; Craig Whitney, "Havel says his predecessors sent 
Libya explosives, " New York Times, 23 March 1990. 
e9 de Horchgrave, op. cit. 
90 SWH ME/1524 A/15,29 October 1992. 
91 Washington Post, 28 February 1992. 
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foreign ministry official indicated that all the 
information supplied was false. 92 Qaddafi himself showed 
a marked reluctance to surrender any hard information, 
stating: 'If I give them such a history of our 
connections, then they could use this information to 
accuse me of specific crimes. It could create another 
problem such as the Lockerbie accusations. i93 
Why, one must ask, did Qaddafi not take more 
decisive steps to disassociate himself from terrorism? 
The Libyan leader was apparently hedging his bets in case 
his moderation failed to yield results (though thus 
hobbled, his reforms could scarcely do otherwise). For a 
weak state with few other bargaining chips, retaining a 
terrorist capability made some sense. But it was not 
just Libya's lack of other military or diplomatic options 
that made Qaddafi reluctant to abandon terrorism as a 
policy option. Terrorism remained closely linked to his 
world view; as he made abundantly clear, he identified 
with the 'freedom fighters' under his care and approved 
of their actions. Such a deep-seated conviction could be 
momentarily disguised, but never fully abandoned. As one 
European diplomat noted: 'People had thought there was a 
new Qaddafi, more mature--someone who was beginning to 
behave like an international statesman. It is as if ho 
92 Time Kelsey and Peter Koenig, "Libya will not arm IRA 
again, Gaddafi aide says, " Ind ependent, 20 July 1994. 
93 Marie Colvin, "Gadaffi goes back on his promise to reveal 
IRA deals, " Sunday Times (London), 10 May 1992. 
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can only be held back so long and then he lets loose. "' 
Qaddafi would have to find another means of convincing 
the international community to accept his rehabilitation. 
Befriending the Zionist enemy 
Rapprochement with Israel was the astonishing--and 
potentially brilliant--pidce de rdsistance of Qaddafi's 
reformation. Secret preparations for such a 
reconciliation began as early as 1991, with Qaddafi 
sending and receiving feelers from Israel through the 
auspices of numerous intermediaries (including the 
Italian government and a famed Middle East arms dealer). 
In the spring of 1993 Tripoli invited Libyan-born Jews 
(who were summarily expelled by the monarchy in 1950) to 
return, either to visit or to live. Moreover, Qaddafi 
agreed in principle to pay compensation to those Jews and 
Italians whose assets were appropriated in 1970.95 Since 
many of these Libyan Jews now resided in Israel, Qaddafi 
was essentially holding out the prospect of normalizing 
relations with Tel Aviv. Indeed, Libya's Foreign 
Minister, Omar El Muntasir, soon announced that Libya was 
prepared to make peace with Israel. 96 To demonstrate the 
regime's sincerity, some 200 Libyan Muslim pilgrims 
94 Chris Hedges, "Libya, fearing attack, braces for clash 
with West, " New York Times, 19 February 1992. 
95 Judith Miller, "Gadhafi takes a new tack, " International 
Herald Tribune, 16 April 1993. 
96 Judith Miller, "Muammar dearest, " 
_The 
New_ R . pubs 31 May 1993. 
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journeyed to Jerusalem with Qaddafi's blessing--the first 
such pilgrimage ever sponsored by an Arab state. Much to 
the horror of Palestinian and Arab hard-lingers, the 
Colonel himself was said to be contemplating making the 
trip. 97 
Though Libyan foreign policy was famed for its 
mercurial, quirky nature, even the most optimistic 
proponents of Middle East peace were unprepared to see 
Tripoli suddenly express interest in reconciling with the 
Jewish state. Qaddafi, after all, had made a career of 
blaming Israel for the Arabs' woes; anti-Zionism had been 
the foundation of his foreign policy for more than two 
decades. If sincere, Qaddafi was initiating not only a 
monumental shift in Libyan foreign policy but a dramatic 
change in regional dynamics. Libya's defection from the 
rejectionist camp would boost the morale of the moderate 
Arab states and further splinter those that still dreamt 
of pushing the Israelis into the sea. 
Why then would Qaddafi even consider making such an 
abrupt volte-face? The Colonel evidently calculated 
that, if given the choice between punishing Tripoli for 
sponsoring terrorism and welcoming a reformed Arab 
nationalist into the peace camp, Israel's influential 
American supporters would choose the latter and swing 
U. S. foreign policy behind them. 
The Libyan pilgrims received a warm welcome from the 
97 Ben Lynfield and Christopher Walker, "Gaddafi hints at 
Israel trip as pilgrims cut visit short, " wes, 2 Juno 1993. 
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Israeli authorities. But then, at a news conference to 
celebrate their presence, the pilgrims abruptly reversed 
the friendly tone of their visit by calling upon the 
Islamic world to liberate Jerusalem. 98 They were quickly 
shown the way back to the airport by their hosts, who 
took the episode with a grain of salt. As Israeli 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres remarked: 'I have no 
illusions. The Libyans came to us to make a good 
impression on America. ' 99 
Had Qaddafi mustered the fortitude to see it 
through, his Israel gambit might still have succeeded. 
The Colonel tried to brush aside the pilgrimage imbroglio 
as a misunderstanding and insisted that Israelis would be 
welcomed at an upcoming interfaith conference in 
Tripoli. 100 However, he never followed up the official 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem with a comparable overture. 
Apparently Qaddafi felt he had overexposed himself and 
was reluctant to do so again. 101 Though the United 
States reportedly advised Tel Aviv against pursuing 
98 Elaine Ruth Fletcher, "Israeli-Libyan exchange turns into 
political fiasco, " Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 1993. 
99 As quoted in Judith Miller, God has ninety-nine names, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 240. 
100 de Borchgrave, op. cit. 
101 Tripoli blew hot and cold on the question of Israel for 
some months afterwards. As late as June 1994, Foreign Minister 
Muntasir signalled a possible softening of Libya's position, 
saying: 'We do not reject the peace agreement in the Middle 
East'. ' Only a few months later, however, Tripoli reiterated its 
old position that peace was not about borders but existence, and 
was achievable only through the destruction of Israel (SWB 
ME/0887 A/6,5 October 1990). 
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relations with Tripoli, only Qaddafi's hesitancy actually 
interred the initiative. 102 
Deeper into the quagmire 
Thus, as the October 1st deadline approached, each 
element of Qaddafi's diplomatic initiative--his overtures 
to the Great Powers, his renunciation of terrorism, and 
his erstwhile acceptance of Israel--was either suspect or 
inconclusive. Qaddafi nonetheless felt he had 
demonstrated his good faith and refused to further 
moderate his policies, even rhetorically, until he 
received some indication that the Security Council would 
let him off the hook. Yet, so far as the dominant UN 
players were concerned, there had been no seachange in 
Libya behavior. (Of course, whether whole-hearted 
reformation would have softened the Security Council's 
attitude is necessarily a matter of conjecture. What is 
clear, however, is that Tripoli tried to test the waters 
without getting wet, and that was not good enough. ) 
The United States, Britain, and France once again 
lobbied the other members of the Security Council to 
impose additional sanctions on Tripoli. Libya made its 
own entreaties to the Council members, but found little 
cause for optimism. A visibly frustrated Qaddafi 
102 Africa Confidential 34 (13 August 1993): 8; Africa 
Confidential 34 (10 September 1993): 4; Washington Post, 23 July 
1993. 
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threatened to set Libya's oil wells ablaze d la 
Saddam. 103 
On November il, 1993, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 883, imposing additional sanctions upon Libya 
for its non-compliance with the Council's previous 
resolutions. Among other things, the Resolution 
stipulated that in the event the Lockerbie suspects 
appeared for trial in the United Kingdom or United 
States, the sanctions set forth in resolutions 748 and 
883 would be suspended, not terminated, pending Libya's 
full compliance with the further provisions of 
resolutions 731 and 748. If Libya had not fully complied 
with those provisions within 90 days, the suspension 
would terminate. The idea, as American officials were 
fond of saying, was to 'keep Qaddafi in his box. ' 
The passage of Resolution 883 was Libya's third 
straight defeat in the Security Council in less than two 
years, and marked the end of the Jamahiriya's reformation 
campaign. Though that campaign had proven ineffectual 
rather than counterproductive, its demise spurred Tripoli 
to re-embrace the counterproductive policies of yore. In 
December 1993, Qaddafi invited the IRA and known 
Palestinian terrorists Abu Nidal and Ahmed Jibril to a 
summit in Tripoli, vowing that Libya would be 'a Mecca' 
103 "Gadhafi threatens to burn oil wells, " International 
HPrald Tribune, 3 September 1993. 
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for terrorists. 104 That same month Mansour Kikhia, a 
former Libyan Foreign Minister who had since become a 
leader of the all but defunct expatriate opposition, 
disappeared from his Cairo hotel room. He was allegedly 
kidnapped, whisked across the border and executed. 
The emergence of a new international order had a 
profound impact upon the security of most Third World 
states, especially the so-called 'rogue states. ' As the 
quintessential rogue state leader, Qaddafi's challenge 
was to ward off the threats that this new order posed to 
Libya's security. However, the policies he devised to 
meet the exigencies of this post-Cold War environment 
proved ineffectual or counterproductive. Libya therefore 
became paralyzed by an international strategy of 
containment. 
Containment was more, however, than the result of a 
shift in the global balance of power, more too than the 
product of short-term tactical errors, lapses of 
judgement, or ill fortune. Rather, Libya's quandary was 
the bitter harvest that followed years of disregarding 
international norms. The long accumulation of aggrieved 
neighbors was an important factor (as evidenced by 
Morocco's refusal to support Tripoli in the Security 
Council). So too was Libya's reputation as a state- 
104 Reuters, "Qaddafi summons militants, " New York Times, 14 
December 1993; Reuters, "Qaddafi calls Libya a Mecca for 
guerrillas, " New York Times, 
18 December 1993. 
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sponsor of terrorism, which created a political climate 
(particularly in the United States) supportive of 
containment. The definitive factor, of course, was 
Libya's history of picking fights with states far more 
powerful than itself. 
Under the weight of UN sanctions Libyan national 
security sank to a new nadir. The ban on weapons, parts 
and advisers compounded the armed force's already 
notorious maintenance problems. With each passing year 
under the sanctions regimen, an ever-growing percentage 
of military equipment was doomed to become inoperative. 
Moreover, the sanctions threatened to erode the regime's 
internal security as the economy began a slow-burn. 
Finally, the development of weapons of mass destruction 
was another point of friction with the West which kept 
the threat of military reprisals on the horizon. 
This chapter concludes our four-part chronological 
analysis of Libyan national security policy, the intent 
of which was to assess that policy's overall efficacy. 
In each period, the historical record has supported our 
contention that Libyan policy was counterproductive when 
measured against its apparent objectives, and hence 
irrational. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
Libya's war in Chad was no less self-defeating. 
Chapter 5 
Qaddafi's Vietnam: The Libyan war in Chad 
Libya is the defender of Africa. ... We are the ones interested in peace in Chad ... because we are an extension of Chad and Chad is 
an extension of us. 
-- Muammar El Qaddafi 
Speech at Tripoli, 
5 March 1982 
Is war rational? Or, to put a finer point on it, 
are certain wars rational and others not? Doubtless 
there are some who would consider even the suggestion 
that war is rational to be a repugnant and inflammatory 
thought, perhaps even a self-serving justification for 
violence. The temptation to condemn war a priori is 
understandable; nevertheless, war should not be lightly 
deemed less rational than any other human activity. Nor 
should rationality, particularly in the restricted sense 
in which we are using the term, be confused with that 
which is good or desirable. If we think of war in the 
Clausewitzian sense (as an extension of politics) there 
is no shortage of statesmen and academics who would admit 
its potent rationality. Organized violence, as has been 
observed, may at times be the shortest distance between 
two points. Indeed, one could argue persuasively that it 
is precisely because wars so often produce desired ends 
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that they recur with such regularity in human history. ' 
Let us therefore assume that war is a neutral activity, 
not intrinsically rational but capable of being so. 
The admission that war may be rational obliges us to 
accept the existence of irrational war as well, lest 
rationality cease to have any meaning. How then can 
rational wars be distinguished from those that are 
irrational? By applying Clausewitz's dictum that war is 
a continuation of politics by other means we can reason 
syllogistically that the criteria for judging rationality 
in war do not differ greatly from those that we have thus 
far employed with regards to policy. 2 Rationality in war 
is therefore demonstrated by the accomplishment of 
political objectives, and is independent of whether a 
given war is offensive or defensive (which are clumsy 
concepts in any event), and even of whether the outcome 
on the battlefield is victory or defeat. The logic of 
this rather startling assertion becomes apparent upon 
consideration. Failure taken in isolation does not 
necessarily denote irrationality, and military defeat can 
still produce strategic victory (as in the Tet Offensive 
or Egypt's 1973 War). In contrast, a war distinguished 
by consistently self-defeating behavior is irrational. 
The hallmarks of such a conflict might include obscure 
1 See Lawrence Freedman, ed., Wdr, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 4-5. 
2 For Clausewitz's famous formulation, see Carl Von 
Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 99. 
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political objectives, an inappropriate strategy, or one 
that is poorly executed. 
Qaddafi's war in Chad was irrational. In two 
decades of military adventurism Libya failed to 
decisively achieve any of its war aims yet inflicted 
serious damage upon itself. The war shattered the LAF's 
morale. It alienated the states most sympathetic to 
Qaddafi's militant Third Worldism. Instead of securing 
Libya's southern border, it provided Libya's enemies-- 
France, the United States, and to a lesser extent Egypt 
and Sudan--with an arena for bleeding off Libya's 
military strength. Domestically, the war diverted scarce 
resources from development, yet produced no obvious 
benefits. By every conceivable measure Libya's war in 
Chad was counterproductive. 
As the title of this chapter suggests, Vietnam is an 
appropriate metaphor for Libya's war in Chad. This is 
not least because the American failure--with its 
attendant social turmoil and loss of national confidence- 
-never ceased to provide rhetorical inspiration for the 
Libyan leader. Qaddafi cited the war as proof that 
American soldiers were cowards, and America itself a 
'paper tiger. t3 One would expect a leader so acquainted 
with another nation's putative defects to guard against 
them, but in Qaddafi this expectation was not fulfilled. 
By embroiling his forces in a conflict of dubious 
3 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/6517/A/2,8 
September 1980. 
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strategic worth and by managing that conflict 
counterproductively, he repeated the most grievous 
mistakes America made in Vietnam. It seemed that Qaddafi 
was determined to be the leader of a Great Power, even if 
that meant emulating the Great Powers' mistakes. 
To assist the reader, the following pages contain an 
abbreviated outline of the Chadian civil war. 
Admittedly, simplification and a certain degree of 
distortion are inevitable when the history of a civil war 
is compressed into two paragraphs. Nevertheless, for 
those unacquainted with Chad this synopsis should prove 
helpful. There follows an analysis of Qaddafi's war aims 
which provides the standard whereby we may measure 
Tripoli's achievement. The remainder of this chapter 
traces Libya's interventions chronologically, 
underscoring the counterproductive consequences that 
followed each. 
Contemporary Chad is the offspring of French 
colonialism, its national boundaries contrived by fiat in 
1946, its disparate peoples--many of whom harbored little 
interest in building a multi-ethnic nation-state-- 
arbitrarily lumped together for administrative 
convenience. 4 Like the Sudan, Chad is ethnically 
bifurcated between Arab north and black south. It is 
4 The best history of modern Chad is John Wright's Libya_ 
yj d and the Central Sahara (London: Hurst & Company, 1989). 
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also geographically bifurcated: the north is mostly 
desert, whereas the south is arable. It was in the 
latter region, 'le Tchad utile, ' that the French 
established their administration when they arrived in the 
nineteenth century. Able colonialists, the French lost 
no time in turning the existing ethnic frictions to their 
advantage. The French needed willing clients; the Sara 
(the dominant black ethnic group) needed relief from the 
Tebu, Arab/Muslim slave-raiders living in the Sahelian 
and Saharan regions to the north (especially the Borku, 
Ennedi and Tibesti provinces [BET]), where French rule 
remained nominal. The match was quickly consummated. 
There were naturally tensions with other colonial 
powers in the area. After prolonged disputations over 
the 1919 border demarcation, France agreed to cede the 
area known as the Aouzou Strip to Libya (then under 
Italian domination) in the Mussolini-Laval accords of 7 
January 1935. Unfortunately, the treaty was ratified by 
the French parliament (unanimously in the Senate and with 
a vote of 555 for and only 9 against in the Chamber of 
Deputies) but never by the president, with the result 
that when Libya gained its independence in 1951, popular 
sentiment agreed that the border represented a historical 
injustice. In response, King Idris made a tentative grab 
at the strip in February 1955, but his forces were 
repelled by French troops. 5 
5 Bernard Lanne, Tchad-Libye: To querolle des frontierg4 
(Paris: Karthala, 1982), 210. Lanne's is the most comprehensive 
account of the origins of the Aouzou dispute. 
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Upon independence in 1960, the Sara (favored by 
their closer ties to the French) set up the first post- 
colonial government with Francois Tombalbaye as Prime 
Minister. In 1965 the comparatively disenfranchised 
northerners rebelled and organized their forces into the 
Front de Liberation Nationale de Tchad, or FROLINAT. 
After a decade of indecisive civil war, which kept the 
government dependent upon French assistance, Tombalbaye 
was toppled by a Sara-led coup in 1975. Discord also 
plagued the FROLINAT. A 1976 falling out between two 
rival warlords, Goukouni Oueddei and Hissein Habre, 
presaged years of internecine combat that became the 
defining conflict of the civil war. In 1978 Habre 
entered into a government of national unity with 
Tombalbaye's successor, Felix Malloum, which dissolved in 
early 1979 as Habre temporarily aligned himself with 
Goukouni once more. By the end of the year all three 
factions had entered into a Gouvernement d'Union 
Nationale de Transition (GUNT), but in early 1980 
fighting broke out between Habre's faction, the Forces 
Armdes du Nord (FAN), and Goukouni's Forces Armdes 
Populaires (FAP). Goukouni, by allying himself with the 
remnants of Malloum's forces (FAT), emerged as the 
effective head of the GUNT. For the next several years 
control of Chad see-sawed between Goukouni and Habra. 
Although Habre emerged as the leader of a (relatively) 
unified Chad in 1987, he himself was deposed by Idriss 
Deby in 1990. It was into this maelstrom of conflict and 
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shifting alliances that North Africa's least experienced 
leader plunged his young state in 1969. 
Why Chad? 
That such an inauspicious state became the focal 
point of Libyan military activity between 1969 and 1987 
is somewhat surprising when one remembers that Qaddafi's 
ultimate aim was to transform Libya into a Great Power. 
Chad, after all, had the unenviable distinction of 
ranking among the poorest countries in the world. Its 
sheer size was a potential asset but could also be a 
formidable liability. Defending its immense space, even 
with the aid of press-ganged Chadians, would severely 
strain the capacity of Libya's armed forces (which were 
already sorely taxed to defend the borders of Libya 
proper). Though the Aouzou Strip along the Libyan border 
was rumored to hold uranium deposits, the existence of 
these was never independently confirmed. In short, Chad 
was no strategic prize. Instead it was a sieve into 
which any conqueror would have to pour billions of 
dollars in aid before realizing any significant pay-off. 
What did Qaddafi hope to accomplish in Chad? Even 
Qaddafi's countrymen were apparently hard-pressed to 
decipher his intentions, and few non-Libyans have 
ventured authoritative answers to this basic question. 6 
6 Nolutshungu, for example, submits that: The true nature 
of Libya's aims in Chad was a matter of speculation. ' Sam C. 
Nolutshungu, Limits of anarchy: Intervention and state formation 
j had (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), 
150. 
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Again, the temptation to dismiss Libyan behavior as 
inscrutable must be resisted. 
As with Libya's broader national security 
objectives, we must discern Qaddafi's war aims not only 
from what he proclaimed them to be, but from what reason 
and experience confirm. Only thus can we parse the 
screen of state propaganda and arrive at some 
approximation of Libya's real objectives. To demonstrate 
the necessity of a critical approach, consider that 
though Libya frequently justified its interventions in 
terms of defending Islam, this putative casus bella did 
not prevent Qaddafi from allying himself at one point 
with the non-Muslim south against the Muslim north! 
Both reason and experience suggest that Chad became 
the object of Qaddafi's attention for one simple yet 
compelling reason: it was weak. Chad was the course of 
least resistance for Qaddafi's Grand Strategy, its 
selection made almost inevitable by the debility of its 
military and state institutions. As amply demonstrated 
in the preceding chapters, Qaddafi could rarely resist an 
opportunity to meddle in the internal affairs of other 
nations. 
Obviously, Tripoli did not explain its Chad policy 
in these terms. Libya betrayed its motives only to the 
degree that they could be passed off as defensive. As 
early as 1971 Qaddafi fretted that 'the Americans may be 
r ^°" "'u 
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in Chad tomorrow. '7 Preventing the encirclement of 'the 
Great 1 September Revolution' by hostile powers (e. g., 
France, the United States, and Egypt) became his favored 
explanation for Libya's incursions into Chad. 8 As usual, 
these expressions of threat perception shed little 
insight into Libyan behavior. Even Deeb concedes that 
Qaddafi found the mere prospect of an independent Chadian 
government to be threatening, and concludes that his 
'military intervention was therefore not merely a 
defensive action against the perceived threat ... it 
was also an aggressive pursuit of his interest. t9 
To further obfuscate his motives Qaddafi dressed up 
his actions in anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
garb, often making vociferous verbal attacks on France. 
Only Libya had legitimate interests in Chad: 
The events in Chad are of direct bearing on us 
because of our unmistakable proximity to the 
country. Events in Chad, on the other hand, 
have nothing to do with French, American or 
Egyptian security. 10 
Propinquity was therefore held by Qaddafi to be 
legitimacy (except when, one assumes, when Libya 
delivered weapons to the IRA or armed separatists in the 
7 "CBS News interview of Colonel Mu'ammar el-Gathafi, " 
Libyan Arab Republic Ministry of Information, 16 December 1971, 
(Washington, D. C.: World Wide Printing Service, n. d. ), 18. 
8 Benyamin Neuberger, Involvement, invasion and withdrawal: 
ýaahdhafi's Libya and Chad, 1969-1981 (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah 
Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, 1982), 60. 
9 Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya's foreign policy in North Africa 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 131-133. 
10 SWB ME/6645/A/2,10 February 1981. 
ýw ^pýý n 
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South Pacific--in which case revolution or faith became 
legitimacy). And though Qaddafi denied neighboring Egypt 
any legitimate interests in Chad, Libya's own interests 
were so comprehensive as to embrace the entire continent: 
'When we fight for the freedom of Africa, we are actually 
defending ourselves. "' As always, Qaddafi's convictions 
were as elastic as occasion required. 
In contrast, his true war aims--though fluid-- 
remained within clear parameters. Qaddafi saw Chad as a 
Libyan hinterland rather than as a proper nation-state. 12 
His strategic goal was to gain political control over 
Chad and ultimately to incorporate its territory into 
Libya proper, thereby making his state a power to be 
reckoned with--at least for the cartographers. This 
grand aim became readily apparent over time but was 
rarely enunciated as such. Instead, Qaddafi maintained 
that he was merely attempting to 'secure the borders of 
Libya. 913 Yet his subsidiary objectives, many of which 
were explicitly admitted, betrayed his true aims. These 
included: 
f The elimination of French influence in Chad 
and elsewhere in Africa (specifically, by 
forcing the removal of French forces and in 
general, by opposing the French-supported 
11 SWB ME/6972/B/6,8 March 1982. 
12 An oft-stated position. For example, Qaddafi called 
Aouzou a Libyan oasis whose inhabitants 'would not understand if 
they were told that they are Chadians and not Libyans' (as cited 
in Deeb, 132). See also "Gaddafi states 'Chad is not a 
country!, '" NFSL Newsreport 7, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 4. 
13 SWB ME/6644/A/4,9 February 1981. 
310 
government and other French clients). 14 
f The occupation, annexation, and defence of 
the Aouzou Strip. 15 
f The installation of a pro-Libyan regime. 16 
There is some reason to believe that Qaddafi saw 
Chad as a trans-Sahelian conduit through which he could 
create an African empire. 17 The implausibility of the 
scheme does not mean the idea was not entertained in 
Tripoli. If Nolutshungu is correct in arguing that those 
who saw such an 'imperial grand design' behind Libya's 
activities in Chad 'were failing to distinguish the 
oneiric from the real in Libyan policy, ' then Qaddafi 
must be included among their numbers. 18 He himself 
fanned such fears by calling for the creation of an 
'Islamic Republic' and by claiming that the Touaregs (a 
14 For a sampling of Qaddafi's anti-French diatribes during 
this epoch, see Gideon Gera, "Libya, " in Middle East Contemporary 
Survey: 1977-78 , vol. 2, ed. Colin Legum, (New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), 642. 
is The strip, said Tripoli, 'is an integral part of the 
Libyan territory like ... Tripoli and Benghazi, ' and hence 
Libya would interpret 'any military action against Aouzou as a 
declaration of war against it. ' As quoted in Yehudit Ronen, 
"Libya, " in Middle East contemporary survey: 1987, vol. 11, ed. 
Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1989), 555. 
16 As Jalloud put it, '(we) cannot possibly accept (anyone) 
imposing a regime on Chad hostile to the Libyan people. ' SWB 
ME/6626/B/1,19 January 1981; see also Rabinovich and Shaked, 
553. 
17 A theme often picked up by the press. See for example 
James Markham's pieces: "Libya steps up role in Chad's civil war: 
Troop shifts arouse concern that Qaddafi seeks to build Islamic 
nation south of Sahara, " New York Times, 4 December 1980; and 
"Libya's Islamic visions are a real nightmare in Africa, " He& 
york Times, 28 December 1980. 
18 Nolutshungu, 151. 
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nomadic sub-Saharan people found in Chad, Algeria, Niger 
and Mali) were in fact Libyans. 19 The French found this 
particularly alarming, since they saw in it a veiled 
threat to Niger, and hence to the uranium which fed the 
French nuclear program. 
Having acquainted ourselves with Chad and Qaddafi's 
aims, let us now examine how the Libyan leader translated 
his ambitions into policy. 
Embroilment 
Qaddafi's designs on Chad, though they did not leap 
fully articulated from his brow on the morning he seized 
power in 1969, were already germinating on that fateful 
day. During the first year of his rule he gave teeth to 
the anti-Tombalbaye policy inherited from the Sanusi 
monarchy. King Idris had permitted the founder of 
FROLINAT, Dr. Abba Siddick, to operate from Tripoli and 
had provided the FROLINAT with rhetorical support. 
Nevertheless, the monarchy's support of the rebels 
stopped short of military aid and thus avoided a complete 
diplomatic rupture with N'Djamena. 20 Soon after taking 
office Qaddafi removed this prohibition and reportedly 
provided the FROLINAT with a base inside Libya, along 
with weapons and insurgency training, the operational 
19 The Islamic Republic thesis is found in Martin Sicker, 
Oaddafi (New York: Praeger, 1987): 89-91. See also Ronald Bruce 
St. John, Qaddafi's world design: Libyan foreign policy. 1969- 
7 (London: Saqi Books, 1987), 101. 
20 Wright, 129. 
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effect of which was probably slight since the Libyan 
military at the time was itself barely functional. 21 
Slight or not, this minor escalation in aid did little to 
facilitate relations with Tombalbaye, and a war of words 
between the two capitals climaxed with accusations that 
Libya instigated a coup d'etat against Tombalbaye in 
August 1971. 
The coup failed. Incensed, N'Djamena severed 
relations with Tripoli, proclaimed itself a haven for 
anti-Qaddafi dissidents and even staked an irredentist 
claim to southern Libya! 22 In just under twenty-four 
months Qaddafi had thus precipitated (whether through a 
coup or its antecedents) the first of what was to be a 
long string of self-inflicted injuries in Chad. In fact, 
the rupture with Tombalbaye might have escalated into 
fighting were it not for the restraining influence of 
France, whose unwillingness to intercede forced 
Tombalbaye to reconcile with Qaddafi--in effect, 
rewarding Libya's pressure tactics. Tombalbaye, bitter 
but disillusioned, met with Qaddafi in April 1972 and 
agreed to break relations with Israel in exchange for 
peace. 23 By some accounts, he also secretly ceded the 
Aouzou Strip (a sizable piece of territory in Northern 
21 Neuberger, 25. 
22 "Chad breaks Libyan ties, charging a coup attempt, " NgN 
ynrk Times, 29 August 1971. 
23 "Libya halts aid to Chad rebels: Fort-Lamy split with 
Israel apparently is rewarded, " New York Times, 8 April 1973. 
ý; 
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Chad) to Libya. 24 In December the two nations signed a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Although Tripoli 
pledged to curb its aid to the FROLINAT, in actuality the 
tenor and tempo of its activities remained unchanged. 25 
By ignoring Tombalbaye's pleas, Paris delivered to 
Qaddafi what he himself had failed to achieve through 
subversion. The French, however, were losing confidence 
in Tombalbaye's ability to restore order and were 
reluctant to further entangle their forces in an 
unpromising civil war. Although France tried to buy off 
Libya's support of FROLINAT by selling Mirage fighters to 
Tripoli in early 1970, within months it became apparent 
that Tripoli was not keeping its part of the bargain. 26 
The fatigue evident in France's ambiguous position was 
further marked in mid 1972 when French combat units 
ceased fighting alongside Chadian troops. 27 The result 
of France's hesitancy was to prolong Chad's misery, 
keeping the government and rebels in an agitated limbo 
24 For years Libya categorically denied its occupation of 
the Aouzou Strip. Not until 1988 did Libya publicly claim a 
secret agreement was reached (Wright, 130). For additional 
details, see Neuberger, 27; n. b. Lanne, 228-231, who argues such 
an agreement would have been illegal and was therefore 
improbable. 
25 Neuberger, 28. 
26 French Defence Minister Michel Debre explicitly cited 
Libya's cessation of aid to the rebels as a term of sale (John 
Hess, "France now says Libyans will get total of 100 jets, " New 
york Times, 22 January 1970). In one memorable ambush later that 
year, 11 French soldiers were killed and 10 wounded by rebels 
using Libyan-supplied weapons (Henry Giniger, "Criticism of 
French role in Chad increases in Paris, " New York Times, 14 
October 1970). 
27 Neuberger, 27. 
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between triumph and negotiated settlement. 
Qaddafi capitalized on France's flagging commitment 
by occupying the Aouzou Strip in 1973 (after numerous 
small incursions in 1972) and quietly annexing the 
territory two years later. 28 Scarcely a ripple was heard 
in international circles, making this one of the great 
short-term successes of Libyan national security policy. 
Tombalbaye, having been left twisting in the wind, was 
finally deposed by his own kinsmen in 1975. 
The fall of Tombalbaye did not placate Tripoli, 
which instead became increasingly aggressive. As Libya's 
relations with Egypt worsened in 1977, Qaddafi began to 
see Chad as a zero-sum battlefield. He decided to again 
gamble on France's lethargy. Libyan forces operating in 
conjunction with FROLINAT units captured almost all of 
northern Chad in mid 1977, and the French military 
response was limited to ferrying Malloum's forces to the 
battlefield. 29 Malloum broke relations with Tripoli on 
February 6,1978, protested Libya's behavior to the UN 
Security Council, and pleaded for assistance--to no 
avail. 30 Aside from Egypt (which sent arms and 
advisors), few nations seemed inclined to come to the 
government's aid (though the United States promised to 
28 "Libya said to annex an area of Chad, " New York Times, 8 
September 1975; "New Libyan maps annex territory from 3 
neighbors, " New York Times, 10 September 1976. 
29 Paul Lewis, "Intervention in Chad disclosed by French, " 
New York T{mes, 20 July 1977. 
30 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt's road to Jerusalem, (New 
York: Random House, 1997), 63. 
2; 
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consider sympathetically any requests for military 
aid). -" Even Egypt was more concerned with defending 
Sudan (and thus the Nile) than with propping up 
N'Djamena. When the fall of Faya-Largeau (a 
strategically positioned town in northern Chad) on 
February 19 failed to excite any international reaction, 
Malloum--like Tombalbaye before him--felt compelled to 
pursue appeasement. 
A few weeks and two conferences later, Qaddafi and 
Malloum concluded a lop-sided agreement known as the 
Benghazi Accords which amounted to little more than an 
enumeration of Qaddafi's war aims. 32 Both parties called 
for the withdrawal of all French forces from Chad. The 
accords also stipulated that Malloum would formally 
recognize the FROLINAT and accept an immediate cease-fire 
(to be monitored by troops from Libya and Niger), thus 
freezing the map in Libya's favor. Libya, Niger, and 
Sudan were made the 'guarantors' of the agreement-- 
thereby giving Tripoli a hook with which to justify 
further intervention. The accords collapsed in less than 
a month, apparently by mutual dissent. The forces of 
Qaddafi's client, Goukouni Oueddei, (accompanied by 
31 Bernard Gwertzman, "U. S. steps up offers of arms to 
Africans; ready to aid Sudan: Help for Chad also weighed, " RPM 
nrk Times, 28 July 1977. For evidence of covert Egyptian 
participation, see "Rebels in Chad report cutting off a regional 
capital in the North, " New York Times, 16 February 1978. 
32 Neuberger, 34. According to Boutros-Ghali (112-113), 
Egypt tried to help Chad pass a resolution condemning Libya's 
agression at the July 1978 OAU summit but failed because Libyan 
diplomats bribed the other delegates! 
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Libyan 'advisers') quickly advanced to within striking 
range of N'Djamena. " 
Qaddafi seemed to be on the verge of victory. 
However, by seeking too much, too soon, and with too 
little subtlety, he finally galvanized Malloum's allies 
into action. This soon proved to be his second costly 
error of the war. The French air force began flying 
sorties against the Libyan-FAP forces and, after 
intensive bombardment, brought the advance to a halt some 
100-150 miles from the capital. French Foreign 
Legionnaires were deployed in April, and for the first 
time Paris and Tripoli stood on the brink of open 
warfare. 34 Libya blinked, and a cease-fire was 
established. 
Frustrated by the collapse of the FAP offensive, 
Qaddafi sent Jalloud to parley with the French. After 
negotiations in Paris, Jalloud and his interlocutors 
allegedly reached a secret agreement on splitting Chad 
into spheres of influence--a proposal Qaddafi is said to 
have made rather crudely ('if you leave me the Muslims, I 
will leave you the Blacks. ')" If such a modus vivendi 
were in fact established, it signified that both sides 
33 Deeb argues (129) that Qaddafi's clients must have acted 
without his approval since it was 'not in Libya's interests at 
that time to reignite the hostilities. ' This misses the point 
that a failure to control his clients was still Qaddafi's 
failure, and made him no less responsible for the deleterious 
aftermath. 
34 Gera, 642; "Foreign Legionnaires are rushed to Chad, " New 
York Times, 21 April 1978. 
35 Neuberger, 35, citing Jeune Afrigue (24 December 1980). 
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were biding their time: Libya, until it could launch a 
fresh offensive; and France, in hopes that it could 
undercut Qaddafi by negotiating a peace between the 
warring Chadian factions. 36 
Of the two sides, France got the better deal since 
it gave away nothing new; Paris had already accepted the 
de facto partition of Chad. The result was to keep 
Qaddafi at bay, while France engineered a reconciliation 
between Malloum and Hissein Habre, who formed a joint 
government in August 1978. When the union collapsed 
under the weight of mutual suspicion in February 1979, 
France quietly shifted its support to Habre as the party 
most likely to achieve stable rule. 
This strategy immediately paid strategic dividends, 
as Qaddafi became apprehensive that his principal client, 
Goukouni, would join Habre in a coalition government. As 
practitioners of realpolitik, Goukouni and Qaddafi were 
too well matched for the latter's comfort. Each was 
willing to accept the other so far as their interests 
converged. But that convergence, they both knew, was 
quite limited. Qaddafi wanted to use Goukouni to 
establish a puppet regime; Goukouni sought only to 
install himself as the uncontested ruler of Chad, after 
36 On 30 July 1978, Tripoli attempted a commando raid 
against the French Mirage squadron at N'Djamena airport (to 
deprive French ground forces of air support and thus revive the 
FAP drive); the operation was aborted because of inclement 
weather. Thus died Qaddafi's hopes of a quick military victory. 
Francois Soudan and Joseph Goulden, Kaddafi, la CIA et les 
marchands de more (Paris: Jeune Afrique Livres, 1987) 97-100; cf. 
John Cooley, Libyan sandstorm (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1982), 193-195. 
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which he would have little need of Qaddafi. Neither made 
any secret of their mutual distrust and lack of 
allegiance. 
Once again, Qaddafi set in motion a series of events 
that realized his worst fears. He placed Goukouni under 
house arrest, and when disputes erupted between 
Goukouni's forces and those of Asil Achmat in October 
1978, the Libyans sided with the latter. 37 Thus were 
sown the seeds of resentment that matured in March 1979, 
when Goukouni (who resurfaced in December 1978) and Habre 
did in fact create a united front against Qaddafi--the 
Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT). By 
trying to force his client's loyalty, Qaddafi had 
transformed him into a formidable enemy. 
Destruction of the GUNT became Qaddafi's primary 
tactical objective, but that task was beyond the 
capabilities of the LAF. A sizable Libyan force (est. 
2500 men) sent into the BET region to punish the FAP was 
soundly repulsed by Goukouni's forces, which continued to 
enjoy French air support. 38 Alienating Goukouni was 
truly Qaddafi's third major self-inflicted injury in 
Chad. 
The Libyan leader was left with only two relatively 
37 Neuberger, 40. Achmat, ethnically black but culturally 
Arab, was a prototype of the followers Qaddafi imagined would 
flock to his banner. His followers formed the pro-Libyan Conseil 
Ddmocratique de la Rdvolution (CDR). 
311 "Libyan offensive deep into Chad is described as military disaster, " New York Times, 21 April 1979; "Chad leader says 
forces routed Libyan invaders, " New York Times, 27 July 1979. 
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insignificant clients: Achmat and Abdelkader Kamougue. 
Kamougue, who served as Malloum's foreign minister and 
now led the remnants of the Sara forces which Habre had 
driven from N'djamena, visited Tripoli in May 1979 and 
was soon receiving Libyan armaments. 39 This put Qaddafi 
in the incongruous position of supplying weapons to 
Chad's southern Christians for use against the northern 
Muslims! 
Qaddafi rallied from military defeat and switched 
his attack to the negotiating table. Libya's performance 
did not, in the beginning, favorably distinguish itself 
in the annals of diplomatic history. During a spring 
peace conference in Kano, Nigeria, Qaddafi conspired with 
the host government to place Habrd and Goukouni under 
house arrest until they caved in to a joint Libyan- 
Nigerian demand to admit Qaddafi's clients to the GUNT. 
Understandably outraged by this treatment, both men 
ignored their pledge upon returning to Chad . 
40 By 
August, however, the GUNT was faltering and Qaddafi had 
learnt the difference between pressure and duress. With 
the support of neighboring African states Libya induced 
the two Chadians to make concessions. Achmat and 
Kamougue were admitted to the GUNT in November, 1979. 
This was one of the most brilliant diplomatic successes 
of Qaddafi's career, and he capitalized on it by 
pressuring Goukouni to turn on Habre. This was an appeal 
39 Neuberger, 46. 
40 Neuberger, 45-46. 
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to the Chadian's self-interest, since it seemed evident 
that the unwieldy coalition would not long survive. 
Showing that he truly had no permanent friends, only 
permanent interests, Goukouni finally relented. In March 
1980, Chad slid back into civil war. 
Having thrown the dice, Goukouni set fire to his 
bridges. In May he expelled the French military mission 
from Chad. A few weeks later, on June 15,1980, he 
signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya. 
This supplied Libya with a pretext for sending an 
expeditionary force into Chad to restore order, and 
within weeks the first platoons of Libyan troops were 
fighting in N'djamena. Another 7,000 troops followed to 
aid Goukouni in repulsing a FAN offensive in October 
1980. After quelling the enemy advance they 
counterattacked. Habre's forces, all but defenseless 
against Libyan air power, collapsed. On December 15, 
1980, the FAN fled from N'Djamena to the Sudanese border 
and Libyan units occupied the capital. 41L 
This was in many ways Qaddafi's finest hour. 
Persistence, force and coercive diplomacy had at long 
last yielded results. He had splintered the GUNT, 
banished the French, and had conquered nearly all of Chad 
in only six months. It was a sweet moment, but it did 
not last. 
Qaddafi summoned Goukouni (who was in no position to 
al James Markham, "Libyan troops control Chad's capital, " 
New York Times, 17 December 1980; "Libyans replace French in 
Chad's battered capital, " New York Times, 28 December 1980. 
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object to his patron's whims) to Tripoli and on January 
6,1981, the two signed an accord to upgrade their 
relations from 'strategic and fateful alliance' to 
'complete unity. '42 Libya pledged to help Chad to 
'eliminate the remnants of agent reaction which co- 
operates with colonialism' (i. e., mop up the French 
clients); to 'send a number of military men to assist in 
keeping security and maintaining peace' (i. e., 
institutionalize Libyan military occupation); and to fend 
off the 'agent regimes in Egypt and Sudan. '43 
Announcement of this pending union, to which Qaddafi 
apparently expected the world would be indifferent, 
proved to be a portentous miscalculation. The Libyan 
leader had unwittingly initiated a chain of events that 
would erase all of his hard-won gains within a mere nine 
months. This was his fourth major miscalculation. 
Before assessing the consequences, let us briefly 
address the contention that Qaddafi's declaration of 
unity was purely symbolic and meant to be understood as 
such. " The argument itself is unpersuasive: Libya's 
behavior in the BET region--where Chadians were issued 
Libyan identity cards, Libyan currency was circulated, 
the Libyan flag was flown and People's Committees were 
42 "Libya and Chad say border will be opened, " New York 
Times, 7 January 1981. 
43 The declaration is reproduced in toto in Neuberger, 69- 
71. 
44 Nolutshungu, 151. 
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created--suggested Qaddafi was in earnest. 45 Moreover, 
if this were not the case, Libya had inexplicably placed 
the burden of discerning its benign intentions on the 
very countries most likely to view its actions with 
suspicion. This too would have been an egregious 
mistake. In any event, statesmen must be judged by their 
results and not only by their professed or imagined 
intentions. 
The mere suggestion of unifying Libya with Chad 
showed a staggering disregard for balance of power 
calculations. No great insight into the affairs of 
nations was required to understand that nothing could 
persuade Egypt and Sudan that the creation of a Libyan 
supra-state was in their interest. Nor would France or 
the United States be inclined to idly watch such a 
development. That Tripoli failed to perceive this or, 
perceiving it, failed to anticipate the wholly 
predictable reactions of the states in question, 
displayed a remarkable insularity. This was solipsism of 
the most dangerous kind, and brings to mind Kissinger's 
critique of the Schlieffen Plan: 'A minimum knowledge of 
history would have revealed that Great Britain would 
surely go to war if Belgium was invaded--a fact which 
seems to have totally eluded the Kaiser and the German 
general staff. '46 In like manner, the consequences of 
`s Neuberger, 49; Nolutshungu, 153. 
46 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1994), 205. 
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Libya's proposal to unite with Chad had somehow eluded 
the Colonel. 
Egypt immediately began shipping arms to Habre, who 
was operating out of Sudan with the increasing support of 
his hosts. 47 Defending the Sudan from similar proposals 
of 'unity' was of even greater importance to Cairo. 
Egypt promised to invoke its 1976 mutual defence pact 
with Sudan should need arise. 'e In March, 1981, amidst 
fears of a Libyan plot to destabilize the Sudanese 
government, the Egyptian air force pointedly showed the 
flag in Khartoum. Border skirmishes between Habre's 
forces and Libyan/FAP units in August led to some thirty 
Libyan air raids against Sudanese villages in Darfur. 
The strikes themselves were relatively ineffectual and 
'actually played into (the) hands' of Sudanese President 
Numeiri, who skillfully used the Libyan air threat to 
wring additional aid from Washington. 49 
The incoming Reagan White House did not need much 
convincing that the proposed unification was evidence of 
Qaddafi's expansionist ambitions. Washington's alarm was 
mitigated by a sense of the opportunity to turn the 
"A fact confirmed by Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hassan Ali in a news conference. "Egypt says it is assisting 
anti-Libyan rebels in Chad, " New York Times, 17 March 1981. 
48 Olf at M. El Tohamy, "Egypt sees threat to Sudan after 
Libyan push into Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 23 January 
1981; John Yemma, "Clashes loom between Libya, Sudan, Egypt over 
Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1981. 
49 William D. Brewer, "The Libyan-Sudanese 'crisis' of 1981: 
Danger for Darfur and dilemma for the United States, " Middle East 
tea. 36 (Spring 1982): 211-212. 
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tables on Tripoli. The CIA noted that 'Qaddafi's 
regional foes, including President Sadat, are focusing 
their resources on quietly bleeding Qaddafi at his most 
vulnerable point--his overextension in Chad and the 
danger this poses for him at home. ' This strategy 
appealed to the Reagan Administration, which began 
sending its own covert aid to Habrd so as to, in the 
words of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, 'increase the 
flow of pine boxes back to Libya. "' 
Washington was not the only capital that saw 
'unification' as a euphemism for expansionism. Within 
the Organization of African Unity Libya faced a torrent 
of criticism. OAU Chairman Siaka Stevens vigorously 
condemned the proposed union and called for Libya's 
withdrawals' The OAU formally denounced the merger in a 
meeting at Lome, Togo. 52 Libyan diplomats were expelled 
from Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Upper Volta, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gambia and Mauritania. 53 Of these, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria broke relations completely. 
Several others broke ties later in the year, or, like 
Senegal, had already done so to protest Libyan 
51 Bob Woodward, Veil: The secret wars of the CIA 1981-1987, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 96-97. 
51 SWB ME/6625/B/2,17 January 1981. 
52 According to Qaddafi, the Lome conference had 'no 
legitimacy' and its resolutions 'will be ignored by us and will 
not be binding upon us. ' SWB ME/6624/B/2,16 January 1981. 
53 SWB ME/6626/B/1-3,19 January 1981; George Joffe, 
"Qadafi's adventures in Chad, " Middle East International, no. 142 
(30 January 1981): 12. 
325 
subversion. Indeed, Senegal had taken the additional 
step of airlifting troops to Gambia in November, 1980, to 
deter Libya from attacking there as well. 54 Likewise, 
Nigeria moved the bulk of its army to its Chadian border 
and sharply increased its defence spending. 55 Nigeria 
also took the precaution of sharply increasing its 
defense spending. 
Tripoli seemed bemused by Africa's furor. Only a 
year earlier many African states had joined Libya in 
pressuring the GUNT to admit Qaddafi's clients. Why then 
did unification prove so controversial? 
Aside from the multitudinous balance of power 
calculations, there was a principle at stake which 
galvanized the African community. Hitherto, Libya's 
activities in Chad had enjoyed--deservedly or not--an 
anti-colonialist patina: Libya was ostensibly assisting a 
fraternal African people to 'liberate' themselves from 
the final vestiges of French imperialism. The 
unification decree irrevocably changed the perception of 
Libyan intervention. Territorial aggrandizement--which 
most African leaders now believed was Qaddafi's goal-- 
violated the deepest taboo of post-Second World War 
African diplomacy which held that colonial borders were 
inviolable. Tripoli had already pushed the envelope by 
54 "Around the world, " New York Times, 6 November 1980. 
55 Gregory Jaynes, "Black Africa outraged by Qaddafi's Chad 
adventure, " New York Times, 2 March 1981; Juan de Onis, "Nigeria 
puts new stress on defense to counter Libyan moves in Chad, " Ne& 
ynrk Times, 15 January 1981. 
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occupying the Aouzou Strip. If full unification were 
countenanced the principle would be further eroded and, 
to an indeterminant degree, the entire continent would be 
destabilized. 
It is difficult to suppose that Qaddafi was unaware 
he was trespassing on a sacrosanct principle of African 
security; nevertheless, he seemed unprepared for the 
vehemence with which the chorus of African states 
demanded his withdrawal from Chad. Reluctantly 
acknowledging the criticism, he sought to calm the 
'fearful minds in Sudan, Niger, and other African 
countries' by suggesting there had been a 
'misunderstanding' and that the Chadian people had not 
yet decided to unite with Libya but would be allowed to 
decide for themselves. 56 However, Tripoli simultaneously 
insisted that only Goukouni could ask the Libyan forces 
to leave. 57 
Many of the states alarmed by Qaddafi's idea of 
'unity' looked to Paris for protection. Naturally, the 
French were gratified to see their African vocation 
vindicated. In addition, they were eager to give Qaddafi 
his comeuppance for engineering the precipitous decline 
of their own fortunes in Chad over the preceding two 
years. Paris could understand and even tolerate a 
friendly game of realpolitik, but the game had ceased to 
56 SWB ME/6645/A/2,10 February 1981; SWB ME/6676/A/1,18 
March 1981. 
57 SWB ME/6625/F/1,17 January 1981. 
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be friendly. Indeed, the Libyan leader seemed to delight 
in slighting the French. During the recent campaign he 
had paid embarrassingly little heed to warnings from 
Paris and had brazenly dared France to intervene. 58 In 
late January he had the effrontery to issue a communique 
with Goukouni demanding that France recall all its 
soldiers from Africa. 51 
France seized the opportunity to reassert itself and 
humble this upstart North African. President Giscard 
d'Estaing cancelled a major oil deal with Libya and 
imposed an arms embargo, barring Tripoli from taking 
delivery of five new patrol boats. 60 The Foreign 
Minister and his deputy rushed to regional capitals to 
weigh the security implications of Libya's moves with 
local leaders. 61 French troops were despatched to the 
Central African Republic and military aid was offered to 
other threatened states. 62 
Notwithstanding its posturing, Paris recognized that 
the easiest way to force Qaddafi's hand would be to have 
58 "France warns Libya on Chad intervention, " New York 
wes, 14 December 1980; "Libya says its force in Chad could 
resist French move, " New York Times, 23 January 1981. 
59 "Libya tells France to pull its troops out of Africa, " 
New York Times, 24 January 1981. 
60 SWB ME/6662/i, 2 March 1981. 
61 Geoffrey Godsell, "Qaddafi plan for Chad merger sparks 
alarm in Europe, Africa, " Christian Science Monitor, 9 January 
1981. 
62 "France strengthens Africa force in reaction to Chad 
intervention, " New York Times, 10 January 1981; "French deny 
Libyan charge of troop move near Chad, " New York Times, 27 
January 1981. 
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Goukouni request Libya's withdrawal. 63 In seeing this as 
a realistic possibility the French displayed a commanding 
grasp of"Goukouni's character and predicament. By siding 
with Habre in 1979, Goukouni had demonstrated to Paris 
that his alliance with Qaddafi to that point was just a 
marriage of convenience. Moreover, the projected Chad- 
Libya merger placed Goukouni in an awkward position with 
most'Chadians, none of whom were eager to be engulfed by 
Libya. Nor, for that matter, was Goukouni; only weeks 
earlier he had grimly described Libya's occupation of the 
Aouzou Strip as a fait accompli. 64 Moreover, his ally 
(and Vice-President) Kamougue immediately branded the 
union 'an impossible marriage. 165 His discomfort with 
the relationship-now rose to the surface, and within days 
of the unity announcement Goukouni hedged by making it 
conditional on approval in a referendum. 66 
Though aware of Goukouni's tenuous loyalty, the 
Libyans could not figure out how to reverse the erosion 
of their alliance. As Goukouni drifted towards the 
French orbit, it became less certain that the Libyans 
would leave if Goukouni asked them to do so. This had 
already been in doubt for some months. In early 1981 
63 "Sudan and Egypt back Chad rebels against Libya, " He& 
York Times, 22 March 1981. 
6` "Libyans replace French in Chad's battered capital, " Hem 
York Times, 28 December 1980. 
65 Richard Eder, "France acts to counter the Libyan move 
into Chad, " New York Times, 9 January 1981. 
66 George Joffe, "Qadafi's adventures in Chad, " Middle Eact 
International, no. 142 (30 January 1981): 12. 
329 
Qaddafi demanded nothing less than the renunciation of 
all French interests in Central Africa as his 
precondition for withdrawal: 
These forces will not be withdrawn until ... the evacuation of the French forces from the 
Central African Republic and Cameroon, the 
evacuation of the French forces stationed in 
Senegal and Gabon and until France stops giving 
orders to its agents in Africa to threaten the 
security of Chad and its stability. 67 
Moreover, Tripoli asserted that Libya's departure--if it 
ever came--would be contingent upon the situation in Chad 
remaining favorable to Libyan interests. 68 That Qaddafi 
hinged Libya's withdrawal on factors Goukouni could not 
control showed that he would not abandon Chad willingly. 
However, the Libyan leader had lost the initiative 
to the French, who deftly co-opted the Chadian warlord. 
In September Goukouni and Mitterand met in Paris and 
agreed on a tentative peace plan which France unveiled 
the following month. In addition, Paris began sending 
small arms and ammunition to Qaddafi's erstwhile 
clientl69 Meanwhile, French diplomats spearheaded the 
formation of an OAU peace-keeping force for Chad. In 
November 1981, "Goukouni formally demanded Libya withdraw 
67 SWB ME/6644/A/4,9 February 1981; see also SWB 
ME/6624/B/3,16 January 1981, in which Qaddafi somewhat 
theatrically promised to wage war against imperialism (i. e., 
France) 'until they burn in the jungles of Africa together with 
their bases and their puppets. ' 
68 SWB ME/6687/A/2,31 March 1981. 
69 Edward Girardet, "France stepping up its role in Chad to 
support Woddei, undercut Libya, " Christian Science Moni. nr, 29 
October 1981; Geoffrey Godsell, "French support for Chad paying 
off--Libyans are leaving, " Christian science monitor, 5 November 
1981. 
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its troops (15,000 men by Qaddafi's estimate--nearly 20% 
of Libya's entire military). 70 
To everyone's surprise, Qaddafi agreed. Within two 
weeks not a single Libyan unit remained south of the 
Aouzou Strip. The alacrity of the LAF's departure was 
little understood at the time, and even afterwards was 
often ascribed to spurious motives. Libyan propagandists 
(and apologists) hailed the returning troops as 
'peacekeepers' and praised the Colonel for having 
restored 'stability' to Chad. 71 Others ascribed the 
departure to Qaddafi's desire to be chairman of the OAU, 
which was imperiled by the occupation of Chad and which 
he did not obtain in any event, and to his fear of a 
joint U. S. -Egyptian attack. 72 This last suggestion hits 
closest to the mark. Operation Bright Star in November 
1981, in which more than four thousand U. S. troops 
exercised with soldiers from Egypt, the Sudan, Oman, and 
Somalia, clearly signalled Washington's ability to 
70 "Habre and Sudan pose threat, " Jamahiriya Review no. 19 
(December 1981): 11. 
71 See La Jamahiriya et la paix au Tchad, (La Jamahiriya 
Arabe Libyenne Populaire Socialiste, L'Information Exterieure: 
1982); "Libya welcomes home its Chad 'peacemakers"' Jamahiriya 
Review no. 19 (December 1981): 10-11; G. H. Jansen, "Trumping 
their aces, " Middle East International no. 162 (13 November 
1981): 5. 
72 Qaddafi was slated to be the next OAU chairman, but 
opposition to his installment was so fierce that three successive 
OAU summits collapsed (August 1982 in Tripoli; November 1982 in 
Tripoli; and May 1983 in Addis Ababa). 
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forcibly intervene in Chad should it choose. 73 Yet this 
does not tell the whole story. 
The dissolution of Qaddafi's alliance with Goukouni 
made Libya's withdrawal all but inevitable. To remain in 
Chad against Goukouni's wishes would have dismembered 
their alliance and might even have resurrected the 
Goukouni-Habre coalition. Furthermore, remaining would 
increase the likelihood of aggressive U. S. or French 
intervention, and Qaddafi had no desire to enter a 
pitched battle with either. Withdrawing, on the other 
hand, might remind Goukouni where his bread was buttered. 
Indeed, the speed of Libya's departure (which deprived 
Chad of some vital` infrastructure) suggested that Tripoli 
sought to precipitate an economic collapse for that very 
reason. 
Though the decision to withdraw was strategically 
sound, it must have been a bitter one for Qaddafi. 
Libya's abrupt egress from Chad marked the end of an era. 
Never again would Qaddafi come as close to his goal of 
absorbing his southern neighbor. 
Without Libyan support the fortunes of war (and 
diplomacy) turned against Goukouni. The OAU peacekeeping 
force which was supposed to ensure stability proved weak 
and ineffective. Habre's forces, which had regrouped and 
73 Mary-Jane Deeb, "The primacy of Libya's national 
interest, " In The green and the black, ed. Rene Lemarchand, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 34. 
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been resupplied, began pushing towards strategic towns. 
By the end of the year they had retaken Abeche and Faya- 
Largeau. In a war where both armies were evenly matched 
but neither was well disciplined, momentum was the key to 
victory. Goukouni's FAP broke and abandoned the 
territory it had conquered less than a year before. On 
June 7,1982, Habre retook N'Djamena. 
France tried in vain to reconcile the two Chadian 
warlords. Goukouni therefore made yet another dramatic 
reversal in policy, and--to Qaddafi's grim satisfaction-- 
sought Libyan aid once more. With Qaddafi's blessing, 
Goukouni rallied his forces (3,000-4,000 men) in Bardal, 
just south of the Aouzou Strip, where the Libyans began 
to re-equip and train them. 74 
In mid 1983 the invigorated FAP (accompanied by a 
cohort of Libyan advisors) pressed southward towards the 
vital but virtually indefensible town of Faya-Largeau. 
This was a probing action aimed primarily at the new 
government led by Francois Mitterand, which Qaddafi 
believed (with good reason) would be more tolerant of his 
sub-Saharan ambitions. During the last election the 
socialists had vowed to take a less "neo-colonial" 
approach to African problems (i. e., to undertake fewer 
military interventions) than did the Gaullists. 
Mitterand himself was a leading critic of Gaullist policy 
towards Chad, where four French military interventions 
74 Jean R. Tartter, "National security, " in Chad! A country y, ed. Thomas Collelo, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1990), 192. 
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since 1964 had failed to produce stability. 75 Memories 
of Vietnam and Algeria apparently weighed heavily on the 
new president. 
On July 15,1982, Mitterand lifted the arms embargo 
against Libya, unlocking the patrol boat deal as well as 
the sale of four Spanish Daphne-class submarines (which 
Paris had persuaded Madrid to suspend). The Libyans were 
delighted, and hailed the "closer ties" ushered in by 
Mitterand. 76 Tripoli promptly ordered an additional ten 
patrol boats, some Mirage F-1s and a number of Alouette 
III helicopters, thereby making itself an important 
French arms customer once again. " 
For all of these reasons, Qaddafi believed France 
would avoid war in Chad at almost any cost. He therefore 
brushed aside a pointed warning from Mitterand and sent 
his air force to attack Faya-Largeau. 71 Adding insult to 
injury, Qaddafi countered with his own warning, 
suggesting that Mitterand would be 'crazy' to send troops 
to Chad and that doing so could lead to 'massacres' which 
75 Eric Pace, "Paris assailed on intervention in Chad, 
sometimes called 'France's Vietnam, '" New York Times, 29 April 
1970. 
76 "Patrol boats from France, " Jamahiriya Review no. 23 
(April 1982): 7. 
" Cooley, 210. How did the Colonel justify such dealings 
with the foremost neo-colonial power in Africa, whose record was 
'black and dirty'? There was no ideological contradiction that 
Qaddafi could not solve by rhetoric: 'Brothers, we shall not 
confront France ... We found that France was the only state 
that could, by its own will, conduct its foreign policy without 
permission from the USA' (SWB ME/6664/A/12,4 March 1981). 
78 James Dorsey, "Libyan-backed rebels reportedly attack 
Chad in border region, " Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1983. 
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might end Mitterand's political career. 79 This threat 
was echoed by the Libyan ambassador to Paris. 80 In spite 
of these exchanges--each of which must have galled a 
nation so sensitive to questions of national honor-- 
France reacted weakly. Mitterand ordered some 400 tons 
of military supplies airlifted to N'Djamena, but he 
resolutely refused to send ground troops or to permit a 
squadron of Jaguars based in Libreville, Gabon, to engage 
the Libyan air force. "' } 
As a result, the air war over Faya-Largeau was one- 
sided. Libyan bombers, accompanied by ground attack 
fighters and helicopter gunships, flew dozens of sorties 
against troops whose only defence consisted of captured 
SAM-7 missiles. 82 On, June 24 the city fell. 83 With 
Faya-Largeau secured, Goukouni's soldiers launched a 
coordinated air-land strike to the south, capturing 
Kalait, Oum Chalouba, and Abeche on July 8. Although a 
FANT counterattack recaptured Abeche four days later, 
Goukouni's thrust threatened to sunder Habre's strategic 
corridor to Sudan, cutting off the flow of vital 
79 As quoted in Deeb, 155. 
80 Mohamed Selhami, "La Libye n'intervient pas, " Jeune 
Afriaue no. 1174 (6 July 1983): 31. 
ei William Echikson, "France provides support--but not 
troops-to Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 9 August 1983. 
82 "Libya threatens to shoot down American Awacs, " Times 
(London), 9 August 1983; "Libyan pilot tells of Chad raids, " 
rhr{st{an Science Monitor (9 August 1983). 
83 Francois Soudan, "La bataille de Faya, " Jeune Afrigue no. 
1174 (6 July 1983): 29. 
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matdriel. 
On July 30,1982, Habre mounted a brief 
counteroffensive and recaptured Faya-Largeau. This 
forced Qaddafi to make a choice he would undoubtedly have 
preferred to avoid. Libya could intervene directly and 
risk French retaliation, or it could continue to rely 
upon Goukouni and risk further setbacks. Qaddafi made 
his decision swiftly. As Libyan Tu-22s resumed 
pummelling the city with fragmentation and phosphorous 
bombs, a mechanized battalion was despatched to help in 
the siege. 84 Soon, according to the U. S. State 
Department, between 1500 and 2000 Libyan troops ringed 
Faya Largeau. 85 
Qaddafi, aware that to admit his troops were again 
campaigning in Chad would be to invite another round of 
diplomatic protests (and perhaps worse), simply lied. 
There were no Libyans in Chad, said the Colonel, and 
there would be none if it were left to Tripoli. On the 
other hand, 'all foreign intervention in Chad will be 
considered by us as an act of war against Libya. "' 
This was the rhetorical culmination of the 'Qaddafi 
Doctrine' which, as noted at the beginning of this study, 
generously endowed Libya with global interests, universal 
values, and the right to intervene wherever it saw fit. 
84 Tartter, 193; cf. Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, U. S. 
Regional deterrence strategies (Santa Monica, RAND: 1995). 
85 Times (London), 9 August 1983. 
86 William Echikson, "France and Libya facing off in Chad's 
civil war, " Christian Science Monitor, 8 July 1983. 
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However, it was one thing to 'talk the talk' of a Great 
Power; to behave like one was something else entirely. 
The re-introduction of Libyan ground forces to Chad added 
a new dimension to the conflict that soon brought 
counterproductive consequences upon Tripoli; this was 
Qaddafi's fifth major policy mistake. 
Not cowed by Qaddafi's threat and unswayed by his 
protestations, several states lent support to Habre. 
Zaire sent some 2,000 airborne soldiers to N'Djamena. 87 
Many diplomats expected Egypt and Sudan to follow suit, 
though in the end their aid to Habre remained covert. 88 
Gabon appealed for French intervention. So too did the 
United States. The Reagan administration was determined 
to, at the very least, neutralize Libya's air advantage 
and give Habre's forces a fighting chance. But the 
French dithered. Impatient with the Quai d'Orsay's 
temporizing, the White House took matters into its own 
hands and announced it would provide Chad with anti- 
aircraft missiles and instructors. 
Rattled by this Yankee intrusion into its 
traditional sphere of influence, France immediately 
announced it would contribute anti-aircraft guns 
(although it still refused to commit its Gabon-based 
Jaguars to combat) and pledged more than $40 million 
87 Tartter, 193. 
88 James Dorsey, "Libyan-backed rebels reportedly attack 
Chad in border region, " Christian Science Monitor, 24 June 1983. 
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worth of supplies. 89 Yet the American weapons arrived 
first, symbolically denoting the transfer of leadership 
in Chad's defence. In addition, Washington vowed to more 
than double its military aid to Chad (to $25 million). 
The U. S. Navy stationed the aircraft carrier Eisenhower 
off the Libyan coast. The Pentagon announced the 
deployment of two AWACS to Sudan, along with F-15 
escorts, refueling tankers, and reconnaissance 
aircraft. go ý, 
Libya's response to this outflux of American aid was 
to step up its air attacks on Faya-Largeau. 91 Moreover, 
JANA announced: 'The Libyan Air Force has been given 
orders to strike at US AWACS planes whenever it becomes 
evident to the Libyan Air Force that they affect Libyan 
territory. '92 By the standards of normal diplomacy, this 
was an extraordinarily rash threat. Libya was signalling 
a willingness to risk war with the United States merely 
to retain a tactical advantage in northern Chad. One can 
89"U. S. F-14s chase Libyan jets over Mediterranean, " 
International Herald Tribune, 4 August 1983; Gary Marx, "French 
and US weapons to help battle Libyan jets in Chad, " Christian 
science Monitor, 3 August 1983. 
90 Gary Marx, "Libya's blitz into northern Chad, " Christian 
8c{ ence Monitor, 8 August 1983; Herb Boyd, "Chad: A civil war 
without end? " Journal of African Studies 10, no. 4 (Winter 1983- 
84): 122. 
91 Gary Marx, "French and US weapons to help battle Libyan 
jets in Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 3 August 1983. 
92 Linda Feldman, "Libyan pilot tells of Chad raids, " 
rhvistian Science Monitor, 9 August 1983. Libya also threatened 
strikes against any U. S. ships operating in the Gulf of Sidra. 
See Gary Marx, "US steps up role in Chad war, " Christian Science 
Monitor, 5 August 1983. 
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scarcely imagine any other state in the international 
system issuing such a bellicose challenge to a 
superpower; that Libya's challenge failed to generate 
much media attention suggests that most observers found 
the threat not only presumptuous but wearisome. It 
certainly failed to deter Washington, and doubtlessly 
reinforced the Reagan Administration's anti-Libyan 
predispositions. 
America's activism aimed not to supplant France but 
to spur it into action, and in this it was largely 
successful. Le Monde, for example, was already 
questioning whether France was being squeezed out of Chad 
by Washington. 93 Infuriated by Reagan's apparent 
disregard for diplomatic sensitivities, Mitterand was 
reluctantly compelled to defend France's African 
vocation. 94 Consequently, only a day after the Foreign 
Ministry averred that France had no intention of 
intervening, the French Defence Minister, Charles Hernu, 
abruptly announced that 'whatever the Libyans (or perhaps 
more appropriately, the Americans) do, we will match. '95 
On August 10-13, French transports could be heard 
93 Robert M. Gates, From the shadows, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996), 254; William Echikson, "France provides support- 
-but not troops--to Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 9 August 
1983. 
94 In a news conference, President Reagan bluntly expressed 
his surprise that France refused to commit its air power. Daniel 
Southerland, "'AWACS diplomacy' reassures friends, warns 
adversaries, " Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 1983. 
95 William Echikson, "France points finger at Qaddafi, " 
. 
Cj ristian Science Monitor, 11 August 1983. 
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rumbling over N'Djamena, ferrying thousands of troops in 
an undertaking dubbed Operation Manta. Within four days 
one thousand French troops were on the ground. Another 
twenty-five hundred soon followed, as did ground support 
aircraft and attack helicopters. The French units 
secured the approaches to the capital and then took up 
positions along the 15th parallel. 
The French were too late to prevent Libya from 
recapturing Faya-Largeau, which fell on August 10,1983. 
Indeed, by making the 15th parallel their line of 
defence--the parallel lies considerably to the south of 
Faya-Largeau--the French in effect conceded the 
devastated northern city to Qaddafi. The Libyan garrison 
at Faya-Largeau quickly swelled to some 6,000 men. 
Nevertheless, the Libyan offensive was irretrievable. 
Attrition tactics proved counterproductive. In January 
1984 Goukouni's men broke the de facto cease-fire by 
raiding a FANT position at Ziguey. While retreating, the 
rebels managed to shoot down a French Jaguar sent to 
strafe their column. This small triumph soured when 
France moved its 'security zone' northwards to the 16th 
parallel and tripled the number of its combat aircraft in 
Chad. 96 France had belatedly shown it could hold its own 
at coercive diplomacy. 
Much of the credit for undoing Libya's 1983 
offensive must go to the Reagan Administration. 
96 William Echikson, "Risk of direct French-Libyan 
confrontation grows in Chad, " Christian Science Monit r, 31 
January 1984. 
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Qaddafi's preoccupation with the French dimension of the 
conflict led him to underestimate America's relevance to 
the war. He failed to foresee that Washington's activism 
would oblige Paris to support Habre in order to prevent 
further encroachments upon France's African vocation. 
Nevertheless, to ascribe Libya's reversal to the vagaries 
of Great Power rivalries alone is to miss a larger and 
more instructive point. Libyan national security policy 
had once again produced the opposite of its intended 
result: rather than exploiting France's absence, Qaddafi 
re-entrenched the French in his backyard. Though its 
failure arose from a multitude of specific conditions, 
the 1983 offensive was thus emblematic of Qaddafi's 
counterproductive behavior throughout the war. 
Chad was now carved into French and Libyan spheres 
with the 16th parallel demarcating the border between 
north and south, precisely the arrangement Qaddafi 
allegedly proposed to the French in 1978. French 
officials expressed their hopes that Qaddafi would be 
satisfied with what he had captured so that the cease- 
fire would hold. This was presumably enough for the 
French. President Mitterand, if only by his refusal to 
help Habre mount an offensive, appeared predisposed to 
accept a Libyan presence in northern Chad (in fact, 
Mitterand was rumored to believe that partition might be 
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the only viable solution to Chad's civil war). 97 
But Qaddafi was no longer interested in a Franco- 
Libyan condominium, if indeed he ever had been. He 
simply wanted the French to leave so he could get on with 
the business of dominating Chad. Moreover, Qaddafi 
evidently realized (quite correctly) that time was on his 
side. With the French in Chad and the stalemate holding, 
American pressure on Paris was temporarily neutralized. 
For their part, the French were eager to reach an 
understanding, and this eagerness conveyed an advantage 
to Tripoli. Qaddafi made this clear by demanding Habre's 
resignation be part of any negotiated settlement, a 
condition he knew Paris would have to reject (as it 
did). 98 
Still, by professing a willingness to negotiate and 
by scrupulously avoiding military engagements, Qaddafi 
provided Mitterand the superficial calm necessary to 
proclaim Operation Manta a success. The French 
President, who was clearly looking to egress from Chad at 
the earliest possible opportunity, eventually abandoned 
the idea of forging a reconciliation between Goukouni and 
Habre and set about cutting a separate deal with Qaddafi. 
In September 1984, Libya and France agreed to 
simultaneously withdraw their troops from Chad. 
97 William Echikson, "French forces await Qaddafi's next 
move in Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 1983. 
98 William Echikson, "French push for Chad solution gets 
stuck in the diplomatic sand, " Christian Science Monitor, 13 
February 1984. 
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Satisfied once Libya made a token withdrawal, France 
removed all of its troops by November 10,1984, expecting 
that Libya would follow suit. However, U. S. satellite 
intelligence soon revealed that substantial Libyan forces 
remained in Chad--a fact that the State Department 
trumpeted much to the embarrassment of the Quai d'Orsay. 
Mitterand made things worse by suggesting that Libya had 
left relatively few forces behind; not only did the 
Parisian papers discover that the real force level was 
three to four times higher than Mitterand's estimation, 
but the fact that this information was leaked to them by 
French intelligence sources suggested significant 
disgruntlement within the government. " A frantic summit 
with Qaddafi in Crete availed nothing. ` Mitterand 
endured scathing criticism in the National Assembly, his 
approval rating plummeted, and several African states 
boycotted a Franco-African summit to show their 
displeasure with what they perceived as an abdication of 
France's responsibility towards Africa. 101 
There is no reason to believe that Libya ever 
intended to honor its agreement with France and though 
99 William Echikson, "French confident about Libyans in 
Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 1 October 1984; William 
Echikson, "Mitterand gives peace--and Qaddafi--a chance in Chad, " 
Christi-nn Science Monitor, 26 November 1984. 
100 Indeed, Libya later claimed that the French gave Tripoli 
a carte blanche at the summit to intervene in Chad as they saw 
fit. SWB ME/0644 A/4,20 December 1989. 
101 William Echikson, "France's travails in Africa have 
implications for United States, " Christian Science Monitor, 13 
December 1984. 
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Mitterand probably suspected as much, it seems he was 
determined to escape from Chad at almost any cost. On 
the face of things, this amounted to a coup for Qaddafi, 
who no doubt considered himself a master of realpolitik. 
Yet here again was an astounding failure to grasp 
the consequences of state behavior. In cuckolding the 
French, Qaddafi humiliated the Western power most 
inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt. Thus, 
instead of widening an already gaping policy rift between 
the U. S. and its European allies, Tripoli made Mitterand 
look foolish. The ramifications of this short-sighted 
ploy would rebound against Libya for years to come. 
The immediate effect of Qaddafi's duplicity was to make 
it impossible to capitalize on France's withdrawal, since 
the political pressure on Mitterand was now such that any 
further deterioration in Habre's position would have to 
be met by force. 102 Constrained by this web of his 
own devising, Qaddafi had little else to do except to 
consolidate his position in northern Chad and bide his 
time. During this period the LAF constructed a regional 
headquarters in Wadi Doum, with an enormous airfield to 
accommodate ground support aircraft. 103 
Qaddafi made less effective use of this interlude in 
terms of improving relations with his ostensible allies. 
Without an active war to unite them, the various factions 
102 Nolutshungu, 212-213. 
103 David Willis, "Qaddafi pursues dual strategy in effort 
to expand Libya's influence in Chad, " Christian Science Monitor, 
26 June 1985. 
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that formed the rump GUNT began to fall out with each 
other and personal rivalries (notably between Goukouni 
and CDR leader Al-Shaykh Ibn Omar) became disruptive. 104 
In addition, familiarity between the Libyans and their 
clients bred contempt. This was due in part to latent 
racism on the part of the Libyans, who viewed their 
Chadian neighbors as something less than the 'brothers' 
Qaddafi proclaimed them to be. 105 This was an elitism 
made all too clear by regulations that allowed Libyan men 
to marry Chadian women, but denied Libyan women to 
Chadian men. 106 
The FANT also took advantage of the relative lull 
over the next two years to re-organize and re-equip. In 
this they were aided by the Reagan Administration which 
was nearing the apex of its anti-Libyan activities and 
therefore happy to provide tactical advice, intelligence, 
and a stream of small armaments, most notably anti- 
aircraft and anti-tank missiles. 107 Though the U. S. 
offered big-ticket items as well, the FANT Judiciously 
selected arms appropriate for a mobile guerrilla war. 
104 Nolutshungu, 190-193. 
105 "Libyan offensive deep into Chad is described as military 
disaster, " New York Times, 21 April 1979. 
106 Nolutshungu, 203. 
107 Kenneth M. Pollack, "The influence of Arab culture on 
Arab military effectiveness, " PhD thesis, Massachusetts institute 
of Technology, February 1996,704. Pollack's analysis of Libyan 
combat performance in Chad is unsurpassed for detail. 
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The last hurrah 
In February 1986, after a year of relative calm, 
Libya and the GUNT launched a fresh offensive with an 
attack on Kouba-Olanga, followed by an assault on Oum 
Chalouba. This was a violation of the "red line" which 
French forces had established along the 16th parallel as 
a zone of disengagement between north and south. France 
responded with uncharacteristic sharpness by bombing the 
Libyan airstrip at Wadi Doum--a sure sign that Mitterand 
was still smarting from the battering he received after 
unilaterally withdrawing from Chad. The Libyans were 
undeterred, and retaliated by bombing N'Djamena airport. 
This was Qaddafi's sixth fateful miscalculation. France 
replied by airlifting troops into the capital, and 
Habre's forces retook Oum Chalouba on February 14.108 A 
second Libyan probing action in March was also repulsed. 
Mitterand, who could not afford to look weak, 
ordered French ground and air units back to Chad. This 
deployment, known as Operation Epervier (Sparrowhawk), 
grew in strength from an original contingent of 1,400 men 
to nearly 2,000 soldiers. 
For the second time in less than three years, 
Qaddafi had triggered the return of French troops to 
Chad. " This development was adverse, to say the least, to 
his war aim of ejecting the French from Chad. One can 
only speculate as to why the Colonel felt February was a 
108 George Henderson, "His last chance?, " Middle Ea st 
Jnternational (21 February 1986): 9-10. 
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propitious time for renewing operations in Chad. 
Perhaps, given that in early 1986 his conflict with the 
United States was nearing its crescendo, Qaddafi vaguely 
hoped that stirring things up in Chad might induce France 
to bridle Washington. This was not without a kernel of 
logic, since as it became more and more evident that the 
United States was seeking some sort of military show down 
with Libya, Mitterand may have feared that the United 
States would again undercut France in Chad. Whatever the 
Colonel's reckoning (which historians may never 
retrieve), Operation Epervier marked the beginning of the 
end for Libya's war in Chad. 
Faced once more with the risk of war with France, 
Libya abandoned its planned offensive--which was just as 
well, because the Libyan-GUNT coalition was rapidly 
beginning to unravel through a string of defections to 
Habre. Kamougue, for instance, left after Goukouni 
missed a March reconciliation meeting with Habre in 
Congo, perhaps because Libya would not allow him to 
attend. 109 Moreover, in August 1986 tensions peaked 
between Goukouni and Al-Shaykh Ibn Omar, leader of the 
pro-Libyan CDR. 110 With less than 3,000 men, the CDR was 
far more dependent upon Libya than was Goukouni's 5,000 
strong FAP. A skirmish broke out between the FAP and the 
CDR at Fada. In a virtual replay of 1979 the Libyans, 
109 Nolutshungu, 212-213. 
110 A post he received after Asil Achmat, former leader of 
the CDR, died in a freak accident with an airplane propeller in 
July 1982. 
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rather than remaining neutral, sided with the CDR. The 
FAP, which constituted nearly two-thirds of the GUNT, 
retreated to its bases in the Tibesti mountains. 
The break with the FAP was compounded by what would 
be the Libyan leader's seventh major self-inflicted 
injury in Chad. Qaddafi did the worst thing possible 
under the circumstances: he arrested Goukouni to ensure 
his 'loyalty. ' News of Goukouni's arrest soon reached 
Chad, as did reports that the rebel leader had been shot 
and seriously wounded while resisting arrest. This news 
made the loss of the FAP irretrievable. "I Habrg seized 
upon this strategic windfall by proposing a cease-fire to 
the FAP in October. The FAP accepted, and from then it 
was only a matter of time before the two former 
antagonists became an anti-Libyan alliance. Goukouni's 
FAP began to cooperate with the FANT against Libyan 
troops and the CDR. 112 
In mid-November, Al-Shaykh Ibn Omar was "elected" 
President of the GUNT, which the Libyans vainly hoped 
would lend some legitimacy to their position. But 
Qaddafi knew that Goukouni's supporters in the FAP would 
have to be smashed if he were to continue to control 
northern Chad. Thus, in mid-December the LAF launched a 
two-pronged attack, led by T-62s covered by heavy air 
"I Yehudit Ronen, "Libya, " in Middle East contemporary 
B, rv_y: 1986, volume 10, ed. Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 519. 
112 Although Goukouni was later rehabilitated by Tripoli, he 
never regained his former political stature. 
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support, against the FAP in Tibesti. The first column 
(800 men) struck at Bardai on the northern edge of the 
Tibesti mountains. Though it initially caught the FAP 
off guard, the attack was soundly repulsed on December 
12. The second column (1200 men) looped through Niger 
and attacked Zouar in southwestern Tibesti. Despite its 
superior weaponry, the Libyan force took heavy casualties 
in capturing the town. 113 
In January 1987, Habre sent a relief column to 
reinforce the FAP in the Tibesti region. The combined 
FAP-FANT forces liberated Zouar, depriving Tripoli of a 
key foothold in the Tibesti region. 114 The Chadian 
victory was all the more impressive since Habre's relief 
column was a diversion. The real Chadian thrust was 
directed against Fada. On January 2,1987, Habrg's men 
swarmed Fada's defenders using light Toyota trucks 
sprouting anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, 
recoilless rifles and machine guns. Enveloped by a 
series of pincer movements, the torpid LAF armored units 
were utterly routed. 
Libya's losses were heavier than any the LAF had 
ever suffered. At least 700 soldiers (out of a garrison 
of around 1,200) were killed, and hundreds of armored 
113 Hugo Sada, "Ce que feront Paris et Washington, " eu 
gf Q. no. 1358 (14 January 1987): 31. 
114 Pollack, 704-705. 
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vehicles were di 
wrath fell upon 
Al Mabrouk, who 
minute. He was 
executed. 116 
Aside from 
Bstroyed or captured. 115 The regime's 
the Libyan commander, Col. Mohammed Abbas 
escaped from Fada by air at the last 
taken to Sebha, court martialed, and 
shooting the officers, Tripoli was at a 
loss as to how to deal with this turn of events. The 
regime's confusion immediately became apparent as the 
foreign ministry and the military worked at cross 
purposes. Two days after the loss of Fada, at the very 
moment Libyan diplomats in Paris were delivering a 
demarche insisting that the de facto border along the 
16th parallel be respected (ignoring the fact that Libya 
and the FAP repeatedly violated it the previous year), a 
squadron of Libyan MiG-23s were attacking Arada--well 
south of the parallel. Brushing aside the Libyan 
demarche, France dismissed the air strike as an "insect's 
bite" and responded by bombing radar installations at 
Wadi Doum, thus blinding its air defenses. 117 After 
further Libyan incursions into the "red zone, " the French 
air force returned (on February 18,1986) and cratered 
its For a detailed but inflated battle damage estimate, see 
"International defense digest: Chadian offensives, " International 
Defense Review 20, no. 5 (May 1987): 537. Pollack's figures are 
more reasonable, as are his estimates of the various parties' 
troop strength, and generally correspond to Nolutshungu's 
(Pollack, 704-705; Nolutshungu, 217-218; cf. Tartter, 194-198). 
116 Francois Soudan, "Tchad-Libye: La bataille do Fada, " 
. iune Afrigue no. 1366 (11 March 1987): 17; Lemarchand, 12. 
117 Hugo Sada, "France-Libya: Jusqu'oü Paris pout aller, " 
je ne Afrigue no. 1359 (21 January 1987): 31. 
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the runway. "e 
Habre's men then lured a relief column out of Wadi 
Douro, which they ambushed and devastated at Sir Kora; a 
second relief column, sent to rescue the first, was also 
decimated. "' Libya lost roughly 800 men and 100 T-55 
tanks. 120 Four days later Habre personally led his 
forces in an attack on Wadi Doum itself. The base fell 
in just four hours. Libyan losses were again staggering: 
some 1200 dead and 400 captured out of a garrison of more 
than 4,000.121 The losses in materiel--tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, jets, helicopters, missile batteries, 
and ammunition--were even higher. Estimated construction 
costs of the air base alone ran as high as $500 
million. 122 
This time Qaddafi did not have the luxury of 
executing the base commander to ease the sting of 
its Henderson, op. cit., 9. 
119 According to one former Libyan army officer, Qaddafi took 
personal command of operations in Chad after the debacle at Fada, 
and it was he who ordered the counterattack that resulted in the 
disastrous engagements at Bir Kora. See Kadafi/Tchad: Ing. renns 
agre sion, occupation (Livre blanc, edite au Tchad: July 1987). 
120 The best account of which is found in Pollack, 705. 
121 Years later, evidence of the immense carnage at Wadi Doum 
was still horrific. See Lt. Col. Nielly, "Rencontres entre 
Marsouins et Epervier, " Armces d'Aujourd'hui no. 184 (October 
1993): 76. 
122 "Chadian offensives, " International Defense Review 20, 
no. 5 (May 1987): 537; George Henderson, "Qadhafi's final 
curtain?, " Middle East International (3 April 1987): 10. 
351 
defeat. 12' The Libyan general staff surely recognized at 
this point that Faya Largeau was now indefensible, and 
that Libya must abandon its position in central Chad 
(whether Qaddafi also realized this, or had to be led to 
that conclusion, is a question for future historians). 
In any event, the decision was made and the LAF fell back 
from Faya Largeau to the Aouzou Strip. Tripoli then 
systematically reinforced its forces in the Strip until 
they numbered more than 12,000 troops--more than a third 
of the entire Libyan army. 124 Qaddafi's resolve to 
retain the Aouzou Strip had not waned. 
In late July, after a respite of three months, 
Habre's forces renewed their offensive. After a few 
minor actions the Chadians engaged a Libyan reinforced 
armored brigade on August 8,1987 at Oumchi. The Libyans 
were again routed (est. 650 killed, 150 captured) and the 
Chadians easily overran the oasis of Aouzou. After two 
unsuccessful counterattacks, the Libyans managed to 
recapture Aouzou at the end of the month and raided the 
town of Ounianga Kabir. 125 
Scarcely a week later, Habre delivered the most 
decisive blow of the war. Several hundred kilometers 
inside the southern border of Libya proper lay Maatan al- 
123 The Libyan commander was captured during the battle. 
Ironically, he soon joined an exiled opposition group, the 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya, and became the leader 
of its military wing. 
124 Pollack, 706. 
125 George Henderson, "Habre strikes back, " Middle rast-. 
Tntprnational no. 308 (12 September 1987): 11. 
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Sarra, the LAF's principal base of air operations against 
Chad following the fall of Wadi Doum. The soldiers 
stationed there felt themselves distanced from the war in 
Chad; they were unprepared, both psychologically and 
militarily, to defend themselves when the Chadians 
struck. The perimeter defenses collapsed almost 
instantly, and soon the entire base was in Chadian hands. 
Once again, Libya's losses were extraordinary (1700 dead, 
300 captured out of a garrison of roughly 2,500). In 
Tripoli, the state-run news agency insisted that Maatan 
al-Sarra had warded off its attackers, but the admission 
that foreign forces had penetrated Libya was, like the 
attack itself, unprecedented. 126 Shrewd Libyans must 
have discerned that the war effort was in serious 
trouble. 
Though he had often decried the imperialist peril 
along his southern border, it is doubtful that Qaddafi 
ever seriously entertained the notion that his war in 
Chad might spill over into Libya. That he feared the 
French is true, but the French had never taken the 
offensive. As for the Chadians, they had always crumbled 
in the face of Libyan artillery and air power. (In 
dismissing Habre's offensive potential Qaddafi was not 
alone: the Chadians themselves, to say nothing of their 
French and American advisors, were frankly amazed at 
their own success. ) 
Nevertheless, Qaddafi was now facing a real war. 
126 ibid. 
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Behind him stood a demoralized army that had lost some 
5,000 men in less than a year. There stood as well a 
populace that, having sent its sons off to die in an 
unpopular war, was growing bitter and disillusioned. 127 
Qaddafi's nebulous justifications for the war, which had 
been tolerated during the years of few casualties, 
suddenly looked vacuous in the cold light of 1987. Never 
had Libyan national security policy appeared more 
bankrupt, nor its architect more irrational. 
Early in this study we posited that the perpetuation 
of irrationality presupposes an absence of political 
accountability. In a dictatorship, where the mechanisms 
that ensure accountability are either defunct or non- 
existent, it often falls to the generals to restore the 
ship of state to an even keel in times of national 
crisis. The loss of Maatan al-Sarra was the final proof 
that Libya was caught in such a crisis, and (in the 
absence of documentary evidence) one can only speculate 
as to the exchanges that passed between Qaddafi and his 
generals in the following days. Whether they had the 
temerity to point out that the war was going badly or 
maintained a deferential silence, the unspoken threat of 
12' By most accounts, Libyans were never enthused about the 
war in Chad. See, for example, John Davis, Libyan no1iticas 
Tribe and revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), 114; "Libya: Blind confidence, " Africa Confidential 28 
no. 4 (18 February 1987): 3; SWB ME/0821 B/5,20 July 1990. 'Most 
Libyans tend to be quite indifferent to the Aouzou strip, which 
they regard as a piece of desert not worth bloodshed' (El-Kikhia, 
130). 
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a coup d'etat hung heavily in the air. 128 On September 
11,1987, Libya agreed to an OAU-proposed ceasefire. 
Qaddafi's Vietnam was drawing to an end. 
Closure 
The terms of the cease-fire obligated Habre to 
forego further attacks on the Aouzou Strip. This allowed 
Qaddafi to strengthen his toehold there, and he 
accordingly trebled his armored forces near the Chadian 
border during the winter of 1987-1988 and enlarged a 
runway at Tuomo, in Niger, from whence his air force 
could reach southern Chad. 129 Yet when spring came he 
did not launch a new campaign. This was a sagacious 
decision, one that gave the LAF time to recover, kept the 
French position static, and allowed Qaddafi to probe for 
Habre's weaknesses. 
As for the status of the Aouzou Strip, Qaddafi was 
in no hurry to permanently resolve the question; after 
all, the territory was still occupied by Libyan forces 
and the longer they remained, the more likely that the 
territory would eventually be recognized as Libya's. He 
was nevertheless willing to go through the motions of 
diplomacy. In accordance with the ceasefire package 
Libya began discussing its territorial claims with an OAU 
ad hoc committee on Chad as early as September 1987, 
128 "Libya/Chad: A fragile peace, " Africa Confidential 28, 
no. 19 (23 September 1987): 2. 
129 E. A. Wayne, "Libyan border activity sends mixed messages 
to Chad, West, " Christian Science Monitor, 8 March 1988. 
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though the Libyan delegation steadfastly refused to 
consider international arbitration. 130 
This was enough to convince the French to keep Habre 
on a short leash. The Chadian leader was eager to 
complete the liberation of the Aouzou Strip, but France 
refused to provide him with the requisite air cover. 
Consequently, Habre had to tolerate a long string of 
Libyan ceasefire violations. 131 At the urging of Paris 
and the OAU, he restored diplomatic ties with Libya in 
June 1988--one month after Qaddafi cagily declared a 
unilateral truce and offered to recognize the Habre 
government. This paved the way for a meeting (albeit an 
unsuccessful one) with Qaddafi in Bamako, Mali on July 
21-22,1989, to discuss a settlement. The following 
month, on August 31,1989, the foreign ministers of Libya 
and Chad signed the Algiers Accord, pledging to work out 
a settlement by the following year. Failing that, they 
agreed to submit their dispute over the Aouzou Strip to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
From Libya's point of view, the Algiers Accord had 
the admirable quality of postponing a final settlement 
for at least a year and probably much longer, since the 
case would presumably sit before the ICJ for some time. 
Tripoli therefore continued to stall, using a translation 
131 Ronen 1989,556. 
131 There were 272 violations by July 1988 and more than 450 
by January 1989, most of which were reconnaissance flights. 
"Chad: Full circle, " NFSL Newsletter no. 64 (January 1989): 3; 
"Chad/Libya: Gadaffi turns diplomat, " Africa Confidential 29, no. 
13 (1 July 1988): 4. 
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error between the French and Arabic texts of the accord 
to keep discussions knotted around prisoner-of-war issues 
rather than territorial compromise. 132 At one point 
Libya sought to extend the deadline set at Algiers by 
another year so as to further delay things. 133 It 
gradually became clear to journalists, as well as to 
Habre's cabinet, that Libya's participation in the 
diplomatic channel was a purely diversionary measure 
intended to preoccupy N'Djamena while Tripoli developed 
its new military option. 134 
By the same token, the startling concessions Qaddafi 
made in Algiers served to deflect attention from Libya as 
the Colonel gradually applied military pressure to Habrg. 
Although Tripoli had promised to withdraw Libyan forces 
from the Aouzou Strip and allow them to be replaced by an 
African observer force, the modalities of withdrawal were 
relentlessly disputed until Tripoli had essentially 
reneged on this commitment. 
The resumption of conventional military operations 
was obviously far too risky; another disaster like the 
destruction of Maatan al-Sarra might push the LAF into 
rebellion. A low-intensity conflict was needed, 
preferably one with a measure of deniability. paddafi's 
132 "Libyan interference in Chad halts Algiers Accord, " NFSL 
Newsreport 7, no. 1 (January-February 1990): 4-5. 
133 SWB ME/0725 B/1,29 March 1990. 
134 SWB ME/0649 B/1,29 December 1989; George Henderson, 
"Warning for Qadhafi, " Middle East International no. 296 (20 
March 1987): 9. 
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answer was to use his Islamic Legion (an unhappy band of 
press-ganged Muslims who had travelled to Libya in hopes 
of working in the oil fields) to pester Chad with 
guerrilla operations from Darfur province in Sudan. 
Qaddafi's guerrilla war might have fizzled out were 
it not for the timely defection of Idriss Deby, who had 
hitherto served under Habre as army chief of staff. 
Jealous of Deby's popularity, Habre deliberately 
marginalized the young general and soon gained his 
enmity. After failing to unseat Habre in February 1989, 
Deby fled to Sudan with a sizable portion of Habre's 
followers. Deby readily allied himself with the Islamic 
Legion, thus providing Qaddafi with a viable means of 
pressuring Habr6.135 
A series of bitter skirmishes ensued. On October 
30,1989, Chadian forces destroyed an Islamic Legion 
stronghold at the Bamissi oasis on the Chad-Sudan 
border. 136 On March 25,1990, some 2000 of Ddby's men 
occupied a number of Chadian border posts. The timing of 
this incursion was no accident, since the OAU ad hoc 
committee on the Aouzou Strip was due to convene the next 
day in Libreville. After repelling the incursion HabrO's 
forces captured a Libyan convoy inside Darfur in May, 
which became another sticking point between N'Djamena and 
135 SWB ME/0783111,8 June 1990. 
136 SWB ME/0605 B/3,4 November 1989. 
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Tripoli. 137 Negotiations seemed increasingly pointless. 
On August 31,1990, Libya submitted its case for the 
Aouzou Strip to the International Court of Justice with 
the sardonic observation that it had become 'difficult to 
reach an agreement' bilaterally. 138 
In the following weeks things fell apart. France 
refused to intercede on Habre's behalf, and Deby's forces 
(well armed by Libya) won the day. 139 On December 1, 
1990, Habre fled the country. Deby assumed control of 
Chad. 
This was, as one periodical wrote, 'sweet revenge' 
for Qaddafi. 140 Deby's success placed a pro-Libyan 
government in N'Djamena, a goal Libya had sought for two 
decades. Some 400 Libyan POWs were released to Libya, 
and the bodies of several prominent Libyans killed in 
Chad were also returned. Even Washington concluded 
Qaddafi had won, and the U. S. therefore evacuated the 
Libyan opposition guerrillas that the CIA had been 
training in Chad and that Qaddafi wanted repatriated. '"1 
Was Deby's triumph Qaddafi's victory as well? With 
time it became clear that it was not. Once in power, 
137 Peter Hiett, "Libya and Chad: Flare up, " Middle East 
International no. 376, (25 May 1990): 12-13. 
138 SWB ME/086511,10 September 1990. 
139 SWB ME/0758 B/3-4,8 May 1990; "Libyan-backed rebels oust 
Chad's president, " NFSL Newsreport 7, no. 6 (November-December 
1990): 4-5; Nolutshungu, 242-243. 
140 "Libya: A good year for Gadaffi, " Africa Confidential 31, 
no. 25 (21 December 1990): 1-2. 
141 Africa Confidential 31, no. 25 (21 December 1990): 1-2. 
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Deby no longer felt beholden to the Colonel. There was 
no talk of union between the 'fraternal peoples. ' Deby 
rejected Libya's claim to the Aouzou Strip. And while 
Libya did not re-establish a military presence in Chad, 
France retained its own military mission. '" 
In fact, the eminently pragmatic French deftly made 
Qaddafi's man their own. Not only did Operation Epervier 
survive the Habre-Deby transition, but military ties 
between France and the new government actually grew. In 
January 1992, when Habre's followers mounted an anti-Ddby 
insurgency, France sent troops in a move that--though 
ostensibly aimed at protecting French nationals in Chad-- 
amounted to tacit support of the new government. Months 
later, in September 1992, France supplemented Epervier 
with a military assistance mission to assist in the 
professionalization of Chad's armed forces. 143 
Furthermore, France kept the Deby government afloat 
through annual grants of $18.5 million. 144 France's on- 
going military presence was a bitter pill for the Libyan 
leader. 1f5 
The advent of the Deby government did not bring 
142 The French mission continued until 1996, when it died in 
Paris at the hands of the accountants. See Col. Jean-Marc 
Jantet, "Dispositif epervier, " Armces d'aujourd'hui (March 1994): 
42. 
143 Romain Lefebvre, "Au bonheur des 'DAMI' ... 
d'auiourd'hui no. 196 (December-January 1995): 70-73. 
144 Mark Huband, "Libya and Sudan extend influence, " 
r ristian Science Monitor, 24 June 1992. 
145 FBIS-NES-94-108,6 June 1994,15-17. 
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Qaddafi a reprieve on the Aouzou Strip. On February 3, 
1994, the ICJ rejected Libya's claim to the Aouzou Strip 
in a 16 to 1 ruling. 146 Qaddafi, perhaps because Libya 
had won its previous disputes before the ICJ, had 
apparently not decided in advance whether he would 
respect the court's ruling. JANA and Libyan state 
television passed over the ruling in silence that 
evening. 147 For the next few weeks Libya blew hot and 
cold. Immediately after the ICJ's ruling, some 400 
Chadians in Libya were reportedly arrested, apparently to 
serve as bargaining pieces. 148 Moreover, Tripoli 
reinforced its forces in the Aouzou Strip. 149 Finally, 
Libya demanded a quid pro quo from the Chad: the return 
of 500 Libyan POWs who joined the Libyan opposition and 
were evacuated to the U. S. when the Habrd regime fell. 150 
Since Chad was patently unable to fulfill this demand 
even if it wished to do so, Tripoli was in fact 
threatening to ignore the ICJ's decision. 
Then, unexpectedly, Qaddafi declared his conflict 
with Chad 'definitely finished, ' and sent his foreign 
lea "Court rejects Libya claim on Chad, " International Herald 
Tribune, 4 February 1994. 
1" Christian Chartier, "La bande d'Aozou est attribude au 
Tchad par la Cour internationale de justice, " Le Monde, 5 
February 1994. 
148 George Joffe, "Aozou setback, " Middle East International, 
18 March 1994. 
149 "Tchad: la Libye renforcerait son dispositif militaire 
a Aozou, " Le Monde, 15 February 1994. 
150 George Joffe, "Aouzou setback, " Middle Act 
Tntprnational, 18 March 1994. 
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minister to work out the details of Libya's 
withdrawal. 151 On June 3,1994, Deby paid an official 
visit to Libya in gratitude. The following day Libya and 
Chad signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation two 
days later. 
Qaddafi's sudden change of heart was inspired by 
broader geostrategic concerns and not by any abrupt burst 
of munificence. Escaping the hold of UN sanctions 
(imposed after the Lockerbie/UTA bombings) had become 
Tripoli's foremost foreign policy concern. Foreign 
Minister Umar al-Muntasir made it clear that Libya 
expected to be rewarded for its withdrawal (which was 
'not in Libya's interests'), preferably by having the UN 
Security Council terminate sanctions. 152 Unfortunately 
for Tripoli, the Security Council was unmoved. The 
sanctions remained in place, and the Aouzou Strip 
remained in Chadian hands. Rather than accept defeat 
gracefully, Qaddafi gave a typically vitriolic speech in 
which he argued that France no longer had a justification 
for keeping forces in Chad. 153 
The Chad which Qaddafi eyed in 1994 could not, in 
any objective sense, be construed as significantly more 
or less threatening to Libya than the Chad of 1975, or 
1980, or 1985. Yet at the last hour, Qaddafi accepted 
151 "Tchad: le conflit tchado-libyen est <<ddfinitivement 
termine» , selon le colonel Kadhafi, 
" Le Monde, 7 MarCh 1994. 
152 FBIS-NES-94-109,7 June 1994,24-25. 
153 SWB ME/2016 MED/19,7 June 1994. 
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the end of his ambitions in Chad with stunning 
equanimity. This above all meant that the untold 
millions of dollars spent on the war effort had been 
squandered, that the thousands of lives lost had been 
wasted, that the victories won had been hollow and the 
defeats endured had been meaningless. 
When it is remembered at all, Libya's war in Chad is 
usually recalled only by military historians. All too 
often, it is then reduced to an aside on desert warfare, 
leaving one with the vivid if simplistic image of nomadic 
warriors in Toyota pick-ups routing a sluggish, reluctant 
Libyan army. 154 This is a lamentable injustice to a 
story which is far more complex and infinitely more 
compelling: a tale of thwarted ambition, of multiple 
betrayals, of power and impotence, of best laid plans 
gone awry. 
Lawrence Freedman has made the point that wars are 
most often fought when the outcome is in doubt. "5 So it 
was in Chad, where Qaddafi always thought he glimpsed 
victory through the fog of blood and smoke. There were, 
at least until 1987, good reasons for him to harbor 
optimism. In theory, the LAF's superior arsenal should 
have conferred an overwhelming advantage to Libyan units 
154 s. v. "Chad" in R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Mlg 
rnii{n4 encyclopedia of military history, fourth edition, 
(London: ECA, 1993), 1538-1539. 
155 Freedman, 4. 
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when arrayed against the impoverished Chadians. 
Likewise, Qaddafi's tenacity gave him an advantage over 
the French, whose will to fight was questionable. 
Moreover, with Chad already fragmented by civil war there 
was rarely a shortage of clients willing to sign on with 
Tripoli. The confluence of these factors repeatedly 
placed victory within Libya's jaws ... yet Tripoli 
always tasted defeat. Why? 
The answer lay in Qaddafi's unerring ability to 
shoot himself in the foot. His efforts to conquer Chad 
in 1978 provoked French intervention and stalemate; 
Qaddafi's subsequent mishandling of his client led to a 
humiliating military defeat. His attempt to swallow up 
Chad through 'unification' in 1981 engendered a hailstorm 
of criticism and international support for his enemies; 
further unravelling of his partnership with Goukouni 
caused him to abruptly abandon Chad altogether. His 1983 
offensive produced France's Operation Manta, which 
checked his ambitions. That he duped Mitterand into 
withdrawing in 1984 is true, but this was not as clever 
as it seemed since he merely lowered the threshold for 
French re-engagement. Predictably, his decision to renew 
hostilities in early 1986 led to France's Operation 
Epervier--again stopping the Libyan forces in their 
tracks. Finally, Qaddafi once more alienated Goukouni's 
FAP and thus precipitated a united anti-Libyan front 
which routed Libya's forces, pushed the LAF back into the 
Aouzou Strip, and destroyed a major military base in 
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Libya itself. While the immediate causes of any one of 
these setbacks were specific in time and place, their 
cumulative history revealed an unmistakable and by now 
familiar pattern of self-defeating behavior. 
This counterproductive behavior originated firstly 
in a lack of accountability: so far as Qaddafi himself 
was concerned, the costs of his Chad policy were quite 
low during most of the war. Chad's debility was a 
veritable invitation to meddle. N'Djamena had no 
effectual means of retaliating against subversion, a fact 
made apparent when the Tombalbaye government was obliged 
to restore relations with Tripoli less than a year after 
fending off what it called a Libyan-backed putsch, and 
again when the Malloum government reluctantly reconciled 
with Tripoli after another Libyan sponsored coup attempt 
in April 1976.156 
Qaddafi's counterproductive choices were also rooted 
in his world view. Though the leader of a Third World 
state, Qaddafi did not see himself as such, or conceive 
of Libya's security in terms befitting its stature. As 
John Wright notes, Libya's repeated incursions into Chad 
'more closely resembled the obsessive behavior of a 
superpower than that of a developing country. 1157 
Such pretensions could not be indulged without cost 
to the nation state, even if its leader could dodge the 
personal political fallout. Should the financial costs 
156 Neuberger, 32. 
15' Wright, 133. 
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of the war ever be tallied by some future historian they 
will no doubt be staggering. According to Wright, Libya 
spent as much as two million dollars per day on the war 
effort during the height of its fighting in Chad. 'so By 
conservative estimates the Jamahiriya lost at least $1 
billion worth of military equipment in Chad during 1987 
alone. 159 This was money that could have been poured 
into national development rather than being squandered on 
ephemeral notions of security. 
The strategic costs were no less high. Libya's 
enemies used Chad to wage a proxy war against the regime 
in Tripoli, completing the 'southern front' which Qaddafi 
ostensibly sought to preclude. 160 Thousands of soldiers 
were killed or taken captive as a result. Libya itself 
was briefly invaded. The Aouzou Strip was forfeited. 
African states that had once viewed Tripoli with 
tolerance and sympathy now looked upon Libya with 
suspicion and hostility. As Nolutshungu writes, 'There 
can be little doubt that Tripoli's diplomacy undermined 
both its own aims and those of its Chadian allies. '161 
Truly, Qaddafi's war in Chad was cut from the cloth of 
Libyan national security policy. 
At the beginning of this chapter we posed the 
158 Africa Confidential, 21 September 1983. 
159 Anthony H. Cordesman, After the storm (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1993), 134. 
160 SWB ME/6665/A/6-8,5 March 1981. 






question, 'Is war rational? ' Using the analytical 
framework employed throughout this study, we determined 
that those wars which manifestly fail to accomplish their 
objectives and instead accomplish quite the opposite 
should be deemed irrational. Libya's war in Chad was 
such a war, but it was neither the first nor (one fears) 
the last of its kind. In point of fact, Nasser too was 
guilty of leading his nation into a disastrous war. But 
Nasser at least had the wisdom not to needlessly cheapen 
his nation's suffering. This wisdom was lost on his 
would-be protege. On at least one occasion Qaddafi 
bitterly blamed his countrymen for dragging Libya into a 
pointless war. 162 This was cruel even as jest; beneath 
the cruelty, however, one detects a begrudging admission 
that the entire adventure had not only been futile but 
that Libya's losses had far outstripped its gains. As we 
shall see in the following chapter, Qaddafi (like the 
heads of most authoritarian states) was not oblivious to 
unpleasant reality--especially when his own survival was 
at stake. 
162 "Libya: Looking for friends, " Afr{ ca Confidential 28, no. 
16 (5 August 1987): 5. 
Chapter 6: 
The Primacy of Internal Security 
Theoretically, this is genuine democracy. 
But realistically, the strong always rule ... 
-- Muammar El Qaddafi, 
The Green Book' 
The preceding chapters have been devoted to 
establishing the accuracy of this study's principal 
contention, that Libyan national security policy after 
1969 was irrational, and that this irrationality was 
primarily attributable to the leadership of Muammar El 
Qaddafi. Having operationally defined irrationality as 
the consistent practice of counterproductive behavior, we 
saw that such a pattern could be detected in Libya's 
foreign affairs during the period in question. Reasoning 
from the premise that all humans have innate tendencies 
towards irrationality but that these tendencies are 
generally held in check by learned behavior, we addressed 
the subsidiary question, 'Why are leaders irrational? ' 
We hypothesized that the answer is both systemic (because 
they can afford to be) and internal (because individuals 
may have value systems which predispose them to self- 
defeating behavior). Both of these factors were manifest 
in the formulation and implementation of the external 
1 Muammar El Qaddafi, The green book (Tripoli: Public 




dimensions of Libyan national security policy. 
This study would be incomplete if these propositions 
were not tested against Libya's internal security 
policies as well. In fact, internal security may well be 
the most important litmus test of this thesis since it 
constitutes the paramount security preoccupation of most 
Third World states. Much of the Third World security 
predicament can be seen as a conflict between the 
dictates of state-making and the demands of liberal 
political ideals. 2 The paths which most developing 
countries followed to statehood--an anti-colonialist 
struggle, a revolution or a coup--favored authoritarian 
leadership structures which easily evolved into 
dictatorships. As Barry Rubin notes, leaders who came to 
power by such means found it difficult 'to conceive of 
opponents as anything other than traitors. 93 
Nevertheless, new states could not make policy in a 
vacuum; as the century progressed they were increasingly 
forced to contend with the spread of liberal ideals and 
concomitant expectations of political participation and 
human rights. Sham elections, the ubiquitous sop to such 
expectations, were nonetheless an admission that in an 
era marked by the slow spread of democracy, 
unrepresentative regimes were inherently insecure. 
2 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World security predicament, 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 15. 
3 Harry Rubin, Modern dictators: Third world coup makers 
¢trong , and ooou 
ist tyrants, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 
28-29. 
369 
Exploring the domestic dimension of the Third World 
security predicament obliges us to acknowledge one of the 
more intriguing theoretical debates in strategic studies: 
who or what is the appropriate object of internal 
security? The very phrase implicitly suggests the state 
has interests distinct from--and perhaps in conflict 
with--those of its citizens, and thus leads into an even 
more fundamental debate over the nature and rights of the 
state. To what extent the survival of the state should 
take precedence over the interests of its citizens is a 
perplexing question both in the abstract and in the day 
to day operation of the polity. The question becomes 
particularly poignant in the Third World, where control 
of the state often resides within a narrow social 
stratum--a particular religious or ethnic group, a given 
political party, or a traditional elite. In such cases 
use of the more limited concept of regime security may be 
appropriate, since it infers the divergence between 
societal security and the security of the ruling class. 
Qaddafi tried to blur the disjunction between his 
own interests and those of ordinary Libyans by concocting 
banal syllogisms (e. g., the revolution is the people, 
hence all the people are revolutionaries, therefore there 
are no anti-revolutionaries in Libya) and by pretending 
that the Libyan state itself had ceased to exist, that it 
had truly become a 'state of the masses' where there was 
no need for representative government and where 'people's 
security' prevailed, thereby obviating the need for 
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police forces and even for the military. The reality of 
Qaddafi's brave new world was less utopian. Institutions 
of control not only survived the advent of the so-called 
'non-state, ' they flourished. 4 A state by any other 
name, it seemed, was still a state. 
Thus, Qaddafi's Jamahiriya--no less than any other 
state--felt itself threatened by and in turn threatened 
and coerced its citizenry to ensure the regime's 
security. Shortly after coming to power, the Libyan 
leader spelled out his understanding of the imperatives 
of internal security in the Third World. Military 
regimes, he said, were liable to 'intrigues and 
liquidation. 's The problem was partly one of 
underdevelopment: 
I believe that they (coups) are inevitable at 
this stage since the newly-independent states 
suffer from chronic problems that many regimes 
fail to tackle ... So long as these problems 
exist without solution ... (the coups) will 
continue. 6 
But the question of internal security was also, he added, 
a matter of keeping the army, police and intelligence 
services in line. In this Qaddafi was largely 
successful, and if (per our hypothesis) consistent 
counterproductive behavior indicates irrationality, then 
consistent success augurs for rationality. We must 
4 John Davis, Libyan Politics: Tribe and rpvptutinr 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press): 217. 
5 In an interview with Bassam Freiha for Al-Anwar, 2 August 
1974. 
6 In an interview with Dara Janikovic, 29 April 1974, for a 
Zagreb newspaper. 
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therefore take Qaddafi's political survival as evidence 
that his internal security policies were reasonably 
efficacious and rational. 
Such a result not only accords with but is in fact 
anticipated by the proposition that irrationality is the 
luxury of those who are unaccountable, whereas 
rationality is essentially enforced by circumstance on 
those who must answer for their conduct. In the 
totalitarian state, those who aspire to power must be 
prepared to take it by force, as Qaddafi himself did in 
1969. Thus, internal challengers of any stripe 
implicitly placed Qaddafi's very survival at stake, 
thereby imposing a degree of accountability on him rarely 
achieved by external actors. In other words, systemic 
conditions compelled Qaddafi to be rational. Those who 
invoke Qaddafi's survival as proof of his overall 
rationality ignore this dynamic which differentiated 
Libya's internal security policies from its external 
behavior. 
If an essentially rational internal security policy 
can coexist with an irrational external security policy, 
how might the two correlate? External security policies 
obviously have internal consequences; so too domestic 
security arrangements have external ramifications. In 
the case of Libya we may posit that the primacy placed 
upon Qaddafi's survival acted as an irrationality 
coefficient, with deleterious effects on foreign and 
defence policy. There are sound theoretical grounds for 
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suspecting such a correlation. As Barry Buzan points 
out, domestic factors always impede the formation of 
rational national security policy. When they dominate 
decision making--as when the preservation of a regime 
becomes the state's prime security objective--they 
produce myopia, insensitivity, and inconsistency. In 
short, states in such a condition 'cannot be cool, 
calculating and rational actors in relation to the 
international dimension of the national security 
problem. ' 
So it was with Qaddafi. His refusal to tolerate any 
political opposition tended to channel those disaffected 
with his rule into sedition and extremism. Preoccupation 
with his political survival blurred his judgement in 
foreign af fairs, ' sparking a counterproductive terrorist 
campaign against Libyan exiles--the infamous 'mad dog' 
killings. Likewise, subjugating national security 
objectives such as the professionalization of the 
military to internal security priorities contributed to 
embarrassing military debacles. Thus, Libyan internal 
security policy--though rational in and of itself--was 
inextricably bound up with the overarching irrationality 
of the state's behavior. 
In assessing the application and ramifications of 
such policies, it is helpful to make use of Buzan's 
typology of threats posed by the state to its citizenry: 
7 Barry Buzan, eop]e, States & F_ay, second ed., (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 355-359. 
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first, threats incidental to law making and enforcement; 
second, threats resulting from direct state action 
against specific groups or individuals; third, threats 
arising from struggles for control of the state 
machinery; and fourth, threats engendered by the state's 
external security policies. ' The first three facets of 
Buzan's typology serve as an organizational matrix for 
this chapter. 
I. Disallowing dissent: The Libyan legal system 
All states protect themselves from their discontents 
by turning their legal apparatus against those who engage 
in sedition or revolt--offenses which, in totalitarian 
societies, are defined rather broadly. As recounted in 
Chapter 1, it did not take long for Qaddafi and his 
comrades in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to 
lay the legal foundation of a police state. 9 An RCC 
decree of December 11,1969, prohibited anti- 
revolutionary activity in the broadest of terms 
('inciting propaganda against the revolutionary 
republican system ... stirring hatred and disunity 
... spreading rumors ... demonstrating or striking') 
and made such offenses punishable by three to fifteen 
years imprisonment. This was merely the beginning of 
8 Buzan, 44. 
9 The best analysis of which is found in Amnesty 
International's report, "Libya: Amnesty International's prisoner 
concerns in the light of recent legal reforms, " June 1991. 
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what soon became an intimidating body of law. Law 71 of 
1972 defined all political party activity as treasonous 
and made its practice punishable by death. In 1975 the 
authorities amended the penal code to make the 
dissemination of ideas critical of the existing social 
and political structure (i. e., democracy) punishable by 
death. A May 1979 law on economic crimes promised life 
imprisonment or death for those 'guilty of sabotage in 
oil establishments or subsidiaries or any public 
establishment, or warehouse of raw materials, products or 
consumer goods. "° 
That such laws could be promulgated without 
generating the slightest degree of protest was indicative 
of the arrested development of Libyan civil society when 
Qaddafi came to power. Neither tradition nor the 
experience of decolonization had prepared Libyans to 
expect anything other than a police state. The average 
Libyan had precious little experience with representative 
government. His cultural and political frontiers were 
largely limited to the Arab world, where totalitarian 
rule was still de riguer and human rights were given 
short shrift. His memories were of the Italian 
occupation--a less than sterling introduction to Western 
political values--and of the Sanusi monarchy, which was 
certainly no bastion of civil liberty either. The 
io SWB ME/6106/A/6,2 May 1979. 
il For example, a protest against shady election returns in 
early 1952 was quelled by Tripoli's police; twelve people died 
and many were injured. The U. S. Ambassador, Henry Villard, 
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elite few who had been exposed to liberal democracy were 
scions of the monarchy, and stood to gain the most from 
keeping such values at bay. 
As a result, Libyans disputed neither their new laws 
nor their arbitrary enforcement. Nor did they protest 
when even the few rights accorded to them by law were 
soon suspended in practice. The needs of the revolution 
simply came first, and determining those needs was the 
prerogative of Qaddafi's band. As the Libyan leader 
himself explained: 
He (a government official) is in charge of 
everything and nobody can say no to him. 
Anyone who said no would be seen as 
collaborating with the enemy. He (the 
official) has the right to shoot him dead, 
often without a trial or with a summary trial 
lasting no more than a few minutes. The 
revolution would be doomed without this. 12 
The climate took on a pall of fear and suspicion. 
Citizens were encouraged to inform on neighbors and 
relatives so that the 'people's justice' could be meted 
out: 
Every street should have a people's court. And 
everyone who notices corruption should report 
it to the court, whose address should be given 
and declared. You see so and so behaved 
corruptly, you immediately report him ... 
This way we can end corruption, each one 
reports on the other in order to rid the 
country of this corruption. 13 
According to Qaddafi's political theories, people thus 
expressed approval of the King's ability to maintain domestic 
order. John Wright, Libya: A modern history, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1981), 77-78. 
12 SWB ME/2632 MED/299,7 June 1996. 
13 SWB ME/0709/A/2,10 March 1990. 
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empowered to police themselves did not need the state to 
administer justice, maintain order, or defend against 
internal threats. The police were duly renamed the 
'Police at the Service of the People and the Revolution' 
and later the 'People's Security Force. t14 
Libyans viewed such verbal shellgames with 
incredulity. For a state that was supposedly not a state 
at all, theirs was awash with institutions of control. 
Some were political, such as the People's Congresses and 
People's Committees. Many more were of a police or 
paramilitary nature; the regime supported a baffling and 
intentionally redundant array of intelligence and 
security services. These included Military Intelligence, 
the Jamahiriya Security Organization (which dealt with 
foreign intelligence and covert operations), the 
Revolutionary Committees (which also collected foreign 
and domestic intelligence and conducted its own covert 
operations), the Jamahiri (aka Republican) Guards (whose 
job it was to keep the Libyan Armed Forces [LAF] in 
line), and a Deterrence Brigade (possibly composed of 
Jamahiri Guardsmen, the brigade was tasked with smashing 
any coup attempt). Last but not least came Qaddafi's 
hand-picked corps of female bodyguards--an idiosyncratic 
solution to the problem of personal security that, 
whatever its utility, was a perennial source of amusement 
14 Jean Tartter, "National security, " in Libya: A _ount. -ý. 
fix, ed. Helen Metz, (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1989), 285. 
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for visiting diplomats and journalists. 15 
This plethora of services was just the tip of the 
iceberg. Early in his rule Qaddafi gave each of the 
country's regional governates a security directorate with 
responsibility for the police and militia forces as well 
as the civil defence volunteers in the area. 16 This 
division of labor survived with few changes into the 
1990s. The governors of each of the five internal 
security directorates (kata'ib)--Tripoli, Sirte, 
Ajdabiya, Tobruk, and Sebha--reported directly to 
Qaddafi. Each commanded a detachment of 200 to 400 
agents with which to eradicate any sign of rebellion. 17 
In addition, the Ministries (later the People's 
Committees) of the Interior and Justice, the LAF, the 
People's Militia, and the secret police were all tasked 
with internal security duties, and their jurisdictions 
inevitably overlapped. 
Since the time of-the Mamelukes--the slave-warriors 
recruited to defend an Arab dynasty who ended up usurping 
power in the thirteenth century--astute Arab rulers had 
kept a watchful eye on their praetorian guards. Qaddafi 
15 "Libya: The limits of tolerance, " Africa Confidential 27, 
no. 19 (17 September 1986) : 8; see also Jane Kokan, "In love with 
Gaddafi, " BBC focus on Africa 6, no. 3 (July-September 1995): 4- 
8. 
16 The revolution of 1st September: The fourth anniversary 
(Benghazi: Libyan Arab Republic Ministry of Information and 
Culture, 1973), 114-116. 
17 Moncef Djaziri, "Libye: Chronique Interieure, " in 
nýý""ý{+-p de L'afriaue du nord 1992, vol. 31, (Paris: CNRS 
Editions, 1992), 760. 
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was therefore quick to realize that his security forces, 
by acquiring the strength to ensure that no other 
institution could threaten him, necessarily became 
threats themselves. " Neither this problem nor its 
solution was exclusive to the Arab world. Historian John 
Keegan, in describing the competition between the German 
army and the SS observes that Hitler 'impelled by the 
logic of the dictatorship principle--Führerprinzip--was 
hellbent on enlarging and compounding the divisions 
implicit in his own system. 119 Compelled by the same 
logic, Qaddafi employed the same strategy of pitting his 
defenders against one another and paring back those that 
accrued too much power unto themselves. 
Thus, Libyan internal security was a zero-sum game 
in which any increase in the regime's security was offset 
by a corresponding rise in the unpredictability and 
insecurity of the society as a whole. Like China during 
the cultural revolution which Qaddafi sought to 
replicate, Libya became a bewildering and chaotic place. 
In dealing with the state, the ordinary Libyan faced a 
morass of officials with concentric areas of jurisdiction 
and fuzzy limits to authority. Determining when a 
policeman or local politician was exceeding his authority 
18 For example, an elite unite in Benghazi reportedly 
attempted to mount a coup d'etat in late July 1975. "Paper in 
Cairo reports a coup in Libya foiled, " New York Times, 5 August 
1975. 
19 John Keegan, The mask of command, (New York: Viking, 
1987), 273. 
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became an almost Sisyphean task. 20 Moreover, the astute 
citizen was beset by the unsettling thought that 
distinguishing one's self as a zealous supporter of the 
regime might have the dangerous effect of attracting 
attention in the next round of purges. 
As with any large organization, widespread 
redundancies produced inefficiencies. After a serious 
coup d'etat attempt almost succeeded in October 1975, 
Qaddafi tried to restore order by placing the security 
services under one roof, which he dubbed the office for 
the Security of the Revolution. 21 But the existing 
bureaucracies proved too strong, and the new, under- 
empowered office slipped into oblivion. It took years 
for Qaddafi to again admit that too many bodies had been 
given emergency policing powers. Angered by bureaucratic 
turf wars, he declared in 1989: 
The Jamahiriyah security apparatus must also be 
abolished because complaints are mounting 
against it and its violations are on the 
increase, added to the competition it is 
engaging in with the Foreign (Ministry). The 
Jamahiriyah security apparatus must be 
abolished. It duplicates security work with the 
(Bureau of) Investigations ... 
Still the duplications of effort persisted. Agents of 
military intelligence, the military police, the Bureau of 
20 For a graphic illustration, see Davis, 138-140,221. 
21 Wright, 187. For similar reasons, Qaddafi was compelled 
to create an 'Office of External Security' in the early 1980s as 
well. Andrew Rathmell, "Libya's intelligence and security 
services, " International Defense Review 24, no. 7 (1991): 696. 
22 SWB ME/0361/A/2,18 January 1989. 
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Investigation, and the Revolutionary Committees were all 
authorized to arrest, interrogate, and issue verdicts. 23 
In addition to deterring insurrection, the Libyan 
regime hoped that its security services would inspire 
citizens to actively support the government's 
initiatives. But, like people everywhere, Libyans were 
generally more concerned with their own prosperity and 
comfort than with reordering society. The People's 
Congresses and Committees--the chief adornments of 
Qaddafi's Third Universal Theory, which purported to 
remedy the ills of representative democracy--were unable 
to overcome the widespread political apathy that greeted 
each new chapter in Qaddafi's revolution. If anything, 
they were instead having a centrifugal effect as 
committees, congresses and even local police forces 
became aligned with regional or tribal interests. 24 
What was needed, Qaddafi thought, was a new corps of 
political shock troops. In May 1976 he unveiled his 
solution, the Revolutionary Committees. The Committees' 
task was to galvanize--and supervise--the lackadaisical 
People's Congresses and Committees. Revolutionary 
Committees soon coalesced in every major city and in most 
organizations. 'Committees everywhere' became the 
surreal battle cry of Libyan politics. In March 1979 the 
now omnipresent Revolutionary Committees were given veto 
power over the membership of the People's Congresses and 
23 Amnesty International, June 1991,1. 
24 Davis, 142-44,223-24. 
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Committees. 25 Scarcely a year later, in February 1980, 
they supplanted the regular judiciary as well. Qaddafi 
authorized the Revolutionary Committees to hold ad hoc 
courts and to dispense revolutionary (i. e., cursory) 
justice. 26 Human rights advocates drily noted that cases 
tried in this manner fell short of international 
standards for fair trial. 27 
In fact, the Revolutionary Committees were 
responsible for many of the worst abuses of the Qaddafi 
era. They allegedly maintained a torture center in 
Tripoli (rivalled by a similar center in the basement of 
the Military Intelligence Headquarters). 28 And it was 
they who carried out the Colonel's order of February 6, 
1980, to 'liquidate' expatriate Libyans who refused to 
come home (although the Colonel later stressed that this 
responsibility could not be 'restricted to the 
revolutionary committees alone ... every Libyan who 
travels abroad ... is then responsible for the 
elimination of its [Libya's] enemies' ). 2'9 Fifteen Libyan 
expatriates--'stray dogs' in Qaddafi's parlance--were 
murdered that year alone. Several of the attacks were 
25 Hanspeter Mattes, "The rise and fall of the Revolutionary 
Committees, " Oadhafi's Libya: 1969 to 1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle, 
(London: Macmillan, 1995), 100. 
26 Mattes, 101. 
27 Amnesty International, June 1991,6. 
28 Amnesty international, "Violations of human rights in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, " 20 November 1984,9. 
29 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984,2. 
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intentionally gruesome. In Athens, the killers of two 
Libyan students painted revolutionary slogans on the wall 
in the victim's blood. In England, the young children of 
another dissident were sickened after eating poisoned 
peanuts left by a would-be assassin. Astoundingly, the 
Libyan government acknowledged that such attacks were a 
matter of policy. In a letter to Amnesty International, 
one Libyan foreign ministry official proudly wrote: 'many 
countries liquidate their political enemies secretly, 
only the Jamahiriya publicly announces this policy. 10 
The 'stray dogs' campaign was essentially an 
overreaction to the emergence of expatriate opposition 
groups, groups which--notwithstanding their sponsorship 
by Western intelligence agencies--posed scant threat to 
the Libyan regime. Yet the campaign had a deeper 
significance insomuch as it reflected Qaddafi's 
aspirations to Great Power status. By demonstrating that 
he could assassinate exiles in almost any industrialized 
country--Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States-- 
Qaddafi was giving the world notice that he was not to be 
trifled with, and would not be constrained by 
international norms. Qaddafi was a law unto himself. 31 
Of course, Libya was unable to sustain such behavior with 
impunity and therefore chose to end the campaign in mid- 
30 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984,2. 
31 As Qaddafi put it, 'Revolutionary law and revolutionary 
doctrine do not recognize international institutions. They only 
recognize the language of revolution. ' "Qaddafi commemorates 
coup, " New York Times, 2 September 1985. 
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1980 (although it was briefly resumed in 1985). The 
assassinations nevertheless provided a striking example 
of how internal security objectives propelled the ship of 
state into counterproductive waters. 
The Revolutionary Committees penetrated the military 
and police forces in 1979. They were not welcomed by the 
officers corp, who viewed committee apparatchiks with the 
universal loathing of professional soldiers for political 
minders. But there were no open displays of contempt. 
Committee members had more authority then the officers 
they worked alongside of, ranks notwithstanding. 32 The 
committees, eager to exhibit their revolutionary zeal, 
denounced the officers as bourgeois fascists--which was 
not so far-fetched as it sounded at first. Many soldiers 
moonlighted at other jobs, and according to one Libyan 
shopkeeper, 'A military dinar is worth two civilian 
dinars. 1 33 In 1983 the Committees' newspaper, Al Zahf Al 
Akhdar, launched a blistering series of attacks on the 
officer corps. (Ironically, many Committee members 
enjoyed even greater perks than did military officers). " 
By mid-decade the Revolutionary Committees had 
sprouted a paramilitary wing, the Revolutionary Guards 
32 Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, "The transformation of 
mass political institutions in revolutionary Libya: Structural 
solutions to a behavioral problem, " Social ahd economic 
, ýaý, o1 pment in Libya, ed. George Joffe and Keith McLachlan, 
(Wisbech: MENAS Press, 1982), 259. 
33 Davis, 221. 
34 Judith Miller, God has -ninety-nine names, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996): 226-227. 
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(also known as the Republican or Jamahiri Guards). 
Comprised of some 1000 to 2000 members of the Qaddadfa 
tribe, the Guards were armed with weapons ranging from 
tanks and armored personnel carriers to anti-aircraft 
missiles. The duplication of effort was again 
intentional, and marked the second time Qaddafi had tried 
to break the LAF's monopoly of armed force; in 1973 he 
launched a gendarmerie known as the People's Militia. 
The poorly equipped and virtually untrained militia, 
however, was scorned by the LAF. The Revolutionary 
Guards proved more formidable. They were entrusted with 
ferreting out threats to the regime, and allegedly 
arrested thousands in the aftermath of a May 1985 coup 
attempt. Moreover, they were reportedly made the 
custodians of ammunition at major military bases. " This 
arrangement may have broken down after the 1986 bombings, 
when some anti-aircraft crews were reportedly unable to 
load their weapons because the ammunition was locked up. 
Indeed, 1985 was probably the high-water mark for 
the Revolutionary Committees as a whole. 36 The following 
year the LAF muscled their minders into the background, 
apparently taking advantage of mistakes Revolutionary 
Guard units made during the U. S. attacks. Moreover, the 
adventurism of the Revolutionary Committees (i. e., the 
assassination of Libyan dissidents) had been instrumental 
in derailing relations with Washington even before the 
35 Tartter, 257. 
36 Mattes, 107. 
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bombings. Thus, even Mattes, not a scholar to exaggerate 
Libya's faults, concedes that 'by the end of the decade 
(the actions of the Revolutionary Committees) had become 
counterproductive to the pursuit of revolution. ' 37 
Qaddafi himself acknowledged that the Revolutionary 
Committees had grown a little too zealous in 
'liquidating' dissidents--and even some of their own 
members--for deviating 'either in behaviour or in 
conviction. 138 Although Qaddafi had sanctioned and 
directed these ultimately counterproductive activities, 
blame could only safely be apportioned to the Committees. 
Within two years the Revolutionary Committees 
evolved from brownshirts to scapegoats, becoming the 
foremost target of a series of domestic reforms Qaddafi 
unleashed in early 1988. He abolished the extraordinary 
courts, thereby depriving the Committees of their most 
powerful weapon, and created a Secretariat of Jamahiri 
Mobilization and Revolutionary Guidance to bring the 
Revolutionary Committees to heel. 
Qaddafi instituted a number of additional reforms to 
prevent such abuses from recurring, but this 
liberalization proved fleeting. After repeatedly urging 
that the death penalty be abolished, Qaddafi thought 
better of relinquishing--even if only in theory--his 
ultimate coercive tool: 
There is no surgery without blood ... serious 
37 ibid., 106. 
38 SWB ME/0245/A/4,1 September 1988. 
386 
transformations (of society) ... can only be 
achieved through a huge number of victims and 
blood. 39 
Accordingly, he rescinded the prohibition on the 
Permanent Revolutionary Court in October 1989, re- 
sanctioning the application of 'revolutionary' justice. 
He did, however, subject the Revolutionary Committees to 
tighter control. In January 1990 Qaddafi invited his 
quasi-parliament, the General People's Congress, to 
refashion the police system according to their liking. 40 
In March he ordered 'all the revolutionaries' to withdraw 
from the People's Committees and the Secretariats of the 
People's Congresses, thereby stripping them of the 
immense political power they had hitherto enjoyed 041 
In practice, the security infrastructure Qaddafi 
created--composed of a stifling legal code and a coven of 
mutually suspicious institutions with which to enforce 
it--was quite effective. Yet its design was not 
flawless. The system's chief defect was that it 
propelled many dissatisfied Libyans into extremism since 
all other forms of political protest were closed to them. 
Many of Qaddafi's internal threats were thus of his own 
making. 
39 Amnesty International, "Libya: Prisoners released; 
Abolition of the death penalty proposed, " March 1988. 
40 SWB ME/0668/A/3,22 January 1990. 
41 SWB ME/0709 A/1,10 March 1990. 
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II. 
Though all Libyans had to contend with an atmosphere 
of repression, those unlucky enough to be identified as 
members of potentially threatening elements were 
subjected to deliberate persecution. Pre-emptively 
identifying these potential political enemies was one of 
the major responsibilities of the Libyan security 
services. Once so identified, Qaddafi's foes led a 
precarious existence. The dreaded summons to police 
headquarters for questioning carried with it the threat 
of imprisonment and perhaps torture. 42 At worst, guests 
of the penal system were liable to suffer one of the 
fatal 'accidents' endemic to police states. Amr Taher 
Deghayes, co-founder of the Libyan Baath party, so died 
immediately after his arrest in February 1980.43 
Universities, with their unique mixture of 
intellectual energy and political fervor, were natural 
hunting grounds for the regime's informers. Well before 
coming to power Qaddafi became aware of (and sought to 
capitalize on) the universities' potential for breeding 
political agitation. In 1964 the Cyrenaican Defense 
Force, under the command of Mahmud Bukuwaytin, killed a 
number of Libyan students while suppressing a riot in 
42 The arbitrary arrest and torture of civilians was at 
times Kafkaesque. See, for example, the cases recounted in D. 
Blundy and Andrew Lycett, Qaddafi and the Libyan revolution, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), 115-116. 
43 Wright, 277. 
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Benghazi. The Premier, rather than Bukuwaytin, was 
forced to resign to appease the angered public; 
Bukuwaytin was deemed too valuable to the King's 
security. " 
The Qaddafi regime was no less brutal in quelling 
student protest. After demonstrations erupted at 
Benghazi University in April 1982, three students 
allegedly died while being tortured. The following year 
Qaddafi instructed the Revolutionary Committees to purge 
the campuses, an order which touched off a string of 
violent demonstrations resulting in as many as twenty- 
five deaths. 45 Determined to restore order and to make 
an example of the protestors, the authorities hung one of 
the student leaders on the campus of Al Fateh University 
on April 7,1983. Two other Al Fateh students were 
executed in the same fashion the following year. 46 After 
a five year interlude of uneasy calm, clashes between 
students and security services again erupted at Al Fateh 
University (January 9,1989) and Gar Yunis University 
(April 1989) . 
47 
Students were fairly easy to keep in line since they 
wielded little social and economic power. The same could 
not be said of Libya's tribes. In the first years of his 
44 Wright, 98. 
45 Mary-Jane Deeb, Libya's foreign policy in North Africa, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 147. 
46 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984,11-12. 
*' Amnesty International, "Libya: Further information on 
political detention, " October 1992,3. 
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rule Qaddafi, it will be recalled, tried to eradicate the 
tribal bonds which defined traditional Libyan society. 
This dissolution was imperative if the state were to 
assert its authority. Tribal loyalties conflicted with 
the absolute loyalty demanded by the state, and tribal 
leaders resisted the modernizing agenda of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Yet the RCC 
underestimated the resilience of the tribal system and 
was soon compelled to abandon their frontal assault on 
tribalism. 
Notwithstanding this failure, Qaddafi still 
considered tribalism an anachronism. He periodically 
berated his countrymen for perpetuating a tradition that 
nurtured corruption and nepotism, and considered tribal 
loyalties particularly egregious when they intruded upon 
the workings of state security: 
A policeman should not stay near his family or 
cousin. This is one of the causes of 
corruption, putting down roots: this is his 
cousin, this is his tribe, this man he cannot 
arrest, he cannot search, he cannot report. " 
In reality, corruption was probably the least of 
Tripoli's concerns. The real fear was that mid-level and 
senior police officials would acquire a local following 
which would allow them to mount a coup; to prevent this, 
officers were subjected to frequent transfers. But the 
problem of tribal nepotism was real enough, and was 
compounded by tribal rivalries; it was not uncommon, for 
example, for a policemen to have his objectivity and even 
48 SWB ME/0709/A/2,10 March 1990. 
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authority challenged by members of other tribes. 49 In 
1979 the regime actually erased its regional 
administrative boundaries in an attempt to abrogate 
traditional tribal borders, a perpetual obstacle to 
national integration. 50 Years later Qaddafi showed he 
had not abandoned the hope of outlawing tribes 
altogether: 'One thing is illegal though, it is tribal 
blocs. .. You could not bring any benefit to your tribe. 
Those times are gone. 151 
However, Qaddafi's socio-political tinkering 
inadvertently strengthened the very bonds he hoped to 
disintegrate. The evisceration of state institutions, 
which The Green Book forecast would produce a utopian 
political order, instead had the reverse effect of 
amplifying anxiety and insecurity. The erratic 
performance of the People's Congresses, Committees, and 
what remained of normal bureaucratic institutions, 
created civic stresses which were only relieved through 
the re-emergence of tribalism, making the tribes 'a 
political identity and affiliation of last resort. '52 
None of this was lost on Qaddafi, who by 1975 had 
49 Davis, 218-219. 
50 George Joffe, "Libya--regional history, regional and 
national borders, " in Libya: State and region, ed. J. Allan, K. 
McLachlan and M. Buru, (London: SOAS Centre of Near and Middle 
Eastern Studies, 1989), 13. 
51 SWB ME/0668/A/6,22 January 1990. 
52 Lisa Anderson, "QadhafiIs legacy: An evaluation of a 
political experiment, " in Qadhafi's L. {bya" 1969 to 1994, ed. Dirk 
Vandewalle, (London: Macmillan, 1995), 230. 
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marginalized the surviving members of the RCC (in fact, 
he abolished the RCC as such) but in so doing had 
narrowed his power base. The Colonel was thus obliged to 
reconsider the utility of the kinship ties he had 
hitherto scorned. Rather than suppressing tribal 
affiliations for the sake of unity, Qaddafi gradually 
began to exploit them. He rewarded cooperative tribal 
leaders with political appointments and entrenched 
members of his own tribe in favored jobs, most especially 
in the security services. Tribalism crept into the most 
intimate areas of Qaddafi's inner life. His first 
marriage was an arranged union with the daughter of a 
senior army official under the monarchy. The marriage 
did not long endure, doubtless in part because Qaddafi 
had his wife's uncle (another supporter of the monarchy) 
imprisoned; his wife subsequently humiliated the Libyan 
leader by beseeching Nasser to intervene on her uncle's 
behalf. 53 His second marriage was, intentionally or not, 
a sound political match of which any Bedouin sheikh would 
have been proud. 54 
In particular, Qaddafi favored his own tribe, the 
Qaddadfa, with senior military and police posts and a 
disproportionate share of the state's development 
spending. The result was a sociological upheaval which 
53 Jehan Sadat, A woman of Egypt, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1987), 243-44. 
S* Qaddafi once tried, unsuccessfully, to heal relations 
with Egypt by proposing a marriage between one of his cousins and 
Sadat's daughter. He later proposed a similar union to Bourguiba 
(again, without success). Sadat, 337-38. 
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catapulted the hitherto disadvantaged Oaddadfa tribe and 
its allies (such as the Warfalla) from the bottom of 
Libyan society to its highest echelons. Qaddafi's 
conversion from anti-tribalism was not unusual in the 
post-colonial Arab world. Other rulers (including King 
Idris) had reached a similar accommodation with tradition 
and tribal loyalty. 55 Thus, once the sound and the fury 
of the Libyan 'revolution' had dissipated, the new order 
looked suspiciously akin to the old. 
Among the elements of tribal tradition that Qaddafi 
turned to his own advantage was the idea of tribal 
justice, the central premise of which is that tribes are 
accountable for the behavior of their members. From this 
premise flowed collective rewards (the nepotism that 
Qaddafi decried but adroitly practiced) and collective 
punishments (which he practiced without complaint). 
Collective punishment was essentially a form of 
deterrence. Tripoli hoped that the likelihood that a 
family, clan, or tribe would suffer for any conspiracy 
against the regime would deter any would-be attackers 
(the same logic can be detected behind Israel's policy of 
dynamiting the homes of Palestinian suicide bombers). 
The Libyan regime was therefore quick to punish tribes 
for the misdeeds of their members, even when it was 
questionable whether an individual acted with the 
foreknowledge or support of his tribe. 
55 Charles Tripp, "Near East, " in Superpower competition and 
security in the Third World, ed. Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. 
Wells Jr., (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), 113. 
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Woe to the tribe living in the aftermath of an 
unsuccessful assassination attempt by one of its members. 
Jobs were lost, careers ended, fathers and brothers 
carted off for questioning and perhaps imprisonment. The 
only consolation in such circumstances was that, given 
the abundance of attempts on Qaddafi's life, nearly every 
tribe in Libya had been there before. The Shuhaybat were 
chastened after one of their own launched a minor 
rebellion in 1980.56 In May 1981 the Megarha fell under 
a cloud after tribe members serving in the armed forces 
were discovered with a cache of weapons in the desert. 57 
In October 1993 it was the turn of the Warfalla, 
hitherto considered one of the most loyal tribes. Yet 
several hundred members conspired to launch a rebellion 
from their stronghold of Bani Walid, from whence the 
uprising was to spread to other cells in Misrata, 
Gharian, Tarhuna, and Brak. 18 Alas, the hapless Warfalla 
were betrayed. Security forces crushed the conspirators 
in a pre-emptive attack on October 11, three days before 
the coup was to have occurred. LAF pilots flew sorties 
against the conspirators from bases near Chad (suggesting 
both that Libyan intelligence knew exactly where the 
plotters were, and that there were plenty of them) and 
56 e. g., SWB ME/6502/A/10,20 August 1980. 
57 Andrew Lycett, "Libya: Is the sun setting on Muammar 
Gadaffi's day?, " New African (October 1982): 18. 
58 David Hirst, "Gadafy puts down rebellion led by army, " 
Guardian, 25 October 1993; Mark Nicholson, "Rebellion crushed by 
Gadaffi, diplomats say, " Financial Tim_s, 23-24 October 1993. 
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bombed local arms depots for good measures' Qaddafi's 
Revolutionary Guard proved their worth by leading the 
ground assault and mopping up operations, though the 
commander of the celebrated 'Deterrence Battalion' was 
alleged to be among the conspirators. 6° Anxious to avoid 
the appearance of weakness, Qaddafi took the BBC to task 
for reporting the coup attempt. "' 
Numbed, the Warfallah began a prolonged and very 
public penitence. Within a few days the sheikh of the 
Bani Walid and representatives of related clans appeared 
on Libyan television pledging their fealty to Colonel 
Qaddafi. 62 Nevertheless, the Warfalla remained the 
target of official harassment for the next twelve months, 
a campaign which culminated in mid-1994 with the arrest 
of 55 Warfalla officers accused of spying for the United 
States. 63 Alleged confessions from the accused were 
aired on Libyan television. Not until September of the 
following year did the Warfalla finally get a hint of 
reprieve, when Qaddafi lauded Bani Walid for setting an 
example 'which ought to be followed--to condemn treason, 
59 George Joffe, "Qadhafi survives the coup, " Middle East_ 
International, no. 462 (5 November 1993): 8. 
60 The Reuter Library Report, 31 October 1993. 
61 Qaddafi was particularly angered by the BBC's coverage of 
the explosion of a police explosives dump, explosives he said 
were 'used for decorations' (FBIS-NES-95-218,13 November 1995). 
62 Charles Richards, "Mass arrests as Gaddafi 'crushes army 
rebellion, ", Independent, 23 October 1993. 
63 "Libya's restive tribes, " Foreign Regt, no. 2316 (18 
August 1994): 3-4; FBIS-NES-94-120,22 June 1994. 
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then to encircle treason and to finally destroy the nest 
of treason. Treason at Bani Walid is totally rejected 
and is being trampled underfoot. '64 
Naturally, Qaddafi's own tribesmen, the Qaddadfa, 
were considered the most loyal of all, since they owed 
their elevated status--and quite possibly their ability 
to retain it--to Qaddafi's survival. But even the 
Qaddadfa were not above suspicion. The November 1985 
murder of Hassan Ishkal, a prominent Qaddadfa, created a 
surge of tribal resentment against Qaddafi, and even 
produced a temporary refusal to send young men to fight 
in Chad. The state-controlled press struck back with 
excoriating attacks on the Qaddadfa. 65 According to 
Libyan opposition sources, a Qaddadfa member and two 
associates attempted to assassinate Qaddafi at a 
celebration on 28 April, 1990.66 (If press accounts are 
to be believed, the Qaddadfa were also instrumental in 
another failed assassination attempt against Qaddafi in 
September 1996.67 ) 
Though no tribe--not even his own--could be 
completely trusted, Qaddafi managed to hold them all in 
64 SWB ME/2405/MED/26,11 September 1995. 
65 "Libya: A lonely Colonel, " Africa Confidential 27, no. 1, 
1-2. 
66 "Regime clamps down on internal dissent, " NFSL Newsreprt 
7, no. 4, (July-August 1990): 19. 
67 See "Exiled ex-royal claims Qadhafi has survived 
assassination plot, " Mideast Mirror, 17 September 1996,22; for 
details of another alleged assassination attempt see "Attempt on 




check by playing an elaborate game of political chess: 
fueling a rivalry here, humbling a powerful clan there, 
always pitting the tribes against each other. However, 
beneath the patina of tribalism lay one more layer of 
Libyan identity that competed with Qaddafi's state for 
the loyalty of the man on the street--faith. 
No single group of Libyans suffered more at the 
hands of the state than did the Islamists (i. e., members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood and others who took their 
political agenda from Islam and advocated the imposition 
of sharia--Islamic law). That they should ultimately 
become the principal target of the regime's security 
services was no small irony--for much of his career 
Qaddafi himself was regarded by Westerners as the 
archetypical Islamic fundamentalist, an image he 
purposely cultivated. Qaddafi's professions of piety 
were frequent and ostentatious. Libyans were bombarded 
by images of him visiting mosques, praying in the desert, 
and reading the Quran. These displays of religiosity 
implied that Qaddafi's political legitimacy flowed from 
his devotion to Islam rather than from his self-styled 
'revolution. ' Thus, in some respects the Islamist 
challenge was a threat of his own making. 
As early as 1974, a prescient observer noted that 
Qaddafi's 'ideological compound of nationalism, religion, 
and social reform serves to clear the way for the 
(Muslim) Brotherhood's message, rather like John the 
I 
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Baptist did for Christ. 168 In many respects their 
messages were identical. Both nurtured a sense of 
historical injustice and espoused a mystical rebirth of 
the Arab/Islamic world, through faithfulness to Arab 
nationalism or God, respectively. 
Yet in the late 20th century, Islamic 
fundamentalists had a significant advantage over the Arab 
nationalists: Arab nationalism had been tried and 
discredited, whereas fundamentalism remained relatively 
untested. Having lost out in the initial rush to post- 
colonialism power, the Islamists watched patiently from 
the sidelines as Arab nationalism failed to prevent the 
creation of the State of Israel, led to humiliating 
military defeats in 1956 and 1967, and failed to close 
the power gap (as measured in prosperity and military 
strength) between the Arabs and the West. Under such 
circumstances it was easy for the Islamists to 
recirculate the old nationalist rhetoric and, by giving 
their message a religious twist, appear to have fresh and 
credible ideas. 
Nowhere was the rise and fall of Arab nationalism 
more apparent than in Libya. For the first decade of his 
career, Qaddafi rode buoyantly on a sea of rising oil 
revenues. Then the oil market crashed, the Americans 
stopped rolling over, the war in Chad turned sour, the 
Security Council imposed sanctions and suddenly the self- 
68 Ruth First, Libya: The elusive revolution, (Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1974), 255. 
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styled 'Guide' seemed to have lost his way. Qaddafi's 
speeches became shriller, his face bloated by worry (and, 
some said, drugs), his optimism ever more forced. Seeing 
him falter, Libya's Islamists began to take aim at 
Qaddafi's regime. 
Qaddafi had long ago recognized the danger of being 
attacked in the name of Islam, and systematically tried 
to neutralize those most likely to use Islam as a weapon 
against him. For example, in 1973 he launched a 
'cultural revolution' which, though it also targeted 
Baathists and Marxists, was primarily a crackdown on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Liberation Movement. 
Religious leaders were subjected to media attacks. The 
Grand Mufti of Libya, Sheikh Tahir al-Zawi, was forced to 
resign in 1977 and was not replaced. 
In early 1978 the regime went further, instructing 
the people's committees to take control of mosques with 
Ipaganist tendencies' and 'heretical imams. 169 This was 
followed in 1980 with a blunt warning to Muslim clerics 
to steer clear of politics. 70 Those who ignored this 
warning did so at considerable peril: during that year 
Sheikh Al-Bishti, a popular theologian in Tripoli, was 
quietly kidnapped and executed along with four of his 
followers. 71 Although Al-Bishti did not pertain to any 
69 Lillian Craig Harris, Libya: Oadhafi1a revolution and the 
modern state, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 49. 
70 "Qadhafi draws the line between politics and Islam, " 
jamahiriya Review, no. 3 (August 1980): 6. 
71 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984,11. 
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specific Islamist group, he had criticized the regime in 
his sermons. 72 The security services prevented any 
public protest over his demise. 73 
As the decade progressed, the suppression of 
Islamists became more brutal. In June 1984 eight members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, described by JANA as 'agents 
of America, ' were hung. 74 Nine more activists were 
publicly executed in'February 1987, and a further twenty- 
one were secretly killed during Ramadan in May 1989.75 
This increased brutality reflected the Islamist 
movement's gathering steam. To an extent, geography and 
culture made the growth of a Libyan Islamist movement 
inevitable: burgeoning (and often militant) Islamist 
movements in neighboring Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, and 
Algeria diffused propaganda, acolytes, and weapons into 
Libya. 
The year 1989 was a watershed for Libyan Islamists, 
a year which saw them grow from mere nuisance to credible 
threat. This maturation was marked by a series of 
violent incidents, including a demonstration by religious 
students at al-Fatih University in Tripoli, a riot at a 
soccer game, an armed skirmish between militant Islamists 
72 George Joffe, "The role of Islam, " in The green and the 
black, ed. Rene Lemarchand, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1988), 44. 
73 George Joffe, "Islamic opposition in Libya, " Third World 
QUArterly 10, (April 1988): 625-26. 
74 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984,4. 
75 "Libya: Gaddafi's fundamental problem, " ca 
Confidential, 30, no. 13 (23 June 1989): 6-7. 
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and security personnel near the road to the Benghazi 
airport, and a conflict between Revolutionary Committee 
members and students at Gar Yunis University. 76 The most 
serious of these incidents was the airport road incident, 
which occurred on January 14,1989. Members of the 
fundamentalist sect al-Jihad built an entrenchment 
alongside the road from whence they began shooting at 
passing motorists. The fundamentalists killed the first 
detachment of policemen who responded to the scene, and 
did not surrender until they were surrounded by a larger 
force. " Visibly shaken by this Algerian-style violence, 
the regime arrested some 392 known or suspected Islamists 
over the course of the next fifteen months. 78 
A few weeks later Qaddafi devoted a lengthy address 
to the Islamist threat and employed all his rhetorical 
skills to discredit the fundamentalists. If Islamists 
ever managed to gain power, he said, they would trample 
on Libyans' civil liberties. There would be no appeal: 
'If a ruler is appointed in the name of religion (or in 
the name of revolution, one might add), this will be a 
76 When authorities cancelled a scheduled match with 
Algeria, 70,000 angry fans turned their wrath on the security 
officers present (SWB ME/03651,23 January 1989). Among other 
slogans, the fans chanted 'Qaddafi is the enemy of God. ' 
Soldiers from the Deterrence Brigade were called out and quelled 
the demonstration by firing into the crowd; at least three people 
were reportedly killed. "Libya: The fundamentalists' rise, " 
Africa Confidential 30, no. 3 (3 February 1989): 7; Amnesty 
International, "Arrest of possible prisoners of conscience, " 
August 1989. 
" Amnesty International, June 1991,16-17. 
78 Amnesty International, June 1991,16-17. 
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great disaster, because if he follows the wrong path 
nobody can tell him that he is not following the right 
path ... your lives would become hell. 
79 Moreover, he 
warned that Islamist rule would be particularly 
repressive for women; those who ventured out of the home 
would be killed as infidels, and those who did not would 
be regarded as chattel. 80 
He embellished these themes over the next few 
months, describing Islamists as a Mafia 'destroying Islam 
from within. 181 Fundamentalism was not, he said, an 
indigenous movement but a carcinogenic import. Foreign 
workers, particularly South Asians who had come to work 
as teachers, were responsible for indoctrinating Libyan 
youth with alien ideals, ideals that the Colonel claimed 
were 'more dangerous than Zionism ... AIDS or cancer or 
TB. v 82 
In branding Islamist leaders as foreigners the 
Colonel was making a transparent appeal to Arab 
prejudices: 'Are we now going to listen to a non-Arab 
telling us about our religion? #83 Certainly not, said 
Qaddafi. Islamists, he claimed, were seriously deluded: 
'Whoever opposes Libya is someone who fights for Satan 
79 SWB ME/0405 A/4,10 March 1989; parentheses added. 
80 SWB ME/0787/A/1,11 June 1990. 
81 SWB ME/0787/A/1,11 June 1990. 
82 SWB ME/0837/A/10,8 August 1990. 
83 SWB ME/0823/A/7,23 July 1990. 
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and not for God. 84 True Islam was the province of 
Arabs, not of Pakistanis or Afghanis: 
This is the second time that heresy has come 
from Asia in an attempt to deal a blow to pan- 
Arabism from within as well as deal a blow to 
Islam. Heresy emerged during the era of the 
Abassids, during the days of Mansur 
... Heresy came 
from Asia. It is now 
experiencing a renaissance, it is coming once 
again from Asia. The Chinese who speaks Arabic 
and whom we taught Islam is coming to teach us 
Islam! 85 
In addition to being a foreign transplant, 
fundamentalism was inherently inimical to Arab interests. 
Why, Qaddafi asked, did Islamists attack Arab governments 
instead of Israelis? Because they were pawns in the 
eternal conspiracy against Arab unity: 
Non-Arab Muslims are spreading the Islamic 
calls ... These calls have come from Muslims 
who are not Arabs, and they have been spread in 
the Arab homeland. Naturally, the victim in 
this case is Arab nationalism, Arab unity, 
socialism and progress ... in the name of 
Islam they have entered the Arab world so they 
can destroy Arab nationalism. 86 
Thus, though Qaddafi accused the Islamists of being poor 
Muslims guilty of 'not knowing God properly, ' he was 
perhaps more enraged by the thought that they had sinned 
84 FBIS-NES-95-218,13 November 1995. 
85 SWB ME/0735/A/7,10 April 1990. For Qaddafi, all non- 
Arab Muslims (and most especially American Muslims) were second 
class worshippers. See SWB ME/0859 A/7,3 September 1990. 
86 SWB ME/0405 A/4,10 March 1989. In Qaddafi's rhetoric, 
the fiendish authors of this plot were (who else? ) the United 
States and Israel. Palestinian Islamic Jihad must have been 
shocked to hear that their group was 'the same as Israeli 
intelligence' (SWB ME/0837/A/10,8 August 1990). On another 
occasion Qaddafi opined that Islamists 'work for US intelligence 
and they have nothing to do with Islam or anything else. ' 
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against Nasser. 87 
The punishment for heresy, of course, was death: 
'the Brotherhood, the Takfir, the Hijra, the Da'wah, the 
Jihad, the Tahrir and all these heretics and pariahs 
should be eliminated .... we will confront them and 
even kill some of those people when necessary. 188 It was 
a small leap from killing some to killing as many as 
possible, as paddafi suggested to Libyan students: 
If you find among you one who says: Da'wah or 
Jihad or Takfir or Ikhwan, then you should cut 
off his head and throw it in the street as if 
you found a wolf, a fox or a scorpion. This is 
poison. This is a devil. This is a heretic. 89 
Those not sanguinary enough to decapitate heretics 
themselves were instructed to alert someone less 
squeamish. 90 (Perhaps angered by these calls of 'off 
with their heads, ' in October 1989 a youthful Islamist 
reportedly strode into a mosque and beheaded a Qaddafi 
loyalist with a sword. 91) 
Despite the incendiary rhetoric, Qaddafi found that 
there was depressingly little he could do to curb the 
growth of the-Libyan Islamist movement. In fact, his 
every action seemed to incubate the very movement he was 
trying to stamp out. His displays of piety implied that 
87 Amnesty International, June 1991,11. 
88 SWB ME/0735/A/7,10 April 1990. 
89 SWB ME/0823/A/7,23 July 1990. 
90 Burgat 1989,604. 
91 Peter Hiett, "Fundamentalist 'cancer'", Middle East 
International, no. 362 (3 November 1989): 13. 
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religion was the ultimate source of political legitimacy, 
yet his heterodox interpretations of Islam eroded the 
last vestiges of his credibility as a believer. " 
Moreover, by disallowing the emergence of a secular 
opposition, the regime had inadvertently funnelled more 
and more dissidents into the mosques. 
So long as he tried to beat the Islamists at their 
own game, Qaddafi had few good policy options for meeting 
the fundamentalist threat. Closing the mosques was 
obviously a non-starter. Likewise, it was politically 
unfeasible to ban the seemingly innocuous displays of 
piety which doubled as signs of passive resistance to his 
regime (such as beards for men and head coverings for 
women). 93 Nor, so long as the Islamists kept a low 
profile, were mass arrests an attractive option since 
they might create more sympathizers than they would net. 
Indeed, one of Qaddafi's senior security advisers was 
reportedly killed by an Islamist whose friends had been 
arrested and tortured by the regime. 9` 
Consequently, Qaddafi adopted a policy of heavy 
surveillance and intimidation. On June 9,1990, the 
92 Davis, 46; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "In search of sacred law: 
The meandering course of Qadhafi's legal policy, " in Qadhafi's 
I. {bya: 1969 to 1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle, (London: Macmillan, 
1995), 115-118. 
93 United States Department of State, "Libya: Respect for 
Human Rights, " in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
1994, Submitted to the Committee on foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, and the Committee on International Relations, 
United States House of Representatives (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 
February 1995). 
11 NFSL Newsreport 7, no. 6 (November-December 1990): 11. 
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Libyan leader decreed the formation of a 'People's Guard' 
whose task it was to keep a watchful eye on the 
mosques. 95 According to a journalist who made several 
trips to Libya during the early 1990s, guard members or 
other secret police were present at all mosque services. 
Worshippers were not allowed to congregate after 
prayers. 96 
In addition, the regime took a number of steps to 
retard the development of transnational Islamist links. 
For example, Tripoli placed renewed emphasis on tracking 
the movements of foreigners. " Furthermore, Libya 
entered into a series of cooperative security agreements 
with its neighbors. The Libyan and Egyptian security 
services agreed to assist each other in apprehending and 
extraditing Islamist extremists, and Tripoli gave 
permission for Egyptian security units to pursue 
extremists across the Libyan border--an unprecedented 
concession. " Though Libya's Islamist troubles were 
generally concentrated in the eastern half of the 
country, Tripoli kept a wary eye on the deteriorating 
situation in Algeria and held frequent consultations with 
the Algerian interior ministry. 99 
95 SwB ME/0790/A/3,14 June 1990; Djaziri 1990,680. 
96 Author's interview with Jane Kokan, December 1994. 
97 FBIS-NES-94-109,7 June 1994. 
98 FBIS-NES-94-164,24 August 1994. 
99 See, for example, FBIS-NES-95-157,15 August 1995, in 
which the Algerian interior minister praised the new level of 
security cooperation between Libya and Algeria. A 'hot pursuit' 
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These measures helped to keep the Islamist threat in 
check, but did not keep the movement itself from growing. 
Qaddafi's denunciations of the fundamentalists were 
themselves discredited by the Colonel's attempts to 
bolster his own flagging religious credentials. By 
equating religiosity with legitimacy, Qaddafi was 
entering a contest he could not win. The monastic junior 
officer who overthrew the monarchy in 1969 had persuaded 
the world of his piety with comparative ease, but the 
flamboyantly arrayed Colonel of 1990 was rather less 
convincing. 
Qaddafi nevertheless made his best effort, oblivious 
to the fact that he was conceding the moral high ground 
to his opponents. He proclaimed himself 'Imam of the 
imams' and talked of re-establishing the institution of 
the caliphate (presumably with himself as caliph). 100 He 
chastised Arab Christians for having an 'Israeli soul' 
and called for the next generation of Arabs to be purely 
Muslim. 101 His rhetoric took on an Iranian flavor: 
Visits to America and meetings with the 
American President by Muslim rulers amount to a 
pilgrimage to the American White House, 
polytheism. A satanic country like that is not 
to be visited: no relations should be 
established with it, and it is Karam for an 
Islamic country to establish relations with the 
government of America and its allies. 102 
agreement, similar to that signed with Egypt, was concluded with 
Algeria in 1996 (SWB ME/2608 MED/21,10 May 1996). 
ioo Dj aziri 1992,757. 
101 SWB ME/0693/A/7,20 February 1990. 
102 SWB ME/0720/A/5,23 March 1990. 
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Moreover, Qaddafi curtailed his support of feminism, 
which had never garnered much support in such a 
traditional society. In 1993, and again in 1994, he 
announced the implementation of strict sharia 
punishments, which only a few years earlier he had 
denounced as nonsense. 103 
These gestures failed to persuade the Islamist 
opposition of the Colonel's piety. From their 
standpoint, the Colonel's somewhat unorthodox approach to 
Islam was nothing less than blasphemous. Qaddafi opined 
that religion was a purely personal matter and that 
religious edicts should therefore not be enforced by the 
state. 104 He dismissed commentaries on the Quran, 
commentaries which formed the bulk of Islamic law, as 
'outdated books (which) have never been the Islamic faith 
per se. ' los And in the introduction to the Russian 
version of The Green Book Qaddafi styled himself as a 
modern Mohammed. 106 He argued that performing the hajj 
was not obligatory for Muslims so long as the Saudi 
103 Le Monde, 
islamique, " Le Monc 
A/4,14 February 19 
104 SWB ME/0859 
105 SWB ME/0405 
6 April 1993; "Application de la loi 
le, 19 February 1994. See also SWB ME/0688 
90. 
A/7,3 September 1990. 
A/4,10 March 1989. 
106 The introduction states: 'There was a very ordinary man 
(Mohammed) who rode a donkey and wrote his books on scrolls, this 
being before the age of publishing and paper. Eventually, this 
man was to ride a camel, spreading his message ... I, being a 
simple bedouin who rode on a donkey and looked after sheep and 
walked bare-foot and lived my whole life amongst simple people, 
present my small 'Green Book' which is like the Bible of Jesus 
or the Tablets of Moses or the message of the camel-rider. ' 
Africa Confidential 30, no. 18 (8 September 1989): 8. 
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monarchy remained in power. 107 Even less devout Libyans 
were sometimes left wondering about Qaddafi's faith, as 
when he mocked those who prayed for pious rulers, 
observing (with irreverent historical accuracy) that 'the 
positive response to such prayers has been minimal so 
far. 1108 In early 1989 the Libyan newspaper Al 
Jamahiriya printed an attack on Islam itself, asking 
readers: 'How can you have faith? ' Though retracted only 
hours after publication, the essay--allegedly written by 
Qaddafi himself--caused serious ructions. '°9 
In short, the Libyan leader had doomed himself to 
failure in any test of religious devotion against the 
fundamentalists, and never seemed to grasp that by 
engaging in such a test he conceded the moral high ground 
to his opponents. This fact, coupled with the regime's 
declining fortunes and the robust Islamist movements in 
neighboring Algeria and Egypt, helped Libyan 
fundamentalists to win grass roots support and establish 
themselves as the only significant (if covert) domestic 
opposition to-the regime. This was no small feat. 
Although they failed to unseat Qaddafi by the mid-1990s, 
107 After stinging rebukes from Saudi clerics, Qaddafi backed 
away from this position, only to rejoin the argument in 1990 by 
issuing a fatwa (religious edict) against performing the hajj 
while U. S. forces were present in Saudi Arabia (SWB ME/0885 A/16, 
3 October 1990). Since he later made a point of flying Libyan 
pilgrims to Mecca each year in defiance of UN sanctions, one must 
assume that Qaddafi revoked his own fatwa. 
108 SWB ME/0885 A/15,3 October 1990. 
109 "Libya: Paradise Lost, " Africa Confidential 30, no. 11, 
(26 May 1989), 8. 
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their resiliency made it probable that thereafter the 
most serious anti-regime challenges would operate under 
the aegis of Islam. Even the secular NFSL, hitherto the 
most prominent opposition movement, conceded that 
religion had become 'the last line of defense against the 
regime. ' ilo 
III. The struggle for control of the state 
Islamists were by no means the only group to 
forcibly contest the government's control of the state. 
Scarcely a year passed without an attempted assassination 
or conspiracy. Some were foiled by ill fortune or 
incompetency, and others were fended off by the security 
services. Several such challenges were detailed in 
Chapter 1, which discussed Libyan internal security until 
1973. 
As the Al-Hawaz affair illustrated, those closest to 
Qaddafi posed the greatest danger to him. And indeed, 
when in mid-1975 Qaddafi again narrowly escaped being 
overthrown by-members of the RCC, it was his childhood 
friend Omar Abdullah Al Mehaishi who led the conspiracy. 
Mehaishi had served in Qaddafi's cabinet in a variety of 
ministerial posts, but became frustrated by Qaddafi's 
spending priorities while serving as Minister of Planning 
(Mehaishi claimed to object to the favoritism shown to 
the Qaddadfa. After oil revenues fell by 15% in 1975, 
110 "Regime clamps down on internal dissent, " NFSL Newsrepo t 
7, no. 4 (July-August 1990): 19. 
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Qaddafi elected to curb social spending and proceed with 
yet more arms purchases from the USSR. Mehaishi 
objected, arguing that Libya's oil wealth should be 
devoted to domestic development rather than squandered on 
adventurism; the result was a row within the RCC. 
Mehaishi enlisted the support of two other RCC members, 
Bashir Hawadi and Awad Hamza, and approached others 
(reportedly Najm and Kharrubi) as well as some army 
officers in hopes of forcing Qaddafi to step down. "" 
Fortunately for Qaddafi, Mehaishi's plans were 
betrayed. 112 Mehaishi himself escaped to Tunisia, but 
his accomplices were arrested. Hawadi and Hamza were 
sentenced to house arrest, presumably to minimize the 
appearance of disorder within the RCC, which was shortly 
thereafter shorn of its formal role in the Libyan polity. 
In December 1976, no less than seventy-five army officers 
implicated in the plot were tried in a military court. 
On April 2,1977, twenty-two of them were executed. 113 
Many others were sentenced to long prison terms, 114 
These purges wiped away the last vestiges of moderation 
from Qaddafi's inner circle and left, in Lisa Anderson's 
words, 'idealogues at best, sycophants at worst, but none 
"I Wright, 186-87. 
112 Apparently by Kharrubi, who used the intelligence as a 
means of regaining Qaddafi's favor. See Henry Tanner, "Syria, 
Libya, P. L. O. shun Cairo talks, " New York Times,, 16 October 1975. 
113 Amnesty International, 20 November 1984, il. 
114 Tartter, 290. 
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willing to stand up to the Leader of the Revolution. 1115 
The regime was thus freed to pursue ever more irrational 
policies. 
Mehaishi himself ultimately became a victim of 
Qaddafi's vindictiveness. After living the life of an 
exile in Tunisia, Egypt (where he survived a Libyan 
assassination attempt), and Kuwait, he found asylum in 
Morocco. But in 1983, King Hassan and Colonel Qaddaft 
struck a deal: Libya curbed its support of the Polisario 
Front, and in exchange Mehaishi was secretly repatriated. 
The Libyan dissident was never heard from again. 
While in exile, Mehaishi became affiliated with a 
number of small Libyan opposition groups. Such groups 
had begun to attract the attention and support of foreign 
intelligence agencies. For example, five Libyan 
civilians were executed on April 7,1977, after being 
accused of working for Egyptian intelligence. Nearly 
fifty more putatively pro-Egyptian officers were executed 
in August of that year, and still more were allegedly 
killed in March 1979.116 Whether Egyptian intelligence 
had achieved so many deep penetrations is debatable, but 
there is little question that the Libyan opposition 
groups were forging links with a number of foreign 
sponsors. Foremost of these opposition cells was the 
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), which 
115 Lisa Anderson, "Libya and American foreign policy, " 
Middle East Journal 36 (Autumn 1982): 521. 
116 Juliette Bessis, La Libye contemnoraf ne, (Paris: 1' Ecole- 
polytechnique, 1986), 168; Wright, 197. 
412 
was formed on October 7,1981, and led by Mohammed Al 
Maghariaf, a Libyan diplomat who defected in 1980. 
Although the NFSL generated much propaganda and 
boasted of a large paramilitary wing, it only mounted one 
significant anti-regime operation. On May 6,1984, the 
NFSL's military commander, Ahmed Ahwas, was killed in 
Zuwarah after crossing the border from Tunisia, and two 
of his colleagues were captured. The operation he had 
hoped to lead took place two days later. At 7: 30 AM on 
May 8, two dozen NFSL guerrillas attacked Qaddafi's 
headquarters at the Bab al-Aziziya barracks. After 
initial success--the NFSL penetrated into the compound-- 
the attack foundered and nine NFSL commandos were killed. 
The survivors fled to nearby safehouses, but all were 
discovered and killed within two weeks. 
The NFSL attack was not solely an internal security 
matter; at least one reputable source reports that the 
assault was orchestrated by France's Direction de la 
Securite Exterieure in conjunction with the CIA. 
Moreover, it is well known that the Reagan Administration 
bankrolled the NFSL's presence in Chad. "" The attack 
should therefore be understood, at least in part, as a 
consequence of Libya's repeated challenges to larger 
powers. In any event, the NFSL's audacity provoked a 
major crackdown on dissident elements. According to the 
U. S. Department of State's estimation, more than five 
117 Seymour Hersh, "Target Qaddafi, " New York Times MagAý zi ne, 
22 February 1987. 
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thousand Libyans were arrested during the ensuing purges, 
and perhaps more than a hundred were executed. 118 The 
NFSL's covert infrastructure was apparently rendered 
inutile, and no further commando raids were attempted. 
Notwithstanding sporadic attempts to forge a broader 
anti-Qaddafi movement, the Libyan opposition never 
managed to form a credible government in exile. "" Riven 
by jealousy, the various factions all but disappeared 
once the Bush administration returned America's Libya 
policy to its natural center of gravity. 120 
Thus, the gravest threats to the Libyan leader did 
not arise from declared opponents to his regime but from 
those within his own retinue. Qaddafi entrusted his own 
security to his closest comrades and kinsmen, a 
dependency that became problematic as he fell out with 
one after another of them. Captain Muhammad Idris al- 
Sharif, a childhood friend of Qaddafi's who had long 
served as a director of Military Intelligence, was 
arrested in 1977 and accused of organizing three attempts 
to kill the Libyan leader. His brother-in-law, Capt. 
Muhammad al-Said, was also arrested. At the time Capt. 
al-Said was serving as commander of Libya's largest 
airbase, Ugba bin Naf'i; approximately one hundred 
soldiers from the 7th Armoured Brigade stationed at the 
118 Tartter, 290. 
119 See Ali El-Roz and Antoine Jalkh, "Les anti-Kadhafi de 
AAZ, " Arabies (October 1995): 20-31. 
220 Andrew Lycett, "The divided opponents of Qadhafi, " Middle 
gast international, no. 300 (15 May 1987): 14-15. 
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base were also arrested. 12' 
In November 1985 another close friend of Qaddafi's 
and luminary of the regime, Colonel Hassan Ishkal, was 
summarily executed after being summoned to Qaddafi's 
barracks in the middle of the night. Though Ishkal 
reportedly had some disagreements with the Colonel over 
the war in Chad, the real reason for his demise was 
apparently that he had grown too popular for his own 
good . 
122 
By the 1980s, more than half of the original members 
of the Revolutionary Command Council had defected, been 
executed, or placed under house arrest. Even Major 
Jalloud, who for years was considered Qaddafi's right 
hand man and heir apparent, was banished to Syria for a 
period. After his return he was consigned to semi-house 
arrest for a spell and then 'retired. 1123 
The exact causes of Jalloud's fall from grace are 
shrouded in some mystery. Qaddafi may have suspected him 
of involvement in the October 1993 coup attempt launched 
by Jalloud's fellow tribesmen, the Megarha. Not long 
afterwards, Jalloud (perhaps sensing he was under 
121 Gwynne Dyer, "Libya, " in World armies, ed. John Keegan, 
(London: Macmillan, 1983), 374. 
122 For details of Ishkal's demise, see Martin Sicker, Tha 
making of a pariah state: The adventurist politics of Muammar 
Qaddafi, (New York: Praeger, 1987), 41-44. 
123 FBIS-NES-94-183,21 September 1994; "Jalloud 'under house 
arrest' following coup attempt, " Middle East Economic Digest 37, 
no. 44 (5 November 1993): 29. For more on Jalloud's falling out 
with Qaddafi, see the author's "Libyan threat perception" in 
Tape's Intelligence Review 7, no. 9 (September 1995): 407-410. 
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suspicion) reportedly incensed Qaddafi by requesting 
permission to live abroad. 124 Qaddafi refused this 
request and confiscated Jalloud's passport, although he 
permitted his former aide to move freely in social 
circles. By the end of 1994 Jalloud had resumed some 
ceremonial duties, yet by all indications he had ceased 
to be a player in Qaddafi's inner circle. Jalloud's 
confidants were purged from the government as well. For 
example, Omar el Hariri, once the military governor of 
Tobruk and a prominent Free Unionist Officer, was 
arrested because he was considered to be a Jalloud 
loyalist. 125 
Whether Jalloud's removal reflected paranoia on 
Qaddafi's part is moot (and largely irrelevant). The 
Libyan leader had proven that he had no permanent 
friends--only a permanent interest in survival. In that 
regard, pre-emptively neutralizing his potential foes was 
a prudent and rational course of action, whatever the 
personal cost. With the RCC out of the way, the 
Islamists on the defensive and the secular opposition 
consumed with petty internal rivalries, only one major 
threat to Qaddafi's survival remained: the armed forces. 
Despite the regime's lavish spending on military 
hardware, morale in the LAF was habitually low. The 
reasons for this were several. First, the conscription 
124 "Libya's restive tribes, " Foreign Report, no. 2316 (18 
August 1994): 3-4. 
125 "Libye: arrestation d'un officier sup6rieur, " Le Monde, 
25-26 September 1994; FBIS-NES-94-185,23 September 1994. 
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system was inequitable: the privileged escaped military 
service, the poor did not. 126 Second, the omnipresent 
political controls (such as the Revolutionary Committee 
members) fostered a climate of distrust. '27 During the 
first few months of 1980, for example, approximately two 
thousand Libyans were arrested for political purposes, 
among them a number of senior army officials who were 
charged with corruption. All suspects were tried before 
revolutionary tribunals operating beyond the bounds of 
the regular judiciary; more than a hundred were allegedly 
executed. 128 Third, the LAF repeatedly found itself 
conducting operations that inspired little or no 
enthusiasm in the ranks (e. g., occupation duty in Chad). 
Finally, the LAF's dismal combat performance was a source 
of deep humiliation. 
Officers who saw an opportunity to defect often did. 
For example, in 1980 an LAF MiG pilot tried to reach 
freedom in Italy but crashed while searching for an 
Italian airport. 129 In February of the following year 
126 Conscription was so unpopular that the regime had to 
constantly threaten draft dodgers, sometimes with death. See, 
for example, Qaddafi's remarks to the General People's Congress 
in Benghazi (SWB ME/0404 A/2,9 March 1989). 
127 Omar El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, "Institutional 
development in Qadhafi's Libya, " in Oadhafi's Libya: 19669 n 
1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle, (London: Macmillan, 1995), 172-73. 
128 George Joffe, "Libya: The decline of Qadafi, " Middle East_ 
International, no. 127 (20 June 1980): 9-10. 
129 SWB ME/6502/A/10,20 August 1980. Demetrio Cogliandro, 
former head of the Italian secret service, alleges that the MiG 
was shot down by NATO fighters during an attempt to assassinate 
Colonel Qaddafi that-inadvertently destroyed an Itavia DC-9 on 
June 27,1980. See Andrew Gumbel, "NATO attack on Gaddafi blamed 
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another LAF pilot flew to Greece and received asylum. '" 
In July 1984, yet another MiG-23 pilot defected to Egypt, 
where he revealed that the Libyan pilots had been 
training to bomb the Aswan High Dam. 131 In January 1987 
Mohammed Tala Shelhi, nephew of Col. Abdul Aziz Shelhi of 
the old regime, piloted a Cessna over Libya's new coastal 
defenses and escaped to Italy. 132 Within the next six 
months eight officers flew their aircraft to Egypt and 
requested political asylum, leading the Egyptian defence 
minister to remark that the entire Libyan air force was 
prepared to defect. 233 A military helicopter pilot 
defected to Egypt in April 1989.13 Similar defections 
plagued the diplomatic corps. 
This string of defections was embarrassing but did 
little harm, aside from the loss of a few aircraft and 
whatever classified information the pilots divulged. 
Sabotage, of which the regime frequently complained, was 
costly and pointed to even more disgruntlement within the 
LAF, though some alleged incidents of sabotage may have 
merely been the result of incompetence. (On one occasion 
for air disaster, " Independent, 8 January 1996; "Plane 'shot down 
in failed Libyan coup, ' Guardian, 10 January 1996. 
130 SWB ME/6648/i, 13 February 1981. 
131 Jacqueline Hahn, "Libya: Intelligence briefing, " Jj2E 
journal 3, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 34. 
132 NFSL Newsletter no. 54, January 1987,4. 
133 Tom Porteous "Dissidents on the run, " Middle Easr_ 
International, no. 305 (25 July 1987): 10-11. 
134 SWB ME/0445 1,28 April 1989. 
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Libyan soldiers were thought to have immolated themselves 
by lighting a propane heater inside of an ammunition 
bunker. ) True or not, securing weapon and ammunition 
stores was problematic for the regime. In early 1984 an 
ammunition depot at Al-Abyar in Cyrenaica was rocked by a 
massive explosion. 135 In June 1992 another arms depot An 
al-Siwana, a suburb of Tripoli, exploded killing 9 and 
injuring 143.136 In July 1994 there was an attempted 
coup near Ajdabiya and a raid on an ammunition dump in 
Sebha. 137 The next month Libyan authorities reported the 
disappearance of weapons and ammunition from a storage 
depot close to Ajdabiya and subsequently arrested scores 
of suspects, particularly youths. 138 Thereafter, 
authorities began consolidating weapons in the central 
military zone. Saboteurs, however, were not his most 
pressing concern. 
A surprising number of LAF officers took it in their 
heads to assassinate their Commander-in-Chief, but it was 
no simple thing to kill a man who himself had seized 
power througha coup d'etat. As Qaddafi was well aware, 
a successful conspiracy required two things: a small 
number of participants (to minimize the risk of leaks), 
and access to the Colonel. Since few would-be assassins 
could meet the latter criteria, it was unsurprising that 
135 Harris, 76. 
136 Associated Press, 20 June 1992. 
137 Kokan, 1. 
138 FBIS-NES-94-147,1 August 1994. 
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most of the conspiracies which did mature involved senior 
military officials. For example, Colonel Khalifa Khadir, 
who commanded Libyan forces in their 1980 invasion of 
Chad, was promoted to general upon his return. While 
sharing a jeep with Qaddafi, the new general drew his 
pistol and fired point blank at Qaddafi. He missed, or 
(depending upon the account) merely wounded Qaddafi in 
the shoulder, and was cut down by the Colonel's East 
German bodyguard before he could fire again. 139 After 
another abortive coup attempt in January 1983, five 
officers were executed, including the Deputy Commander of 
the People's Militia (the Libyan equivalent of a national 
guard or territorial army). 140 
Many of the most interesting efforts to kill Qaddafi 
originated in the air force. In March 1978 a helicopter 
that was carrying several East German officials, and 
which was supposed to have been ferrying Qaddafi, crashed 
in an apparent assassination attempt. 141 In April 1979, 
according to a Cairene newspaper, Libyan pilots planned 
to attack Qaddafi's headquarters with rockets during a 
training mission. One of the plotters informed on his 
comrades, who were immediately arrested. Another eleven 
officers were arrested after unsuccessfully attempting to 
plant an explosive in Qaddafi's car. In 1981 an air 
139 Hersh, op. Cit.; cf. Andrew Lycett, 1982,18. 
140 Tartter, 209. 
141 David Binder, "U. S. says Qaddafi escaped plot fatal to 
4 East Germans, " New York Times, 29 March 1978; FBIS-MEA, 12 
March 1978,12. 
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force officer and a subordinate were caught while trying 
to assassinate Qaddafi at the grand opening of a 
supermarket in Derna. 142 
Larger mutinies were even less successful, either 
because the mutineers were betrayed by a comrade or 
because the mutiny progressed too slowly, allowing the 
regime to rally its forces. For example, in-August 1980 
an intelligence officer, Major Idris Shuhaibi, led the 
Tobruk garrison to mutiny and allegedly tried to lure 
Qaddafi to the base to kill him. When the Colonel failed 
to appear, the mutineers lost the initiative and were 
crushed by security forces. 143 Similarly, soldiers at 
the Al Abyar barracks, situated close to the Egyptian 
border, rebelled in March 1984 but failed to move quickly 
enough. More than two hundred were killed as the 
uprising was suppressed. 144 
Unrest in the LAF peaked in the mid 1980s, no doubt 
because Libya's embroilment in Chad and its conflict with 
the United States were cresting at that time. Seventy 
senior officers were forced into retirement in late 1984, 
and sixty were arrested the following spring. 145 The 
commanding officer of Al-Watiyah Air Force Base was 
arrested for opposing military action against Tunisia in 
142 Amnesty International, June 1991,14. 
143 SWB ME/6502/A/10,20 August 1980; Lycett 1982,18; John 
Cooley, Libyan sandstorm: The complete account of Oaddafi's 
revolution, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 199. 
144 Bessis, 170. 
145 Harris, 73; Tartter, 290. 
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August 1985.146 Some forty-three officers who supported 
him were executed. 147 Another sixty were reportedly put 
to death over the next two years. 148 
Consequently, Qaddafi's preoccupation with his own 
survival became more intense. He adopted the tactics of 
a guerrilla leader, rotating between residences, abruptly 
changing his itinerary, riding in different cars in his 
convoy. When he took to the air in his personal jet all 
other Libyan planes were grounded. 149 During the 1st of 
September celebrations in 1985, East European advisers 
were seen in his security detail for the first time, and 
Soviet intelligence reportedly tipped him off to several 
plots against him. '5° 
Despite these precautions, at times Qaddafi's 
survival owed itself as much to serendipity as to careful 
planning. To those who wished to see his demise, the 
Colonel--much like Cuba's Fidel Castro--simply seemed to 
live a charmed life. The U. S. Air Force, for example, 
was amazed that Qaddafi survived the 1986 bombing of his 
146 "Libyan army reportedly thwarts troop rebellion against 
Qaddafi, " New York Times, 2 September 1985. 
147 "Libya: A lonely Colonel, " Africa Confidential, 27 no. 
1 (2 January 1986): 1; FBIS 12 September 1985, Dl; Mohamed El 
Khawas, Oaddafi: His ideology in theory and r actinn, 
(Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1986), 112. 
148 Rene Lemarchand, ed., The green and the black, 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988), 12. 
149 Harris 1986,50. 
150 Sicker, 44; New York Time 
, 
20 July 1981. 
422 
residence in Tripoli. 151 Improbable though it seemed, 
the Colonel's luck held. In March 1989, he was assaulted 
by a knife-wielding assailant while walking with Syrian 
President Hafez Al Assad. The attacker was killed by one 
of Assad's bodyguards; Qaddafi escaped with a light 
wound. A few weeks later another would-be assassin got 
cold feet at the last minute and dropped the two grenades 
he had planned to throw at the Colonel. 152 Fortune had 
once again smiled upon the Libyan leader. 
The role of chance in the Libyan leader's many 
brushes with death might lead some to argue that 
Qaddafi's survival was no more evidence of efficacious 
security policy than longevity is necessarily evidence of 
good health in people. According to this line of 
reasoning, states, like people, may simply be favored 
with constitutions that can withstand neglect and abuse. 
In Libya, one could hypothesize that the absence of a 
mature civil society combined with an influx of 
unprecedented oil wealth to produce a placid, politically 
apathetic citizenry--an environment in which even an 
inept leader could survive with comparative ease. 
151 Hersh, op. Cit. The bombing came so close to achieving 
its unstated purpose--to kill the Libyan leader, or induce the 
Libyan armed forces to do so--that Qaddafi immediately replaced 
his head of internal security. John Bulloch, "Gaddafi sacks his 
chief of security, " Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1986. 
152 "Libya: Gaddafi's fundamental problem" Africa 
confidential 30, no. 13 (23 June 1989): 7. 
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However, such an assessment is overly stingy. 
Qaddafi weathered too many internal threats for 
serendipity alone to account for his survival. His 
internal security policies must therefore be credited 
with success and deemed rational. In this one area, 
Qaddafi accomplished what he set out to do--to keep 
himself in power for as long as possible, and to maximize 
his own authority at the expense of all other aspirants 
to national leadership. 
He, of course, would never admit that such was his 
intention, and it may well be that in the idealistic days 
of his youth, Qaddafi truly saw his own survival as a 
means of preserving the Libyan 'revolution' rather than 
as an end unto itself. If so, time and the experience of 
power wrought predictable changes in his value system. 
Self-preservation became his final and all-consuming 
preoccupation. 
In and of itself, this preoccupation did not make 
Qaddafi rational. Rationality, as we have defined it, 
inheres not in the wisdom of a goal but in the successful 
attainment of goals. Granted, there are schools of 
thought which take self-preservation to be the supreme 
expression of rationality; Montesquieu, for example, 
observed that 'a rational army would run away. 151 
However, as Nietzsche reminds us, we 'should think before 
putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the 
cardinal instinct of an organic being, ' the verity of 
153 As quoted in Keegan, 329. 
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that thesis being neither philosophically self-evident 
nor empirically established. 154 Indeed, upon reflection 
the reduction of rationality to biological directives is 
less straight forward than one might think. The instinct 
for survival is strong, but one can persuasively argue 
that other instincts--the maternal instinct to protect 
one's offspring, for example--are stronger still, and no 
less rational. 
Why then should we deem Qaddafi's internal security 
policies rational? Because they worked. This is not to 
say that those policies were always optimal, or that they 
did not have counterproductive spillover effects. By 
prohibiting the emergence of a legal opposition, the 
regime tended to channel dissidence into extremism. By 
trying to establish his Islamic credentials, Qaddafi 
reinforced the legitimacy of his Islamist opponents. 
Moreover, by eliminating insignificant opposition figures 
living in exile the regime was clearly moving into the 
realms of the irrational: the marginal increases in 
security thereby derived came at a steep cost to the 
state's foreign policy objectives. 
Insomuch as Qaddafi's internal security policies 
were intended to mobilize political support for his 
agenda (as the creation of the Revolutionary Committees 
was intended to do), they were markedly less successful. 
In fairness, this was in large part because Qaddafi, who 
154 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond good and evil], trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1966), 21. 
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at one time was intent on transforming Libyan society in 
accordance with his philosophical predilections, grew 
less sure of the enterprise over time. In particular, 
the bankruptcy of his economic development policies 
contributed to general unrest and to his Islamist 
troubles, which in turn generated tighter repression. As 
Qaddafi himself put it: 'those who have nothing to offer 
use force to control the masses. "" 
Finally, one might question whether Qaddafi felt 
more secure at the conclusion of a quarter-century as 
head of state than he did ten, fifteen, or twenty years 
earlier. That he had more of the accoutrements of 
security--bodyguards and armoured limousines--cannot be 
doubted, but these did not necessarily make him more 
secure. Security, after all, is as much--if not more--a 
mental construct than a measure of objective reality. 
Qaddafi, because of the nature of the political system he 
created, lived with a degree of insecurity even higher 
than that experienced by the average Libyan. The 
constant fear -of assassination, the interminable games of 
cat-and-mouse with friend and foe, and the stress of 
command took an extraordinary physical toll on the 
middle-aged Colonel. Those who knew him in his younger 
days were shocked at his rapid deterioration. 156 
Security, even when pursued rationally, remained an 
elusive quantity for the Libyan leader. 
155 SWB ME/0783/A/10,6 June 1990. 
156 Miller, 231. 
Conclusion 
What has Libya done? ... I saw that after a 
quarter of a century, all we had done was to 
establish social welfare ... we did not 
create something strategic, with the exception 
of the great man-made river. 
-- Muammar El Qaddafil 
The admission of failure by a head of state is a 
sufficiently rare event as to justify the attention of 
scholars, even when that admission is somewhat ambiguous. 
In the case of the above quote, the Libyan leader's 
language is maddeningly imprecise: what did he mean by 
declaring Libya's failure to 'create something 
strategic, ' and what--if any--responsibility did he 
assume for that failure? Intriguing though these 
questions may be, they do not make the Colonel's 
admission any less noteworthy, nor must they prevent us 
from observing that his comments--even if made in 
reference to 'strategic' economic development--could just 
as appropriately been made with reference to Libyan 
national security policy. For Libya's failure to produce 
'something strategic' certainly extended beyond mere 
deficiencies of infrastructure. A quarter of a century 
after its dramatic inception, the Libyan regime had 
manifestly failed to achieve any of its core national 
security objectives. 
1 SWB ME/1639 A/B, 17 March 1993. 
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As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, this 
failure occurred not so much because Libya was the victim 
of imperialist machinations (as the Libyan regime would 
have the world believe), but because the national 
security policies adopted by Tripoli were almost 
invariably counterproductive. This pattern of 
counterproductive behavior originated in both systemic 
and personal forces. On the one hand, the nature of the 
Libyan polity afforded its leader an inordinate degree of 
latitude in designing and implementing policies, while 
insulating him from their negative repercussions. In 
addition, the incompatibility between Libya's objectives 
and its policies was reflective of the Libyan leader's 
inability to reconcile his world view with geostrategic 
reality. 
Individually, each of the preceding chapters tested 
this thesis against one period or facet of Libyan 
national security policy. Taken in conjunction, the 
emergent picture is of a state whose security was 
routinely jeopardized, rather than enhanced, by the 
policies established in Tripoli. 
Upon seizing power in 1969, Muammar E1 Qaddafi began 
re-aligning Libyan national security policy in accordance 
with his world view. Believing Libya to be inherently 
insecure in a world dominated by larger powers (and in 
which the Arabs were divided and weakened by the 
existence of the state of Israel), Qaddafi decided to 
change the status quo. By transforming Libya into the 
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catalyst for an Arab supra-state, he hoped to transform 
the existing balance of power and thereby remedy his 
security dilemma. To that end, he allied himself with 
Nasser's Egypt, expelled U. S. and British forces from 
Libya, and re-armed Libya's military forces. In the 
Mediterranean he laid claim to the Gulf of Sirte and 
sought NATO's expulsion from Malta. 
Tripoli's Pan-Arab vocation soon ran into unexpected 
difficulties, not least of which was Anwar Sadat. 
Libya's new national security orientation had not 
anticipated, nor could it accommodate, an Egyptian leader 
determined to pursue Egypt's interests by making peace 
with Israel. Consequently, relations between Tripoli and 
Cairo steadily worsened after the October 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War. Oblivious to the possibility that Tripoli's 
disputations with Cairo were creating the very breach in 
the Arab world that Qaddafi continuously accused the 
Western powers of attempting to create, Libya brazenly 
fomented insurrection in Egypt's western province, and 
the two former allies engaged in their own brief war in 
1977. Elsewhere, Libya showed remarkable consistency in 
alienating the very states which might have ameliorated 
its strategic position. In Algeria, Tunisia, Malta, 
Niger and Sudan, prospective alliances came to naught, in 
large part because the Libyan regime was quick to employ 
subversion whenever its partners failed to meet Tripoli's 
expectations. 
Throughout the 1970's Libya engaged in a series of 
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increasingly provocative behaviors towards the Western 
powers, notably the United States and Great Britain. 
Tripoli denounced American and British foreign policy, 
forcibly challenged freedom of navigation and air travel 
in the Gulf of Sirte, rendered aid to terrorists, and 
attempted to assassinate Libyan dissidents residing in 
England and the United States. Even the relatively 
cautious Carter administration was obliged to put Libya 
on notice that such behaviors could precipitate severe 
consequences. Moreover, these behaviors did little if 
anything to advance Libya towards its goal of reducing 
America's regional influence and thereby promoting Libyan 
security. To the contrary, U. S. influence steadily 
increased and, despite Tripoli's best efforts, ultimately 
brought about peace between Egypt and Israel. 
The emerging crisis with Washington became acute 
after the advent of the Reagan administration. Faced 
with an openly hostile White House, Qaddafi engaged the 
new American President in a series of verbal and then 
military confrontations. These engagements gave the 
Libyan regime an unprecedented level of prominence in the 
international community, but they also enabled Washington 
to discredit the modernized army Libya had energetically 
assembled over the preceding decade. In addition, these 
engagements revealed that the Libyan-Soviet friendship 
was far less consequential than many--perhaps including 
the Libyan leadership--had presumed. The Kremlin clearly 
did not share Tripoli's appetite for conflict. 
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Moreover, by attempting to coerce neighboring states 
into supporting Libyan foreign policy, Tripoli ended up 
driving those states into other alliances (e. g., Egypt 
and Sudan, and Tunisia and Algeria) or deeper into 
America's embrace. Finally, Libya's use of extremist 
(e. g., the murder of WPC Fletcher) turned the country 
into a pariah state. Instead of increasing its political 
influence in the Middle East and beyond, Qaddafi's state 
became increasingly isolated. 
The end of the decade brought with it closure of a 
sort. The United Nations Security Council, acting at the 
behest of its permanent Western members, sanctioned Libya 
for its alleged role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. 
The sanctions regimen left the state's oil revenues 
intact but crimped the regime's foreign and defence 
policies. Tripoli was forced to curtail the size of its 
diplomatic missions abroad, and restrictions on air 
travel to Tripoli increased Libya's diplomatic isolation. 
Moreover, because of the prohibitions on purchasing 
additional military hardware and the loss of its foreign 
military advisors, Libya's military might--hitherto the 
focal point of the regime's security planning--began a 
steady erosion. Apart from a persistent yet dubious 
program to develop chemical and biological weapons, Libya 
ceased to pose a credible military threat to Israel, the 
NATO powers, and all but the weakest of its neighbors. 
Perhaps in no other conflict were the shortcomings 
of Libyan national security policy so etched in relief as 
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in Libya's war in Chad, a war which proved disastrous 
both in military and geopolitical terms. The 
unprecedented casualties Libya suffered in 1986 shattered 
the army's morale and revealed Libya's inability to fight 
a modern war. Not only did Qaddafi fail to achieve his 
primary war aim (annexation), he also failed to achieve 
his stated objective of securing Libya's southern border. 
Instead, he provided Libya's enemies--France, the United 
States, Egypt and Sudan--with an arena for bleeding off 
Libya's military strength, thereby limiting the regime's 
ability to project power elsewhere. In short, Libya's 
war in Chad exemplified the self-defeating nature of the 
regime's policies. 
In contrast to Libya's foreign adventures, where the 
price of failure could be high for the nation but small 
for the Libyan leader personally, internal security was 
the one area in which Qaddafi could not afford failure. 
Consequently, his internal security policies--which aimed 
to keep Qaddafi in power and to maximize his authority-- 
were rational -and efficacious. Nevertheless, security 
(even when pursued rationally) is an elusive quantity for 
a totalitarian leader. By the early 1990's, 
circumstances within Libya were forcing the regime to 
abandon its foreign adventures and focus instead upon the 
task of managing social unrest in an era of declining 
petroleum revenues. Internal security challenges, be 
they tribal, secular, or Islamist in nature, increased in 
frequency and intensity and demanded more of Qaddafi's 
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attention. 
These then were the results of Libyan national 
security policy after a quarter of a century of Muammar 
El Qaddafi's leadership: Libya cringed beneath the gaze 
of the United Nations Security Council, its diplomacy 
enervated, its military crippled, its economy ailing, its 
populace restless. Clearer evidence of the 
counterproductive consequences of Libyan national 
security policy could scarcely be imagined. Qaddafi's 
objective, after all, had been to precipitate the 
resurgence of not just Libya but of the entire Arab 
nation. Yet after a quarter century the Arab nation, as 
the Libyan leader himself admitted, was further from 
achieving that resurgence than ever. Qaddafi failed at 
his one self-anointed task in life: he did not make 
himself, his state, or the Arab nation strong. Instead 
he perpetuated, and often worsened, their condition of 
weakness. 
Having considered the nature, origins, and 
consequences of Libyan national security policy, we might 
well ask whether there is something in the Libyan 
experience which exceeds, in the words of military 
historian John Keegan, that which 'is stubbornly local 
and particular'? ' Specifically, are there lessons in the 
Libyan experience which might prove relevant to the study 
of national security policy making in other developing 
2 John Keegan, The mask of _ommanti, (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1987), 1. 
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states? 
Although this thesis has dealt at length with the 
national security policies of a single state, our purpose 
has indeed been to deal with the more fundamental issues 
which are also at stake here, issues which are relevant 
not only to other developing states but to established 
states as well. Had Libyan national security policy only 
occasionally proven counterproductive it would be of less 
theoretical significance as a case study. It is not 
self-defeating behavior, but an extensive pattern of 
self-defeating behavior which warrants further 
examination. The puzzle is to understand why a rational 
entity would repeat the same mistake again and again. As 
Qaddafi observed (in an essay cryptically directed to the 
'incapable ones'): 
The truly strange thing in your lives is that 
you not only fail, but fail to learn your 
lesson. Any effect on you is not taken 
advantage of as a useful experience, no matter 
how much you fail you never change. No matter 
how much your beliefs betray you, this is never 
accepted by you. 3 
Libya displayed an equally remarkable resistance to the 
lessons of experience, a resistance so obviously out of 
synch with the predictions of mainstream international 
relations theory as to demand a re-examination of the 
assumption that all actors are rational. 
Such an examination reveals first, that though the 
assumption of rationality may be useful for theoretical 
3 Muammar Qaddafi, "Death to the incapable ... until 
revolution, " in Escape to hell and other stur eS (New York: 
Stanke, 1998), 158. 
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purposes, there is no compelling reason apart from 
convenience to assume its applicability to the real 
world. Moreover, rationality--in its common academic 
usage--tells us remarkably little that is worth knowing. 
For example, the employment of cost-benefit analysis is 
routinely touted as evidence of rationality but is rarely 
enlightening, since the pay-off matrices are almost 
always supple enough to accommodate any decision--even 
one that directly contradicts an actor's previous 
choices. In other words, no one ever makes an irrational 
choice because irrational choices are a logical 
impossibility; rationality itself is reduced to its 
lowest common denominator, choice. 
By presenting an operational definition of 
rationality that attempts to make the concept both 
meaningful and measurable, this thesis has attempted to 
open up an avenue of inquiry which might make strategic 
studies more reflective of the real world and, 
consequently, of greater relevance to policy makers. 
Much more remains to be done. It is worth noting in this 
regard that many of the courses taught at the United 
States National Defense University (which provides post- 
graduate level training to senior American officials) are 
constructed with the belief that 'non-rational factors' 
(e. g., bureaucratic dynamics, domestic politics, and 
personalities) are at least as important in the policy- 
making process as are rational assessments of the 
national interest. This official interest in 
435 
understanding the workings of less-than-rational states 
suggests that adherents of strategic studies should be in 
the forefront of exploring the potential impact of 
irrational actors. 
Additional suggestions for further research arise 
with regards to Libya. It is conceivable that upon the 
passing of the current regime, Libya, like other closed 
societies which have been transformed in recent years, 
will undergo a liberalization that will at least 
partially open the state and its archives to foreign 
scholars. It should then be possible to write a much 
richer history of a regime many of whose internal 
deliberations remain--at the time of this writing-- 
largely beyond the purview of academic scrutiny. One can 
hope that, among other things, a more detailed 
understanding of the regime's decision-making processes 
and strategic calculus would emerge from such a history. 
Such an understanding would be of particular interest to 
students of deterrence and non-proliferation. 
Whether such a liberalization will be forthcoming in 
the near future is impossible to predict. In any event, 
one fears that the information-gleaned thereby would be 
of fleeting historical interest. If recent history is 
any indication, Libya does not, as a rule, excite great 
or prolonged attention from scholars or journalists. The 
study of Libyan society and government is therefore 
likely to remain the province of a distinct few. 
Pending such a liberalization, perhaps the most 
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fruitful lines of academic enquiry suggested by this 
thesis pertain not to Libya but to an intellectual 
problem that has more often than not been circumambulated 
by the pretense that all actors are rational: how does 
one cope with an irrational actor? 
This is not just an intellectual problem but, in the 
context of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, a substantial policy dilemma for developed 
and developing states alike. For those who must plan for 
the worst contingencies, the admission of irrationality 
is at once terrifying and morally perplexing. Should, as 
Locke suggests, those who have removed themselves from 
the 'commonlaw of reason' be treated as beasts of prey, 
who may be killed before they actually attack? 4 In other 
words, is pre-emption a legitimate or desirable course of 
action when confronting an irrational proliferant? 
The findings of this thesis would suggest not. If 
irrationality is more often an indulgence made possible 
by the lack of accountability mechanisms than an innate 
mental defect, it follows that irrational actors are not 
necessarily undeterrable. A cursory reading of Iraqi 
history, for example, would suggest that Saddam Hussein 
may fall into the category of actors whose behavior is at 
times counterproductive (and therefore irrational by our 
standards), but who are nevertheless deterrable--at 
times, eminently so. Further enquiry into the problems 
4 John Locke, Second treatise of government, originally 
published 1690, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1980): 14. 
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of coping with irrational proliferants would therefore be 
useful. 
Conclusion 
Because its meaning is a question of perception as 
well as of objective reality, security is an inescapably 
amorphous concept. Disagreements between reasonable 
people as to whether, and to what degree, a given state 
is secure are frequent and frequently vigorous. So too, 
are debates over how best to procure security. 
Third World states, we noted earlier, are generally 
obliged by circumstance to pursue security within 
narrower economic and politico-military parameters than 
are developed states. But circumstance alone is not 
determinative. To the ruling elite belongs the 
prerogative of defining a nation's security interests, of 
establishing security objectives, and of devising and 
implementing policies to reach those objectives. Thus, 
whether a state pursues security through economic growth 
or militarization, through alliances or non-alignment, 
through eschewing conflict or provoking the same, the 
quality of a state's leadership in its national security 
affairs will be critical--and perhaps decisive--in 
determining the ultimate outcome of that pursuit. 
Lamentably, many developing states have adopted the 
highly centralized, authoritarian leadership structures 
so conducive to irrational leadership. Such states are 
perhaps least able to bear the costs incurred by leaders 
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who themselves remain insulated from the suffering 
occasioned by their policies. Yet no state is 
invulnerable to the risks created by irrational leaders, 
and in an era of instantaneous communication and also 
instantaneous destruction, none of us are immune to the 
consequences. 
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